 Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 87, Spring 2008
Bucharest Summit: US Missile Defence Bases Continue to Divide
NATO
Nicola Butler and Martin Butcher
Missile defence and deteriorating relations with Russia were
amongst the toughest issues for the 26 governments in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) when they met April 2-4, 2008
in Bucharest. The Alliance, which is currently struggling to fulfil
its mission in Afghanistan, faces divisions at home over President
George W. Bush's plans to extend the US Ballistic Missile Defence
(BMD) system into Europe.
The Bush administration wants to site at least 10 ballistic
missile interceptor silos and missiles in Poland, and a missile
defence radar in a military training area at Brdy, south-west of
Prague in the Czech Republic to provide missile tracking and
targeting information. This will supplement data from the upgraded
X-band radar facility at Fylingdales and the US National Security
Agency (NSA) Menwith Hill listening base, both in Yorkshire,
England.
The Pentagon had hoped that work on the two Eastern European
facilities could begin during 2008, becoming operational in 2013.
However, opposition in the US Congress to extending existing
strategic missile defences before they are proven to work,
sharpened by an awareness of European concerns, has prevented an
immediate go-ahead.
The Bush administration's plans are highly controversial within
NATO, and are a major exacerbating factor in deteriorating
relations with Russia. Though the US adamantly claims that the
bases in Eastern Europe are to provide missile defences in the
event of an attack from countries in the Middle East, such as Iran,
Russia has objected to having US bases so close to its borders. As
the US makes Poland an offer that, to coin a phrase, the new Polish
government can't refuse, there are concerns that well before any
system is capable of being deployed, US missile defence plans are
damaging European cohesion and security, bringing NATO-Russia
relations to their lowest point since the end of the cold war.
Even in the UK, where Prime Minister Gordon Brown appears to be
emulating his predecessor, Tony Blair, who enthusiastically
supported the US BMD project, opposition continues to grow, amid
accusations that the government had been less than transparent in
its handling of the decision over Menwith Hill.
In an unusually frank revelation of the deep divisions besetting
NATO's relations with Russia, the Chair's Statement on the
NATO-Russia Council meeting held in Brussels in December 2007
acknowledged "serious disagreements on the CFE Treaty, Kosovo's
final status, as well as missile defence related matters".[1]
Selling BMD in Europe
Faced with growing opposition within NATO, the Bush
administration has spent the last few months talking up the missile
defence programme to its allies. Speaking in Brussels in October,
US Permanent Representative to NATO, Victoria Nuland, highlighted
missile defence as key to strengthening "NATO in our homelands" -
one of four US objectives for the forthcoming Bucharest Summit.[2] In a keynote speech in Riga,
her Deputy, Richard Olson, said that the next step was to "develop
a plan for complementarity" to "bolt together" NATO's theatre
missile defence programmes with the US system.[3]
In November, 45 NATO delegates and selected media
representatives were taken to Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California for a briefing and tour of the Missile Defense Agency's
(MDA) Ground-based Missile Defense facilities. A NATO
representative was quoted as saying, "There is some concern as to
the necessity of these missiles in Europe... This is a great
opportunity for the US to show the European delegates and the
citizens of their countries how the programme is run here and give
them a better idea of what to expect in the Czech Republic and
Poland."[4]
Poland's new government is in no hurry
In Poland the previous government, led by the conservative Law
and Justice Party, had been enthusiastically pursuing talks with
the US, and was close to agreement in the autumn when it lost a
snap election to the opposition Civic Platform. The new Prime
Minister Donald Tusk is considerably more sensitive to NATO and
Russian concerns than his predecessor. Poland wants to build better
relations with Russia and has opened discussions with Moscow on
missile defence. Poland and Russia held talks in Warsaw in January
and in Moscow in February. The key bone of contention is a US
proposal to station Russian personnel at the Polish base as a
confidence-building measure to reassure the Kremlin. A former
Warsaw Pact nation, Poland objects to the permanent stationing of
Russian personnel on its soil. A possible compromise hangs on a
proposal for regular, but not permanent military exchanges between
US and Russian missile defence facilities, a deal that would
include Poland.
Concerned that hosting a US missile base will put them on the
frontline of a new confrontation with Russia, the majority of Poles
now oppose siting the interceptors in their country. Many also
resent the US government using Poland whilst refusing to allow
Poles visa-free travel to the United States. Local residents argue
that it would be better to develop the site as a regional airport
and business park, bringing more jobs to the area.[5]
Tusk has made clear that whilst his government will continue
negotiations with the United States, he is in no hurry to conclude
a deal. In a series of public statements and interviews during
January, Tusk told reporters that Poland "definitely shouldn't
hurry on the missile defence issue", adding "[O]ur agreement to a
missile defence installation in Poland is going to be directly tied
to ... increasing Poland's security."[6] This drew an angry reaction from the Pentagon,
which described the Polish Prime Minister's remarks as "not
helpful".[7] However, the tone
of Tusk's stance has not changed. Polish sources have indicated
they see no agreement with the United States before this
summer.
Tusk has argued that any US missile defence site built in his
country should eventually become part of a NATO and European
system, noting: "As Prime Minister of the Polish government, I feel
responsible for the security of Poles, and not, with all due
respect to our greatest ally, for the security of the United
States."[8] Visiting nearby
Slovakia, which has become an increasingly vocal opponent of the
basing plans, Tusk said, "I want to stress that it matters to us
very much that the issue of defence systems - including the missile
defence installations - in the long run be an element of a NATO,
European and Euro-Atlantic security system."[9]
Tusk's position should not be construed as one of outright
opposition to missile defence, however; he appears rather to be set
on driving a harder bargain with the United States. The new Polish
government wants greater security guarantees from the US -
guarantees that it believes are not sufficiently provided through
current NATO arrangements - and an "injection of American funds"
into the modernization of its armed forces.[10] It wants the US to provide Poland with
Patriot PAC-3 and Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD)
missile defence systems and is also demanding that Washington pay
the costs of creating, maintaining and protecting the missile
defence system.[11] Poland is
also trying to coordinate with the Czech Republic to secure a
better deal for both countries.
During talks in Washington in January, Defence Minister Bogdan
Klich welcomed that the US administration was willing to discuss
Poland's demands but stated that, "We still in Poland do not see
the right balance between the costs and the benefits of this
installation."[12] The
Pentagon, meanwhile, alluded to chequebook diplomacy, implying that
Poland's dependence on US military aid could be used to its
advantage to secure a deal. "They are the biggest beneficiary
within Europe of defence aid... because of that special
relationship, we believe that we can overcome whatever differences
may exist on this issue very quickly," Pentagon Press Secretary
Geoff Morrell told the media.[13] Nonetheless Washington also needs Poland's
continued support and commitment to increase its troop levels in
Afghanistan, where the US is struggling to persuade NATO allies to
provide more soldiers.
By the beginning of February, it appeared that the Bush
administration was willing to pay almost any price to buy agreement
with Poland. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski told reporters
that they had achieved agreement "in principle", although he added
that Prime Minister Donald Tusk still has "marathon" negotiations
ahead of him to finalize plans.[14] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that
Poland's requests for aid to upgrade its air forces and air
defences (on top of military support of some $750 million in recent
years) would be met since "the United States is very committed to
the modernization of Polish forces".
A US team was in Warsaw in early April to examine Poland's
conditions, and both sides agree that more detailed talks are
necessary. Diplomatic sources predict that the United States will
meet Poland halfway on its demands for military equipment (though
there are apparent doubts that Poland can even use some of the
items it has asked for). This could leave Tusk with the dilemma of
whether to accept a less attractive deal, or walk away with
nothing.[15]
Pressure to broaden Czech talks
Bilateral talks between the governments of the United States and
Czech Republic have also been underway since April 2007, and look
set to conclude in the signing of an agreement in early May,
despite growing Czech opposition, particularly in the region
closest to the proposed base. "We have clarified the content of the
treaty," Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg told the media after
a final negotiating session with US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice on the sidelines of the Bucharest summit.[16] However, this refers only to the installation
and operation of the Brdy site, where the Czech government faces
growing domestic opposition. The sensitive question of a Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) remains to be negotiated. The Czechs, with
a painful history of occupation by the Nazis and the Soviet Union,
are extremely reluctant to agree the normal SOFA which would exempt
US personnel from the jurisdiction of Czech courts.
The Czech government is working actively for the Brdy base, but
it could lack the parliamentary majority needed to approve the US
deal. The coalition government's junior member, the Green Party,
supports deployment only with a binding commitment from the United
States that the system will be under formal NATO command. Even with
this condition, the Green Party leadership is deeply divided on the
deal, while the grassroots overwhelmingly oppose it.[17] According to recent reports,
moreover, 70 percent of Czechs are opposed to the Brdy radar. Some
of this opposition is because people fear antagonizing Russia,
while others think that having got rid of the Soviet occupation,
there should be no further foreign bases on Czech soil. In the
nearby village of Stitov, concerns have been raised about the
effects of the proposed radar on local health and security, with
questions about whether the US would allow such a powerful radar to
be built so close to human habitation in its own country.[18]
A fixed, ground-based system would leave key detection and
tracking components, such as the X-band radars, vulnerable to
pre-emptive or asymmetric attack. As former Canadian Foreign
Minister Lloyd Axworthy noted in his presentation to Canada's
Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs in
2003, "At a conference in early 2001, an American discussant
quipped that the US's real early warning system would be when its
stations at Thule and Fylingdales were attacked and destroyed."[19] Likewise, a UNIDIR
conference report recorded, "anecdotally, America's early warning
for an impending missile attack would be when a rain of missiles
fell on Thule and Fylingdales."[20] It is therefore not surprising that there is
growing concern that, far from conferring security, the base will
make the local towns and villages more vulnerable and insecure.
The US and Czech governments hope to sell missile defence to
reluctant parliamentarians on the grounds that Czech firms will
gain financially and technologically from participation in
development of BMD. Seeing generous missile defence budgets in the
United States, the Czech government hopes for greater access for
its firms to US markets. The US already has similar agreements with
other countries that host significant numbers of its bases,
including Australia, Britain, Denmark, Italy and Japan. According
to Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, "One of our requirements is to
be able to take part in research and development. We want to be
among those countries that will be able to benefit from the results
of the US military industry and some of its technologies."[21]
In January 2008, the US Missile Defense Agency and the Czech
Foreign Ministry hosted a meeting of defence contractors, bringing
together about 40 Czech companies with the big four US defence
companies - Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Boeing.
Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Tomas Pojar told the press, "This is
not only a strategic alliance, it is not only a military alliance,
but it is also a business alliance that we want to promote."[22] However, this meeting was
controversial, and many Czech MPs refused to attend a special
dinner.[23] Lobbying is not as
cash focussed in Prague as it is in Washington DC, and according to
parliamentary sources many MPs felt that this meeting came
uncomfortably close to bribery.
The US administration has considerable leverage over the
government in other respects as well. The Czech Republic is
currently negotiating for the right of Czech citizens to enter the
United States without obtaining a visa in advance. Whilst there is
no formal linkage with missile defence, reports suggest that the
Czech government expects this right to be granted as a quid pro
quo for accepting the radar. Czechs bitterly resent that they
do not already have this right, along with the EU's richer
countries.
Congressional opposition thwarts the MDA
One major reason why the Bush Administration has tried to push
for agreement so quickly during 2007 is that it hoped to present
the next President with a fait accompli, amid fears that a
Democrat controlled administration and Congress might cut the
programme if work was not significantly underway. The
administration sought some $310 million in funding for the European
BMD sites, intending to begin construction of the Czech and Polish
facilities in the US Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, which began on October
1, 2007.[24] Congress cut that
figure to $225 and imposed significant conditions on use of the
funds. Despite this, the administration has requested $720m funding
for the European sites in FY09.
Signs of Congressional opposition surfaced during the budget
process in early 2007. Chair of the Strategic Forces Sub-Committee
of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Ellen
Tauscher (Democrat-California), said "I strongly support the need
to work with our European allies on missile defense, but I'm
concerned that the Bush Administration's current proposal... has
not been sufficiently coordinated with NATO."[25] She emphasized these concerns at a conference
in Bucharest this year, saying that: "what I have proposed - and
I've worked with Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and
Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice - is to have a NATO-ized system,
to have a comprehensive, layered system with command and control in
SHAPE under the SACEUR that would be a comprehensive system, one
that would have a short- and medium-range component developed by
NATO that the United States would include our long-range system,
and so you would have a completely tiered, layered defense against
all emerging and current threats, indivisibly for all of NATO
countries."
In July 2007, John Murtha (Democrat-Pennsylvania), a generally
pro-military legislator, wrote in his Appropriations Committee
report to the House of Representatives that the request for
construction funds for European sites was premature.[26] In the December 2007 Omnibus
Appropriations Act, Congress voted to trim $85 million from the
budget, and more importantly set stringent conditions on future
work. The administration is barred from "procurement, site
activation, construction, preparation of equipment for, or
deployment of a long-range missile defence system in Europe" until
Poland and the Czech Republic have signed and ratified agreements,
and until the Pentagon's director of Operational Test and
Evaluation reports to Congress that the system has been
demonstrated to work through operationally realistic testing.
Pentagon watchdog, the Center for Defense Information (CDI)
reports that "...testing has been so limited that it is 'not
sufficient to provide a high level of statistical confidence in its
limited capabilities'. The small amount of operational realism that
has been added to the GMD system's testing 'has uncovered
unanticipated deficiencies that will require additional development
and testing'."[27] In early
2008, Murtha said that he doubted Congress would pass a military
appropriations budget in 2009, preferring to wait for a new
President to take office in January 2009. In that event, a
'continuing resolution' would be passed to allow the DoD to
continue to operate, but this would not permit money to be spent on
taking the European sites forward.[28]
Under these conditions it appears impossible for work to
commence in Poland and the Czech Republic until after President
Bush leaves office, though the MDA appears to cling to the hope
that it can begin work in January 2009 - in the very last days of
the Bush Presidency. An X-Band radar that the Bush administration
was hoping to station in the Caucasus (most likely in Georgia or
Azerbaijan) will also be significantly delayed.
Congress has allocated $1 million for an independent study on
missile threats to Europe and alternative solutions to the Bush
deployment plan. This report is an item in the Defense
Authorization Act, which has yet to be finalized after President
Bush vetoed the first version, but if approved it could delay the
programme further still.[29]
Government handling prompts criticism in Britain
The UK government - which has strong military links with the
United States and is depending on US help to procure a successor to
its Trident nuclear weapon system - appears to be the most
enthusiastic supporter of the US missile defence programme in
Europe. Britain has already enabled the United States to upgrade
its early warning radar at RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire. In
addition, Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne in July 2007
confirmed the warnings of local opponents to the US National
Security Agency (NSA) listening facility at Menwith Hill, when he
informed Parliament that this second base in Yorkshire would
participate in missile defence as a relay base for information from
US satellites:
"[A]t RAF Menwith Hill, equipment will be installed and operated
by the US Government to allow receipt of satellite warnings of
potentially hostile missile launches, and will pass this warning
data to both UK and US authorities. The data will also be fed into
the US ballistic missile defence system for use in their response
to any missile attack on the US."[30]
Browne also kept open the possibility of the UK hosting missile
defence interceptors in future, despite numerous US denials that it
sought a base for such interceptors in Britain: "We have no plans
to site missile interceptors in the UK but will keep this under
review as the threat evolves."[31]
Aware of significant opposition to BMD, the government has
sought to avoid or minimize parliamentary scrutiny of its missile
defence participation - at least until it is too late for opponents
to block agreement. In 2003 the Ministry of Defence (MoD) attracted
parliamentary and public criticism for its handling of the decision
on upgrading Fylingdales, when it attempted to circumvent scrutiny
and debate by releasing key statements over the Christmas period.
Despite new leadership under Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the MoD
deployed the same tactic for Menwith Hill, slipping out news of its
decision in a written statement on the eve of the long
parliamentary summer recess. This was despite a promise from then
Prime Minister Tony Blair only months earlier, that there would be
"discussion in the House and, indeed, outside the House".[32]
Parliament reacted frostily, as noted in a Foreign Affairs
Select Committee report published in November 2007: "We regret the
manner and timing of the Government's announcement that RAF Menwith
Hill is to participate in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD)
system, and the resulting lack of Parliamentary debate on the
issue. In its response to this Report, we recommend that the
Government inform us of the date on which it received the formal
proposal from the US to include Menwith Hill in the BMD system. We
recommend that there should be a full Parliamentary debate on these
proposals."[33]
In January 2008, Lord Wallace of Saltaire (Liberal Democrat
Foreign Affairs spokesperson) obtained a debate in the House of
Lords on missile defence. Introducing the motion he said he hoped
that the Government would "be sufficiently embarrassed to provide a
fuller and more detailed justification of their decision, and to
grant time for an appropriate debate also in the Other Place
[parliamentary euphemism for the House of Commons]."[34] Baroness Williams of Crosby (a
Liberal Democrat peer who has been appointed by Gordon Brown as an
adviser on arms control and non-proliferation) was also highly
critical of the government's "contemptuous treatment of
Parliament".[35]
The Liberal Democrat Party spring conference this year has
formally agreed a policy that opposes ballistic missile defences,
unless they can be made compatible with wider arms control and
non-proliferation objectives.[36]
Worsening relations with Russia
US plans for European participation in BMD have played a major
role in deteriorating relations between NATO and Russia. The Bush
administration insists that European facilities would be aimed at
detecting and destroying missile launches from Iran or elsewhere in
the Middle East and would not be a challenge to Russia's strategic
nuclear forces, which are still being reduced. Russia, however,
sees a threat. In early January 2008, the Russian Ambassador to
Belgium, Vadim Lukov, told a seminar that: "The trajectory of any
American missile from Poland would be south-south-east and the
speed would be very high. In this situation any notion of an early
warning evaporates. Poland is just six and a half minutes from
Moscow and in this situation the Russians would rely on an
automated response. I am sure you may all well imagine the
unfortunate consequences."[37]
Russia has also responded with repeated statements reasserting
its nuclear doctrine, threatening to deploy new warheads with the
aim of being able to penetrate US defences, and giving notice that
it is considering withdrawal from important arms control treaties
such as the 1992 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. On
July 14, President Vladimir Putin announced a moratorium on
Russia's compliance with the CFE Treaty. While officially separate
from the missile defence issue, the two items have clearly been
linked in Russian minds. Also in July Russian Army Chief of Staff
Baluyevsky said that Russia's future participation in the bilateral
1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty would rest on US
actions on missile defences.[38] Then in October, President Putin proposed
globalizing the obligations contained in the INF Treaty, an
initiative that some European countries have welcomed, and which
could have implications for the deployment of US interceptors.[39]
At a press roundtable for G8 countries in June 2007, journalists
asked President Putin: "[I]f the United States continues building a
strategic shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, will we not
return to the situation and times in which the former Soviet
Union's nuclear forces were focussed on European cities, on
European targets?" Putin replied: "Certainly. Of course we will
return to those times... Of course we must have new targets in
Europe..."[40]
Two months later, Putin announced that Russia would resume
strategic flights by its long-range aircraft carrying missiles.
There have already been a couple of incidents during which British
RAF fighter jets have been scrambled to "escort" Russian bombers
seen approaching British airspace. In early 2008, Baluyevsky was
reported to have said: "We do not intend to attack anyone, but we
consider it necessary for all our partners in the world community
to clearly understand... that to defend the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, military forces
will be used, including preventively, including with the use of
nuclear weapons."[41]
Despite US denials, concerns that a European-based missile
defence system is ultimately meant for Russia are exacerbated by US
plans to extend its weapons into space. Although the first phase of
BMD involves only land-based missile interceptors, the Bush
administration's planned missile defence architecture envisages
interceptors based also at sea, in the air and on satellites in
space. As Paul Wolfowitz, then US Deputy Secretary of Defense,
noted in 2002: "while we have demonstrated that hit-to-kill works,
as we look ahead we need to think about areas that would provide
higher leverage. Nowhere is that more true than in space. Space
offers attractive options not only for missile defence but for a
broad range of interrelated civil and military missions. It truly
is the ultimate high ground. We are exploring concepts and
technologies for space-based intercepts."[42] This follows from an earlier US Space Command
document that bluntly identified space as the fourth medium of
warfare.[43]
While current negotiations have somewhat lessened immediate
Russian concerns, its continued opposition is reflected in the
Sochi Summit Strategic Framework which states that "The Russian
side has made clear that it does not agree with the decision to
establish sites in Poland and the Czech Republic and reiterated its
proposed alternative."[44]
Russia proposes missile defence cooperation
In June 2007, Putin appeared to wrong foot President Bush with a
surprise proposal that the US use the Gabala radar station in
Azerbaijan and deploy interceptors in Turkey or Iraq, rather than
the current plans for the Czech Republic and Poland.[45] Bilateral talks between the US
and Russia took place through the autumn, with Russia insisting
that the offer of Gabala and a second site at Armavir was an
either/or deal, replacing the Czech and Polish bases. In offering
these radar sites, Russia's intention appeared to be to call the US
bluff by directly addressing US arguments that the Eastern European
bases were necessary for monitoring and defending against potential
Middle East threats like Iran. Russia wanted the bases to remain
under its control rather than becoming an integral part of any
American defence system. The United States, for its part, was only
prepared to consider the proposal as complementary, suggesting that
these sites could be part of a wider system of missile
monitoring.
During the summer and autumn, Russia appeared to be fluctuating
between proposing cooperation with the US system, and threatening
gestures if it goes ahead. In early July, for example, in
conjunction with warnings about possible withdrawal from the INF
Treaty, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov threatened to
deploy intermediate-range missiles to Kaliningrad ready for use
against the Polish and Czech BMD sites: "If our proposal is
accepted, then the need will disappear for us to place... new
weapons, including missiles, in the European part of the country,
including Kaliningrad, to counter those threats that... will appear
if the decision is taken to place the missile defence system in
Poland and the Czech Republic."[46]
In December, differences over missile defence and the CFE Treaty
erupted into the open during NATO's Foreign Ministers' meetings. At
his press conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
commented, "We also talked about the US plans for the missile
shield in Europe, and obviously we are forced willy-nilly to bear
witness to conversations and talks about this dislocation and the
linkup with the NATO MD system."[47]
Current negotiations appear to revolve around
confidence-building measures including an exchange of personnel
with Russians and Americans monitoring each other's BMD facilities.
However, both Poland and the Czech Republic have expressed concerns
about this idea. There are also ongoing talks on linking the
nations' systems under one command and control structure. The US
has said, in the wake of Bucharest and Sochi, that it is prepared
to work with Russia on the use of the Gabala radar - something that
political appointees in the administration had previously
resisted.[48] In short,
Bucharest and Sochi did not bring agreement, but discussions will
go on.
The Impact on NATO and Europe
The 2006 NATO Summit in Riga approved a concept study on
NATO-wide theatre missile defences - a system designed to defend
against shorter-range missile threats. However, some European
nations have significant concerns that NATO is being bypassed by
the Bush administration, which appears bent on ignoring the effect
that its strategic missile defence plans would have on European
security.
Most European NATO members are not opposed to participation in
US-led missile defence efforts in principle. But in practice the
Bush administration has proved somewhat tone-deaf to European
concerns, once again sending signals that it has little time for
collective agreements and formal alliances, except as a rubber
stamp. Emphasizing the administration's desire to keep the European
missile defense infrastructure outside of NATO command and control
structures, US Assistant Secretary of Defense Brian Green told a
Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee hearing, "If by
approval, you mean turning this into a NATO-funded effort, a NATO
effort to develop and deploy long-range missile defences, that is
not our intent." [49]
Administration supporters went further, with the president of
the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Riki Ellison, proclaiming
that the United States does not need permission to protect itself:
"When has the US Congress or any US president asked NATO or any
country in the world permission to protect our population, homeland
and armed forces?[50]
Germany's Defence Minister Franz-Jozef Jung had earlier declared
that "it would be smart to integrate this whole system into
NATO."[51] In January 2008,
the President of the Western European Union Assembly, Jean-Pierre
Masseret, called for the "missile defence problem" to be resolved
by the whole of Europe, not just the two countries involved.[52] Similarly, Slovakia's Prime
Minister Robert Fico told the Council of Europe's Parliamentary
Assembly, "I refuse the premise that these bilateral talks are of
no concern to third countries, especially the ones that border...
We don't see any reason for the defence shield to move to Europe."
He argued that far-reaching defence decisions should be negotiated
by the appropriate organisations, such as NATO or the European
Union, rather than bilaterally between the United States and allied
countries.[53]
One concern is that the new US system will not defend all NATO
allies, breaching the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance
security. Maps circulated at the NATO meetings in 2007 showed that
much of South-Eastern Europe could not be defended, even if the
missile defence system worked perfectly. Philip Coyle, a former
chief weapons tester for the Pentagon has produced analysis that
suggests that using the Russian radar sites might provide better
defensive coverage for south-eastern Europe - if the missile
defence system can be made to work at all.[54]
Belgium and Bulgaria previously raised concerns that if an
incoming nuclear missile, aimed at northern Europe or the United
States, were shot down by the system, then radioactive debris would
fall in Europe.[55] This
problem applies to Canada. If US-based interceptors shot down an
incoming missile from East Asia, there could be risk of fall-out
over Canada.[56] Such
scenarios suggest that Canada and Europe are being asked to accept
a new and serious risk in order to provide a defence for the United
States. Coyle also noted that in the hypothetical event of an
Iranian missile being intercepted by missiles fired from Poland,
debris could also fall on Russia. Russian radars might reduce but
would not eliminate this problem.[57]
Romania's Prime Minister, C?lin Popescu Tariceanu, asserted that
Romania could not support the missile defence system - and nor
should NATO - unless his country were protected as well. Tariceanu
argued that "Russia should be a partner in this sphere both for the
EU and NATO".[58]
Back in March 2007, EU High Representative for security and
defence policy Javier Solana called for the EU to be consulted on
US defence plans in Europe, since they affect EU security. Solana
told the European Parliament that placing components of the US
ballistic missile defence system on EU soil could "affect our
relations with third countries, namely Russia... On security
matters, the treaties in force allocate sovereignty to EU member
states, but that sovereignty must be compatible with the union's
general interest in security."[59] This is similar to doubts expressed by a
significant swathe of EU countries, including Germany, France,
Austria and Ireland. By contrast, Britain, Poland and the Czech
Republic reject an EU role in this debate, though the UK government
acknowledged last year that, "Europe as a whole does have concerns
and will not be shy in expressing those concerns."[60]
At the June 2007 NATO meetings, Defence Ministers agreed to
assess the political and military implications of the US strategic
missile defence system for the Alliance. In December, NATO
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stressed that missile
defence talks would be based on the principle of the
"indivisibility of security".[61]
Prior to the Bucharest Summit, the US and Czech delegations
trumpeted NATO's support for strategic BMD deployments in Europe,
putting their message into the press even before the Summit
communiqué was published and obscuring that document's
actual message. Later, Condoleezza Rice told a press briefing in
Bucharest that "[W]e have a breakthrough document on missile
defense for the Alliance. Again, I remember going to that first
summit, when I think the President talked about missile defense,
and perhaps only two allies gave even lukewarm support for the
notion of missile defense. But now it is clearly understood in the
Alliance that... we will take that work ahead."[62]
This contrasts with a more nuanced message from Assistant of
State Daniel Fried back in Washington DC, when he told reporters
that "Allies recognized the threat that ballistic missiles can
pose, endorsed the concept of missile defence, agreed to work not
simply with the United States but look forward to the possibility
of a more general architecture involving NATO, American assets and
working, hopefully, with Russia."[63] This accords with the text of the Summit
communiqué, which makes it clear that any decision has been
pushed into 2009 or beyond, while NATO leaders reconfirmed the June
2007 decision to study strategic missile defences.
In a report on NATO's website, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said in a
press conference that the "allied leaders decided for NATO to
develop 'options for a defence architecture' that should cover the
states which are not in the protection range of the USA project.
These options are to be discussed in 2009."[64]
Clearly, this decision falls short of actual endorsement by the
Alliance of the system. In other words, NATO opponents of BMD, such
as Norway and Slovakia, have succeeded in delaying a decision until
after President Bush leaves office. While John McCain is likely to
press ahead, if elected, Hillary Clinton and Barrack Obama have
both expressed deep doubts of moving ahead with a system that
antagonises Russia, but is not proven to defend America. Ministers
may not need to revisit this decision for some years.
Conclusions
Even following the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, it is clear that
these issues remain highly charged and politically sensitive. The
Bush administration believed it could get away with making a deal
with Poland and the Czech Republic behind the scenes, as it had
with Britain, but did not take sufficiently into account the
concerns of other NATO and EU members and the importance of public
opinion in the proposed host countries.[65] In 2007, Brooks Tigner of Defense News had
summed up NATO's dilemma: "The risk is that Europeans could be
associated with - and dependent on - a US system that falls
entirely outside the framework of NATO. And yet missile defence
touches the core of NATO's purpose of collective defence.. this
could bring NATO's whole raison d'être into
question."[66] Bucharest
failed to deal with these challenges.
While funding cuts and policy limitations for BMD programmes in
the US Congress give cautious hope that neither the European bases
nor the weaponisation of space will be fully realised, the US plans
are already having a serious and negative effect on European
security and interests, not least in provoking (or providing an
excuse for) a hardening of Russian positions, and threats by Russia
to withdraw from two of the most important treaties achieved at the
end of the Cold War.
Congresswoman Tauscher may be seeking to address the problem by
making funding for the programmes contingent on "NATOization" of
BMD. As for Europe, opposition is growing in Poland and the Czech
Republic, but much more will be required to prevent US ambitions on
missile defence and space dominance from giving rise to the very
threats that they purport to protect against. Europe needs to
formulate a policy and strategy to prevent destabilising missile
defence deployments and the weaponisation of space. Much more needs
to be done to manage the relationship between the European Union
and NATO, with inauguration of a more in-depth, transparent, and
rational analysis of the actual threats, prospects of and
alternatives to missile defences, and implications of certain
policy routes for European, international and space security.
As part of NATO's continuing post-cold-war transformation, there
needs to be a reinvigoration of arms control policies and
commitments to build security based on cooperation with countries
outside NATO, especially Russia. It is likely to take a new
administration in the US to allow such policies to be effectively
pursued. In particular, it will be important for any new
administration to take more account of Allied opinion, giving
Europeans a way to avoid a potential new confrontation with Russia
and reason not to rush agreement on deploying an unproven system.
Canada, for example, has negotiated a way through its similar
dilemma by allowing the US to use NORAD facilities for BMD
purposes, while refusing to participate themselves - both on cost
grounds but also because Ottawa fears an arms race in space.[67] The UK and Czech Republic
may come to regret having dashed to support Bush administration
policies, while Polish leaders may well look the shrewder for
having waited.
See also:
Notes
[1] Chairman's Summary of
NATO-Russia Council Meeting, NATO HQ, December 7, 2007.
[2] Ambassador Victoria
Nuland, United States Permanent Representative to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , Institute of European
Studies, Brussels, Belgium, October 16, 2007.
[3] Deputy Permanent
Representative Richard Olson, Speech at the Conference on "Europe
at the Crossroads: Agenda from Riga to Bucharest" Riga, Latvia,
October 15, 2007.
[4] 'European delegates
visit Vandenberg, view missile facilities', by Staff Sgt. Raymond
Hoy, 30th Space Wing Public Affairs, Vandenberg Air Force Base,
November 26, 2007.
[5] Ryan Lucas, Polish
Town Leery of US Missile Defense, Associated Press, January
19, 2008.
[6] 'Polish leader takes
harder line on U.S. missile defense', AP, Warsaw, January 9,
2008.
[7] Desmond Butler,
'Polish Defense Minister in US for Talks', AP, January 15,
2008.
[8] Xu Liyu, 'Poland in
harder bargain with US on missile defense plan', Xinhua,
January 21, 2008.
[9] 'Polish PM: US missile
defense should be part of a NATO, EU security system',
Associated Press, Bratislava, January 18, 2008.
[10] Xu Liyu, op
cit.
[11] Judy Demsey, ' Poland
and Czech Republic Team Up in Missile Defense Talks With U.S.',
New York Times, January 11, 2008.
[12] Desmond Butler, op
cit.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Transcript, Polish
Foreign Minister Sikorski, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
Remarks at a Press Conference, Washington D.C., February 1,
2008.
[15] 'Poland Faces
Pressure Over Missile Defense', Reuters, April 7, 2008.
[16] 'FM: Czech, U.S. deal
on missile system to be signed in May', Xinhua News Agency, April
4, 2008.
[17] Rob Cameron, 'Greens
ultimately to decide whether radar base gets green light or not',
April 4, 2008.
[18] Karel Janicek,
'Czechs Torn Over Missile Defense', Washington Post, June 4,
2007.
[19] Lloyd Axworthy,
'Issues on Missile Defence and Alternatives', Submission to
Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs,
Ottowa, May 29, 2003, p 13.
[20] See Missile
Defence, Deterrence and Arms Control: Contradictory Aims or
Compatible Goals, Wilton Park/UNIDIR, 2002, p 2
[21] Czech PM Seeks
Military Know-How in Exchange for Radar Base Deployment,
Associated Press, January 17, 2008.
[22] Xu Liyu, op
cit.
[23] Zoltan Dujisin, US
Base Nears Moment of truth, Inter Press Service, January 21,
2008.
[24] For more detail, see
the US Missile Defense Agency's briefing, 'Proposed US Missile
Defense Assets in Europe', at http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/euroassets.pdf.
[25] Rep. Ellen Tauscher,
Chair's Opening Statement, Hearing of the House Armed Services
Committee Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces on Ballistic Missile
Defense, March 27, 2007.
[26] Megan Scully,
'Defense Spending Clears House Committee', Congress Daily,
July 25, 2007.
[27] Victoria Samson,
'DOT&E's 2007 Assessment of Missile Defence: Wobbling Along',
Center for Defense Information, January 18, 2008, www.cdi.org.
[28] Benet Wilson, 'Panel:
Only Defense Funding Will Pass', Aviation Daily, March 17,
2008.
[29] Wade Boese, 'Europe
Anti-Missile Plan Faces Hard Sell', Arms Control Today,
January/February 2008.
[30] Secretary of Defence
Des Browne, Statement to the House of Commons on Ballistic Missile
Defence, July 25, 2007.
[31] Ibid.
[32] House of Commons,
Official Report, February 28, 2007, columns 919-920.
[33] House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee, 'Global Security: Russia', Second
Report, HC 51 of 2007- 2008, November 25, 2007.
[34] House of Lords,
Official Report, January 10, 2008, column 950.
[35] House of Lords,
Official Report, January 10, 2008, column 976.
[36] Resolution agreed by Liberal Democrat
Party Spring Conference, March 8, 2008. Available at
http://www.libdems.org.uk/news/missile-defence-
decision-condemned-by-liberal-democrats.13997.html.
[37] Angus McDowall,
Poland 'agrees' to US missile defence deal, Daily Telegraph,
February 4, 2008.
[38] Jacob Quamme, Russia
Eyes Intermediate-Range nuclear Forces Treaty As Next Pullout,
UPI, July 30, 2007.
[39] See also Sergey
Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, statement to the Conference on
Disarmament, Geneva, February 12, 2008.
[40] President Putin,
'Interview with Newspaper Journalists from G8 Member Countries',
June 4, 2007, www.kremlin.ru.
[41] 'Russia Issues
Nuclear Attack Threat', Sky News online, January 19, 2008,
http://news.sky.com. See also
Nabi Abdullaev, Russian Forces Chief: Pre-emptive Nuclear Attack Is
a Defensive Option, Defense News, February 4, 2008.
[42] Paul Wolfowitz, US
Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Frontiers of Freedom
organisation, 'Transcript - Wolfowitz Outlines Missile Defense
Successes, Way Ahead, US State Department (Washington File)',
October 25, 2002. Some of the Bush administration's more ambitious
plans and timetables have been derailed, mainly due to the
budgetary and military overstretch in Iraq.
[43] United States Space
Command, Vision for 2020, February 1997: "the medium of space is
the fourth medium of warfare - along with land, sea and air."
[44] U.S.-Russia Strategic
Framework Declaration, April 6, 2008.
[45] U.S.-Russia Strategic
Framework Declaration, April 6, 2008. Press Conference following
the end of the G8 Summit, Heiligendamm, June 8, 2007, www.kremlin.ru.
[46] Neil Buckley and
Demetri Sevastopulo, Russians threaten to counter US shield,
Financial Times, July 4, 2007.
[47] Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov, Press Conference at NATO HQ, December 7,
2007.
[48] Daniel Fried,
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Press
Briefing, April 7, 2008, Washington DC.
[49] Deputy Asssiatnt
Secretary of Defense Brian Green, Testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Subs-Committee for Strategic Forces, April 11,
2007.
[50] Jen DiMascio, Green:
U.S. Does Not Need Formal NATO Approval To Build Interceptor Sites
In Europe, Defense Daily, April 17, 2007
[51] Germany suggests NATO
use U.S. missile shield, International Herald Tribune, March
2, 2007.
[52] 'Europeans want
greater say in U.S defence system', Malaysia Sun, January
18, 2008.
[53] 'Slovak PM says there
is no reason for US anti-missile shield in neighboring countries',
AP, January 21, 2008.
[54] Philip Coyle, The
Obstacles to the proposed US Missile Defense Systems in Europe,
Britske Listy, January 14, 2008, ISSN 1213-1792.
[55] Europe cool on US
missile bases plan, Daniel Dombey and Neil Buckley, Financial
Times, April 19, 2007.
[56] These arguments,
widely circulated among NATO members, are detailed in Geoffrey
Forden, 'Laser Defenses: What if they work?', Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (September/October 2002) pp 49-53.
[57] Coyle, op
cit.
[58] 'Romania should
benefit from US anti-missile shield', Agence France Presse, 22
January 2008. Available at www.spacewar.com.
[59] EU High
Representative Javier Solana, 'Speech to the European Parliament on
Foreign and Defence Policy Priorities for 2007', March 29,
2007.
[60] Phillippe Naughton,
Britain Calls for Constructive Dialogue After Putin Outburst,
The Times, June 4, 2007.
[61] NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Press Conference at NATO HQ,
December 7, 2007.
[62] Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, Press Briefing, April 3, 2008, Bucharest
Summit.
[63] Daniel Fried, op
cit. (Emphasis added).
[64] Martin Butcher,
'Missile Defence Decision in 2009 (or later), NATO Bucharest Blog,
April 3, 2008.
[65] Bryn Bailer, 'U.S.
defense contractors 'testing the waters' for Czech cooperation',
Czech Business Weekly, January 14, 2008.
[66] Brooks Tigner,
Rethinking NATO's role in missile defense, ISN Security
Watch, March 20, 2007.
[67] Coyle, op
cit.
Nicola Butler is Deputy Director of the
Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. She writes regularly
on a range of subjects including UK and NATO policy, and the North
Korea nuclear crisis. Martin Butcher is part-time analyst for the
Acronym Institute on NATO and European Security, and a freelance
consultant on a wide range of nuclear and international security
issues. This article also benefited from research and publications
on NATO, the EU and space security by Rebecca Johnson.
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