Disarmament Diplomacy

Weapons of Terror: The Report of the WMD Commission One Year On

Hans Blix

In June 2006, I presented the final report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), which it had been my privilege to head since the beginning of 2004. I think the report, titled Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, has a very helpful role to play in the current international disarmament and non-proliferation debate.

Initiated by the late Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh, after a proposal by Jayantha Dhanapala, outgoing United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, the Commission consisted of fourteen experts on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation from all parts of the world.[1] We aimed at providing a road map for moving forward, and espoused some valid but still unimplemented ideas and initiatives from the past, as well as coming up with ideas of our own. Altogether, the report presented 60 recommendations, half of which deal with nuclear weapons.

The WMDC report urged governments to wake up from what former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, had called "sleepwalking into new arms races", and to revive arms control and disarmament. Kofi Annan's quote describes the situation quite well. In the post cold war era we ought to be able to agree on measures to reduce the risks of a new wave of arms races and proliferation and speed up disarmament efforts. Instead, we have stagnation in disarmament and arms control, combined with a deleterious situation in which the nuclear weapon states are renewing and modernising their arsenals, North Korea has tested a nuclear device, and Iran seeks to develop a capability to enrich uranium. In Russia and China the US plans for a missile shield have raised concerns over a potential loss of their deterrent capability. In addition, a nuclear deal between the United States and India risks fuelling tensions with China and Pakistan. If not coupled with effective measures to prevent further Indian production of fissile material for weapons, this may deal a severe blow to the international nonproliferation regime and exacerbate an Asian nuclear arms race.

Headlines tend to focus on proliferation risks - Iran, North Korea, and the threat of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons. While this attention is justified, the WMD Commission also wanted to remind the world of the dangers represented by the existing nuclear warheads in the world, in the hands of the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea - currently some 27,000. While agreeing that nuclear weapons may be particularly dangerous in some hands, the Commission takes the view that nuclear weapons are actually dangerous in any and all hands. As long as someone possesses nuclear weapons, others will want them. And as long as any such weapons remain, the risk that they will be used, by accident or by design, will be present.

When our final report was launched, a little over one year ago, multilateral negotiations on disarmament were deep frozen. International security had experienced a number of setbacks in the year prior to our launch. Tensions between states resulted in the failures at the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May 2005 and the subsequent UN Summit in New York the same year, during which delegates could not agree on a single sentence about arms control and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. The stage onto which the report was launched was anything but inviting, with a backdrop that included: a decade of nonexistent substantive work at the Geneva Conference of Disarmament (CD), the principal international forum for negotiations on issues related to weapons of mass destruction; talk of modernisation and renewal of existing nuclear arsenals; and the inability of the international community to handle effectively the few cases of nuclear proliferation around the corner.

One year has passed since the launch of the report, and I have spent the better part of it travelling around the world to present our conclusions and recommendations to governments and political leaders, think tanks and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The Synopsis, Chairman's Preface and recommendations of the WMDC report were included in an official UN Document (A/60/934) and thereby translated into all official UN languages. In addition, the full report has been translated into Chinese, Japanese, Russian and Spanish. Translations into Arabic and Finnish are underway, and other languages are contemplated. My hope is that the report will continue to reach an increasingly broad audience and that it will stimulate thought and debate worldwide.

Although support for our conclusions has not been - and was not been expected to be - universal, the reception has been overwhelmingly positive, not only for the recommendations, but just as much for the reasoning. Earlier this year, a number of American NGOs[2] presented an assessment of the WMDC Report entitled: "Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security", focussing on US nuclear policy and the relevance of our recommendations in the American context. I am very grateful to them, as such analyses are an important contribution to our work and exactly the kind of response that we were hoping for.

While it is difficult to engage in concrete measurement of the impact of our report, let me give a general view of the state of affairs in the world, in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The past year has been eventful. In January 2007, the famous 'Doomsday Clock' of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was moved to 11.55 - the closest to doomsday since the cold war. We appear to be witnessing a renewed cold war atmosphere in relations between the United States and Russia over plans to install components of a US missile shield - radar tracking and missile interceptors - in the Czech Republic and Poland. In January, China tested its space-war capabilities by shooting down one of its own satellites. There has been a heated debate over the proposed US-India nuclear technology deal. And in March, we witnessed the preliminary decision by the United Kingdom to renew the submarines for its Trident nuclear weapons system and so retain a nuclear weapons capability far beyond 2020.

Two cases of non-compliance have been at the centre stage of international attention during the past year - North Korea and Iran. Rather different approaches have been taken towards these challenges.

In October 2006, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, reducing speculation about its technological capacity. While not demonstrating the level of sophistication needed for weapons use, the test was a serious blow to international non-proliferation efforts. However, after a period of hard words and sabre-rattling, negotiations were reinvigorated under the auspices of the Six Party Talks; and North Korea, at least for now, seems to be going along with international requests to disable its nuclear programme in exchange for security guarantees, diplomatic relations and oil and financial aid. At the time of this writing, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had visited the Yongbyon and four other nuclear facilities (including the reprocessing plant). The inspectors reported that all five had been shut down.

The approach to drawing North Korea back from the proliferation brink is in line with the proposals put forward in the WMDC Report - diplomatic pressure combined with an incentive in the form of attractive offers of security assurances, normalisation of relations and economic support to reward compliance. There may be many further hurdles - not least in the field of inspection - and the final outcome remains to be seen, but there is hope that these efforts to bring North Korea back to the international community will be followed by further constructive progress and a credible, verified renunciation of weapons of mass destruction

In the case of Iran, developments have been heading in a different direction. While an attractive package was offered to North Korea, the international community has taken a more confrontational approach to Iran. By determining that the Iranian programme for enrichment of uranium constituted a threat against international peace and security and demanding that Iran must suspend it before talks about a package of rewards can begin, the Security Council painted itself into a corner from which it now has difficulties finding a way out. Iran feels humiliated by the treatment and fears it would lose face if it were to suspend the programme now. The international community on the other hand is running out of options. Economic pressure has so far only been marginally effective; military measures to enforce the decision of the Security Council would be disastrous, and are in any case now unlikely, given the failures in Iraq.

To ensure compliance with the NPT, our Commission has stressed the need to understand why states seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and we put emphasis on work to remove proliferation incentives. In Iran's case, I feel that analysis by the key governments has so far been inadequate in this regard. We have to get it right, because failure with Iran could create serious risks of escalation and long-term domino effects in the region.

So, are we on the brink of nuclear disaster? We often hear warnings that the NPT - the global instrument through which states committed themselves against the acquisition of nuclear weapons and for nuclear disarmament - now risks collapse. The good news is that the world is not replete with would-be violators. The overwhelming commitment to the Treaty remains tremendously valuable. Libya and Iraq were both found to be in violation and brought back into observance. With regard to North Korea and Iran, the world is actively seeking solutions. For now, at least, there appear to be no other problematic cases.

Still, the dangers are there, and the Treaty is under strain. The global process of arms control and disarmament has stagnated and needs to be revived and pursued in parallel with efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to more states and to terrorist movements. Preventing further proliferation is essential, but it is hardly a recipe for success to preach to the rest of the world that they must stay away from the very weapons that nuclear states claim are indispensable for their own security.

What would a broad programme of global disarmament look like? Let me sketch some of the recommendations of the WMDC, starting with two measures to improve the processes and institutions.

Improving disarmament machinery

Given the challenges in arms control, we need to reset the stage for a credible multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation process. The CD has been unable to adopt an agenda for almost a decade. As a result, during this time no substantive issues have been discussed or negotiated in the conference. This is the unsatisfactory result of a consensus requirement that has its roots in cold war practices. The UN General Assembly can take up disarmament items by simple majority decisions. There is no good reason why the CD should not be able to make administrative and procedural decisions, including the adoption of a programme of work, by a qualified majority of two thirds of the membership present and voting.

Secondly, a new and visible start could be made if the General Assembly convened a World Summit on disarmament, nonproliferation, and terrorist threats from weapons of mass destruction. Thorough preparations would be necessary and planning should start as soon as possible.

To make substantive progress

Substantive measures to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of existing arsenals formed the main thrust of the Commission's report.

No measure, the Commission underlined, could be more important than bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force. For this, ratification is required by the 44 states listed in annex II to the Treaty. Ten of these ratifications are currently missing - China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States. The entry into force of the CTBT is vital for efforts to prevent the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons, and to help reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence in security policies. The entry into force of the CTBT would reset the clock for global nuclear disarmament, signalling to the world that leading states, once again, stand firmly behind their commitments to disarmament.

Despite the reluctance of some key states to ratify the CTBT, there is a strong political barrier against testing. Since the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996, only India, Pakistan and - just recently - North Korea, have conducted tests. The reaction from the international community has been almost unanimous condemnation. The testing of a plutonium device by North Korea on October 9, 2006 was unanimously condemned by the Security Council - as were the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998. Notably, the North Korean test was explicitly held by the Security Council to constitute a threat to international peace and security and sanctions were imposed.

The second most urgent issue is to reach agreement on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons. Combined with a continued reduction in the number of existing nuclear weapons, a verified closing of the tap for more weapon-usable fissile material would contribute to reducing the world inventory of bombs. A draft of a cut-off treaty has been presented in Geneva. Although it has crucial weaknesses - notably, the absence of a provision for international verification - it should be welcomed as a draft and discussed further.

Steps could further be taken by all nuclear-weapon states to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals. The United States and Russia, which have the most weapons, should take the lead. All states that have nuclear weapons should commit themselves categorically to a policy of no first use, and the United States and Russia should reciprocally take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. With increasing cooperation between Russia and the European Union, Russian nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from forward deployment to central storage, and all US nuclear weapons should be withdrawn to American territory.

If reliance on nuclear power increases, as is expected, the need for a greater production of low-enriched uranium fuel and for the disposal of spent fuel can be anticipated. This must occur in a manner that does not increase the risks of proliferation and the diversion of nuclear materials. Various proposals are on the table, and the possibilities should be explored for international arrangements to ensure the availability of nuclear fuel for civilian reactors while minimizing the risk of weapon proliferation. The IAEA, where these matters are currently discussed, is the most suitable forum for such exploration. The production of highly enriched uranium should be phased out.

Regional approaches should be pursued, especially in areas of tension. It would be desirable to obtain commitments from the states in the Middle East (including Iran and Israel) to accept a verified suspension of the production of enriched uranium and plutonium for a prolonged period of time, while obtaining international assurances of the supply of fuel for civilian nuclear power. Similar arrangements are foreseen for the Korean peninsula.

Lastly, international professional inspections, as have been practised by the United Nations, the IAEA, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), remain an important and effective tool for verification, and should be utilized and developed. Such inspections do not conflict with national means of verification. Rather, these two fact-finding methods can supplement each other. Many states have no national means that they can use and should not have to be dependent upon the intelligence gathering of other states. States that do operate such intelligence resources may, in one-way-traffic arrangements, provide information to the international verification systems. International reports can also offer governments a chance for a quality check on their national systems and corroboration of their conclusions.

US leadership for collective progress

When we presented the results of our work, we did not expect immediate results. Our mandate was to outline the possible next steps and to give concrete and practical form to the long-term vision of a world free from weapons of mass destruction. I believe we have done that. We hope that NGOs, think tanks, and the general public and media will debate the proposals and issues we have dealt with. It will be for governments to move to political action.

The transformation of the international context during the last decades, not least developments towards increasing global interdependence and revolutionary technological progress in the fields of information and transportation, have fundamentally changed the threats to our security and the means needed for defence against these threats. The world missed an historic opportunity at the end of the cold war, to formulate a new global agenda for peace - 'a new world order', if you will. Instead nations embarked on a new road leading in an old direction.

New enemies and threats were perceived and projected with traditional rhetoric and approaches. But the security threats of today cannot be met by a cold war approach to security. We need cool headed analysis of the real challenges ahead, and modern responses to counter the threats. Nuclear weapons have no meaningful role in the fight against international terrorism or in efforts to stop atrocities in ethnic conflicts. There is no conceivable use for nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect has been shown to be limited. In regions where deterrence is still asserted as a basis for security, other measures, such as reintegration into the international community, are likely to be more promising.

In January 2007, former US Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, together with former Secretary of Defence William Perry, who was also a member of our Commission, and former Senator Sam Nunn, published an article in the Wall Street Journal entitled "Nuclear Madness". In it they proposed a number of concrete measures to be taken to reduce the dangers of existing nuclear weapons and adjust the international approach to security to a modern analysis of threats - all of which were also dealt with in our report. This article, and the discussions it has provoked, are indicative of movement within the United States that prompt the question: is America getting ready to reoccupy the driver's seat in international efforts for arms control and disarmament?

Much will depend on the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled for November 2008. In the July/August edition of Foreign Affairs, Democratic presidential candidate, Senator Barack Obama, declared his support for the general premise of the Wall Street Journal piece, including the need to achieve a bipartisan consensus behind ratifying the CTBT and to work towards securing ratification by other key states. Is this something that other top Democratic and Republican candidates would also consider?

It would be interesting to hear the issue of arms control and disarmament debated in the upcoming presidential elections. In all key issues discussed above, the United States has decisive leverage. It is worrying that, while new threats to global and human security are rapidly emerging, its focus remains on the old threats and military approaches. Some of the most important challenges of our time are to recognize our new interdependence, to cooperate to counter the threats against the global environment, and to contain our capacity for war and destruction. We must revive disarmament and redouble our efforts to prevent further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The next President of the United States will have a new opportunity to gain congressional support for US ratification of the CTBT - and to reclaim American leadership in building international cooperative security. The world is ready to follow - is the US ready to lead?

Notes

[1] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Alexei G Arbatov, Marcos de Azambuja, Alyson Bailes, Jayantha Dhanapala, Gareth Evans, Patricia Lewis, Masashi Nishihara, William J. Perry, Vasantha Raghavan, Cheikh Sylla, Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Pan Zhenqiang.

[2] Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, Western States Legal Foundation, Reaching Critical Will (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom).

Dr. Hans Blix is the Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC). He served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1981-1997) and Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 2000-2003.

The full report of the WMDC can be downloaded from the Commission website: www.wmdcommisison.org, or ordered from the WMDC secretariat: secretariat [at] wmdcommission.org.

See also: WMDC Recommendations.

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© 2007 The Acronym Institute.