Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

BWC Protocol Bulletin, July 25, 2001

By Jenni Rissanen

United States Rejects Protocol

On July 25, two days after the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of states parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) opened its 25th and final session, the United States announced its rejection not only of the current draft Protocol aimed at strengthening the accord, but also of further efforts to negotiate such an agreement. This double rejection deals a severe blow to efforts, underway for over six years, to strengthen the Convention.

Ambassador Donald Mahley, the head of the US delegation, opened by stating that "no nation" was more committed to combating the biological weapons threat than the United States. This was a hollow boast in view of what Mahley then proceeded to announce: the United States had completed its review both of the Protocol text and the current and emerging threat from biological weapons and concluded that "the current approach to a Protocol" was not "capable of strengthening confidence in compliance with the Convention. It would not improve the ability to verify compliance and would "do little" to deter countries seeking biological weapons.

In what some characterised as "shutting the door" on further efforts to negotiate and conclude a Protocol, Mahley concluded that the United States would not support the Chair's 'composite text' - his compromise proposal on how the final product should look alike - "even with changes, as an appropriate outcome of the Ad Hoc Group efforts". Instead of a Protocol, the United States would "develop other ideas and different approaches that-could help to achieve our common objective of effectively strengthening the [BWC]". Mahley shed no light on what kind of measures his country envisaged, saying only that the US would be exploring them in "the next coming months". He then made an attempt to pre-empt the likely criticism that the United States was 'going-it-alone' with unilateralist approaches when it comes to multilateral instruments on weapons of mass destruction. Mahley tried to assure that the United States stood by "all multilateral arms control, non-proliferation and export control regimes currently in force", naming the Australia Group - criticised by a large number of developing countries as a discriminatory arrangement, and a bone of contention in these negotiations - as one example among others.

Mahley detailed some of the reasons why the United States had come to its decision. These, he felt, were not new or surprising. He argued that the Protocol draft could not achieve the objective of covering illicit activity: there was no "great promise of providing useful, accurate and complete information to the international community". And trying to "do more" with regard to the mechanisms would only "raise the risk to legitimate [US] activities". Nor could the Protocol deter or complicate a "rogue" state's ability to conduct illicit activities. Furthermore, Mahley argued, there was an "inherent flaw" in the approach to bio-defence: there was not sufficient protection of "sensitive legitimate acts". As for regular on-site activities - 'transparency visits' - they risked "damage" to innocent declared facilities, putting national security and commercial propriety information "at risk". The United States could not agree to subject itself to such risks when there was "no corresponding benefit in impeding proliferation efforts around the globe".

Mahley also addressed the most controversial topic in these negotiations, export controls. He underlined that the BWC was "a disarmament, not a trade treaty". Rather than identifying any 'inherent flaws' in the draft text itself, Mahley focused on criticising other participants' demands, particularly calls to abolish existing export control arrangements such as the Australia Group. Finally, Mahley claimed that some AHG delegations were seeking "disturbing" outcomes. He referred to attempts to "fix" the meaning of the Convention's terms - a reference to Russia's interest in definitions - as well as to investigations of disease outbreaks that the United States felt were too restrictive.

In concluding his ten-page rejection statement, Mahley tried to assure delegations that the United States "understands and appreciates" the effort and compromises put into the Protocol process. The United States had looked in "for a set of specific changes that could alter our fundamental conclusions", but had found that this effort would not yield an outcome to which it could agree. Finally, Mahley rejected the argument that not having a Protocol would weaken the Convention, saying that his country remained committed to the search for ways to strengthen the regime.

Although there was a great sense of disappointment in the room after the US statement, there were no immediate reactions from the floor. Canada, Cuba, Japan and South Africa commented on the US decisions a few hours later. Japan felt "obliged to express disappointment", while Canada "regretted" the move. Canada reaffirmed its full commitment to the Protocol process, whereas Japan, urging everyone involved to act in a "calm" and "business-like" manner, said it needed a few days to reflect on the new situation. Describing US participation as "imperative", Japan wondered how the AHG could accommodate the US withdrawal. South Africa joined Canada and Japan in expressing its regret, stressing that it remained committed to the endeavour and was ready to work through and beyond the 25th session in order to conclude the task. Cuba's reaction was harsher, arguing that the rest of the world was being held hostage to the "hegemonic" interests of the United States. It also said that the US bio-defense programs constituted "a source of concern" to it. Further statements - in particular, from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the European Union (EU) - are expected shortly.

The US decision did not come as a shock to anyone in the AHG. Press reports over the last two months had given a strong indication of what was to come. However, many were surprised by the bluntness and severity of the US message, and by the fact that its rejection encompassed not only the Chair's composite text but also the process of striving for any legally-binding Protocol.

Official confirmation of Washington's stance has now changed the situation dramatically, creating at least a mental pause in the final session of the AHG. It is likely that delegations will need a few days to consult their capitals and convene their groups before any firm strategic and tactical conclusions are drawn as how to proceed. Prior to the US statement, some fifty countries, nearly all of the AHG, had shown support for concluding the negotiations on the basis of the composite text. With the situation now transformed, it is unlikely that such 'like-mindedness' can be recreated again. There are signs already that countries will differ greatly when it comes to taking next steps.

Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's analyst monitoring the BWC AHG Protocol negotiations in Geneva.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.