Disarmament Documentation

'[R]obust verification by the Agency, combined with active dialogue' IAEA Director General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei on Iran, November 24, 2005

Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Board of Governors, November 24, 2005 [excerpts].

See also: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2005/87, November 18, 2005, Derestricted November 24, 2005.

Implementation of Safeguards in the DPRK
As I have noted before, the Agency has not performed any verification activities in the Democratic People´s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since December 2002. Therefore, we cannot provide any assurance about DPRK´s nuclear activities since that time. We continue to follow with interest the six-party talks, which aim to achieve a comprehensive settlement on the Korean Peninsula. I hope that these efforts will, inter alia, lead to the return of the DPRK to the non-proliferation regime, and that the Agency will be given the authority required to provide credible, comprehensive assurances regarding the nuclear programme in the DPRK. The Secretariat and I stand ready to contribute to that process.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
The report before you provides an update on the implementation of Agency safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As the report makes clear, the Agency is continuing with its effort to clarify the nature and extent of Iran´s nuclear programme. Iran has provided additional documentation, permitted interviews with relevant individuals, and allowed further access.

I welcome these actions on the part of Iran. The Agency is currently assessing the results of this additional information. However, I urge Iran to respond positively and without delay to the Agency´s remaining questions related to uranium enrichment, and to the additional transparency measures we have requested. As I have stated before, these transparency measures are indispensable for the Agency to be able to clarify remaining outstanding issues - in particular, the scope and chronology of Iran´s centrifuge enrichment programme. Clarification of these issues is overdue, after three years of intensive verification efforts.

The Agency will continue its investigation of these and other issues in order to be in a position to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of the programme. I will continue to report to the Board, as appropriate.

The Agency continues to monitor installations related to Iran´s enrichment programmes, and has not observed any deviation from Iran´s voluntary suspension of enrichment activities. Iran has continued to conduct uranium conversion activities at its Esfahan facility. The Agency has been verifying this activity, and all UF6 produced so far at this facility remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

I do hope also that, in parallel, every effort will be made so that the dialogue between Iran and all concerned parties can be resumed, with a view to achieving a comprehensive solution that addresses, inter alia, both Iran´s concerns about its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the concerns of the international community about the peaceful nature of these activities. I still believe that robust verification by the Agency, combined with active dialogue among all concerned parties, is the best way to move forward.

Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification
The Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification held its first meeting earlier this month. The Secretariat presented to the Committee the areas in which, from our perspective, the safeguards system could be strengthened. I hope that the Committee, in time, will be able to consider all ways and means to strengthen the system, and will be in a position to recommend concrete measures to the Board.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org.

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