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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
March 11, 2005
INTERVIEW
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
With Washington Times Editorial Board
March 11, 2005
Washington, D.C.
Rice: ...I'll be talking in a little while about Iran and the decision to back the diplomacy of the EU-3. But if you think about it, Iran wasn't even on the agenda as a nuclear issue until the President put that on the agenda with the "axis of evil" speech. And now, slowly but surely, you have the international community uniting around the idea that the Iranians cannot have a nuclear weapon, that indeed there are suspicious activities that need to be dealt with. And we, for our part, have decided to more actively back those diplomatic efforts of the EU-3 by removing our objections to spare parts and to WTO application -- and I want to emphasize application -- by the Iranians, because it exposes where the problem is. If the Iranians can't come to agreement with the Europeans, it exposes what all of us suspect, which is that the Iranians don't want to come to agreement. So it puts the spotlight back on the Iranians, not on, well, what is the United States willing to do or why aren't you supporting the diplomacy and so forth...
QUESTION: I wonder if you could elaborate just a bit more on the Iranian decision to cooperate with the Europeans on the Iranian initiative.
SECRETARY RICE: Sure. When I went to Europe the first time, as opposed to the other two times I've been since, but the first time, it was very clear that the Iranians had succeeded in making the discussion about the United States and, in effect, sowing division between the United States and Europe so that it almost appeared that Europe was mediating between the United States and Iran. And in talking to our European allies, this didn't make sense because nobody wants the Iranians to get a nuclear weapon. It's the Iranians that are isolated, not the United States. How had we maneuvered into a position or gotten maneuvered into a position in which we were the problem?
So I came back, I talked to the President about it. He immediately saw this issue. And when he was in Europe he talked to his counterparts and basically said there are a couple things I need to know. Do you intend to -- do you believe that Iran has to be prevented from getting a nuclear weapon? Yes. Are you prepared to do tough things to make sure that they don't get a nuclear weapon? Yes. Because there is always chatter around, you know, well, how seriously did the Europeans take it. It was absolutely clear that they, too, understood how destabilizing it would be if Iran were to get a nuclear weapon and that they were suspicious of the Iranians.
Similarly, in his discussion with President Putin, where they were about to sign an agreement on civilian nuclear power cooperation with Iran, it was also clear that the Russians were determined to have certain antiproliferation measures with the Iranians, like a fuel take-back and so forth.
So, given all of that, we came back, the President met with his advisors, and when I went back to Europe I went back to see if we could then forge a common approach in which the Europeans would be somewhat clearer about their views of the Iranian problem and that there would be consequences and we would support the European diplomacy so that we had now a common approach, and so forging that common approach has been the business of the last ten days or so. And you may have seen that the Europeans sent a letter to their foreign minister colleagues that lays out their policy, and we will a little later today support them.
QUESTION: What specifically are the carrots that will be offered?
SECRETARY RICE: Again, the way that I would think about this, and I think we want to talk about it in a very specific way, which is we are removing our objection to some of the incentives that the Europeans would like to provide to have the Iranians -- to see whether the Iranians are really serious about this. The Europeans have given the Iranians a way out. They have given them -- or a way to comply. Let me put it that way. They've said a whole host of things to them. You know, you could have a better life with the world, you could have trade relations, but you cannot have a nuclear weapon and, given the history, you have to be able to demonstrate that you're not trying to develop a nuclear weapon.
The two that we would agree to remove our objection is an application to the WTO by the Iranians -- and let me just emphasize an application because obviously there's a long process for WTO accession -- and we would remove our objection, which mean we would be willing to license certain spare parts for Iranian commercial aircraft. They have mostly Boeing aircraft. In some ways it's almost a humanitarian thing, there is a safety concern here, and so we had considered doing this at one other point in time during the time of the earthquake.
QUESTION: Let me just follow upon that for a second. I appreciate the logic of why we're moving where we are on Iran. But the President, in his State of the Union Address, put down two unconditional conditions: one, no nuclear weapons, and; two, stop the terrorism. This deals only, as I understand it, with the nuclear weapons, but --
SECRETARY RICE: No. In fact, I'm glad you mentioned it because I should have. The other thing that we said to the Europeans is that we want in the letter that Iran's terrorism activities, particularly against the Palestinians but in general, have to be addressed and that the human rights circumstances in Iran have to be addressed. So those are both also on the table.
QUESTION: What is the benchmark, though, that you know that they are actually doing that? I mean, it's easy to say, okay, we won't support terrorism anymore, but, I mean, how do you measure that?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, this is going to be a long struggle with the Iranians, who are about as entangled in terrorist activity as you can possibly be. I can't give you an answer to what is the benchmark because it's a little bit -- you know, I'm an old deterrence expert. You know it when you -- is it working? Well, yes, because you haven't had a -- nobody has set off a nuclear weapon.
In this case, I think you would hope to see a diminution of funding for training of activity by terrorist organizations that we know Iran supports. But it's going to take time.
We have a chance to make a very concerted effort in this regard because the other thing that we've been saying around Europe is we can't have it both ways. You say you want peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and you then, they have to talk very tough to the states that are supporting the Palestinian rejectionists who would literally blow up the chances for an Israeli-Palestinian peace. In the context of movement on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, I think we've actually got more weight with others than we might otherwise have.
QUESTION: What about if I can ask about U.S.-Iranian relations? You say it's only an application, but why apply if there is no prospect of joining the WTO? And if I just can add to that, you haven't had diplomatic relations with Iran since 1979 and your friends the Europeans, including the British, do have those relations. Are you promising Iran any warming up towards them in this effort?
SECRETARY RICE: No. And, in fact, that goes back to what Tony mentioned. We have a lot of issue with Iran. It's not just the nuclear issue. Our challenge is to continue to speak to the aspirations of the Iranian people even as we deal with near-term issues like the Iranian nuclear program. And the president is determined to do that, determined not to lose the emphasis on the rights and the aspirations of all people, including the Iranian people, to live in freedom.
If you think about it, certain of the things that are going on in the region have created a different strategic context for Iran. They have a new neighbor in Afghanistan and they have a new neighbor in Iraq. They have a neighbor in Iraq that has the potential of having a Shia majority government that is not theocratic and that respects all people and that votes and pretty soon I would think Iranians would ask, well, why can that not be the case here? It must have seemed odd to Iranians that Afghan refugees voted in Iran for a free Afghan Government and Iraqi refugees in Iran voted in Iran for a free Iraqi Government, but Iranians can't vote in a free election in Iran.
So Iran is not going to be immune, I think, from the changing context around them and that's why we don't want to do anything that legitimizes this government -- the mullahs -- in a direct way. And so there isn't any indication here of "warming of relations."
QUESTION: There is an election in Iran for president in June.
SECRETARY RICE: There is.
QUESTION: Do you think that this election could be fair and represent the will of the people?
SECRETARY RICE: I think that given the role that elections have played around the world recently, we ought to make the case that it ought to be. It's very difficult for me to see how, in the current Iranian circumstances, that could happen...
QUESTION: Fascinating. Your new approach to Iran that you're now announcing today is pretty much what some of your Asian allies are recommending towards North Korea, where up till now there's been no consideration of any kind of incentives for North Korea before they decide.
Would you consider a similar approach with North Korea as well?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, North Korea is a little bit different -- a lot different -- because we have some experience from 1994 which, with what happens when you get the incentives too far out ahead of the actions by the North Koreans. And what they did was they took the carrots and never lived up to their obligations, in fact, started breaking their obligations.
We have said to the North Koreans, the last proposal the United States and the other members of the six-party talks made at the last round of the six-party talks said to the North Koreans, all right, if you're prepared to the make a strategic choice then you could have multilateral security guarantees, you could have work done on how to meet your energy needs, and almost parallel to what we've said, we said we would not interfere with what others might want to do in terms of some energy fuel supply and so forth.
So, there are things out there that show the North Koreans that there is a different path available to them than the path they're currently on, which is a path of confrontation. Thus far, nobody has been able to convince them that this is a good idea. But I think you would want to be careful with the North Koreans on frontloading incentives because we know that story. We know how that worked out last time.
QUESTION: They're currently saying that they won't return to the six-party talks until you personally apologize for calling them an "outpost of tyranny." Will you apologize?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I don't think there's any doubt that, you know, I spoke the truth. And I know they want us -- one apologizes for speaking of the truth, you know. It's sad with the North Korean people. You read these stories, you know, of people eating bark and the starvation there, and sure, the United States has tried to do its part.
But again, yes, we need to solve the near-term problem of the North Korean nuclear program, but we can't do it at the expense of being afraid to speak out about what is actually going on in North Korea.
QUESTION: A few of us at this table have been there and I think that it's even worse than what you hear.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah.
QUESTION: Let me ask -- I want to ask you something about South Korea.
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: We had an article in the paper the other day -- pardon me for having to read this. There was a quote on -- an analyst said, "South Korea is fast approaching a critical decision whether to revive its troubled alliance with the United States or dissolve their joint security agreement, expel U.S. forces from the peninsula, and seek an alliance with China."
Would you agree with that assessment and, by extension, what is the state of the U.S.-South Korean relations?
SECRETARY RICE: Thank you. Given all that we've been doing with the South Koreans and every conversation I've had with the South Koreans, it's inconceivable to me. The South Korean relationship is probably as strong as it's ever been -- with a democratic South Korea -- and of course, it's a democracy now so there are people who question whether this is right, if the relationship is right or whether it's wrong. That's a democratic society.
But I'd just remind people, the South Koreans are in Iraq with us. And they said they went to Iraq. You ask, do the South Koreans have a near-term or a near-geographic interest in what happens in Iraq? No. They are in Iraq because they believe that that's what allies do. When the United States believes that it's got a security concern, then allies help. So I would cite that as a counter to what's said there.
QUESTION: Can I ask about China and what's going on in Asia? You're getting ready to go to the region there. I've been working on an article about the rise of China and, you know, it used to be maybe five years ago that experts would certainly talk about a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan as a million-man swim. Unfortunately, the trends are not good and there's a lot of people very worried about the Taiwan Strait. The CIA Director last month said that the military balance is shifting in favor of Beijing and they've just passed the anti-secession law. It seems to me that that is probably going to be the biggest flashpoint, has been, and will remain so.
How are you going to deal with that as Secretary of State in the sense of trying to manage the rise of China?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, China is clearly a rising influence -- I mean, there is no doubt about that -- economically, politically, in terms of its sort of global interests. We have Chinese police in Haiti, which, by the way, is a good thing to have them there because we need the police.
But it has to be managed a couple of ways. First of all, it's very important to be clear about American policies and American interests in the region and that means being very clear about policy, for instance, on Taiwan, where we've had and continue to have a "one China" policy where we are the kind of upright anchor, where we don't expect either side to try to exploit the situation or to provoke the other side, where we've been very clear to the Chinese that we have obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.
And therefore, when I went to China, I said, you know, the arms sales are a matter of record and we've already agreed to do that. You know, we'll see when Taiwan is capable of actually paying for them, but we are, in fact -- I've said that clearly. So the first thing is to be clear about what our policy is.
The second is to be active in making certain that our alliances in the region are as strong as possible. That means with South Korea and I think we've actually strengthened that alliance by what Don Rumsfeld and his folks worked out by removing those 12,000 forces from South Korea, but modernizing the forces, getting out of the area around Seoul, which had been an irritant to the South Korean people. I think that alliance is in better shape now than it's been in a long -- maybe ever. And with Japan, we just had this remarkable meeting with -- Don and I met with the Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs, where we really had a much more articulated, coherent strategy for the United States and Japan together in the region.
The third element -- so the first is be clear about your policies, the second is strengthen your alliances. The third is that you have to recognize that China is going to be an influence and so to try to steer that influence into positive directions, not negative ones. We were proponents of Chinese accession to the WTO because in a rules-based system it's better to have a big economy in a rules-based system than not. But that means on something like intellectual property rights, that my now-Deputy, but then-USTR, Bob Zoellick, was just constant about the problem that the Chinese were causing on intellectual property rights. The President is determined to have a level playing field.
But it's a positive place for China to exercise influence through the WTO. When we go to regional fora we're pretty clear that regional fora that ought to be held are ones in which we are also an actor, not just China. So we have a lot of levers to deal with this and, of course, the American military is going to keep modernizing so that the Chinese should never get the idea that they're going to be able to have a unilateral advantage somehow in the Asia-Pacific region.
QUESTION: Just to follow up, this is kind of an al-Qaida question, but, you know, we haven't been attacked since 9/11 in a major way and that is leading some people in the government to begin to think "Well, maybe the back is broken on al-Qaida." Do you have any sense of --
SECRETARY RICE: I am never going to underestimate al-Qaida, never. I think that we've hurt them, clearly, and we've taken away a lot of their territory. They can't operate in Afghanistan with -- certainly within impunity, maybe in little, small groups, but they can't operate in Afghanistan. They can not operate in Pakistan the way they once did. They can't operate in Saudi Arabia the way that they once did. So we've hurt them and we've taken down a lot of their key leadership, and we have hurt them in terms of their financing.
But as I said when I testified before the 9/11 Commission, the problem is that we have to be right 100 percent of the time and they only have to be right once. And that's a kind of unfair fight and it's why, as much as we need to do in terms of homeland security, we really have to stay on the offense and keep taking away their territory and keep taking away their allies and making it harder for them.
QUESTION: Was John Bolton your first choice to be UN Ambassador?
SECRETARY RICE: John Bolton was my first choice to be UN Ambassador.
QUESTION: Why?
SECRETARY RICE: Because -- first of all, because I happen to work well with John. We worked together on the PSI, we worked together on global partnership, on nuclear security. And because I think John is a straightforward, tough-talking, very good diplomat and I think that's what you need at the United Nations.
He also has spent a lot of time thinking about the United Nations, about how it might change, about how -- what American leadership means to it. He was the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations in George H.W. Bush's administration. And we're going to have some difficult times ahead in figuring out how to help the UN remain relevant for the 21st century and how to deal with issues of reform.
You've got the whole UN operation saying it needs reform. And to have somebody who has thought about these issues, who is critical of many things about the UN about which, frankly, it's right to be critical, to go and lead that effort is very important. And I've told John he's going to be a fully integrated part of the team. I expect to see him often. I expect him to be back in Washington often for those discussions. It's not an outpost in New York. It's an extremely important instrument of American policy. I think he's going to be very good...
Source: US Department of State, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov.
© 2003 The Acronym Institute.