Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
The use of chemical and biological weapons in war was prohibited in 1925
as a result of universal abhorrence at their effects on First World War
soldiers. The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on their destruction (BWC), which entered into force in 1975, prohibited
the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of biological
and toxin weapons and required the destruction or conversion of such weapons
or delivery means. At time of writing, the BWC has 153 states parties.
A further 16 have signed but not ratified, while 25 remain outside the
treaty.
The BWC broke new ground in establishing a non-discriminatory prohibition
regime, making no distinction between states with existing BW programmes
and those without, and explicitly building on the 1925 prohibition on
use. However, it contained no provisions for the monitoring or verification
of compliance or implementation.
The end of the cold war provided the opportunity to negotiate a verification
protocol, but in 2001, after six years of painstaking technical and diplomatic
work, negotiations collapsed without agreement after the United States
first weakened the verification provisions and then scuppered agreement
on the Protocol, arguing that verification would be inadequate and overly
intrusive.
Coverage in Disarmament Diplomacy
-
Midpoint between Review Conferences:
Next Steps to Strengthen the BWC, by Nicholas A. Sims, Disarmament
Diplomacy, Issue No.91, Summer 2009
-
Bringing Biologists on Board: Report
from the 2008 Meeting of BWC Experts, by Kathryn McLaughlin, Disarmament
Diplomacy, Issue No.89, Winter 2008
- Reaching a Tipping Point: Strengthening
BWC Confidence-Building Measures, by Filippa Lentzos, Disarmament
Diplomacy, Issue No.89, Winter 2008
BWC Meeting of States Parties, 1 - 5 December 2008
For reporting on this meeting see the BioWeapons
Prevention Project.
BWC Meeting of Experts (MX), 18 - 22 August 2008
At the 6th Review Conference of the BWC in 2006, States Parties agreed
a work programme for 2007–10 to lay the groundwork for substantive improvement
of the BTWC subsequent to the 7th Review Conference in 2011. The first
Meeting of Experts was held from 20 to 24 August 2007; the first Meeting
of States Parties from 10-14 December 2007.
The second Meeting of Experts takes place this week in Geneva. The reports
below are written and produced by the BioWeapons
Prevention Project and with support from the Acronym Institute.
Reports from Geneva
- The 2008 Meeting of Experts: The Final Day,
MX Report No.6, by Richard Guthrie, Monday 25 August 2008. Also
available in pdf format.
- The 2008 Meeting of Experts: The Fourth Day,
MX Report No.5, by Richard Guthrie, Thursday 21 August 2008. Also
available in pdf format.
- The 2008 Meeting of Experts: The Third Day,
MX Report No.4, by Richard Guthrie, Thursday 21 August 2008. Also
available in pdf format.
- The 2008 Meeting of Experts: The Second Day,
MX Report No.3, by Richard Guthrie, Wednesday 20 August 2008. Also
available in pdf format.
- The 2008 Meeting of Experts: The Opening Day,
MX Report No.2, by Richard Guthrie, Tuesday 19 August 2008. Also
available in pdf format.
- The 2008 Meeting of Experts: Biosecurity and
Education, MX Report No.1, by Richard Guthrie, Monday 18 August
2008. Also available in pdf format.
Further information on the meeting is available from the BioWeapons Prevention
Project website at www.bwpp.org/2008MX/MX2008Resources.html.
This paper provides detailed examples of different oversight mechanisms
that states parties might find helpful in identifying gaps in their existing
national oversight frameworks. It concludes with a discussion on the roles
of statutory and voluntary/self-governance mechanisms for life science
oversight, arguing that while statutory mechanisms are requisite to effective
oversight, informal monitoring systems also play a critical role.
Background Information
- The 2006 BWC Review Conference: The
President’s Reflections
by Masood Khan, Disarmament Diplomacy, No.84, Spring 2007
The President of the Sixth Biological and Toxin Weapons Review Conference
reflects on the factors that contributed to a significant success, with
lessons for future multilateral diplomacy.
- Rising Out of the Doldrums: Report
on the BWC Review Conference
by Richard Guthrie, Disarmament Diplomacy, No.84, Spring 2007
From the author of daily reports during the BWC conference, a detailed
assessment of the conduct and outcome, with annexes on the proposed
(but unadopted) Action Plans and civil society contributions.
- A Counter-Bioterrorism Strategy for
the new UN Secretary-General
by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Disarmament Diplomacy, No.84, Spring
2007
Argues for new multilateral approaches for dealing with bioterrorism,
including reorganisation and resourcing of the UN Secretary-General's
investigational capability to strengthen BWC compliance.
- Strategies to Prevent Bioterrorism:
Biosecurity Policies in the US and Germany, by Jonathan B.
Tucker, Disarmament Diplomacy, No.84, Spring 2007
A detailed comparison of US and German approaches for addressing biosecurity
in the age of international terrorism, drawing out the strengths and
weaknesses.
- Towards the BWC Review Conference:
Diplomacy Still in the Doldrums
by Nicholas A. Sims, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No.82, Spring
2006.
Reports back from the December meeting of BWC parties and looks ahead
to the challenges and opportunities facing the Sixth BWC Review Conference.
- Practical Steps to Accelerate BWC Universality
by Daniel Feakes, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No.82, Spring
2006.
Considers the obstacles to universality and proposes ways forward for
the BWC
For past coverage BWC-related issues, please see our BWC
archive page.
Useful Information and Links
Back to the Top of the Page
© 2009 The Acronym Institute.
|