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Iran’s Nuclear Programme in a Dangerous Poker Game

In Natanz on April 9, to the sound of an orchestra playing a “nuclear symphony”, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proudly announced, “With great honour I declare that as of today our dear country has joined the nuclear club of nations and can produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.”

Just two weeks after the UN Security Council passed the latest - and toughest - of its resolutions, UNSCR 1747 (March 24, 2007), Ahmadinejad has once again upped the stakes in this deadly game of nuclear poker that Iran is playing with the world.

As officials from the countries in the so-called P-5 plus 1 (Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States), as well as the European Union’s High Representative for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solanas, expressed their concern about this acceleration of Iran’s nuclear fuel programme, some experts expressed scepticism. The view that Ahmadinejad could be bluffing as much for domestic purposes as to defy international opinion was partly based on knowledge of Iran’s technology and partly a consequence of the fact that Iranian officials refused to specify how many centrifuges were operating in the “industrial” cascade. (Last October, Iran had boasted that it would have 3,000 centrifuges operating by February 2007 - with the potential of enriching enough uranium for one bomb, though that would require several additional, complex steps)

A game that in its first 15 years resembled subtle chess, full of lures and feints, has now revealed itself as a no-holds-barred game of nuclear poker. In Amadinejad, Iran’s got a new kind of player, with a street-fighter’s wits and a smooth tongue. He displays showily to the Iranian people (perhaps to distract from his poor performance as an economic provider) and appears prepared to make sacrifices (on their behalf) to win his main prize - nuclear independence and regional status. Where his predecessors played quietly and cautiously, Ahmadinejad keeps upping the stakes - 164 centrifuges one day, and the boast of “industrial-scale enrichment” a year later. He gives the appearance of staking his whole country on the hope that enough other parties will believe that his hand doesn’t threaten their interests. He keeps his cards close to his chest, but some watchers believe he has a few extra - knaves or aces? - hidden up his sleeve.

Like a cowboy in a Wild West movie, the United States has repeatedly called Iran a cheat. It has now placed its gun menacingly on the table, but with so many bullets expended so unwisely in Iraq, no-one knows if it is still loaded. Iran assumes it isn’t, as the US keeps trying to get the Sheriff’s Council (on which the P-5 sit) to play judge and jury; some warnings were issued, but Iran is still in the game and has upped the stakes again. Around the table, other players try to persuade Iran that it will stand to lose far less if it shows its full hand (and folds) now. But as Iran ups the stakes yet again, this is looking more and more like a poker game ‘to the death’.

Since Disarmament Diplomacy reviewed the news on Iran a year ago, events have moved further towards a proliferation point of no return. Then, we noted that there is a bitter power struggle underway between Iranian ‘moderates’, who seek to defuse the conflicts and want to find sustainable diplomatic solutions, and President Ahmadinejad. Now it’s looking as if Ahmadinejad has outmanoeuvred his rivals. He has continued to ‘play’ a weakened United States, while recently also heaping embarrassment on Tony Blair’s government with the arrest and then public release of some British sailors and marines as an ‘Easter gift’.

The dilemma for the international community is that the imposition of sanctions or the use of force would help Ahmadinejad to win his domestic power struggle and neutralise the rational opposition and moderates. Iran could weather sanctions more easily than most, so their imposition by the Security Council may well backfire, discrediting the United Nations in the eyes of many Iranians and making it impossible for IAEA inspections to be resumed. By reinforcing domestic opinion that sees Iran as being unfairly treated, the sanctions approach risks strengthening Ahmadinejad’s position and neutralising the opposition, potentially even allowing him to portray them in traitors’ clothes.

Ahmadinejad’s outbursts against Israel are not representative of the majority view of educated Iranians, but they seem to be deliberately timed to undermine efforts by Iranian moderates to defuse the crisis and work with the IAEA, the EU-3 or P-5 plus 1. By contrast, his threats to withdraw from the NPT have appeared to gain more currency in Iran, as Bush’s weakness in Iran and bellicose policies backfire and play into the hands of the extremists. Regional security and nonproliferation would be severely undermined if anyone were foolish enough to take military action.

At present there is no clear evidence of nuclear weapons development. The configuration of Iran’s nuclear programme and its missile tests feed suspicions that everything is being put in place to provide a nuclear weapon option for future decision. In deciding how to take the issue forward, the Security Council needs to be very careful not to fall into the trap that policy mistakes have already dug: the more Iranians feel themselves to be under threat from US-led hostilities, the more they will regard nuclear weapons as a legitimate deterrent or defence.

Reporting Iran to the Security Council was probably premature, but now that it is done, the UN has a difficult dilemma. It must appear to respond to Iran’s repeated defiance, while being careful not to drive Iran further into isolation, which would suit the agenda of the hard-liners. To fail to act risks undermining UN authority and credibility, and will feed perceptions that the NPT and UN are weak and ineffectual - reminiscent of the inability to deal effectively with North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT.

The past year’s developments

June 6, 2006: EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) put their proposals to Iran

The EU-3 and Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, including non-proliferation, put their package to Iran on June 6, 2006, as follows [excerpts]:

“To develop relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and to prepare for a fresh start in negotiations of a comprehensive agreement to that end, to be deposited with the IAEA and endorsed in a Security Council resolution:

The International Community will:

- reaffirm Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in line with Art IV of the NPT and in conformity with its international obligations, and political support for development of a civil nuclear programme;

- actively support activities in accordance with Iran's civil nuclear plan, including the building of new light water reactors in Iran through joint projects, within the framework of the IAEA and in accordance with its Statute;

- agree to suspend discussions of Iran's file at the Security Council on resumption of negotiations.

Iran will:

- commit to address the outstanding issues and all other international concerns through full cooperation with the IAEA;

- suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and commit to continue this during these negotiations;

- resume implementation of the Additional Protocol.

....

Possible Measures in the Event that Iran does not cooperate:

In the event that Iran does not co-operate with the international community, we would adopt proportionate measures, selected from the following list, in order to give effect to the decisions of the international community. Where appropriate, these measures would be adopted under Chapter VII Article 41 of the UN Charter.

Measures Targeted Against Iran's Nuclear and Missiles Programmes

a) Embargo on export of goods and technologies relevant to these programmes.

b) Freeze of assets and ban on financial transactions of organisations and/or individuals involved in these programmes.

c) Travel/visa ban on individuals related to these programmes.

d) Suspension of technical co-operation with the IAEA.

e) Ban on investment against entities associated with these industries.

f) Ban on Iranians from studying abroad disciplines related to nuclear and missile development.

Political and Economic Measures

g) Reduction/freeze of bilateral contacts.

h) Visa/travel ban on selected high-ranking officials and personalities.

i) Freeze of assets of individuals and organisations connected to or close to the regime.

j) Arms embargo against Iran.

k) Embargo on exports of specific products (e.g. refined oil/gas products) to Iran.

l) End support for Iran's WTO Membership Application.

m) Prohibition on co-operation/investment in Iran in certain sectors.

n) General freeze of assets of Iranian financial institutions.

o) Reduction in government support for trade and export credit insurance to Iran.”

July 18, 2006: President Ahmadinejad reiterates his threat to withdraw Iran from the NPT if it is put under unacceptable pressure. This follows reports that a majority of the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) voted in May to withdraw from the NPT if denied the right to enrich uranium.

July 31, 2006: UN Security Council Resolution 1696 on Non-proliferation (Iran)

UNSCR 1696 passed: it demands that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and that this be verified by the IAEA, and it gives Iran a deadline of August 31, 2006 to comply with the resolution. If Iran fails to accede to the ultimatum, the resolution requires the Security Council to discuss implementation of punitive measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Mid-August, 2006: Even as Israel conducts its destabilising and counterproductive war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran heightens regional tensions by staging some large-scale wargames, in which it test-fires a number of surface-to-surface missiles . These Zolfaqar manoeuvres follow the Holy Prophet Exercises which were conducted during April.

August 22, 2006: Iran gives 21-page written response to the EU-3 proposals, and expresses a willingness to hold “serious talks” with the P-5+1 (Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States).

Iran says its reply follows “examination by expert groups”. It regards the June 2006 proposals “as containing useful foundations and capacities for comprehensive and long-term cooperation between the two sides...” but contains “questions and ambiguities regarding guarantees of [Iran’s] rights”. Iran said it was “prepared for removing concerns of the two sides through negotiations and receiving clarifications on the nature, extent, approach, level, duration and depth of issues in the offer such as real and practical cooperation in development of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program including light and heavy water reactors, and exercise of Iran’s right to achieve nuclear energy inclusive of the fuel cycle and continuation of research and development in uranium enrichment.” Iran “is ready for ‘long term cooperation’ in security, economic and political and energy areas in order to achieve ‘sustainable security in the region’ and ‘long term energy security’”. It “always considers that the resolution of all issues may be possible through negotiation and engagement.”

In an unmistakable reference to the United States, Iran talked of being “seriously skeptical towards sincerity of at least some members of the 5+1 in their declared intention to establish comprehensive relations and cooperative exchanges” and “believes... that these governments should come forward with assurances, commitments and indications that demonstrate revision in past behavior and absence.”

The statement then set out a list of terms and conditions for engagement and continued: “Beyond all this, the proposal lacks any reference to irreversible and irrevocable guarantees which should be attached to the undertakings. Such guarantees are particularly essential on access to advanced nuclear technology and equipment, erection and commissioning of nuclear power reactors, nuclear fuel supply, and transfer of know-how and technology. For Iran, it should become clear that the undertakings of our counterparts would become permanent, with no right or possibility to their termination or limitation, in the context of export controls, NSG, domestic laws and regulations, and the procedures of the IAEA and the United Nations.”

“The package also lacks appropriate consideration of ‘negotiation itself’, which is central to the proposal. Ambiguities in this regard are abundant.... Iran is prepared, as a first step, to fully cooperate in agreeing on the scope and elements of the negotiations. We suggest that our first goal should be agreement on terms of reference, a set of guidelines or a joint statement which would serve to give clear direction to the negotiations. This would underscore the firm and common will of all parties for a just and treaty-based settlement of the nuclear issue through well-defined negotiations....”

Reiterating its complaint that the EU-3 proposal was “ambiguous” Iran then identified “two main processes for resolving the nuclear issue”: “...Iran’s interaction and collaboration with the IAEA...[and] negotiations between Iran and its counterparts”.

Calling the nuclear issue “three pronged: First: Rights and responsibilities of the parties toward each other and the actions they should undertake in accordance with the NPT and the IAEA; Second: Transparency, normalization and conclusion of the issue at the [IAEA]; Third: Confidence building by both sides in all areas including security issues.”

A final section appears to have been authored or translated by a different hand, and notes: Iran also insists that the other parties’ commitment to NPT be considered as one of the basic principles for the negotiations. It is self-evident that any decision to be party to an international treaty is based on presumption that the other parties abide by its rules. Moreover, all members have equal rights and responsibilities-according to the IAEA rules-towards the other members’ abidance. That is also logical that one member can only expect abidance from others, commensurate to his own.”

Iran further demands, “suspension of Iran’s dossier in the security council during the negotiation period by the other party, and suspension of enrichment activities by Iran through negotiations....”

Nowhere in the response does Iran offer to suspend enrichment. It focusses on an offer to negotiate with the EU-3 or P-5+1, but says that: “This step will be conditional on simultaneous steps by other party to show that it does not intend to deprive or limit I.R. Iran. These steps specifically include the following:

• Termination of Iran’s dossier in the security council and returning it to the IAEA
• Normalization of Iran’s nuclear case at the IAEA
• The other party commits itself not to pursue the limitation of Iran’s peaceful activities as the result of the negotiations, but to aim for achieving the mutually agreed methods to provide more assurances on the peaceful nature and non-diversion of these activities.
• All members of the P5+1 accept as a show of goodwill to abandon all restrictions that they practice beyond the legal international norms in different areas...

Iran offers (under specified conditions) to “facilitate the necessary working conditions for IAEA’s inspections for clarification of the ambiguities... and if deemed necessary, would consider voluntary steps towards implementation of the Additional Protocol, given the provision of the legal conditions.”

Further on, Iran “underlines that the cooperation with the IAEA, requires drawing up a comprehensive and logical framework for the whole work and related procedures, which is agreed upon by Iran and the IAEA. This framework should comprise certain significant aspects, including:

• To be bounded in the framework of technical and legal standards and not to be influenced by political motives and pressures, and not by problematic inclination and intelligent demands of the parties outside the IAEA.
• Setting the assessment criteria for the IAEA in a normal and non-discriminatory manner, based on the principle of innocence. In other words, inability to find any affirmative indications after due course or ordinary technical and legal examinations, is to be considered nonexistence of undeclared nuclear activities or materials.
• Suspension of discussion on Iran’s nuclear case in the IAEA board of governors until the presentations of the director general’s final report, according to the declared time-table.”

Iran said it would be “ready to implement, voluntarily, the [IAEA] Additional Protocol, with provision of legal conditions, if the above mentioned requirements are met: Iran’s case is only pursued in the IAEA, and any intervention of the security council or other entities are ceased.

Though its response rejected the package as inadequate, Iran held open the door to negotiations, but hedged these around with many conditions - which may have been genuine, but which Iran must have known that at least some members of the P-5+1 group would not be able to accept.

For its part, Iran complained bitterly about UNSCR 1696: “This hasty and unwarranted action at the Security Council impaired the path of negotiation and understanding. As a result, good faith of Iran’s interlocutors is in serious doubt. Many in Iran believe now that the package was aimed at stalemating diplomacy and instigating pressure in place of understanding, cooperation and improvement of relations that it claimed. The adverse implications of this major misstep are not easily rectifiable as confidence in the intentions of the other side is in serious jeopardy.”

We reiterate and emphasize that Iran’s nuclear program has never diverted from its Peaceful [sic] course. The issue has, therefore, never been viewed as a matter of security in our perspective. Preoccupation over security in our region is, on the other hand, the common concern of all responsible states. Clear signals and statements, however, indicating sincere intentions of the other sides for negotiations and understanding on these concerns are not yet evident......

Conversely, a legal and fair approach, entailing unimpeded access to peaceful nuclear technology, would prompts transparency and full monitoring. We have no interest in limiting or suspending inspections of our nuclear facilities and activities. We believe that you also... have not any reason to deprive Iran of peaceful nuclear capabilities and to embark on hostile means. Everything hinges now on your interest, inclination and intention. A quarter of a century of denial and deprivation has lead Iran to pursue it nuclear program on the basis of independence and self-reliance. Years of hardship, tireless effort, and extensive expenses have now borne fruit as Iran has achieved indigenous capabilities in all areas of this industry....” ...

August 31, 2006: Iran is defiant as it fails to meet the target date and ultimatum in UNSCR 1696.

October 3-6, 2006: negotiations between Iran and EU-3 hit stalemate and US pushes harder for sanctions against Iran.

October-November 2006: Overshadowed by the North Korean nuclear test, UNSC has difficulty agreeing sanctions, while Iran continues to expand its uranium enrichment programme. US and Iran each conduct military manoeuvres and wargames in the Gulf.

December 23, 2006: After tense negotiations in the UNSC, the US and EU-3 agree to dilute the sanctions in order to bring Russia and China on board, and Resolution 1737 is agreed. This gives Iran 60 days to suspend all its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and also work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA.

UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), Non-proliferation, December 23, 2006

UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on December 23, 2006, S/RES/1737 (2006)*.

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006)...

Reaffirming its commitment to the [NPT] and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...

Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran’s nuclear programme..

Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General’s report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran’s nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General’s report of 28 April 2006...

Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General’s reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,

Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear nonproliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,

Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696... and with [IAEA] requirements.. and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;

2. Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:

(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and

(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;

3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:

(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;

(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:

(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;

(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;

(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;

(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;

(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;

5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:

(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and

(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and

(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;

6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;

7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

8. Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;

9. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran’s technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:

(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and

(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein “the Annex”), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;

11. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

12. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;

13. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;

(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

14. Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

15. Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:

(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;

(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;

16. Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;

17. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

18. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;

(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;

(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;

(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;

(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;

(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;

19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;

20. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

21. Welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;

22. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;

23. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

24. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;...

UN Security Council Resolution 1747, March 24, 2007

Resolution 1747 (2007), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on March 24, 2007, UN Security Council, S/RES/1747 (2007).

The Security Council,

Recalling... its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions... [several preambular paragraphs similar to previous resolutions]

...

Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006)...

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

2. Calls upon all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;

3. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;

5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of arms;

7. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes;

8. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;

9. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

10. Welcomes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and acknowledges with appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;

11. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;

12. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

13. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

April 9, 2007: Iran announces “industrial scale enrichment”. International experts express scepticism, as Iranian officials refused to say whether Iran had managed to operate the 3,000 centrifuges that they boasted would be up and running by February 2007.

Written and compiled by Rebecca Johnson

Documents available at http://www.acronym.org.uk or United Nations, http://www.un.org.

© 2007 The Acronym Institute.