Disarmament Diplomacy

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Deal or No Deal: Can the North Korea Nuclear Agreement be Salvaged?

At time of writing, the October 2007 deal on disabling North Korea's nuclear programme looks at risk of falling apart, as the US calls for wide ranging powers of verification in the secretive state.[1] With North Korea complaining that it has not yet been taken off the US list of states that support terrorism and once again threatening to eject IAEA inspectors and restart its reprocessing programme to produce plutonium, the deal hangs on a thread. The United States needs to reconsider its position on keeping North Korea on the terrorist list and come to a compromise on verification if it is to have any chance of maintaining progress on implementation of the Second Phase Agreement on disablement of North Korea's nuclear weapon capabilities, let alone getting to the most important final phase on ensuring the complete dismantling of the nuclear weapon-related programme.

In June 2008 US negotiators appeared to have pulled off a diplomatic breakthrough (despite opposition from Republican hawks) when North Korea destroyed the cooling tower of its Yongbyon nuclear plant in front of the world's media and provided a 60 page declaration of its nuclear programmes, along with documents describing its plutonium programme. In return the United States began proceedings to delist the country as a state sponsor of terrorism.

The deal began to unravel over the summer as Washington declined to complete the process of delisting and demanded further intrusive verification. North Korea rejected these demands and in turn requested that the IAEA remove seals and surveillance cameras at Yongbyon and announced its intention to resume reprocessing plutonium from spent fuel rods. There have also been reports in recent weeks of signs of work at the North Korean nuclear test site and missile test site.

Talks on North Korea's nuclear programme are currently complicated by uncertainty concerning the health of DPRK leader Kim Jong-il and question marks over who is now running the country, not to mention the imminent US election. Some speculate that North Korea may be procrastinating in the hope of extracting a better deal from a future US administration. This is a high risk strategy as it is not clear that a better deal would be forthcoming from either an Obama or, particularly, a McCain administration. Nonetheless time is not on the US side. It would be very damaging if the agreement were allowed to unravel further giving North Korea free rein to restart its nuclear weapons programme. Every effort must be made to get the disablement phase of denuclearization back on track and to ensure that international inspectors are allowed back into Yongbyon at the earliest opportunity.

Implementing the Second Phase Agreement

Under the Second Phase Agreement, North Korea agreed to disable its Yongbyon nuclear plant by 31 December 2007 and to make a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programmes, in exchange for a package of inducements including supplies of heavy fuel oil and removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism (see Disarmament Diplomacy No.86). The Second Phase Agreement also gives the objectives of normalizing relations between North Korea and Japan, and between North Korea and the United States.

As the Second Phase Agreement was announced on 3 October 2008, a US Fact Sheet explained that "the DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs - including clarification regarding the uranium issue - by the end of the year."[2] As ever, with North Korea, this proved easier said than done.

As early as November 2007 North Korea was reportedly on the verge of handing a declaration to the Chinese (as convenors of the Six Party talks). However, it was clear from comments by US chief negotiator Christopher Hill that the November version was not as extensive or explicit as the US wished: "As we discussed the declaration, as we discussed materials, installations, and programs we found that items in each of these three lists were not there that in our view should be there."[3] Although Hill did not specify which programmes he was referring to, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesperson complained that the "US side" had "raised 'suspicion' about uranium enrichment" and "the fiction about nuclear cooperation with Syria".[4]

US allegations concerning uranium enrichment helped precipitate the breakdown of talks and North Korea's departure from the NPT in 2002. Although some reports suggest that US intelligence on enrichment had been overplayed in the early years of the Bush presidency, suspicions were heightened in autumn 2007 by reports that the US had discovered traces of enriched uranium on smelted aluminium tubing provided by North Korea.[5] It remains unclear whether this was the result of an active enrichment programme, or contamination from another source, such as Pakistan, from which the tubes were sourced. North Korea has always denied having such a programme.

Claims that North Korea assisted Syria with development of a covert nuclear reactor capable of producing plutonium have also come to the fore (particularly amongst Republican arms control sceptics), following Israel's bombing of the facility in September 2007.

In December 2007, President Bush took the unprecedented move of writing directly to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il - a man he has previously accused of being a "tyrant" and a "pygmy". The letter reportedly emphasised the need to resolve three sticking points: "the number of warheads North Korea built, the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material it produced and the need for North Korea to disclose what nuclear material and knowledge it has received from other countries and what nuclear material and knowledge it has passed on to other countries."[6]

Whilst dialogue between the US and North Korea continued throughout the month, the 31 December deadline came and went with no declaration. "It's unfortunate, but we are going to keep working on this," said State Department spokesperson Tom Casey.[7] According to Hill, the declaration "just wasn't going to be complete and correct, and we felt it was better for them to give us a complete one and correct one even if it's going to be a late one."[8]

Whilst Hill insisted that the US was "not in any way negotiating the North Korean declaration,"[9] he said that "[W]e wanted to discuss what we see as... necessary for complete and correct... We discussed what they plan to have in the declaration, and we wanted to make sure that they would also include all the facilities, materials, and programs that the DPRK has had... We are trying to work with them to make sure we don't have differences "[10]

A period of deteriorating relations

As the months went by talks stalled once again, despite a high profile and symbolic visit by the New York Philharmonic to Pyongyang in February. North Korea claimed that it had met its commitments by disabling Yongbyon and notifying the United States of its version of the declaration in November. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson complained that the US had "not honored its commitments" to remove the DPRK from the list of sponsors of terrorism and had delayed deliveries of heavy fuel oil and equipment.[11]

Washington, in turn, insisted that Pyongyang was yet to provide a detailed declaration as a condition for receiving the assistance. "The United States is ready to fulfill its obligations when North Korea fulfills its obligations," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters.[12]

Following election of a new conservative government in South Korea, relations between the two Koreas were also significantly strained. Following his election in February President Lee Myung-bak took a stronger line in relations with the North, voting for resolutions at the United Nation condemning Pyongyang's human rights record and, in a significant policy shift, announcing that further aid and development of joint projects would depend on progress on eradication of the North's nuclear weapons programme. "Once North Korea abandons its nuclear program and chooses the path to openness, we can expect to see a new horizon in inter-Korean cooperation," he said.[13] North Korea reacted in typical form, test firing a series of ship-to-ship missiles at the end of February.

Annual joint military exercises by South Korea and the United States also provoked an exchange of bellicose rhetoric. Following a statement by the head of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff Kim Tae-young that his military would strike suspected North Korean nuclear weapons sites if Pyongyang attempted to attack the South with atomic bombs, the North threatened to reduce the South to "ashes" if its government made the "slightest move" to attack.[14]

Towards a new deal

As with previous impasses, the turning point came in bilateral talks between Hill and his North Korean counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan. In Geneva for a bilateral meeting in March, Hill emphasised that the US could be "flexible on format",[15] a formulation of words that paved the way for a compromise. Following a further bilateral meeting in Singapore in April, rumours started circulating that the United States had reached a separate and classified informal agreement with North Korea regarding enrichment and the allegations over Syrian cooperation to enable it to move forward on the declaration.[16]

According to senior administration officials, speaking "on condition of anonymity", the new arrangements were that United States would "relax" its demand for North Korea to admit that it assisted Syria and "postpone" the requirement for full and immediate accounting of the uranium enrichment programme. North Korea would "acknowledge" US concerns about uranium enrichment and supplying Syria and would promise not to engage in any further proliferation activities, but would not publicly admit to it.[17]

Asked about the uranium program and proliferation activities, Rice seemed to confirm the existence of the secret deal: "this is a diplomatic matter, and not everything in diplomacy is public." Emphasizing that the US would only remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list if it considered that the declaration fulfilled the North's commitments, Rice told reporters, "We're going to have to judge whether North Korea has carried out its obligations".[18]

Opposition to the deal was quick to emerge from US hawks. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, John Bolton criticized the agreement, saying that it "rests on trust and not verification." North Korea's "escape from accountability could break down international counterproliferation efforts," he claimed.[19] Mindful of conservative criticism Rice noted, "we have a long way to go in terms of all the various statutory sanctions and multilateral and bilateral sanctions that would remain even if the United States were to take the steps that you outlined."[20]

The State Department emphasized that even if North Korea did not fully account for the uranium programme, the new deal would allow inspectors extensive access to North Korea's nuclear facilities. Spokesperson Sean McCormack told reporters, "Every aspect will be subject to verification, and if we detect that they have misled or attempted to mislead, there will be diplomatic consequences."[21]

With the diplomatic process on North Korea under attack from Republicans inside and outside the administration, President Bush appeared to give his backing to the deal: "The whole objective of the six-party talks and framework is to get them to disclose their weapons programs, is to get them to dismantle their plutonium processing, is to get them to talk about activities, nuclear activities. And we'll make a judgment as to whether or not they do that... Why don't we just wait and see what they say before people go out there and start giving their opinions about whether or not this is a good deal or a bad deal."[22]

Alleged Cooperation with Syria

Within weeks the White House decided to make public alleged video evidence of North Koreans working at the suspected Syrian nuclear reactor shortly before it was destroyed. After seven months of near total secrecy, the timing of this announcement appeared political, raising suspicions that Vice President Dick Cheney's aides and other administration hawks were hoping to scupper moves towards removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The question of cooperation with Syria was sensitive at this time because in order for a country to be removed from the terrorism list, under US law it must not have assisted another country on the list for at least six months. The US intelligence suggests that North Korea was helping Syria (which remains on the list) as late as October 2007 - not far beyond the six month limit.[23]

President Bush claimed that the objective of the release was to "advance certain policy objectives through the disclosures, and one would be to the North Koreans to make it abundantly clear that we, we may know more about you than you think, and therefore, it's essential that you have a complete disclosure on not only your plutonium activities, but proliferation, as well as enrichment activities."[24] Whatever the reason for the disclosures, the timing was guaranteed to stir up opposition from Republicans on Capitol Hill. "People are very mad, very angry" about the prospect of an agreement with "a regime that has repeatedly demonstrated that its word is indistinguishable from a lie," a Republican staffer was quoted as saying.[25]

With the State Department maintaining an official silence on the issue, one senior administration official speaking off the record told the New York Times that, "Making public the pictures is likely to inflame the North Koreans... And that's just what opponents of this whole arrangement want, because they think the North Koreans will stalk off."[26] US handling of the North Korea-Syria nuclear cooperation intelligence also attracted criticism from IAEA Director-General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, who said that the United States should not have waited so long before disclosing what it suspected. ElBaradei also reiterated his criticism of Israel for its "unilateral use of force" against the alleged Syrian reactor.[27]

Achieving a Declaration

Despite the political controversy in Washington, in early May there was further substantive progress as North Korea agreed to blow up the cooling tower at Yongbyon within 24 hours of the US beginning the process of delisting it from the terrorism list. John Bolton immediately fired off a oped to the Wall Street Journal lambasting "Bush's North Korea Nuclear Abdication".[28]

Nonetheless on 8 May North Korea handed the US 18,000 pages of documents relating to its plutonium programme, dating back to 1990. The North Korean documents initially appeared to raise more questions than they answered. At first North Korea claimed to have produced only about 30 kilogrammes of plutonium - a figure significantly lower than US estimates. Then US intelligence claimed to have found fresh traces of highly enriched uranium among the 18,000 pages,[29] reviving suspicions about uranium enrichment.

On 26 June North Korea finally handed the US a 60 page declaration, which has not been made public. US media reported that Pyongyang had privately acknowledged US concerns about uranium enrichment and proliferation to Syria two days earlier, but as per the new arrangements this was not made explicit in the document. "The declaration does reference the discussions that the United States had with North Korea on uranium enrichment and proliferation, but it is not appropriate for me to discuss the details at this time," said White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe.[30]

According to officials the declaration states that North Korea possesses 37 kilogrammes of plutonium - a figure at the lower end of US expectations, but higher than earlier claims. Some analysts have speculated that the difference between US and North Korean figures may be accounted for by the plutonium used in the nuclear test of October 2006. North Korea does not specify how many bombs have been fabricated from this material, despite earlier Bush administration demands for such information, but some estimate that this may be enough for between 6 and 10 nuclear warheads.

In exchange for the North Korean declaration, the White House announced that it was lifting the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act and notified Congress that it was beginning the process to rescind North Korea's designation as a State Sponsor of Terror in 45 days, although a White House press statement noted that, "During this period, the United States will carefully assess North Korea's actions particularly with regard to verification."[31] The US also agreed to pay $2.5 million for the televised destruction of the cooling tower at Yongbyon (half the amount requested by North Korea), which took place on 27 June.

The declaration cleared the way for a resumption of reconcilliation talks between the two Koreas, with President Lee telling the South Korean parliament that he was now ready for "serious consultations" with the North.[32] But it was not welcomed in all quarters. "This is a sad, sad day," Bolton told the New York Times, "I think Bush believes what Condi is telling him, that they're going to persuade the North to give up nuclear weapons, and I don't think that's going to happen. I think we've been taken to the cleaners."[33]

Abductions issue remains unresolved

Japan also harbours long standing doubts. Progress towards normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan is an important - but highly demanding - component of the Second Phase Agreement, but here progress has been slow.

The Japanese government believes that eight of its citizens that are still missing are alive in North Korea, whilst North Korea has insisted since 2002 that all are dead, that the matter is now closed and there is nothing further to discuss. The issue is hugely controversial in Japan. Despite UN appeals for food for North Korea, Japan refuses to participate without progress on the abductions. Speaking shortly before the nuclear declaration was received, Japan's Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura demanded that any US decision to take North Korea off the terrorism list should be linked to progress in solving the country's abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s.[34]

The US has attempted to put some pressure on North Korea on this issue, but State Department spokespeople have indicated that removal from the terrorism list is "not necessarily specifically linked" with the abductions issue as Japan would like. Differences of approach have strained relations between Washington and Tokyo. On 14 June North Korea agreed to reinvestigate the abductions. In response Japan has pledged to make some limited moves towards lifting some economic sanctions, but the issue remains to be resolved to Japan's satisfaction.[35]

Talks shift to verification

With the declaration received and the destruction of the cooling tower at Yongbyon, six party talks resumed from 10 - 12 July with the focus strongly on verification. Suddenly the Second Phase Agreement was no longer simply about achieving a declaration but had, according to Washington, become the "declaration and verification" phase.[36] Hill told the media, "Verification is the most important thing. We want to speed up the rate of disablement... we need to discharge the reactor... We hope we can pick up the pace to do that, and there's some other elements of disablement that we'd like to move more quickly on."[37]

North Korea, however, complained that it had only received 40 percent of the promised aid and said it would not take further steps until it had received more.[38] At the end of the talks, China put out a press statement setting out the main areas of agreement, including general principles for verification, monitoring and a timetable for economic and energy assistance and further disablement of Yongbyon (reproduced below).

The verification mechanism was to "include visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures unanimously agreed upon among the six parties. When necessary, the verification mechanism can welcome the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide consultancy and assistance for relevant verification."[39] The six parties were not, however, able to agree on a detailed inspection schedule or verification protocol.

Under the timetable, the DPRK was to complete disablement of Yongbyon by the end of October 2008, with the US and Russia also due to complete provision of their share of heavy fuel oil by this time. China and South Korea were to sign binding agreements with North Korea concerning their share of non-fuel oil provision by the end of August. Japan limited its participation to an expression of "willingness to take part in the economic and energy assistance to the DPRK as soon as possible when the environment is in place."[40]

The six parties also began some discussion of what a third phase agreement might entail. According to Hill there was consensus among five parties that the next phase should be the final or "abandonment" phase, including "abandonment of North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, dismantlement of all North Korea's nuclear facilities, removal of all fissile material, and verification of North Korea's denuclearization."[41] Ultimately the goal would be North Korea's return to the NPT and resumption of full IAEA safeguards. Hill has indicated that the United States would be willing in return to "transform our relations with the DPRK into a more normal relationship... working toward full diplomatic relations", but progress on human rights would also be expected in the next phase.[42] North Korea has yet to sign up to this vision of the next phase.

Disablement or Verification?

On 12 August, 45 days had passed since the Bush administration began the process of delisting North Korea from the terrorism list. However, the date came and went with no verification protocol and no delisting. Meeting with President Lee in August, President Bush emphasised verification, saying that the North Koreans had "a lot to do. They got to, like, show us a verification regime that we can trust. This is a step-by-step process."[43]

According to the State Department, the 45 days was now a minimum time period for delisting. A spokesperson said, "The North Koreans know exactly what it is that we require... Our policy is basically action for action, and we need to see that verification regime, and that's what we wait for."[44] North Korea's response to the goalposts being moved was hostile. Calling the US failure to complete the delisting process "an outright violation of the agreement", a Foreign Ministry statement said that the government had "decided to immediately suspend the disablement of its nuclear facilities" and that it would "consider soon a step to restore the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon to their original state".[45]

Underlining its hostility towards verification in particular, North Korea said, "The 'international standard' touted by the US is nothing but 'special inspection' which the IAEA called for in the 1990s to infringe upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and caused it to pull out of the NPT in the end. The US is gravely mistaken if it thinks it can make a house search in the DPRK as it pleases just as it did in Iraq."[46]

Things took a worse turn in September when the IAEA confirmed that North Korea had asked the Agency to remove seals and surveillance from the reprocessing plant in Yongbyon. The IAEA was told that inspectors would have no further access to the plant and informed that the DPRK intended to introduce nuclear material to the reprocessing facility within one week.[47]

What went wrong?

In late September the Washington Post revealed details of the initial verification demands put to North Korea. According to the Post, "the US requested 'full access to all materials' at sites that might have had a nuclear purpose in the past. It sought 'full access to any site, facility or location' deemed relevant to the nuclear program, including military facilities... Investigators would be able to take photographs and make videos, remain on site as long as necessary, make repeated visits and collect and remove samples."[48]

It is understood that the US pushed ahead with this verification proposal despite warnings from China and Russia that it was asking too much. Moreover, Christopher Hill and other senior negotiators reportedly expressed concerns but were overruled by hawks at a higher level within the State Department. As Dr Jeffrey Lewis sums it up "the State Department managed to impose humiliating verification demands that North Korea was sure to reject".[49] And, as predicted, progress with North Korea ground to a halt.

North Korean objections reportedly centred on two key elements - the taking of samples (an essential tool for inspectors) and visits to undeclared facilities (a more open ended and wide ranging commitment). Hinting that Washington might be attempting to use the verification protocol to reopen the issue of uranium enrichment, Secretary of State Rice stated, "We have to have a verification protocol that is going to give us confidence that we are able to verify the declaration and that we're able to answer certain unresolved questions".[50]

North Korea also protested that there has been no agreement that stipulates verification of the nuclear declaration "as conditionality" for delisting it as a state sponsor of terrorism[51] - an issue that the State Department has attempted to side step.[52] As Lewis notes, "We're basically haggling over price - the North Koreans want to be de-listed for disablement, we want them to pay twice for that privilege: by disabling and accepting intrusive verification measures."[53]

Can the deal be salvaged?

As Disarmament Diplomacy goes to print US chief negotiator Christopher Hill is on his way to North Korea once again to try to get six party talks back on track. Hill reportedly intends to explore a compromise whereby "North Korea would give China, the host of the talks, a plan that includes sampling, access to key sites and other provisions sought by the United States. Bush would then provisionally remove North Korea from the terrorism list, and after that China would announce North Korean acceptance of the verification plan. This would allow North Korea to save face and assert that the delisting occurred before the verification plan was in place."[54]

The US also appears to be willing to make compromises concerning timing. As Hill emphasized, "We're not looking to verify their declaration now. We're looking to come up with rules with how we will verify it in the future. So if we can get that, we'll take them off the terrorism list. We've done our 45-day notice period to the Congress. So we're prepared to move very quickly on that - really instantaneously - provided we get what we need in terms of the verification."[55]

There are several potential stumbling blocks. Whilst the initial US proposal for verification may have been too far reaching, North Korea's counterproposals and statements indicate that it is extremely resistent to even more modest verification proposals, which run counter to the state's culture of secrecy. It is also not yet clear whether Hill's proposal will be supported by senior administration officials, let alone Congressional Republicans. Hill has already taken significant flak in Washington for his deal-making with the North Koreans. As a New York Times editorial commented, "if a Democratic president had made similar compromises, hard-line Republicans probably would have called for impeachment."[56]

But what are the alternatives? During his first term of office, Bush ratcheted up the political rhetoric, demanded accountability for the suspected uranium enrichment project and refused to engage in any direct negotiations. The result? Acting tough on North Korea failed to produce any deal. Worse, North Korea left the NPT, expelled IAEA inspectors, and for the ensuing six wasted years had free rein to develop its plutonium-based weapons programme, ultimately leading to the 2006 nuclear test. When meaningful talks finally resumed, the US was in a far weaker negotiating position than that relinquished in 2002.

At this point getting North Korea's plutonium programme shut down and beginning the process of rolling it back is a much higher priority than pursuing allegations about enrichment - and the verification process should not be used as a proxy for this. The priority now is to get IAEA inspectors back in Yongbyon as a matter of urgency. As Arms Control Association director Daryl Kimball writes, "The six-party process is imperfect but invaluable because it also provides much needed leverage to snuff out North Korea's nuclear proliferation activities."[57]

Time is not on the Bush administration's side. North Korea has a talent for procrastination and at this point, close to the end of the lame duck Bush presidency, some speculate that it is now hanging onto its nuclear programme to see what the next president will do. North Korea plays the nuclear card to try to increase its leverage and wishes to extract the maximum reward for any steps it undertakes towards dismantlement. It will take continued concerted inducements and pressure to persuade it to relinquish that card once and for all, which the United States will have to work closely with its partners in the six party talks to achieve.

Both McCain and Obama have indicated that they would take a tough line on North Korea. McCain has cautioned that destruction of the cooling tower at Yongbyon was only a "modest step", whilst Obama calls for "direct and aggressive diplomacy".[58] It remains to be seen what this will mean in practice. As Hill said in a recent podcast, an agreement with North Korea is "like the proverbial fifth marriage - a triumph of hope over experience... I certainly anticipate a lot of critics. But usually when I ask the critics 'Okay, what would you do?' . . . they usually change the subject. You always end up with people coming back to the idea you have got to sit down and negotiate."[59]

Notes

[1] For more information on the Second Phase Agreement of October 2007, see 'North Korea: Good Progress, but Obstacles Remain', Disarmament Diplomacy No.86, Autumn 2007.

[2] 'Six Parties October 3, 2007 Agreement on "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement"', Fact Sheet, US Department of State, 3 October 2007.

[3] 'Evening Walk-Through at Six-Party Talks', Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Beijing, China, 5 December 2007.

[4] 'DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Implementation of October 3 Agreement', KCNA, 4 January 2008.

[5] Glenn Kessler, 'U.S. Increases Estimate Of N. Korean Plutonium', Washington Post, 14 May 2008.

[6] Helene Cooper, 'A New Bush Tack on North Korea', New York Times, 7 December 2007.

[7] Paul Eckert, 'North Korea misses year-end deadline on nuclear weapons', The Guardian, 1 January 2008.

[8] 'Remarks Upon Arrival in Japan', Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 7 January 2008.

[9] 'Press Availability With Japanese Director-General Kenichiro Sasae', Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 7 December 2007.

[10] Evening Walk-Through at Six-Party Talks, Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Beijing, China, 5 December 2007.

[11] 'DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Implementation of October 3 Agreement', KCNA, 4 January 2008.

[12] 'Briefing En route Santiago, Chile', Secretary Condoleezza Rice, 14 March 2008.

[13] 'Lee vows to upgrade ties with traditional allies', Republic of Korea Presidential website, 25 February 2008, english.president.go.kr.

[14] Choe Sang-Hun, 'North Korea Threatens to Reduce South Korea to 'Ashes' at Slightest Provocation', New York Times, 31 March 2008.

[15] Press Stake Out at The Hotel de La Paix, Christopher R, Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland, 13 March 2008.

[16] Daily Press Briefing, Sean McCormack, Spokesman, Washington, DC, 10 April 2008.

[17] Helene Cooper, 'Past Deals by N. Korea May Face Less Study', New York Times, 18 April 2008.

[18] 'On-the-Record Briefing by Secretary Rice', Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Washington, DC, 17 April 2008.

[19] 'Additional Scrutiny Sought on North Korea', Global Security Newswire, 17 April 2008.

[20] Rice, 17 April 2008, op. cit.

[21] Daily Press Briefing, Sean McCormack, Spokesman, Washington, DC, 18 April 2008.

[22] 'President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability with President Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea', Camp David, 19 April 2008.

[23] Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright 'Accusing N. Korea May Stall Nuclear Pact: Both Nations Cite Progress, but Allegations About Aid to Syria Chill Lawmakers', Washington Post, 26 April 2008.

[24] 'Press Conference by the President', Rose Garden, the White House, 29 April 2008.

[25] Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright 'Accusing N. Korea May Stall Nuclear Pact: Both Nations Cite Progress, but Allegations About Aid to Syria Chill Lawmakers', Washington Post, 26 April 2008.

[26] David E. Sanger, 'U.S. Sees N. Korean Links to Reactor', New York Times, 24 April 2008.

[27] Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, 'Accusing N. Korea May Stall Nuclear Pact: Both Nations Cite Progress, but Allegations About Aid to Syria Chill Lawmakers', Washington Post, 26 April 2008.

[28] John R. Bolton, 'Bush's North Korea Nuclear Abdication', Wall Street Journal, 8 May 2008.

[29] Glenn Kessler, 'New Data Found On North Korea's Nuclear Capacity: Intelligence on Enriched Uranium Revives Questions About Weapons ', Washington Post, 21 June 2008.

[30] Glenn Kessler, 'Message to U.S. Preceded Nuclear Declaration by North Korea', Washington Post, 2 July 2008.

[31] 'Statement by the Press Secretary on North Korea', The White House, 26 June 2008.

[32] VOA News, 'S. Korean President Calls for Resumption of Talks with North', 11 July 2008.

[33] Helene Cooper, 'Bush Rebuffs Hard-Liners to Ease North Korean Curbs', New York Times, 27 June 2008.

[34] Joseph Coleman, 'Japan seeks link over North Korea abductions', The Associated Press, 24 June 2008.

[35] Blaine Harden, 'N. Korea Agrees to Reexamine Abductions', Washington Post, 14 June 2008.

[36] 'Evening Walkthrough at Six-Party Talks', Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, China World Hotel Beijing, China, 6 September 2008.

[37] Daniel Schearf, 'North Korea Nuclear Talks to Focus on Verification', Voice of America, 9 July 2008.

[38] Daniel Schearf, 'North Korea Nuclear Talks to Focus on Verification', Voice of America, 9 July 2008.

[39] 'Press Communiqué of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of The Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks', China Foreign Ministry, Beijing, 12 July 2008.

[40] 'Press Communiqué of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of The Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks', China Foreign Ministry, Beijing, 12 July 2008.

[41] 'North Korean Six-Party Talks and Implementation Activities', Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 31 July 2008.

[42] 'North Korean Six-Party Talks and Implementation Activities', Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 31 July 2008.

[43] 'President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability with President Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea', The White House, 6 August 2008.

[44] Foster Klug, 'US will not take NKorea off terror list _ yet', Associated Press, 11 August 2008.

[45] 'Foreign Ministry's Spokesman on DPRK's Decision to Suspend Activities to Disable Nuclear Facilities', KCNA, 26 August 2008.

[46] Ibid.

[47] 'IAEA Removes Seals from Plant in Yongbyon', IAEA Press Release, 24 September 2008.

[48] Glenn Kessler, 'Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal', Washington Post, 26 September 2008.

[49] Dr Jeffrey Lewis, 'Provisionally Delisting North Korea Redux', Armscontrolwonk.com, 28 September 2008.

[50] Glenn Kessler, 'Administration Pushing to Salvage Accord With N. Korea', Washington Post, 28 September 2008.

[51] 'Foreign Ministry's Spokesman on DPRK's Decision to Suspend Activities to Disable Nuclear Facilities', KCNA, 26 August 2008.

[52] Op Cit, Glenn Kessler, 26 September 2008.

[53] Dr Jeffrey Lewis, 'North Koreans Reverse Disablement, Kinda', Armcontrolwonk.com, 4 September 2008.

[54] Op Cit, Glenn Kessler, 28 September 2008.

[55] 'Evening Walkthrough at Six-Party Talks', Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, China World Hotel Beijing, China, 6 September 2008.

[56] 'Now He's Ready to Deal', New York Times, editorial, 19 April 2008.

[57] Daryl G. Kimball, 'North Korea and the Incident in the Syrian Desert', Arms Control Today, May 2008.

[58] Blaine Harden and Robin Wright, 'U.S. to Delist North Korea As Sponsor Of Terrorism', Washington Post, 27 June 2008.

[59] Glenn Kessler, 'Mid-Level Official Steered U.S. Shift On North Korea', Washington Post, 26 May 2008.

Researched and written by Nicola Butler

Press Communiqué of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of The Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 12 July 2008

The Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 10 to 12 July 2008.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC; Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Saiki Akitaka, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Kim Sook, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexei Borodavkin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the State Department of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the meeting.

The Parties spoke highly of the positive progress made in the second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement and agreed unanimously that the progress contributes to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The Parties reached important consensus on the full and balanced implementation of the second-phase actions.

I. In accordance with the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted on 19 September 2005, the six parties agreed to establish a verification mechanism within the Six-Party Talks framework to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The verification mechanism consists of experts of the six parties and is responsible to the Working Group on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The verification measures of the verification mechanism include visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures unanimously agreed upon among the six parties.

When necessary, the verification mechanism can welcome the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide consultancy and assistance for relevant verification.

The specific plans and implementation of the verification will be decided by the Working Group on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in line with the principle of consensus.

II. The six parties agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism within the Six-Party Talks framework.

The monitoring mechanism consists of the heads of delegation of the six parties.

The mission of the monitoring mechanism is to ensure that all parties honor and fulfill their respective commitments made within the Six-Party Talks framework, including non-proliferation and economic and energy assistance to the DPRK.

The monitoring mechanism will carry out its responsibilities in ways considered effective by the six parties.

The heads of delegation of the six parties can authorize appropriate officials to carry out their responsibilities.

III. The Parties formulated a timetable for economic and energy assistance along with disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

Disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the DPRK and the remaining heavy fuel oil (HFO) and non-HFO assistance to the DPRK by other parties will be fully implemented in parallel.

All parties will work to complete their HFO and non-HFO assistance to the DPRK by the end of October 2008.

The United States and Russia will work to complete the provision of their remaining share of HFO assistance to the DPRK by the end of October 2008.

China and the ROK will work to sign with the DPRK binding agreements for the provision of their remaining share of non-HFO assistance by the end of August 2008.

Japan expressed its willingness to take part in the economic and energy assistance to the DPRK as soon as possible when the environment is in place.

The DPRK will work to complete the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the end of October 2008.

IV. The Parties agreed to continue with their discussions on the "Guiding Principles of Peace and Security in Northeast Asia".

V. The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will be held in Beijing at an appropriate time.

VI. The Parties had a preliminary exchange of views on the third-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties agreed to continue to advance the Six-Party Talks process in a comprehensive manner and work together for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

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© 2008 The Acronym Institute.