Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 25, April 1998
The 1998 PrepCom: Summary and Snapshots
By Rebecca Johnson
Introduction
The second meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for
the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1968 Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held in
Geneva from 27 April to 8 May. A full analysis and review of the
PrepCom will be featured in the next issue of Disarmament
Diplomacy. In this issue, we feature a summary of the outcome
of the PrepCom, plus extracts from a series of reports compiled
during the meeting by Rebecca Johnson. The full text of all these
updates is available on our web-site together with a full-length
report produced for the PrepCom, ACRONYM 11 - Reviewing the
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparing for the Future. The focus
in the following extracts is on the debate about the nature and
role of the PrepComs in the context of the enhanced review process
agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and on specific
proposals and recommendations put forward by delegations. For more
general summaries of debates, open and closed, at the PrepCom -
including statements by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) -
readers are referred to the full-text updates, available on our
website.
Summary of Outcome
Agreement Denied
The second PrepCom, chaired by Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of
Poland, ended after midnight on 9 May with no agreement on
substance, recommendations or rules of procedure. After a day of
tense and difficult discussions, and despite long negotiations on
the Chair's working paper, which managed to achieve compromise
language on fourteen paragraphs of substance, the divisions over
the Middle East and the role of the strengthened review process
appeared only to harden. In the end, just the first part of the
PrepCom report was accepted. This described the procedural aspects
of the 1998 meeting, which had been attended by 97 States Parties,
and confirmed the decision to hold the Third PrepCom in New York,
from 12 to 23 April, with Andelfo Garcia of Colombia as its
designated Chair.
There was no agreement on background documentation for 2000,
which is normally prepared in advance under the auspices of the
United Nations and relevant bodies such as the IAEA and the
secretariats of the various nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), for
papers to be discussed and agreed at the Third PrepCom. This means
that if official background information is to be prepared in time
for the 2000 Review Conference, the decision will need to be taken
in 1999, leaving little time for States to review and accept it
before 2000, unless a fourth PrepCom is held. Some wanted the
documentation to cover the articles of the Treaty only; others
wanted several papers following the line of the Principles and
Objectives, including universality, non-proliferation (articles I
and II), nuclear disarmament (article VI), security assurances;
safeguards (article III) and non-military uses of nuclear energy
(article IV) and on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
(CTBTO) and the various established NWFZ.
The main sticking point was the request by fourteen Arab States,
backed by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), for background
documentation dealing with the Resolution on the Middle East. The
United States refused, holding that background documents should be
limited to addressing the Treaty articles only. The US argued that
though the Resolution on the Middle East was adopted at the 1995
Conference, it was inappropriate to have documentation on an issue
that is not referred to in the Treaty itself. This was just one of
many clashes over whether and how to refer to the Middle East
Resolution. The US appeared to want to distance the review process
from the 1995 resolution, arguing that it was a one-off, stand
alone resolution and not part of the package of decisions adopted
to extend the Treaty and strengthen the review process. Their
position drew no visible support from other delegations and
outraged the Arab States, who considered that their backing for the
consensus decision on indefinite extension had been contingent on
the adoption of the Middle East Resolution and that the resolution
was therefore an integral part of the 1995 agreements.
There was also no agreement on the rules of procedure. The major
block was over rule 34, covering the work of Committees. South
Africa wanted the mention of 'working groups' to be supplemented by
explicit reference to 'subsidiary bodies'. Backed by the NAM and
others, they argued that this was the intention of paragraph 6 of
Decision 1 taken in 1995, which stated that subsidiary bodies could
be established within the respective Main Committees "for specific
issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused
consideration of such issues". South Africa wanted the concept to
be explicitly in the rules of procedure, although it did not insist
on the explanatory language. Russia objected to all mention of
subsidiary bodies and claimed that the term 'working group' was
sufficient. Attempts to include both terms also foundered. Failing
to agree, the PrepCom remitted the rules of procedure for
consideration at the 1999 PrepCom.
Although appearing to be over a minor difference in terminology,
the conflict represented a much deeper division that ran through
the entire PrepCom, and in the end caused it to fail. This
debate was about the role, purpose and limitations of the
Strengthened Review Process initiated in 1995. Objecting to use
of the term 'subsidiary body' in the rules of procedure was another
way to slam down South Africa's proposals for addressing nuclear
disarmament or security assurances more coherently as part of the
review.
Although the participants in the Chair's Consultations had
worked long and faithfully on trying to achieve agreement on
paragraphs to be added to the 'rolling text' of recommendations on
issues in paragraph 3 of the 1997 Chair's working paper, few went
much beyond the paragraphs agreed last year, so a number of
delegates were not sorry to see these fall by the wayside as well.
Wyzner has decided to issue the draft working paper and the
compilation of proposals from 1998 as official documents of the
PrepCom, so the content will at least be available to inform future
deliberations.
A further important factor in the PrepCom's failure to adopt a
substantive report was the opposition by the major nuclear-weapon
States to the recommendations proposed by Canada concerning
reporting on the special sessions and raising current issues, and
from South Africa and Egypt for allocation of time in 1999 for
priority discussion of nuclear disarmament and the Middle East
resolution respectively. Despite the actually more focused debate
on the three issues given special time in 1998, the United States
continued to argue that such sessions were a waste of time. The US
and Russia, in particular, seemed to want to roll back the
precedents set last year, as part of a concerted attempt to turn
the review process into a talk shop and conveyor belt of text for
the next Review Conference to consider. Countries such as Canada
and South Africa, which had played important roles in achieving the
1995 agreements, were determined that the promise and intentions of
those agreements should be developed appropriately and honoured in
the implementation.
Reasons for Failure
What were the reasons for the failure? There were many
components, not all negative. Extreme and ideological positions
were less in evidence from expected quarters among the
non-nuclear-weapon States. The NAM arrived much better prepared
than last year, and organised more effectively around the proposals
in the NAM working paper and from individual members, such as Egypt
and South Africa. Though they fought hard on issues of importance
to them, especially nuclear disarmament, they also offered
flexibility and compromise. They were quick to support constructive
proposals from western delegations, while at the same time western,
including EU countries, expressed qualified support for issues of
importance to the NAM. Thus some important bridge building was
accomplished, including: recognising that existing fissile material
stocks cannot be ignored, supporting a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction in the Middle East, the Canberra Commission proposals
on nuclear disarmament and 1996 advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice, more transparency regarding export
controls, and so on.
The fact that the NAM came with more coherent and reasoned
positions resulted in the real locus of divided opinion being
brought into sharper focus: the fundamental incompatibility of the
interests of the five nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and those of the
vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) Parties to the
Treaty. The NWS - prominently the United States - had made a
considerable effort to respond to calls for greater transparency
and accountability by providing more concrete information on what
they were doing to comply with their obligations in terms of
controlling and reducing military stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
fissile materials, decommissioning and so on. However, they seemed
to want to stop there. Acting individually, the NWS appeared to
support each other in a primary objective of limiting the potential
role and relevance of the enhanced review process.
Russia is enmeshed in its own political difficulties and took an
exceedingly conservative position on almost everything. China said
little in the procedural debates but was clearly unhappy with the
idea of the review process having a role in facilitating and
commenting on current issues. In relation to EU positions, Britain
organised as President, so France was perceived as holding the line
on behalf of itself and Britain to prevent the positions of
anti-nuclear partners from being expressed in EU statements. On the
floor of the PrepCom, however, France and Mexico were significantly
among those seeking constructive ways through the deadlocks.
Britain was not positively negative but the absence of new policy
(blamed on the delayed publication of the Strategic Defence Review
undertaken in 1997) resulted in Britain playing a conservative role
and appearing curiously disengaged. Britain had several important
hats, as a depositary government, President of the EU, Convenor of
the Western Group and Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Though
Britain engaged in busy backroom drafting, in view of the
constructive role it might have played, its forced constraint and
passiveness was unhelpful and must be assessed as a real lost
opportunity.
Another important lesson learned is the necessity for more
preparation in advance of the meeting and for the Chair/Bureau to
have some game-plans for dealing with the most contentious issues.
There is not much that a meeting can do about external events, but
some conflicts are recurring or predictable and might be handled
differently in the future. Taking place at a time of NATO expansion
and START at a standstill, and particularly at a time of high
political tension and little concrete progress in the Middle East
peace process, the PrepCom was saturated with the spray thrown up
by external political events.
It was difficult for delegations - and not only from the Arab
States - to accept the US attempts to marginalise the Middle East
Resolution. The existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and
non-accession by a small number of countries to the Treaty are
relevant issues to the content and scope of the NPT and its review
process. The US only undermined its own commitment to
non-proliferation by its attempts to exempt Israel's nuclear
capability from discussion, although it is also important to
prevent the Treaty being misused in the pursuit of wider political
objectives. The US became increasingly isolated in its approach,
inviting comparison with the ludicrous interventions by Bhutan and
Mauritius at the end, in which they attacked the references to
South Asia in various NPT documents and the NAM statement.
The general feeling among delegates at the end of the PrepCom
was that although they could not get agreement, the time was not
wasted. Substantive issues were addressed; constructive and
interesting proposals were offered not only for the NPT review
process, but also to facilitate progress in the CD and in nuclear
arms control in general, for consideration by the States directly
concerned. The outcome of the Second PrepCom is not (yet)
indication of a failing review process, as it foundered on real and
relevant political differences. If it acts as a warning to those
who would subordinate this important cornerstone of the
non-proliferation regime to their narrow national interests and if
lessons can be learned and applied, the problems of the Second
PrepCom may prove to have beneficial consequences for the NPT
regime as a whole. But only if there is the political will on the
part of all the States Parties, especially the NWS, to make it work
for the good of all.
Snapshots of The PrepCom
27-28 April: The General Debate
The first two days were devoted to general debate, with one
whole session set aside for NGOs to address the meeting.
On 28 April, in an early move indicative of more effective
coordination, the NAM tabled a comprehensive working paper and
proposed that "recommendations which have been deliberated upon
throughout [the] preparatory process should be forwarded to the
Review Conference in 2000 for further finalisation and adoption."
The paper comprised 37 substantive paragraphs, related to the
Articles of the Treaty.
Nuclear Disarmament
The NAM working paper referred constructively as well as
positively to the unanimous International Court of Justice (ICJ)
opinion which reinforced Article VI; the paper urged that the
ruling be built upon by instituting regular information exchanges
among the States Parties, but especially the NWS, on their efforts
towards implementing their international legal obligations on
nuclear disarmament.
Canada referred to START being "at a standstill" and
proposed text to reaffirm the importance of the US-Russian
bilateral process and further progress on nuclear disarmament,
including the engagement of the other three NWS. Myanmar
called on the Second PrepCom to make recommendations for the CD to
negotiate "a universal and legally-binding multilateral
instrument... committing all States to the objective of the total
elimination of nuclear weapons".
Many of the statements outlined national positions with regard
to nuclear disarmament and some proposed language to be included in
a 'rolling text' of recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference.
Several delegations made direct or oblique reference to item 4c of
the P&O, "to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of
eliminating those weapons", and to the importance of the steps
identified by the Canberra Commission which should be undertaken by
the five NWS without delay, such as: taking nuclear weapons off
alert; transparency measures for nuclear weapons and military
stockpiles of fissile materials; restrictions on the deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons; opening the ABM Treaty to accession by
Britain, China and France; commitments not to modernise or increase
the size of nuclear arsenals, and so on.
Also building on the practical proposals put forward by the
Canberra Commission, US National Academy of Sciences and others,
South Africa went a step further with a pragmatic proposal
for using the NPT Review Process to give the P&O programme
concrete content. Taking the implementation of item 4c as its
starting point and recognising the need for "a structured
opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps" for implementing
Article VI and the programme of action outlined in the P&O,
South Africa proposed i) specific time to be allocated at the Third
PrepCom in 1999; ii) for the 2000 Review Conference to decide to
allocate specific time to practical consideration of nuclear
disarmament steps at future PrepComs; and iii) the establishment at
the 2000 Review Conference of a subsidiary body to Main Committee 1
to provide more structured and focused deliberations on the
implementation of the nuclear disarmament provisions of the P&O
and Article VI.
The NAM States, including Mexico, have welcomed
these proposals as a positive step forwards. Although western
countries such as New Zealand, Sweden, the
Netherlands and Belgium have expressed interest in
this practical approach to addressing nuclear disarmament issues in
the review process, others have seemed reluctant, either because
they argue that nuclear disarmament gets sufficient attention in
the cluster debates, or on the grounds that such focused action by
NPT Parties could detract from the work of the CD or the bilateral
START process underway. South Africa, however, had emphasised the
continued importance of the bilateral reductions (and also future
negotiations involving all the NWS).
FMCT
One issue on which all the nuclear-weapon States (and several
others from the Western group) seemed to agree was the necessity
for getting negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty
(FMCT) underway. Japan made a particularly strong pitch,
condemning three "wasted" years of deadlock in the CD and calling
on the NPT PrepCom to express "as a whole, its firm determination
to commence FMCT negotiations" on the basis of the 'Shannon Report'
and mandate agreed in March 1995. Norway reiterated its call
for voluntary transparency measures from all nuclear-capable
States, with particular responsibility on the NWS. Canada
proposed language for a P&O rolling text supporting the FMCT
commitment and urging the NWS to increase transparency with regard
to military stocks of fissile materials and "increase the amount of
fissile material declared excess", putting this under permanent
safeguards.
One of the more innovative proposals came from Australia,
building on the statement of the Foreign Minister to the CD in
February. Recognising that if approaches to a FMCT are to succeed,
they must take account of the security situations of the NWS and
non-NPT states and their regions, Australia put forward the view of
a cut-off treaty not as a stand alone, one-off negotiation, but
rather as "a framework instrument which evolves into a
comprehensive regime governing the production, stockpiling and
disposition of fissile material". Accordingly, Australia proposed
that the conclusion of a first treaty codifying a basic FMCT should
be followed by "a second agreement providing for greater
transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually
bringing fissile material stocks under strict and effective
international control". Verification would also require "an
innovative, multifaceted approach involving a balance of bilateral,
plurilateral and appropriate international - and possibly regional
- arrangements..."
Some observers drew hope from a positive call in the NAM
working paper for the CD to get going, without preconditions, on
negotiating "a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of
fissile material for nuclear weapons..." and implying acceptance of
the Shannon report as a basic mandate.
CTBT
Canada proposed that the NPT PrepCom endorse calls for
the political conference to facilitate the CTBT's entry into force
(as per Article XIV of the Treaty) to be convened in 1999, before
the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Canada's proposal is supported by
many States, although there have been reports that Russia
and possibly others are pushing for the Conference to take place
after 2000.
The NAM working paper included a strong call to all
States to sign and ratify the CTBT. To "build confidence [in] the
full implementation of the Treaty", the NWS were enjoined to
"comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT", to "refrain from
conducting all types of tests in conformity in conformity with the
objectives of the CTBT" - presumed to be an indirect reference to
subcritical testing and other controversial programmes associated
with the ongoing nuclear weapons programmes of at least some of the
NWS.
Furthering START
Arguing that NPT Parties should be able to take a direct role,
as well as evolving text for future review documents, Canada
proposed a 'Draft Statement on Current START Standstill', intended
to be issued either by the PrepCom or as a Chair's statement at the
end of this meeting. The statement built on the 1997 UN General
Assembly resolution co-sponsored by the US and Russia (among
others), and was intended to encourage START II ratification and
further progress on START III. Although Canada's proposal has
attracted interest from a number of delegations, Russia and
the United States have so far shown little enthusiasm for
issuing such a statement from the PrepCom.
CD Nuclear Disarmament Committee
The NAM working paper called explicitly for the CD to
establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Several
Western States also now back CD work on nuclear disarmament,
ranging from support for South Africa's non-negotiating
mandate or Canada's proposal for "substantive discussion of
nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when
one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally" to
Belgium's very mild proposal for an "ad hoc group for
reflection and study". Japan called for information exchange
and discussion of practical issues in various fora, including the
CD and the NPT review process, and hoped that a session of the UN
Disarmament Conference in November in Nagasaki would be devoted to
practical aspects of nuclear disarmament.
Strengthening the Review
Several countries underlined that the post-1995 review process
was intended to be "substantive" and "qualitatively different".
South Africa, Switzerland, Canada and Indonesia
suggested that it was time to begin to develop a rolling text or
document. Canada even provided substantial examples of text
on the range of issues covered by the Treaty and P&O, as "input
for [a] possible revised Chair's working paper".
Mexico made clear its view that the Review Process should
go beyond the "first exercise" and results of the 1997 PrepCom, in
order to put together a coherent compilation of ideas, principles
and concrete methods that could serve as recommendations for the
full implementation of the Treaty's objectives, and "above all,
nuclear disarmament". Sri Lanka stressed that the nuclear
disarmament cluster should have priority and be given sufficient
focus and time. Iran argued for the establishment of a
"follow-up mechanism" to ensure full implementation of the Treaty
and recommendations, and proposed creating an "open-ended standing
committee" to address all aspects of the NPT, including compliance
issues.
Chile suggested that the ideal method for progress should
utilise the Chair's paper from the first PrepCom and incorporate
national positions and new elements with the aim of formulating
concrete and constructive proposals. Chile also expressed support
and interest in Canada's proposals. Australia backed
South Africa's view that it would be "logical and desirable"
to work for a new P&O document "which would guide our nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the period after the
2000 Review Conference..." Egypt proclaimed that the
"ultimate aim of the NPT is universal nuclear disarmament" and
proposed that NPT States should "submit written reports on the
progress achieved to date and their future plans to implement each
provision of the Principles and Objectives" (P&O).
P-5 Statement
The five declared NWS have continued with the precedent, set in
1997, of presenting a paper with their "shared views" regarding NPT
implementation. Read by a British representative, the P-5 statement
called on all States to "contribute to the success" of the CTBT and
urged immediate commencement of negotiations of a FMCT in
accordance with the 1995 Shannon report to the CD. Most of the
statement was a bland but collective reaffirmation of support for
various aspects of the Treaty, with particular emphasis on the
enhanced IAEA safeguards regime and nuclear security and safety
issues, including transparency in the development of nuclear
energy. The P-5 interest in transparency did not appear to extend
to nuclear weapon-related activities, however.
Although they reaffirmed their "determination to continue the
pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons globally..." and welcomed their countries' achievements so
far in the START process and in steps towards placing fissile
materials "no longer required for their defence purposes" under
IAEA safeguards, the NWS seemed particularly keen to emphasise the
responsibility of other States Parties in implementing the Treaty,
including Article VI. The P-5 concluded, however, by promising to
"continue to work together for the success of the preparatory
process and the 2000 Review Conference and on related
issues".[Emphasis added]
Assessment of Issues Raised
Most of the nuclear disarmament debate was general, with much
rhetoric on making further progress. Proposals fell into two
categories: text for taking to the 2000 Review Conference, and
specific proposals for action to be taken by this PrepCom, such as
Egypt and South Africa's recommendations and Canada's proposals on
START and the CTBT. However, there was little agreement on how to
move forwards - and, in the end, the differences proved too great
for any agreed outcome at all.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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