Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 87, Spring 2008
Stagnation and Redundancy: Report on the 2007 UN First
Committee
Michael Spies
See also: 2007 First Committee
Resolutions, Summary and Explanations, compiled by Michael
Spies
The 62nd session of the UN General Assembly
First Committee, chaired by Ambassador Paul Badji of Senegal,
breezed through all items on its agenda within its allocated four
weeks (October 8 to November 2), approving 49 draft resolutions and
3 draft decisions. All but one of these were subsequently adopted
by the General Assembly on 5 December 2007.
Ambassador Badji in his closing remarks extolled the "spirit of
openness and collaboration" that he said prevailed during the
session, and pointed to the fact that 142 delegations spoke and
more than 315 statements were delivered. However, Ambassador Badji
pointed to persistent and entrenched differences among states and
tellingly declined to answer his own question as to whether or not
the 2007 session of the Committee had advanced the cause of
disarmament and international security.
Ray Acheson, who coordinated the publication of the NGO First
Committee Monitor and worked closely with the author in
preparation of this Disarmament Diplomacy report, summed the
Committee's work up as "underwhelming". [See www.reachingcriticalwill.org
for the Monitor and texts of most resolutions and statements.] The
vast bulk of the Committee's work - the positions of governments,
the contents of resolutions, the breakdown of votes - remained
largely unchanged from previous years. Three new resolutions were
introduced, of which two - on nuclear de-alerting and depleted
uranium munitions - sparked useful and challenging debates.
Characterized by some as the "consensus-building" body of the UN
disarmament machinery, the First Committee in 2007 adopted only 24
texts by consensus, meaning that disagreements among members forced
it to vote on more than half of the items on its agenda.
Nuclear weapons issues continued to be the most divisive issue;
only two out of fourteen resolutions were adopted by consensus, and
five of the other texts that received large nonaligned majorities
were opposed by significant blocs of other governments. One notable
exception this year was a new resolution, introduced by New Zealand
on behalf of a selective coalition of states, calling for a
reduction in the operational readiness of nuclear weapons. This
controversial resolution was adopted by a clear majority that
included six members of NATO, and most importantly, it generated
considerable debate, discussion and attention both inside the
Committee and in the real world outside.
Progress on other nuclear weapons priorities, as manifested by
action in the First Committee, was thwarted as the outcome of
nearly all other issues remained unchanged or regressed from last
year. On the issue of a treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons, the Canadian delegation again found
itself unable to garner consensus on a simple draft decision to put
the issue on the agenda for next year. As for the resolution on the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the three
'omnibus' nuclear disarmament resolutions from Japan, the New
Agenda Coalition and Myanmar (Burma), little has changed from last
year. Usually less contentious than resolutions focusing on the
disarmament obligations of nuclear weapon states, half of the six
resolutions dealing with nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) required
votes to be taken.
The work of the Committee occurred against the backdrop of, and
was affected by, two political challenges that bear on issues
related to non-proliferation and so-called strategic stability:
Iran's nuclear programme, and the US/NATO-Russian dispute over
missile defences and NATO expansion in Europe, which has imperilled
the treaties on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE). Action in the Committee on these issues was
largely limited to discussion in the general and themed
debates.
In contrast to nuclear weapons issues, the three resolutions
dealing with other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), and preventing terrorist acquisition of WMD -
were all adopted by consensus. Other areas of the Committee's work
also continued to be less contentious than nuclear weapons, with
only isolated states or groups of states blocking consensus. In
this context, the United States resumed its now established role of
Main Spoiler, casting the solitary vote against eleven resolutions,
including both resolutions on outer space security. It also voted
against eight other resolutions and decisions in a minority bloc of
six states or less.
On conventional weapons issues, what progress took place often
occurred outside the First Committee session and was otherwise not
reflected in action taken by the Committee. One example of this was
the ongoing process to take action against cluster munitions. The
Committee avoided dealing with this issue because delegations were
still debating which venue would be most appropriate for
negotiating an instrument to deal with these pernicious weapons.
Another example was the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which proceeded
through the mechanism of states submitting their views about its
potential scope to the Secretary-General. Although many delegations
addressed the pros and cons of an ATT in the general and themed
debates, no further action was taken in the First Committee,
pending the report of a Group of Government Experts to be convened
in 2008. Action in the First Committee on small arms and light
weapons (SALW) failed to achieve the expectations of states that
would like to see the biennial meetings create a formal, effective
instrument to review the implementation of the 2001 Programme of
Action.
To the dismay of some delegations, the role of civil society was
limited to a single one-hour session spread amongst five NGO
speakers, who addressed a wide range of subjects including: the
nature of the good faith obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament;
creation of a high-level panel to discuss space security; and
creation of a review process for the small arms Programme of
Action. Two presentations addressed the issue of the Arms Trade
Treaty: an emotional appeal from an African delegate from the
International Action Network Against Small Arms (IANSA), followed
by an opposing view from the arms industry, represented by the
World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities.
Nuclear Weapons
With the notable exception of the New Zealand-led resolution on
operational readiness, governments appeared to take a reserved
approach on nuclear weapons issues, possibly attributable to
anticipated changes of administration in key nuclear weapon states
Russia and the United States, or from a desire not to upset any
precarious chances progress in other disarmament fora. Reflecting
perhaps a 'wait and see' approach, the co-sponsors of the three
annual nuclear disarmament resolutions decided not to pursue any
new strategies or ideas.
Japan's resolution, "Renewed determination toward the total
elimination of nuclear weapons", continued to receive the most
support, including from nuclear weapon states Russia and the United
Kingdom. The resolution was largely unchanged from 2006, focusing
on implementation of some of the steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT
Review Conference and with particular emphasis on the entry into
force of the CTBT and negotiation of a fissile materials cut-off
treaty. The vote in the General Assembly was comparable to last
year with 170 states in favour, three against (India, North Korea
and the United States) and nine abstaining.
After voting in favour of Japan's resolution for the past two
years, France abstained, complaining that the text of the
resolution had remained unchanged despite their strong reservations
on the issues of further reductions in strategic arsenals and the
role of nuclear weapons in security policies. Although the New
Agenda Coalition (NAC) was unable to support this resolution as a
bloc in the First Committee, as it had in 2005, Japan gained the
support of NAC member Brazil. However, the last NAC hold-out,
Egypt, switched its abstaining vote in the First Committee to a
vote in favour in the General Assembly.
The content of the annual NAC resolution, "Towards a
nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of
nuclear disarmament commitments", also remained largely unchanged.
Like Japan's resolution it focused primarily on implementation of
the NPT decisions and agreements made in 1995 and 2000, but was
less congratulatory towards the nuclear weapon states for past
progress. The NAC resolution was adopted in the General Assembly
with 156 votes in favour, five against, and 14 abstentions. Notably
this year, the United Kingdom, which had previously voted against
the resolution en bloc with France and the United States, switched
its vote to an abstention. In an expression of its more positive
approach to nuclear weapons, the UK pointed to many elements in the
resolution with which it agreed, but still faulted some of its
basic premises.
By contrast, though the annual nuclear disarmament resolution of
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) now lists the 'Thirteen Steps' from
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it still appears as an omnibus full
of NAM positions, including a time-bound framework for achieving
nuclear disarmament. Therefore, support for the resolution remained
largely unchanged, with 117 mostly NAM-affiliated states voting in
favour in the General Assembly, and with 47 NATO-aligned and
European states opposing and 13 others abstaining.
The Bush administration remains firmly entrenched in its
opposition to the CTBT, even as the US Congress debates the merits
of moving forward with developing a new class of nuclear warheads
intended inter alia to preclude additional nuclear testing. The
annual resolution supporting the CTBT was adopted again by an
overwhelming margin, with 176 votes in the General Assembly. North
Korea maintained a diplomatic absence by not participating in the
vote, leaving the United States alone to cast the single vote
against. India, Colombia, Mauritius, and Syria abstained.
Nuclear Proliferation and the Iran Factor
The nuclear programme of Iran dominated First Committee
discussions on proliferation. However, given the active engagement
in the issue by major powers that are also permanent members of the
Security Council, the role of the General Assembly was limited.
Many reasserted their national positions during the general and
themed debates, revealing substantial differences of view, notably
among the P5, despite the September 28, 2007 statement from the P-5
plus Germany, and contrary to exhortations for unity by the
international community.
Nonetheless, Iran's programme had some impact on the Committee's
work, particularly on votes on two resolutions. The more
contentious of the annual resolutions on the Middle East, titled
"The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", has always
attracted some reservations because of its singling out of Israel
in the context of demands for universalization of the NPT. More
recently, Western delegations such as Canada and the EU countries
have stepped up their concerns, questioning the resolution's
balance since it does not address concerns over Iran's nuclear
programme.
Iran's rather recent - and apparently now biennial - resolution
"Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995
and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", obtained 109 positive votes
in the General Assembly, with 55 opposed and 15 abstentions. This
contrasted with its first appearance in 2005, when it was only
narrowly adopted. Despite agreeing with much of the actual text,
many delegations refuse to vote in favour because they see this as
essentially a political smokescreen and finger-pointing exercise
that duplicates more earnest existing approaches.
In light of progress being made in dismantling North Korea's
nuclear arsenal and production capacity, resolutions that dealt
with the issue tended to note these developments in a positive
light, contrasting with last year's widespread condemnation of the
October 9, 2006 nuclear test.
Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons
As noted above, New Zealand, on behalf of Chile, Nigeria,
Sweden, and Switzerland, introduced a new resolution which called
on states to take "further practical steps to decrease the
operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to
ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert
status". This new resolution is essentially a call for nuclear
weapons to be de-alerted. It was intended to spark discussion and
seek common ground on moving this issue forward, with careful
drafting to attract support from NATO states. It was resoundingly
adopted with 139 GA votes in favour, three against (France, the
United States and the United Kingdom), with 36 - mostly other
nuclear weapon states and members of NATO - abstaining.
The co-sponsors succeeded in splitting NATO, with six states
breaking ranks to vote in favour, including two that host US
nuclear weapons, Germany and Italy. The other four NATO votes in
favour came from Iceland, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. Reportedly
due to indecision within the Russian government, Russia did not
participate in the vote in either the First Committee or General
Assembly. China abstained, noting that different views exist on the
issue - a diplomatic non-answer. De facto nuclear weapon possessors
India, which sponsors the other draft resolution on de-alerting,
and Pakistan voted in favour.
Despite its careful wording, the resolution attracted
controversy in the form of a largely semantic debate that avoided
the real issues of concern. Responding to the draft resolution on
October 9, US Ambassador Christina Rocca stated, "the US forces are
not, and never have been, on hair-trigger alert... In order to
comply with this request we would have to first put our forces on
hair-trigger alert so that we could then de-alert them". As noted
by the Washington Post on November 1, this statement caused
a stir within the arms control and disarmament community, provoking
rebuttals by prominent experts Bruce Blair of the World Security
Institute and Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American
Scientists.
Ambassador Rocca partially backed off from her earlier position
in a brief statement before the vote, admitting that some US
ballistic missile submarines are always on alert. She disagreed,
however, with the resolution's implication that the US level of
readiness increases the risks of accidental or unintentional use of
nuclear weapons, and asserted "As long as nuclear weapons exist and
are part of the US deterrent, it is necessary for us to keep some
portion of our forces at some level of alert".
The other resolution dealing with alert status, India's draft
"Reducing nuclear danger", was adopted by a vote similar to recent
years: with 117-52-12.
Fissile Materials
The long-awaited start of negotiations on a treaty banning the
production of fissile materials for use in nuclear explosives
appeared closer than for many years. At the end of its 2007
session, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) came close to agreement
on a package deal that would made it possible to begin negotiations
on a fissile materials treaty in 2008. In the First Committee,
Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and several other
delegations explicitly expressed support for the package deal. The
European Union called for negotiations to commence without
preconditions. Although the US delegation stated its preference to
proceed with a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) without
linkage with other issues, representatives explained that a
decision had been made this year not to block consensus on the
package proposal in the CD.
Many delegations that spoke about a fissban in the general and
thematic debates restated their national positions, revealing that
substantial differences remain. The Chinese and Indian delegations
repeated language from the 1995 Shannon Report when they reiterated
their support for a "multilateral, non-discriminatory, and
effectively verifiable" treaty. While Pakistan's delegation agreed
that any issue may of course be raised in negotiations, they
insisted that specific reference to matters such as verification
needed to be explicitly contained in the negotiation mandate,
because when entering negotiations "one has to be sure what is
sacrosanct and what is not". Pakistan continues to be a principal
player blocking consensus in the CD on a package deal that would
allow negotiations to commence.
Because of these continuing divisions and clear indications in
preliminary consultations that consensus would be lacking, the
Canadian delegation withdrew what Ambassador Grinius described as
"a strictly procedural draft decision that would have added the
issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile material to
next year's First Committee agenda". Seeing such a procedural
decision blocked is even more disappointing than in 2006, when the
Canadian delegation withdrew its "minimalist" draft resolution that
had called on the CD "to commence immediately negotiations on a
treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons", without prejudice to any issue any delegation might want
to raise in the course of negotiations.
Missiles
Statements made in the General Debate demonstrated continuing
divergence on how to address the issue of missiles - whether in the
context of nuclear disarmament delivery systems or a broader,
holistic mandate under general and complete disarmament, and in
what setting - in a treaty regime or through voluntary measures; on
a case by case basis or in a comprehensive and universal manner.
States showed little interest or will to bridge the chasm, and
there were few if any signs of a multilateral missile treaty
emerging anytime soon, as was pointed out by UN High Representative
for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte. One of the few delegations
that spoke on the issue, Russia again called for a legally-binding
treaty establishing a global missile non-proliferation regime.
Because the third UN Panel of Government Experts on missiles,
established by General Assembly resolution 59/67 (2004), will have
two additional sessions in 2008, Iran introduced only a draft
decision that recalled past resolutions and included the item of
missiles on the provisional agenda of the 63rd (2008) session of
the General Assembly. This was adopted by 123-7-51, with Russia and
China as well as most of the NAM in favour, while 51 mainly Western
states abstained. The opposing votes came from Denmark, France,
Israel, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and
US dependent Palau.
Internationalizing the INF Treaty
On October 25, the United States and Russia presented a joint
statement to the First Committee, noting the twentieth anniversary
of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and calling
for interested countries to discuss the possibility of
internationalizing the Treaty, "through the renunciation of
ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between
500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the destruction of any such
missiles, and the cessation of associated programmes". The
statement, delivered by Russia, also described the INF Treaty as an
important and practical step toward fulfilment of Article VI of the
NPT and expressed concern about the proliferation of missiles in
this range to an ever greater number of countries.
The US/Russian Joint Statement was welcomed by several European
delegations, including Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy,
which acknowledged the Treaty's role in reducing tensions in
Europe. The Netherlands expressed its readiness to participate in
discussions on internationalizing the Treaty as called for by the
statement. It remains to be seen how the United States and Russia
intend to follow through with this proposal.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
The First Committee took action on six resolutions dealing with
NWFZ. Although there is widespread consensus among governments on
the value and utility of NWFZ, from a non-proliferation and a
disarmament perspective, implementation of new zones continues to
stall for a variety of reasons, including regional issues and the
concerns of nuclear weapon states over questions such as security
assurances, transit rights and conflicts with pre-existing
agreements. Only one NWFZ resolution managed to avoid some form of
controversy - that dealing with consolidation of the regime
established by the Tlatelolco Treaty in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Of the two other NWFZ resolutions adopted by consensus - those
dealing with a prospective NWFZ in the Middle East and entry into
force of the Pelindaba Treaty covering Africa - governments
continued to express well-known reservations. On the Middle East
NWFZ resolution, more moderate and balanced than the other Middle
East resolution, discussed above, Israel did not impede consensus
but again reiterated its longstanding view that it would only
accede to a NWFZ treaty as part of a comprehensive peace process.
On the resolution dealing with the Pelindaba Treaty, Spain did not
follow through with its 2005 threat to block consensus, despite the
fact that no changes had been made to meet its concerns about the
Canary Islands (legally part of Spain) being included in the map of
the African NWFZ. However, Spain announced it had decided not to
sign Protocol 3 of the Treaty, explaining that it contains no
provision that Spain has not already signed on to in other
instruments.
France, the UK and US continued to oppose the resolution on a
nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere, citing their familiar
concerns about the law of the sea. Despite explicit assurances in
the resolution to the contrary, the three states remain concerned
that the resolution is really an attempt to ban nuclear weapons
from the high seas. The three nuclear powers did, however, express
willingness to continue consultations with the co-sponsors over the
content of the resolution.
A new resolution dealing with the Southeast Asian NWFZ (Bangkok
Treaty) ran into controversy and resistance from some nuclear
weapons states over outstanding issues relating to the Treaty's
Protocol. The resolution, co-sponsored by ASEAN, was intended to
support a resumption of consultations between states in the zone
and nuclear weapon states that have so far refused to sign the
Treaty's Protocol. Despite concessions that led to the text being
revised in a number of areas to avoid opposition from Britain,
France and the United States, the US delegation cast a lone vote
against.
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
The First Committee adopted by consensus its three annual
resolutions dealing with other weapons of mass destruction. As
reflected in the annual resolution on the BWC, most governments
consider the Convention's Sixth Review Conference in 2006 to have
been a success and they lauded the establishment of an
Implementation Support Unit. Many governments, however, continued
to call for an international verification regime to strengthen the
BWC.
At the time of the 2007 session of First Committee, states
parties to the CWC were preparing for two meetings, the Twelfth
Session of the Conference of States in November 2007 and the Second
Review Conference in April 2008. The annual resolution on the CWC
was adopted again by consensus and, among other things, emphasized
the need for universal adherence to and full implementation of the
Treaty. It referred to the need for states to meet their respective
deadlines for destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles - with
concern about this aimed primarily at Russia and the United States,
which are not expected to complete destruction of their stockpiles
within the maximum time allowable under the Convention. The CWC
Conference of States also urged states that have not yet fulfilled
their disarmament obligations to make known any requirements for
assistance they might need.
The First Committee also adopted by consensus India's annual
resolution on "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction". This is one of several broadly-worded
resolutions introduced annually by either India or Pakistan that
are animated by bilateral regional tensions rather than interest in
multilateral arms control, and yet have subsequently come to be
supported by other states as vehicles to push broader agendas. In
the case of India's resolution, in reflection of the fact that it
has become a medium for promoting Security Council resolution 1540
(2004) and further developments in international law related to
terrorism, this year the United States joined as a co-sponsor. As
in previous years, after the resolution was adopted, Pakistan
expressed reservations, calling for language to address its
understanding that terrorists are more likely to seek biological
and chemical arms, and calling for relevant issues relating to
non-state actors to be dealt with in more inclusive fora than
Security Council resolution 1540
Outer Space Security
In the First Committee, many delegations supported the idea of
developing "best practices" for safe and responsible space
operations. Most agreed that transparency and confidence-building
measures (TCBM) are immediately necessary and that they could
complement future international legal instruments regarding space
security. The Swedish delegation presented some outcomes of
discussions on prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) in
the CD, and made suggestions for ways to avoid or escape the
"linguistic and philosophical debate" associated with the term
PAROS, including support for consideration of "a treaty to prevent
the placement of weapons in outer space" (PPWT), the name given by
Russia to its draft treaty text.
The overwhelming majority of delegations voted in favour of the
traditional resolution on PAROS, sponsored this year by Sri Lanka.
The resolution, opposed solely by the United States - Israel
abstained - emphasized the inadequacy of the current legal regime
on outer space and called for the establishment of an ad hoc
committee in the CD to develop an international agreement on
PAROS.
The Russian-sponsored resolution on TCBMs in outer space was
also overwhelmingly supported, with only the United States voting
against and Israel abstaining. This resolution, first tabled in
2005, is now a regular fixture. It noted the proposals submitted by
states to the Secretary-General on possible outer space TCBMs,
pursuant to the 2006 resolution, and invited states to continue
submitting proposals. The US delegation agreed that TCBMs in outer
space are valuable, but voted against the resolution because it was
unable to persuade Russia to eliminate "what the United States
believes is a false and unacceptable linkage between expert
assessments of TCBMs and efforts to begin pointless negotiations on
unverifiable space arms control agreements".
Conventional Weapons
The energetic work of the Committee on conventional weapons
revolved around a smaller number of resolutions than in previous
years, all either adopted by consensus or by large margins. Indeed,
so many delegations made remarks during the thematic discussion -
nearly 50, compared to less than 30 for nuclear weapons - that the
Chair was compelled to delay the start of voting to accommodate the
speaker's list.
Small Arms and Light Weapons
There was considerable activism around strengthening the review
process for the 2001 UN Programme of Action (PoA) on small arms.
The annual omnibus resolution on combating the illicit trade in
small arms ultimately fell short of the hopes of delegations that
would like a standing mechanism to review the implementation of the
PoA. The resolution did, however, continue to provide for
consideration of implementation of the PoA in the biannual meetings
of states. The United States again cast the sole vote against
resolution, objecting to additional meetings of states.
The second annual resolution on small arms, sponsored by the
Economic Council of West African States and highlighting the
difficulties facing the sub-region attributable to illicit trade in
small arms and light weapons, was adopted again by consensus.
Cluster Munitions
There was substantial debate about how to deal with cluster
munitions, with delegations differing on whether to address these
inhumane weapons through the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) or through the so-called Oslo Process being taken
forward by a group of like-minded states. The annual resolution on
the CCW did not reflect these controversies, however. Adopted by
consensus, it emphasized the need to universalize the Convention
and supported various meetings in relation to this.
Although the next meeting of the Oslo Process will take place in
Dublin, the European Union pushed to keep cluster munitions within
the purview of the CCW and, this year, submitted a draft Protocol
and negotiating mandate to the Convention's Group of Governmental
Experts. The United States announced its willingness to discuss the
issue within the CCW. Japan and Switzerland also expressed support
for keeping cluster munitions inside the CCW. Other states, many of
whom are part of the Oslo Process, such as Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and South Africa, said that they were flexible on the
question of venue, but wanted an instrument on cluster munitions to
be negotiated without delay.
Landmines
There was little progress to note on the issue of anti-personnel
landmines, although the strong norm against their use and transfer
continues to grow. This was evidenced in the First Committee by the
number of states that still explain and justify their non-adherence
to the Ottawa Convention. Such responses tends to indicate
cognizance of the norm, as these delegations provide
rationalizations for why their "unique" security situations takes
precedence rather than denouncing the Convention. The annual
landmines resolution, sponsored this year by Australia, was adopted
by a similar margin as last year in the General Assembly, with 164
votes in favour, none against and 18 abstentions.
Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
The role of the First Committee in dealing with man-portable air
defence systems (MANPADS) remained limited. Australia reintroduced
its biennial resolution, which did little more than encourage
states, on their own initiative, to ban the transfer of MANPADS to
non-state actors. Not really arms control in its traditional sense
- placing limitations on the arms holdings of states in the
interest of common security - the drafters of the resolution this
year actually strengthened its language acknowledging the right of
states to develop, possess, and transfer MANPADS. The resolution
was adopted by consensus, as in previous years, although language
had to be removed regarding the completion of airport vulnerability
assessments in order to appease Egypt and other Arab states.
Depleted Uranium
The Non-Aligned Movement introduced a new resolution on the
effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted
uranium (DU). Less controversial than a failed attempt in 2002 by
Iraq to push through a resolution on the use of DU armaments, the
present resolution, led by Cuba, simply requested the views of
member states and relevant health and environmental organizations
on the harmful affects of DU armaments. In order to appease some
NATO states that might not have otherwise voted in favour of the
resolution, the final version of the resolution omitted a call for
states to refrain from using DU armaments and ammunitions until
studies to determine their effects on human health and the
environment are completed.
The resolution was primarily supported by NAM states, but it
succeeded in splitting NATO. Of the 26 NATO countries, only five
voted against the resolution, while most abstained. Germany and
Italy voted in favour. In discussions on the resolution,
delegations largely revisited the same points brought up in 2002.
The United States cited studies by NATO, the IAEA, the World Health
Organization, and the UN Environment Programme that it claimed
conclude there is no direct link between DU munitions and negative
health or environmental effects. The NAM disagreed, with affiliated
delegations asserting that these same studies concluded that more
research is needed. In any case, now that the issue is inscribed on
the First Committee's agenda, the NAM intends to return with a
follow-up, and possibly stronger, resolution next year.
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
Through statements made in the general and themed debates, the
First Committee dealt with the controversy over the December 12,
2007 announcement by Russia of its suspension of compliance with
the CFE Treaty, in retaliation for US plans to deploy ballistic
missile defence (BMD) and expand NATO bases in Eastern Europe. The
discussion tended to revolve around regional tensions among former
Soviet-bloc countries, rather than anything related to resolving
the NATO/Russia standoff, with Moldova and Georgia levelling
accusations at Russia related to its alleged continued military
presence and support for secessionist movements. The representative
from Ukraine appeared to support the Russian position by noting,
however, that the CFE "does not correspond to the current security
situation in Europe". The French delegation announced that France
was convening an informal conference on the Treaty for states
parties and candidates in Paris on November 4-5 to discuss the
future of the regime.
Disarmament Machinery
While the 2007 session of the CD did not result in the adoption
of a programme of work, there was close to consensus on a
presidential draft decision, L.1, containing a package deal. By the
end of the session, however, China, Iran and Pakistan held out
against consensus, giving rise to speculation that if one of these
dropped its objections, the two others might not continue to block.
Throughout the First Committee, most CD delegations expressed
support for the comprehensive programme of work outlined in L.1,
arguing that a package deal is the best way to get work underway in
the Conference. The traditionally bland and procedural annual
resolution on the CD noted the increased deliberation that took
place during the year, and was again adopted by consensus.
The annual resolution on the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC),
also adopted by consensus, called for a substantive report to be
submitted to the next session of the General Assembly. However,
neither of its two working groups came close to this goal during
the 2007 session. While the troubled nuclear disarmament and
nonproliferation working group made some headway in discussions,
the Chair's working paper was ultimately reduced to a minimalist
document deficient in disarmament.
The UNDC working group on practical confidence-building measures
in the field of conventional weapons is considered to be closer to
achieving consensus on substantive matters. Its work in 2007
resulted in three conference room papers submitted by the Chair.
Both working groups decided to use their final paper as a basis for
discussions at the 2008 session.
As progress on actual disarmament work in the various fora
remains stalled, many delegations continued to push for a fourth
special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. In
particular, the NAM argued that a fourth special session is
necessary to revitalize the machinery and make real progress on
disarmament. The Open-ended Working Group, established by General
Assembly resolution 61/60 (2006), met during the summer of 2007,
but no consensus was reached. The final report of the working group
decided further discussion and exchange of ideas is needed. As a
fitting illustration of the state of multilateral disarmament, the
United States cast the lone vote against the resolution to
reconvene the working group in 2008.
Conclusion
Answering the First Committee Chair's rhetorical question
regarding progress made by the First Committee, Ray Acheson in her
final First Committee Monitor editorial, remarked, "If
productivity can be measured by volume of paper circulated, then
the First Committee was extremely successful". But the 2007 session
did little to truly advance the disarmament and international
security agenda. Despite the appearance of broad-based agreements
in many areas, the lowest-common denominator form of
decision-making that typifies multilateral political fora such as
the General Assembly means that even when widespread agreement
exists, progress can still be agonizingly slow.
This report was written and compiled by Michael Spies, of
Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy, with the invaluable
assistance of Ray Acheson of Reaching Critical Will, a project of
the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, who made
research and editorial contributions to the article and summary of
resolutions. The report also draws heavily on the First Committee
Monitor, edited by Ms. Acheson, with particular thanks for the
contributions from Waverly de Bruijn (Global Action to Prevent War
- GAPW), Mark Marge (IANSA), Kavitha Suthanthiraraj (GAPW), Jim
Wurst (Middle Powers Initiative) as well as others, with my
grateful thanks.
See also: 2007 First Committee
Resolutions, Summary and Explanations, compiled by Michael
Spies
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© 2008 The Acronym Institute.
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