Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 29, August - September
1998
Vers Une Défense Nouvelle:
Defence Policy Planning and Review in France
By Shaun Gregory
The announcement of a defence shake-up in France on 8 July (1), the
same day as the British Strategic Defense Review was published,
raises the issue of how other States plan and review their defence.
The French changes were neither strategic nor the product of a
genuine review and to understand them it is necessary to relate
them to the wider process of defence policy adaptation since the
end of the Cold War. This paper therefore briefly examines the
defence planning and review process in France from 1989, sets in
context and explains the 8 July restructuring, and offers some
thoughts about the strengths and weaknesses of the French system.
As in other Western States defence policy in France has been
under post-Cold War review for almost a decade. In that time France
has seen one President go and another arrive in 1995, three changes
of government (1993, 1995, 1997), and two periods of political
"cohabitation" (2) (1993-1995 and 1997 to date). Against this
background French defence policy has been articulated by a defence
white paper, the 1994 Livre Blanc sur la Défense (the
first for 22 years); four framework military planning laws, Loi
de Programmation Militaire (1990-1993, 1992-1994, 1995-2000 and
1997-2002); nine annual defence budgets, Projet de Budget du
Ministère de la Défense; and a major Presidential
initiative Une Défense Nouvelle 1997-2015.
Understanding the defence policy planning and review process in
France requires understanding the role of each of these elements,
their relationship to each other, and their relationship to the
political background against which they were conducted.
Before this can be done, however, it is worthwhile making two
general observations. Firstly, French defence policy has since the
1980s, and arguably a decade earlier, been the subject of a broad,
if at times imprecise, political and public consensus. As a result
while policy detail is extensively and often sharply debated the
underlying framework and consensual elements of defence policy are
largely not (3). This defence "consensus" flows from structural
elements such as French geography and from French history -
particularly the French Revolution and its aftermath which forged a
close bond between the army and people, the French Empire which
'globalised' French interests, and the pattern of invasion between
1814 and 1940 which seared a highly 'realist' and State-centred
concept of defence into the national strategic culture. It flows
also from the decisive intervention of General Charles de Gaulle
who through the constitution of the Fifth Republic and through the
force of his ideas established from the late 1950s a "Gaullist"
framework of thinking about defence around which the "consensus"
has subsequently accreted.
The "consensus" however has proved to be a double-edged sword,
lending France a certain stability and predictability in long-term
defence policy-making but imposing on France a particular rigidity
in seeking creative responses to a changing context. One of the
core dynamics of the post-Cold War evolution of French defence
policy has been the tensions inherent in adapting the Gaullist
framework to successive pressures, most importantly those from
geostrategic change, budgetary constraint, Europeanisation, and the
wider demands of multilateralism. France has been unwilling to
abandon Gaullist ideas but at the same time has come increasingly
to recognise their declining relevance in the new era. One can thus
observe the adherence to Gaullism in contemporary defence policy -
for example in the maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent,
non-integration with and distance from NATO, a global military role
commensurate with French rang and grandeur, and near
self-sufficiency in arms procurement (4) - and simultaneously find
many senior French analysts observing that "most of the ... defense
guidelines laid out by General Charles de Gaulle ... are simply no
longer relevant" (5).
Secondly, France has eschewed budget-led reform and chosen not
to make the kind of "peace dividend" cuts evident elsewhere amongst
NATO member States. The French defence budget has fallen only
relatively over the past decade or so slipping from 3.1% of GDP in
1986 to 2.4% in 1996 (6). In an expanding economy French defence
spending (volume des dépenses de défense)
actually increased in real terms between 1985 and 1995 by 2% while
over the same period it fell by 17% in the United States, 20% in
Britain, and 21% in Germany (7).
Both these strands - the rigidity of the "consensus" and the
relative budgetary stability - have been important elements
informing the review process which unfolded from 1989. This process
began with reforms led by the Defence Minister Jean-Pierre
Chevènement under the Armées 2000/ORION (8)
programmes. Armées 2000/ORION was essentially an
initiative to restructure the armed forces to simplify territorial
defence, enhance the French capacity to co-operate with European
allies (notably Germany), and improve inter-service operational
capability. To implement the changes the government enacted a new
Loi de Programmation Militaire for 1990-1993 to supercede
that of 1987-1991 (9), which curbed the growth of defence spending
but maintained both the range and balance of procurement
programmes.
Chevènement's changes were quickly overtaken by events
(the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union) which prompted a wide-ranging review of policy both
within the government and in the wider defence community. The
fruits of this strategic review became public through a new Loi
de Programmation Militaire which provided a detailed
prescription for defence spending between 1992 and 1994 and set a
broader framework of spending through to 1997 (10). The 1992-1994
Loi contained most of the key elements of French post-Cold
War defence policy and is arguably the seminal defence document of
the new era. Based on a changed assessment of the geostrategic
context and on threat perception orientated increasingly towards
"southern" issues (proliferation, regional instability,
low-intensity conflict, etc) it slowed down the French nuclear
modernisation programme, and boosted spending on
intelligence-gathering assets, and on supporting inter-service and
multinational military operations (11). Within the framework
established by the new Loi the defence reforms begun by
Chevènement were also taken forward, most notably through
the Optimar 95 project which restructured the French Navy,
shifted principal naval assets to the Mediterranean base at Toulon,
and orientated naval power increasingly towards projection into the
developing world (12).
The election of an opposition government in the spring of 1993
while President Mitterrand still had two years of office to run
took France into its second period of political "cohabitation" of
the Fifth Republic. Anxious to put its stamp on defence policy but
tempered by the constitutional dominance of the President in
defence and foreign policy matters the new government of Balladur
worked for a year to consolidate defence policy. In March 1994 the
new government plublised the second Livre Blanc sur la
Défense of the Fifth Republic (13). The Livre
Blanc is a detailed and extensive document which describes at
length the French view of the new geostrategic context and the
threats therein, the objectives of French defence policy, French
defence resources, and the relationship between defence and
society. It is addressed primarily to the French people (14) and is
a descriptive rather than prescriptive document. Its value is that
it identifies the key issues of central and medium-term interest to
France and describes how French policy is likely to evolve (through
to 2010). It is important also because it describes the consensus
elements of defence policy, self-evidently so since its publication
at a time of "cohabitation" meant it had to have cross-party
political support.
Its limitations, however, are stark: it sets no budget or
budgetary framework and as a consensus document it avoided almost
all of the hard questions (particularly those relating to Europe)
and areas of dispute between political left and right (15). In
substance it was consistent with the themes and ideas implicit in
the 1992 Loi and offered only the most general framework for
the future. In France Livre Blanc are far from from crucial
to either defence policy planning or implementation, a point
underlined by the fact that only two have appeared in forty years
and neither has been a strategically important document. An
informed view in France is that the 1994 Livre Blanc
appeared when it did not because it was a necessary part of the
defence policy-making process but rather because the Prime Minister
Eduoard Balladur, with presidential ambitions of his own for 1995,
wanted to put his name to a major national document so clearly
within the presidential purview to enhance his own credentials
(16).
To take forward the themes of the Livre Blanc the
government enacted a new Loi de Programmation Militaire for
the period 1995-2000. This maintained cross-party fidelity to the
major French projects of the 1990s - the Rafale fighter,
Triomphant-class submarines and M-5 missiles, Charles de
Gaulle aircraft carrier, LeClerc tank, Tigre
helicopter, and Helios intelligence satellite - and
continued the programme emphasis and balance established by the
1992 Loi (17).
In 1995 major political change occurred when fourteen years of
socialist rule came to an end with the Presidential victory of
centre-right RPR leader Jacques Chirac. With President and
government once more of the same political party Chirac and his
defence minister Charles Millon established a Strategic Committee
in July 1995 to undertake a second major review of defence policy.
The review was completed and its findings made public in February
1996 when Jacques Chirac unveiled Une Défense Nouvelle
1997-2015, which was for some the most radical shake-up of
defence policy since de Gaulle (18). The package included the
phased ending of conscription by 2002, ending more than 200 years
of policy continuity, and a far-reaching restructuring and
down-sizing of the French armed forces (19).
The elements of the latter included the scrapping of French
SRBMs and IRBMs to leave just a nuclear diad based on
Triomphant submarines and ASMP stand-off missiles and deep
cuts in force levels from 577,000 to 434,000 (including
particularly heavy cuts in the army from 270,000 to 170,000). It
included also the reorganisation of the armed forces around a "new
model army" centred on four missions: dissuasion based on
the nuclear deterrent; prevention, that is the avoidance and
defusing of threats to national interests through intelligence and
force prepositioning; power projection, the capacity to
project forces of up to 50-60,000 personnel into theatres around
the world for purposes from Gulf War-type scenarios to peacekeeping
and humanitarian intervention; and, protection, that is the
defence of France against terrorism, drugs, and so forth (20).
To accompany Une Défense Nouvelle the government
published a new Loi de Programmation Militaire for 1997-2002
(21) which proposed genuine cuts (to reflect the down-sizing) but
which left intact the major projects dominant since the late 1980s,
squaring the circle inter alia through project stretches and
purchase volume cutbacks. After the dust had settled it became
evident that Une Défense Nouvelle was not quite as
revolutionary as it first appeared to be. In substance it was
consistent with the themes evident in Armées
2000/ORION, the 1992 Loi and the 1994 Livre
Blanc. Its novelty - aside from the professionalisation of the
armed forces - lay in the depth and range of cuts rather than in a
radical revision or even a changed view of French security or
France's defence role. Even the "new model army" was entirely
consistent with the emphases evident in the 1994 Livre Blanc
and implict in the 1992 Loi.
After an initial honeymoon Chirac's presidency fell into rapid
decline and in the spring of 1997 a new socialist government under
Lionel Jospin was elected opening the Fifth Republic's third term
of "cohabitation". Ordinarily Presidential dominance would be
expected in defence matters but the weakness and drift of Chirac
(resulting inter alia from the disintegration of his
personal power base, divisions in his political party, political
scandals and low public approval ratings) has ceded considerable
latitude in defence matters to Jospin's government. After passing
an annual defence budget in 1997 which trimmed the spending
projected by the 1997-2002 Loi (22) (and alarmed defence-sector
unions) the Jospin government has become further emboldened in
1998. The shake-out announced on 8 July, with which we began this
paper, concentrates on cutting and restructuring the logistic and
support side of the armed forces (with the loss of 6,000 jobs) and
is really about bringing these elements into line with the needs of
the new smaller professional armed forces prefigured by Une
Défense Nouvelle. It consequently cannot be understood
as a strategic reappraisal nor a genuine review since none of the
basic parameters of Une Défense Nouvelle have been
examined or changed, but is rather a logical working through of the
process begun by Chirac in 1995.
Of greater significance is the government's September proposal
to facilitate parliamentary oversight of the defence budget by
providing costing details of each procurement programme rather than
simply handing parliament a lump sum figure for each branch of the
armed services (23). Itemised expenditure is expected to be
introduced in the summer of 1999 with the next annual budget and
represents an important, if still limited, shift away from
presidential dominance in defence and a necessary step towards
strengthening the checks and balances in an authoritarian area of
the constitution.
Reflecting on the foregoing allows us to draw at least two main
conclusions about the French defence planning and review process.
Firstly it is evident that the two periods of genuine strategic
review (1990-1992 and 1995-1996) have been periods of political
harmonisation between the president and government. Cohabitation
appears to preclude strategic thinking, confining the protagonists
to less disputed "consensus" ground.
Secondly defence policy is largely articulated and implemented
through the Loi de Programmation Militaire which serves as
the liaison between broader framework of policy such as the 1994
Livre Blanc and the 1996 Une Défense Nouvelle
and the annual defence budgets and which appears to be useful in
maintaining a certain fidelity to the overall objectives of French
defence policy. The Loi, however, is subject to at least two
pressures: it is prone to being undermined by subsequent annual
defence budgets (the 1997 annual budget of the Jospin
administration, for example, cut the spending set by the 1997-2002
Loi) and it is also prone to being superseded by an updated
Loi before its term is completed (the 1995-2000 Loi
for example was superseded within two year by the 1997-2002
Loi). Both issues are particularly relevant in a political
context such as that in France where medium-term planning and
seven-year presidential terms seem increasingly out of synch with a
volatile electorate.
The most glaring weakness of the French system is the
constitutional centralisation of defence policy in Presidential
hands which results (even in periods of cohabitation (24)) in power
being exercised through the Secrétariat
Général de la Défense Nationale subject to
little oversight or external influence even from parliament. On the
cusp of the 21st Century this is anachronistic and unworthy of a
State with profoundly democratic traditions. France could usefully
open up its processes in at least three ways: firstly it could
empower the checks and balances within the political system to
exercise tougher oversight and accountability in defence matters;
secondly it could provide greater transparency with respect to
defence programmes and expenditure to facilitate oversight and
accountability; and, thirdly it could widen the base of those
involved in debating defence matters at the highest levels.
Two features of the French system would appear to lend
themselves to export. The first is the stability of a three to five
year framework of defence spending such as that provided by the
Loi de Programmation Militaire. In a less volatile political
context and one not hampered by cohabitation or coalition such a
framework could have great utlity on both the demand and supply
side. The second is the concern of the French government to explain
defence thinking to the French public which arises from the direct
relationship (albeit eroding) in France between individual and
State. The latter is limited by not seeking wider input into French
defence policy, but is clearly preferable to a situation in which
few citizens are aware of what is being done in the name of their
defence.
Notes and References
1. Jacques Isnard, "La restructuration des armées
provoquera la suppression de 6000 emplois", Le Monde, 9 July
1998, p 9.
2. That is, a period when the President and government are from
different political parties.
3. There are of course exceptions. The Institut des Relations
Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), for example,
held a high-level conference on 16 October 1997 entitled Faut-il
Eliminer les Armes Nucléaires? which examined the basis
and questioned the revelance of the French nuclear arsenal.
4. The best analysis of Gaullist defence policy in English is
Philip Gordon, A Certain Idea of France, Princeton
University Press, 1993. This book can be most usefully read in
conjuction with its progenitor: Michael Harrison, The Reluctant
Ally: France and Atlantic Security, Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981.
5. See for example: Pierre Lellouche, "France in search of
security", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, p 122.
6. Jean-Raphael Alventosa, "Le Demarche Budgetaire et la
Programmation Militaire", Les Cahiers du Chear, Spring 1997,
pp 25-54.
7. Jean-François Couvrat, "Le Défense Coûte
52 Milliards en Trop au Budget", La Tribune, 27 June 1996, p
3.
8. Organisation Rationnelle d'une Infrastructure
Opérationnelle Nouvelle.
9. Jean-Michel Boucheron, Paix et Défense, Dunod,
1992, pp 228-246. See also: Jean François Lazerges,
"Armées 2000", Défense Nationale, May 1991, pp
25-40.
10. Jacques Isnard, "Programmation Militaire Française:
Un Pari sur l'Avenir", Défense et Armament
Internationale, September/October 1992, pp 18-21.
11. For a very detailed analysis of these changes see:
Boucheron, op cit, pp 268-466.
12. "Le Plan 'Optimar 95' ou la Restructuration de la Marine",
Air et Cosmos, 15-21 February 1993, p 32.
13. Livre Blanc sur la Défense, Documentation
Française, March 1994.
14. Explicitly so in the first paragraph of the introduction.
The government also made the Livre Blanc and a second
cheaper edition available [Union Générale d'Editions]
through bookstores and the French equivalent of HMSO.
15. For an insightful critique of some of these issues see:
Pierre M. Gallois, Livre Noir sur la Défense,
Editions Payot et Rivages, 1994.
16. I am indebted to Pascal Boniface for this insight.
17. Pierre Langereux, "613 MdF Pour la Défense
Française d'ici 2000", Air et Cosmos, 2-8 May 1994, p
20.
18. Une Défense Nouvelle 1997-2015,
Minstère de la Défense/SIRPA, February 1996.
19. The changes were significant enough to prompt the
publication of an explanation in the popular Que sais-je?
series of factual paperbacks. See: Jean-Luc Matthieu, La
Défense Nationale, Que sais-je?/PUF, June 1996.
20. A useful overview of these issues in English is:
Frédéric Drion. "France: New Defense for a New
Millenium", Parameters, Winter 1996/97, pp 99- 108. See
also: Special Issue, Armées Aujourd'hui, No 208,
March 1996 devoted to the new defence plan.
21. The full title of this Loi is: Projet de Loi Relatif
à la Programmation Militaire Pour les Années 1997
à 2002, Ministère de la Défense, May
1996.
22. Alexandra Schwartzbrod, "Défense: Un Budget Qui Sent
La Poudre", Libération, 20 August 1997, p 10.
23. J.A.C. Lewis, "France to Outline Procurement Plans", Jane's
Defence Weekly, 2 September 1998, p 13.
24. Even in periods of cohabitation the president and government
are not subject to real checks and balances from parliament or
anyone else, but rather are tempered by each other. For a useful
discussion of the limited role of parliament and an exploration of
some of the related issues see: "Point de Vue: Entretien avec
Xavier de Villepin", Relations Internationales et
Stratégiques, Spring 1994, pp 7-19.
Shaun Gregory is a Lecturer at the Department of Peace
Studies, University of Bradford, UK. He is grateful to the W. Alton
Jones Foundation for its support in his research on French defence
policy issues.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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