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'Iran's Nuclear Policy Requires A Collective Response', EU3 Oped in the Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2005

Iran's Nuclear Policy Requires A Collective Response

By Philippe Douste-Blazy, Joschka Fischer, Javier Solana and Jack Straw

Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2005

The bedrock of global efforts to establish a credible system for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). More states have signed this Treaty than any other. Full compliance is essential for international security and the effectiveness of the multilateral system.

Two-and-a-half years ago, Iran was forced to admit to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it was building secret installations to enrich uranium and to produce plutonium, which could be used to produce material for such weapons. It was and still is building ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads. Iran appeared to be challenging the non-proliferation system. Subsequent investigations showed that, in the IAEA's words, "Iran's policy of concealment … resulted in many breaches of its obligations." They gave rise to serious concern that Iran's nuclear program may not, as it claims, be for solely peaceful purposes. Under the IAEA's rules, Iran should have been reported to the U.N. Security Council two years ago.

The stakes were high then and they still are. If the process succeeds, the non-proliferation system will emerge with its authority enhanced. But if Iran continues on its path, Central Asia and the Middle East, the world's most volatile areas, may well be destabilized. Other states would be likely to enhance their own capabilities. The NPT will be badly damaged, as will the goal of creating a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, a cause to which we are committed. This helps explain the wide support we have.

Last month, Iran decided to defy the international community by restarting uranium conversion at its plant in Isfahan, a unilateral step halting our talks. Iran claims it is doing no more than enjoying its right to make peaceful use of nuclear technology, in accordance with the NPT. Iran wants to paint this as a dispute between the developed and developing world.

These arguments do not stand up. No one is trying to stop Iran from generating electricity by nuclear power. We do not question Iran's -- or any country's -- rights under the NPT. This is why, in August, we offered Iran, as part of a long-term agreement, support for its civil nuclear program. But with NPT rights go very clear obligations, and there are serious grounds for concern that Iran's nuclear ambitions may not be exclusively peaceful.

For nearly two decades Iran hid enrichment-related and reprocessing activities which, if successful, would enable it to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Only since 2002, as the extent of its undeclared activities was uncovered, has Iran admitted to them, and then only under the pressure of IAEA investigations. Iran initially denied having enriched any nuclear material, but was found to have done so using two separate processes. Iran also claimed it had no outside help for its centrifuge enrichment program. But it was found to have worked with the same secret network that helped Libya and North Korea develop clandestine nuclear weapons programs.

There is no economic logic to the facilities at the center of the dispute -- at Isfahan and Natanz -- if they are, as Iran claims, solely to produce fuel for nuclear reactors. Iran does not have any nuclear power station in which the fuel it says it wants to produce could be used. It has only one under construction, for which Russia is contracted to supply fuel for 10 years and has offered to supply fuel for the lifetime of the reactor, which can only work safely with Russian fuel. Iran has no license to make the fuel itself, nor is there any economic rationale. We have offered to work with Iran so it has assurances of supply in the event of a procurement problem. Thirty-one countries have nuclear power reactors -- the great majority without developing a fuel-cycle industry, demonstrating that this capability is not critical to a civil nuclear industry.

We have pursued talks in good faith. But as well as breaking the Paris Agreement by resuming suspended activities, Iran rejected, without any serious consideration, detailed proposals for a longterm agreement that we presented last month. These were the most far-reaching ideas for relations between Iran and Europe presented since the 1979 Iranian revolution and would provide the foundation for a new relationship based on cooperation.

At the U.N. last week, we publicly and privately restated our willingness to work with Iran in political, economic, scientific and technological areas, and our readiness to explore ways to continue negotiations. We went out of our way to avoid public comment which might raise tensions, despite Iran's breach of the Paris Agreement. But in his speech to the General Assembly on Sept. 17, President Ahmedinejad gave no hint of flexibility, talking of a "nuclear apartheid" and insisting that Iran would exercise its right to develop fuel cycle technology, regardless of the concerns of the international community.

The spotlight is now on the IAEA Board of Governors to respond. IAEA head Mohammed ElBaradei's latest report concludes that "after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation, Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue." The proliferation risks if Iran continues on its current path are very great. We hope all members of the international community will remain united. Collectively, we are responsible for meeting the challenge.

The authors are, respectively, the foreign ministers for France and Germany, the EU High Representative, and Britain's foreign secretary

Source: Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com.