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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards, December 18
IAEA Staff ReportStaff Report from the International Atomic Energy Agency, December 18, 2003. On 18 December 2003, Ambassador Salehi of Iran and the Director General of the IAEA signed an Additional Protocol to Iran's NPT safeguards agreement, granting Agency inspectors greater authority in verifying the country's nuclear programme. Iran has stated that it is acting in accordance with the Protocol's provisions, pending the Protocol's formal entry into force. The Additional Protocol requires States to provide an expanded declaration of their nuclear activities and grants the Agency broader rights of access to sites in the country. Since February 2003, the IAEA has been heavily engaged in the verification of the Iranian programme and its history. As IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the Agency's Board in November 2003, the IAEA's ability to reach a conclusion on the nature of Iran's nuclear programme and the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration of its nuclear activities will very much depend on the Agency being allowed by Iran to implement in full the verification measures provided for in the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol that Iran has now concluded with the IAEA - and on Iran's pursuing a policy of full transparency and co-operation. In his report to the Board at that time, Dr. ElBaradei stated that "Iran has committed itself to a policy of full disclosure and has decided, as a confidence building measure, not only to sign the Additional Protocol, making way for more robust and comprehensive inspections, but also to take the important step of suspending all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and to accept IAEA verification of this suspension. These are positive and welcome steps which I very much hope will be sustained." The Director General is scheduled to provide his next report, on the implementation of Agency safeguards in Iran, to the IAEA Board of Governors in February 2004, prior to the Board's next meeting in March. Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org. 'It's a useful step', State Department Spokesperson Richard Boucher, December 18'U.S. Cautiously Welcomes Iran's Signing of IAEA Protocol', State's Boucher urges Iranian implementation of promises, December 18, 2003. QUESTION: Mr. Brill thought this was a step in the right direction that Iran had taken by agreeing to unfettered international inspection. Others might focus on what they actually do to implement this promise. What is the State Department's view of this? Is this a monumental concession by Iran? MR. BOUCHER: I wouldn't use words like "monumental." I would agree with Ambassador Brill, as he said, that it's a useful step. It's welcome that Iran has made this commitment, but what's important to remember is that it is only a first step. Iran needs to bring this into force, needs to ratify the additional protocol that is now signed. And above all, it needs to implement the programs that they've agreed to. For the part of the IAEA, they need to ensure that there is rigorous verification of the protocol's implementation because Iran does have a history of deception in this area, as demonstrated by the information the IAEA has been able to report over the past several months. So we look to Iran to implement this, to carry out its promises in signing the protocol, and also to keep its promises to give full cooperation and transparency to the International Atomic Energy Agency's ongoing investigation into Iran's nuclear activities; and furthermore, to suspend all enrichment-related reprocessing activity as the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors has insisted. Fundamentally, for the international community to have full confidence in Iran's nuclear program, they're going to need to abandon enrichment and reprocessing, and they're going to need to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Agency in allowing everything that the protocol provides for and in answering all the questions they've been asked. QUESTION: I think you're saying, at least that you hope, but do you expect that inspection will get to enrichment, which is I guess, now, the primary concern? You can go ahead with a nuclear program, a country can, and be part of the NPT. I mean, but anyhow -- do you -- are you confident -- is the U.S. confident that the enrichment program will be supervised now? And are you setting aside, at least for now, any threat of sanctions? Are you satisfied you've seen enough to, you know, sidetrack that for a bit? MR. BOUCHER: We have agreed with other members of the Board of Governors that we will continue to watch this program very closely to make sure that Iran does implement all its promises. The signature alone doesn't implement the promises, it doesn't suspend the enrichment program, and it doesn't fully satisfy the international community that Iran is not going to carry out activities relating to nuclear weapons. So it's, as I said, a useful step that they've signed, but actual implementation and then verification are the important steps now. QUESTION: And sanctions is -- MR. BOUCHER: We've kept this under advisement, together with other members of the Board of Governors. I can't remember exactly what the time delay was on the -- the time limit on the last decision, but there are meetings coming up in the new year where the Board of Governors will keep looking at Iran's actions to see not only whether they've signed, but whether they've allowed the inspections, whether they've answered the questions, whether they've suspended the programs and carried out all the other promises that they have been making. QUESTION: Richard, is there any chance in exploring with the United Nations and other groups the possibility of implementing a similar type program that you've just spoken about Iraq with Iranian scientists, and also, perhaps, with Hans Blix and Mr. ElBaradei? MR. BOUCHER: I've not heard any discussion about it at this point. QUESTION: Richard, do you have any expectations on how long it may take Iran to ratify the additional protocol? Have they given any indications to the IAEA about when that may happen? MR. BOUCHER: Not that I'm aware of, but you'd have to ask the Iranians about that. I've seen, I think, some quotes today from Iranians in Vienna, but didn't contain that information. Source: US State Department, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov. 'We welcome this responsible step of the Iranian leadership', Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Yakovenko, December 18'Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Wake of the Signing by Iran of an Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the NPT,' December 18, 2003. On December 18, in Vienna, Iranian International Atomic Energy Agency representative Ali Akbar Salehi and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei signed an Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We welcome this responsible step of the Iranian leadership attesting to the disposition of Teheran to consistently follow the path of ensuring the full transparency of its nuclear program. The signing of the Additional Protocol and the immediate commencement of the application of its provisions in practice will enable the Agency, on a larger scale and in an effective way, to carry out its monitoring activities in order to check Iran's observance of its obligations in the field of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and must contribute to the speediest clarification of all the remaining questions to Teheran. Russia had consistently insisted on the signing of the Additional Protocol and the strengthening on this basis of cooperation by Iran with the IAEA. We highly appreciate the Agency's role in performing its monitoring functions in Iran on the basis of objectivity and impartiality and without bringing any unnecessary elements of politicization in this work. We expect cooperation between Iran and the IAEA to continue to be strengthened. Source: Russian Embassy to the United States, http://www.russianembassy.org. '[M]uch remains to be done, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw MP, December 18'Foreign Secretary welcomes Iran's Signature of the Additional Protocol,' December 18, 2003. 'I welcome the news that Iran has today signed the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. This is an important step towards rebuilding international confidence in Iranian intentions regarding its nuclear programme.' 'Iran has already said that she will act as though bound by the Additional Protocol. I welcome the access already being granted to IAEA inspectors.' 'But much remains to be done. It is now important for her to ratify the Protocol as soon as possible, in order to give the international community the assurances it requires. And, as required by the IAEA, we need to see complete and verified suspension of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing activities.' Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |