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Issue No. 90, Spring 2009
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Proposal |
Lead Proponent(s) |
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Germany |
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Norway |
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Various states |
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Costa Rica |
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China |
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Codifying the 1991/1992 US/Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives |
Finland |
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Prohibition of the development of new types of nuclear weapons |
Iran |
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New Agenda Coalition |
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Central Asian states |
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Actions to strengthen cooperation between the NWFZs and Mongolia |
Various states |
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Iran |
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The IAEA Additional Protocol as the safeguard standard required by the NPT |
European Union |
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United States |
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Endorsement of compliance enforcement by the UN Security Council |
Canada and G10 |
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Canada |
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EU and Zangger Committee |
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| Other Issues | |
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General principles related to withdrawal (various proposals) |
Various states |
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Various states |
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Non-Aligned Movement |
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Concrete measures to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East |
Egypt |
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League of Arab States |
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Egypt |
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Consideration of steps to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education |
Japan |
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Canada |
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Canada |
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Non-Aligned Movement |
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Requests for subsidiary bodies and ad hoc committees (various proposals) |
Various states |
It is rare that consensus forms around new commitments, though the outcomes of 1995 and 2000 continue to set the model for what can be achieved. In 2005, the likelihood of a successful outcome was complicated not only by the lack of implementation, but by the repudiation of those commitments by a small number of governments. Parties even disagreed over the nature of those commitments. Moving forward toward 2010, many delegations have resubmitted initiatives from 2005 and put forward a number of new proposals that include commitments to enhance, modify and strengthen the operation of the NPT regime.
In connection with the decision to indefinitely extend the Treaty, in 1995 NPT parties agreed to a package of decisions, including a set of principles and objectives related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The 2000 RevCon agreed to 13 "practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'." The 2005 RevCon, however, could not even agree to include review of these past agreements in its mandate.
Moving beyond the 2005 impasse, in the present review cycle governments have called for additional arms reductions and demanded further progress in implementing the 1995 and 2000 commitments. Beyond these calls, some governments have called for a variety of next steps. Others have suggested that the international community should move beyond or reassess past agreements in light of "the current security environment".
Proposal: New implementation baseline
Intended as a "brainstorming piece" to "rekindle a sense of common purpose in the international community", Germany has proposed a "New Implementation Baseline."[2] The Baseline, intended to be "result oriented", consists of a two-track approach reflecting the fundamental bargain underlining the NPT. Germany claims it is designed to strengthen non-proliferation and to give new momentum to nuclear disarmament.
The non-proliferation track includes: a commitment to compliance and support for diplomatic efforts aimed at solving regional proliferation risks; improvement of verification, especially through making the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol the verification standard; prevention of misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military ends, in particular through a solution to the risks posed by the nuclear fuel cycle; development of a joint understanding on withdrawal from the NPT; institutionalizing UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) with the NPT; and strengthening the role of the UN Security Council as "the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance."
The disarmament track endeavours to: overcome the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, including negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT); foster dialogue between Russia and the United States on a follow-up to START and SORT; establish an incremental arms control approach to non-strategic nuclear weapons; promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and reaffirm the moratorium on nuclear test explosions; establish other commitments in implementation of the "cessation of the nuclear arms race" obligation through the establishment of accountability and reporting obligations and the capping of nuclear arsenals; recommit to existing security assurances and explore ways of formalizing them; and to bring all existing nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) treaties into force.
Positions. In an informal response to the German proposal, South Africa expressed the view that some states were holding progress on disarmament hostage to implementation of further non-proliferation measures. Reflecting the perspective of the global south, the South African delegation challenged developed states to demonstrate where developing states were failing to implement non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. The South African delegation advocated for the issue of military expenditures and development to become part of the discussion and (in response to European calls for NWFZ elsewhere) called for Europe to begin its own process toward establishing a NWFZ.
Norway responded to South Africa, expressing the contrary view that there was indeed room for improvement in the non-proliferation regime. The Norwegian delegation suggested progress should be made in all three pillars of the Treaty simultaneously, though without matching progress step for step.
New Zealand, representing a position held by many states since 2000, affirmed that changes in the security environment have not detracted from the pertinence of the 1995 and 2000 outcomes. In essence, present circumstances do not require new bargains, but rather the implementation of past agreements and measures.
The Republic of Korea expressed support for a similar idea, calling on the 2010 RevCon to review each of the 13 steps and bring them up to date to reflect changes in the international security environment.[3]
Proposal: Seven nations initiative
Following the failure of the 2005 NPT RevCon, seven governments-Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom-sought to reinvigorate disarmament efforts in the context of the 2005 UN World Summit. Despite the failure of their efforts to affect the outcome of the Summit, the seven nations reaffirmed their initiative in the NPT context, stating that it should be considered as a basis for consensus in 2010.[4] Their July 2005 Joint Declaration is based upon the following elements:
Positions. In February 2008, the government of Norway in cooperation with the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Hoover Institution hosted a conference in Oslo on "Achieving the Vision of a Nuclear Weapon Free World". The conference proposed five principles and ten recommendations. The recommendations included:
Beyond calls for implementation of steps that have already been agreed to, a number of governments have proposed a number of additional nuclear disarmament steps that can be taken in the NPT context. Many of these reinforce or build on the steps agreed to in 2000.
Proposal: Strengthened reporting mechanism
In step 12 of the 13 practical steps in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, NPT parties agreed to provide regular reports within the framework of the review process on implementation of Article VI and on paragraph 4 (c) of 1995 Decision 2, relating to the determined pursuit of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament by all states. Implementation of this commitment to report has been poor.
In 2008, the Canadian NGO Project Ploughshares reported that in the period 2001-2007 only 48, or one-quarter, of NPT parties had submitted at least one report to a PrepCom or RevCon.[7] They further reported that the NWS have generally not submitted formal reports (though they do make informal reports during the review proceedings) and that three NWS-France, the United Kingdom, and the United States-have not submitted any formal reports at all.[8]
Various overlapping proposals and suggestions have been put forward with the aim of strengthening the reporting mechanism agreed to in 2000:
Positions. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and some of its members have expressed support for "further strengthening or enhancement" of the reporting mechanism.[14] Egypt, in particular, supports the strengthening of state reporting mechanisms as one possible measure to realize the full implementation of the 1995 and 2000 packages. In the view of Egypt, such a mechanism would allow "effective scrutiny of measures taken by each State to secure its full compliance with all Treaty articles and steps taken by each State to advance Treaty universality."[15] Egypt thus sees the reporting mechanism as covering more than the implementation of Article VI.
Proposal: Nuclear Weapons Convention
Costa Rica and Malaysia circulated a revised version of the NGO-drafted Model Nuclear Weapons Convention as a discussion piece "to assist States parties to the NPT in their deliberations with respect to the implementation of article VI".[16]
Positions. Due to the complexity of achieving global nuclear disarmament, many western governments are reluctant to endorse the concept of such a convention at the present time, though many see it as the eventual goal. Notably, however, following its change of government, Australia vocalized support for the eventual goal of a nuclear weapons convention.[17] The NAM supports an annual resolution at the UN General Assembly calling for a nuclear weapon convention.
Proposal: Steps to Promote Disarmament and Reduce Nuclear Danger
China suggested the following measures for the NWS to take "to promote nuclear disarmament, reduce the danger of nuclear war and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy":
Proposal: Codifying the 1991/1992 US/Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
In a joint statement to the second PrepCom, Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Austria proposed codifying the US/Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) on what are referred to as "non-strategic nuclear weapons" in the NPT context "as a demonstration of fulfilment of the objectives of Article VI ... and of the rule of law". They note that a first step toward the reduction and elimination of such portable, relatively small nuclear weapons could be their consolidation and withdrawal to central storage.
The six nations explained the necessity of their proposal as stemming from the fact that these initiatives "were not codified as binding legal instruments, they lack a formal verification system, they are not irreversible, implementation has not been fully transparently disclosed or monitored, and first and foremost, the PNI's [sic] have not removed the category of land-based non-strategic nuclear weapons from operation doctrine".[19]
Positions. Not party to this initiative, Norway encouraged the United States and Russia to "take incremental steps in dealing with non-strategic nuclear weapons with a view to fully implementing the [PNI] and reaching a legally binding arrangement."[20] Norway's position differs from the six nation proposal in that it does not seek to internationalize the PNI obligations.
Proposal: NPT decision on prohibition of development of new types of nuclear weapons
Iran has proposed that the RevCon consider a decision "on the prohibition of development and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nukes, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in home and foreign countries."[21]
Many governments maintain that the NPT is the appropriate forum for dealing with assurances to NNWS against the threat or use of nuclear weapons and that such assurances could take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty.
In 1995, in order to strengthen their position prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference, each NPT nuclear weapon state submitted a text containing its own negative security assurance undertaking to the UN Security Council. The Security Council then adopted resolution 984 (1995), noting these unilateral statements and harmonizing a broad agreement to assist any state subjected to nuclear weapon threats or attacks (positive security assurances). Noting these developments, paragraph 8 of Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, stated "further steps should be considered.... These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument."
The 2000 NPT RevCon debated these issues and revised its approach. While reaffirming the role of the NPT as a forum for dealing with security assurances, which "strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime", the 2000 final document made no mention of an international instrument, but encouraged the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 RevCon. Additionally, the document recognized the role played by various NWFZ treaties in extending negative security assurances to states in the zones concerned. The failure of the 2005 RevCon means that no further recommendations were taken forward.
Proposal: Binding NPT Protocol
The New Agenda Coalition resubmitted its draft NPT protocol banning the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS,[22] originally tabled at the 2005 Review Conference. The Coalition reiterated its view that the NPT would be the most appropriate venue for such negotiations.[23] Their draft protocol draws upon a variety of sources, including the IAEA Statute, Security Council resolution 984 and the declarations contained therein and the 2000 NPT RevCon final document.
Positions. The nuclear weapons states differ on how to approach security assurances. Russia said it supported discussions on security assurances only in the context of the Conference on Disarmament (CD).[24] While China called for the CD to negotiate a legally-binding binding instrument, [25] it also said it would consider a protocol to the NPT.[26] The United Kingdom took the view that the assurances contained in Security Council resolution 984 and in the various NWFZ treaties were adequate. The UK maintains that the best way to create new security assurances is through protocols attached to NWFZ treaties.[27]
A number of other governments and blocs have reiterated their support in the present review cycle for consideration of an NPT protocol on security assurances, including Canada,[28] the NAM,[29] and Iran. While the NAM called for establishment of a subsidiary body to negotiate such a protocol, Iran called for the CD to establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft instrument and submit it to the RevCon for consideration and adoption. Iran further proposed that the RevCon adopt a decision holding "that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited", as a first step toward addressing the legality of use and broader issues relating to security assurances. Iran also called for a decision to underscore the unacceptability of any threats or attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities.[30]
Other governments expressed support for different methods to achieve consensus on security assurances. Ukraine called on the 2010 RevCon to recommend that the UN General Assembly adopt a resolution to "enable convening an International Conference under the auspices of the UN to discuss the security assurances issue with the purpose of finding the acceptable solution."[31] Italy expressed the view that further efforts should be explored on a unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral or regional basis, rather than only through multilateral processes.[32]
Article VII of the NPT encourages the development of nuclear weapon free zones, stating in full: "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference, inter alia, agreed that the development of NWFZs should be pursued as a matter of priority and that the cooperation of the NWS was necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such efforts. The 2000 NPT Review Conference reiterated the views expressed in 1995, further expressed support for existing treaties and efforts and reaffirmed the guidelines for NWFZ treaties adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999.
Since the 2000 RevCon, Mongolia has continued to take steps to consolidate its nuclear weapon free status. Further, and more controversially, in 2006 the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) signed a treaty establishing a NWFZ in their territories, despite continuing reservations to the text from France, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Proposal: Recognizing the Central Asian NWFZ
The five Central Asian states have suggested the RevCon adopt language recognizing their efforts to achieve the entry into force of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, establishing a NWFZ in their region.[33]
Positions. Mirroring recent discussions on this issue in the UN General Assembly, where the Central Asian states have also sought to receive international recognition for their efforts, the NWS have split on this issue, with China[34] and Russia in favour and Britain, France and the United States maintaining their reservations. The UK, while reiterating its disappointment in the breakdown of consultations prior to the conclusion of the Treaty, urged the "early ratification of the Treaty by the States of the zone so that we can again seek to resolve our differences over these issues".[35]
Proposal: Actions to strengthen cooperation between NWFZs and Mongolia
The parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (covering Latin America and the Caribbean) have identified a series of actions to strengthen the NWFZs and enhance cooperation with Mongolia, including:
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones By the Numbers
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Article I of the NPT prohibits the direct or indirect transfer of nuclear weapons from the nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states. It also prohibits the NWS from assisting the NNWS in acquiring or attaining control over nuclear weapons. Review of this provision has been limited in past NPT meetings, subject usually to only reaffirmation, as illustrated by the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
While most discussion over the NWS' obligations centres around the article VI obligations, NATO's nuclear sharing and doctrine has come under increasing question since the end of the Cold War, not only from NNWS but also from within NATO countries that continue to host such weapons. Though nothing in the NPT provides for an exception to allow nuclear sharing among allies, NATO states have long argued that such arrangements are legal because they pre-date the Treaty.[37]
Since 1954, the United States has deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. As of March 2008, five non-nuclear weapon states-Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey-host about 240 non-strategic US nuclear weapons. The weapons remain under US auspices and control, but it is envisaged that control over the weapons and their delivery (and therefore use) would be transferred to the host countries during times of war.[38] All of the US warheads currently in Europe are B-61-3/4 modified bombs, which were modernized in 1998-2003.
Proposal: Verification of Article I
Iran has called on the Review Conference to establish "a strong mechanism to verify the implementation of Article I" by the nuclear weapon states, analogous to the verification mechanism created under Article III, as part of a package that Iran dubs the "New Implementation Strategy". [39] Intended to scrutinize the NWS and specifically the NATO nuclear sharing doctrine, Iran's Strategy also calls for the RevCon, inter alia, to define the legal status of Article I and its implementation by NWS and to examine cases of non-proliferation attributable to NWS.
Positions. Given the widespread scrutiny over its own nuclear programme and its defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, Iran's initiative is likely to be dismissed as a finger pointing exercise. As it directly challenges existing NATO policy, there is little chance Iran will find support for its position from the Review Conference.
The NPT places two basic non-proliferation requirements on the non-nuclear weapon states. The obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons is contained in Article II. Governments did not originally seek to negotiate a compliance assessment or enforcement mechanism to address suspected violations of Article II, due to the belief that verification of this provision would require an unrealistically intrusive inspection regime. Instead the verification component of the NPT focuses on the disposition of nuclear material. Thus, under Article III.1, NNWS are required to conclude comprehensive safeguard agreements with the IAEA, for the purpose of "preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".
Following from the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme in 1991, the IAEA undertook efforts to strengthen the NPT safeguards system with a view toward ensuring the completeness of states' declarations of nuclear material and activities, beyond the existing standard of ensuring the accuracy of those declarations. In 1995 the IAEA adopted a set of measures to enhance its practice of implementing the CSA in accordance with perceptions of its existing legal authority. In addition, the IAEA Board of Governors launched negotiations on enhanced safeguards, which resulted in an agreed text for a Model Additional Protocol to states' safeguards agreements, which it approved in May 1997.
As the IAEA continued to strengthen its safeguards practices, after 1997 the focus in the NPT context turned to encouraging states to bring into force the Additional Protocol as well as universalizing the CSA. In 2005 the IAEA Board also agreed to modify the standard text of the Small Quantity Protocol. States that implement the modified text would be required to notify the IAEA and to submit a report on its nuclear materials and plans upon making a decision to build a new nuclear facility.
The Status of NPT Safeguards
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In the NPT context, a number of states have continued to seek improvement in the safeguards regime and to pursue legal and technical means to enhance detection of safeguards violations and to strengthen the enforcement of non-proliferation norms. Developing states have generally opposed further attempts to impose additional legal safeguards requirements and insist that the IAEA Additional Protocol should be only voluntary.
Proposal: The IAEA Additional Protocol as the safeguard standard
The European Union (EU) has proposed that the RevCon adopt a decision to consider the comprehensive safeguard agreements and the Additional Protocol to be the safeguards standard required by Article III. [40] Such a decision would result in the Additional Protocol becoming a legal requirement under the NPT. The right to nuclear energy described in Article IV would then be contingent on a state party's adoption of and adherence to the Additional Protocol.
Positions. The stalemate over this issue has not moved much in recent years. Various states still continue to push and express support for this step. But opposition by many NAM members suggests that the prospects for adoption of such a proposal by the RevCon are unpromising. Reflecting this dismal assessment, some Western states have begun to declare and take national steps to act as if the Additional Protocol were the safeguard standard. The first to take such a step was Australia, which has enacted national legislation to make adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear supply.[41]
In addition to the EU,[42] other governments and blocs, including Canada,[43] Kyrgyzstan,[44] Turkey,[45] the United States,[46] and the Vienna Group of 10 (G10-Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden)[47] have declared that in their view the Additional Protocol constitutes the current verification standard.
A number of states have also specifically called for adherence to the Additional Protocol to become a condition of supply, including Canada, the G10, Norway, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine.[48]
In resisting attempts to treat the Additional Protocol as the NPT verification standard, a number of non-aligned states have linked the issue to achieving universality of the Treaty (coded reference in many cases to Israel's accession to the Treaty as a NNWS). In response to calls for the Additional Protocol to become the verification standard, the NAM have asserted that it is necessary to distinguish between voluntary and mandatory measures, and not to impose voluntary measures as legal requirements.[49]
The Arab League also describes the Additional Protocol as complementary and voluntary, stating that the focus of NPT parties should be on universalizing the CSA.[50] Further, the League strongly opposed making the Additional Protocol a condition of supply, calling such proposals unacceptable, especially in light of the Treaty's lack of universality. Separately, Egypt,[51] Indonesia,[52] Iran[53] and Syria[54] have also criticized attempts to extend the safeguards obligation or make the Additional Protocol a condition of supply, absent the universal application of safeguards.
In recent years, debates over compliance and enforcement have increased in the NPT context, stimulated particularly by concerns over the nuclear programmes of Iraq, North Korea and Iran.
The NPT itself lacks institutional provisions for compliance assessment and enforcement. The role of the IAEA is limited to judging compliance with safeguards agreements-not with the Treaty generally-and it lacks effective means to enforce its judgments. The IAEA can seek recourse to the UN Security Council in a limited range of circumstances, typically upon agreement by the Board of Governors following a report from inspectors about clandestine nuclear operations or the diversion of nuclear materials. However, there are considerable grey areas in its authority, especially absent the Additional Protocol.[55]
Though many have increasingly looked to the Security Council to enforce the Treaty and nuclear non-proliferation norms generally, its ability to address these issues is limited by political and institutional considerations, including the presence of five nuclear weapon states as permanent members with veto powers. Further, the Security Council's role derives from the UN Charter and it has to agree that a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security before it can take legal measures and actions, especially if sanctions are involved.[56] In resolution 1540 (2004), however, the Security Council determined that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace, thus providing itself with a basis and precedent for responding to proliferation issues.
Ultimately, compliance judgment and enforcement is left in the hands of NPT state parties. In light of the evident gaps in this aspect of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, over the past two review cycles many governments have sought to address the issue of compliance in the NPT context. Key differences between governments include the role of the IAEA versus the role of the Security Council in compliance assessment, the adoption of measures by export control regimes or self-appointed "coalitions of the willing", and whether compliance enforcement efforts should focus exclusively on Articles I, II and III or on other aspects of the Treaty, such as Articles IV and VI.
Proposal: Development of national means to detect and reverse non-compliance
Toward assessing and ensuring compliance with the Treaty, the United States has called for states parties to adopt legal mechanisms, develop institutions and internal infrastructure, acquire staff, training and equipment, and respond to non-compliance within their own borders or jurisdiction. The US proposal calls on states, regional groups and international organizations to "provide assistance to those who have identified gaps in their capacities."[57] The United States has argued that states parties should make it their "highest priority" during the review cycle "to develop and implement improved ways to deter, detect, and reverse noncompliance with Articles I, II, or III of the Treaty-or with safeguards agreements."[58]
Positions. The G10 expressed the view that states should not trade with states in non-compliance with comprehensive safeguards agreements, "as established by the IAEA Board of Governors".[59] While the G10 express support for the establishment of disincentives to non-compliance, they differ from the United States in that they do not foresee compliance assessment and enforcement falling to the judgment of individual states. However, the G10 called for states to "not engage in active nuclear cooperation with those States Party that are in non-compliance with the terms of their Safeguards Agreements."[60]
In a competing initiative on non-compliance, Iran proposed that the Review Conference conduct a thorough review of the implementation of Article I, III, IV, and VI.[61] Iran further proposed that the Review Conference suggest ways in which states that are in non-compliance could come into compliance with them. In particular, Iran's working paper on the subject emphasizes that non-compliance with Article IV "merits a thorough consideration by the Review Conference", particularly violations of this article that deprive states parties "from the exercise of their inalienable right and illegal as well as unilateral sanctions."
Proposal: Endorsing compliance enforcement by the UN Security Council
In response to various non-proliferation crises, in the current review cycle several governments have called for the role of the UN Security Council to be affirmed in the NPT context. Canada, for instance, called on the second PrepCom to "underscore the mandate of the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to continue to ensure and uphold compliance with the Treaty and with safeguards agreements, and to take appropriate measures in cases of non-compliance... when notified by IAEA of non-compliance." [62] This goes beyond the language incorporated in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.[63]
Positions. While many governments fully endorse some role for the Security Council in enforcing compliance with the Treaty and with IAEA safeguards, delegations have articulated various visions for how such a compliance responsibility should be discharged, and, most crucially, how compliance assessments should be accomplished in a professional, fair and balanced manner.
Canada's views, depicted above, followed directly from those expressed by the G10 in its paper on safeguards submitted to the first PrepCom. Further elaborating a broad view of the Council's authority to act in matters related to proliferation, the G10 recalled that the Council in resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) "reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security." Further, they underscored the importance of the IAEA's access to the Council, "particularly though not exclusively in cases of non-compliance".[64]
The Republic of Korea expressed a similar view of the Council playing "a vital role in enforcing compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures against non-compliance cases referred to it by IAEA". Dealing with a key concern of many governments, the South Korean paper on safeguards stressed that findings of non-compliance, "should be based on the objective and professional judgment of IAEA".[65]
Fearful of selective or discriminatory implementation, the loss of access to technology for political rather than legal reasons and the transfiguration of voluntary confidence-building measures into legal requirements, some developing states have resisted calls for the Security Council to become more involved in compliance assessment. Concerns about how the issues arising from Iran's nuclear programme are being dealt with is a clear subtext in many of these critiques.
Presenting a view sharply divergent from that of the G10, Indonesia called for states to urgently rectify the situation of the UN Security Council judging and enforcing NPT compliance. Indonesia warned that the Council's motives were political, noted the Council was unlikely to enforce compliance with Article VI and stated that the expansion of the Council's authority risks undermining the authority of the IAEA. Malaysia expressed a view close to the Indonesian position, stating that outstanding issues at the IAEA should not be politicized as they have legal and technical solutions. Malaysia further affirmed the centrality of the IAEA in dealing with safeguards and verification matters and that the Agency should not be subject to undue interference.[67]
On the matter of compliance assessment, the NAM suggested a number of guidelines to ensure that the IAEA remains technical, non-political and impartial, such as requiring non-compliance to be reported first from agency inspectors and that the IAEA "should show appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements" in making judgments.[68]
Since 2001, increased attention has been paid to issues of nuclear security and physical protection. Concerns have stemmed from increased perceived threat of non-state acquisition of nuclear material and from the revelation of nuclear blackmarket smuggling rings. Much of the work in this area has taken place outside the NPT in the form of various conventions, IAEA regulations and interventions of the UN Security Council.
In the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, issues of physical protection and illicit trafficking received relatively scant attention. The document's treatment of these subjects is limited to noting the need for increased cooperation,[69] calling for states to join the CPPNM[70] and welcoming IAEA activity toward addressing illicit trafficking.[71]
Looking toward 2010, the G10 have identified areas requiring additional attention. These include "enhanced coordination among States and among international organizations in preventing, detecting and responding to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials" and enhanced "prevention of terrorist acts, as well as the physical protection and accountability of nuclear and other radioactive material in nuclear and non-nuclear use, and in storage and transport, throughout their life cycle, in a comprehensive and coherent manner".[72]
The major role of the NPT in addressing these issues, however, is likely to be limited in 2010 to endorsing existing efforts and calling on states to join all relevant international instruments.
Proposal: Adequate security as a condition of supply
Canada proposed that, in the NPT context, states "should require that transfers only take place if the recipient State has in place an effective system of nuclear security, adequate physical protection, measures to combat illicit trafficking, and controls on retransfers".[73]
Positions. The G10 have expressed support for such a requirement. They have stated that the existence of measures related to physical protection and to combat illicit trafficking "should be made a precondition for transfers of nuclear material, sensitive equipment or technology."[74]
Proposal: Hortatory measures
Canada and the G10 have called for language urging states to take a variety of actions, including:
In addition, Canada has called for recognition of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative and support for efforts to prevent the emergence of black markets.[76]
Outside the NPT, two export control regimes work to uphold and facilitate global non-proliferation norms. Founded in 1970, the 36 member Zangger Committee supports the NPT by contributing to the interpretation of Article III.2 of the Treaty, which requires states parties not to export source or special fissional material or related equipment unless the items are subject to safeguards. In 1974 the Committee reached a common understanding of the requirements of Article III.2 and submitted a "trigger list" of items to the IAEA, which, if exported, would trigger safeguards. The Committee meets regularly to review and revise its trigger list.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) consists of 45 members, representing most of the NPT parties that have advanced nuclear infrastructures. Founded in 1974, the group endorsed a set of guidelines for safeguards and export controls that should apply to nuclear transfers. The guidelines covers the Zangger trigger list and urges special controls on the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies, such as enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
Following the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network and in response to attempts by some states to curb nuclear trade with Iran, governments have sought various ways to strengthen the export control regimes as a non-proliferation mechanism.[77] The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1540 (2004) requiring all member states to enact measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors by enacting appropriate controls. In the NPT context, proposals have largely been limited to endorsing work done outside the framework of the Treaty.[78]
Proposal: Recognition of export control regimes
Calling for the RevCon "to welcome and recognize the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in pursuance of the NPT non-proliferation goals," the EU and associated states said that "it should also endorse the importance of the Zangger Committee's guidance for States parties in meeting their obligation under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and should invite all States to adopt both memoranda of the Zangger Committee and its trigger list as minimum standards in connection with any nuclear cooperation. Our objective is the universal application of the directives and lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a standard for a collective approach of the international community to the fight against proliferation."[79]
Related to this proposal, the 36 members of the Zangger Committee (with support from Costa Rica, Cyprus, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and New Zealand) called for the RevCon to adopt language on the Zangger Committee in its final document. They recommended that the RevCon should: take note of the Committee's meetings and memoranda; endorse the importance of Committee as a "guidance for States Party in meeting their obligation under Article III, Paragraph 2"; recommend that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation "be reviewed from time to time;" and urge the Committee to "share its experiences on export controls, so that states draw on the arrangements of its Memoranda."[80]
Positions. Developing states generally dislike what they view as non-inclusive articulation of legal non-proliferation norms and argue that such selective restrictions on technological transfers violates Article IV, in spirit if not in letter. The NAM continued "to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and stresses that such restrictions or limitations are incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty and should be removed."[81] Egypt pointedly rejects the concept of "sensitive or proliferation resistant technologies" for the purposes of restricting exports, which it claimed go beyond the criteria of the Treaty.[82]
Others counter that not only are export controls legitimate under the Treaty, but that they are a requirement. In this context, the EU affirmed that effective export controls are required under Articles I and II and that all states should comply with Zangger Committee and NSG guidelines.[83] Further, the G10[84] and Norway[85] emphasized that the "review process should foster a common understanding that nuclear export controls are a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty, in order not to contribute to a nuclear explosive activity, an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or acts of nuclear terrorism". These states have also defended the proceedings of the export control regimes as being transparent and accountable.
The legitimacy of the export control regimes has rested in part on the norm that NPT benefits should flow only to NPT parties. The US drive to get the NSG's rules modified to allow for nuclear trade with non-NPT member India has therefore raised concerns.
The NAM's opening statement in 2008 noted that "the recent developments in particular the nuclear cooperation agreement signed by a NWS with a non-party to the NPT is a matter of great concern, since in accordance with that agreement nuclear materials can be transferred to un-safeguarded facilities in violation of Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT", which stipulates that such transfers must be subject to safeguards required by the NPT.[86] Egypt described the "regrettable situation" of export controls being aggravated "when nuclear weapons States parties enter into new agreement, or update existing ones, with states that are not parties [to the NPT] and refuse to undertake any commitment in the field of disarmament ...without requiring from them to join the Treaty [sic] apply the IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all their nuclear installations."[87] Though understood as an oblique, reference to an agreement in early 2008 between the United States and Israel on cooperation relating (according to reports) to nuclear safety, such criticisms apply equally to India and Pakistan.
In connection with recent proliferation crises, expanding global interest in nuclear energy and the anticipation that states may seek to develop their own nuclear fuel production capacities, governments have renewed discussions over ways to control the spread of the nuclear fuel cycle, or at least what are deemed to be its most proliferation-sensitive aspects. The IAEA has been the focal point for such efforts, where governments have tabled more than a dozen proposals. The most broadly-supported concepts centre around the idea of establishing nuclear fuel supply assurances to augment existing market-based assurances, in order to provide states with an incentive not to pursue national programmes. While most western states are supportive of these initiatives, many non-aligned states have expressed reservations and cautioned against the erosion of the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Though no specific proposals have been put forward in the NPT context, it is likely that any international action taken on the matter will have bearing on NPT concerns. Governments have thus used the present NPT review cycle to express a wide range of views on issues related to controlling the nuclear fuel cycle.
Positions. Among delegations that have advocated for multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle, the EU and associated states are representative of the majority view that the first concrete steps should be taken by the IAEA.[88]
Different delegations have articulated various, often competing, criteria for any proposed mechanism related to the nuclear fuel cycle, including, inter alia:[89]
Following the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and subsequent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, governments began to seek consensus on how the withdrawal provision in Article X should be interpreted and applied, and measures to deter states from withdrawing from the Treaty. Neither the 1995 decisions nor the final document from the 2000 RevCon dealt with Article X or the issue of withdrawal.
Notwithstanding the fact that the question of measures to deal with withdrawal is controversial, NPT delegations came close in 2005 to finalizing language that would have clarified expectations regarding the application of Article X.[91] Following the failure of the 2005 RevCon, several delegations, including the EU[92] and the United States,[93] suggested that governments should build on these Article X debates and initiatives.
In the latest review cycle, a number of proposals have been put forward for dealing with the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty, including from Canada, the EU,[94] Japan,[95] the Republic of Korea and the United States.[96] At the same time, some governments, such as Iran,[97] are of the view that no action should be taken. Others have raised objections or concerns regarding various points, as outlined below.
A number of governments have outlined general principles that they would like to apply to interpretation of Article X, e.g.:
Positions. South Africa took the view that discussion of withdrawal should be limited to interpretation of Article X and that it could not accept any proposal that represented a de facto amendment to the Treaty. South Africa also said that penalties for withdrawal were not provided under the Treaty and that any change could only be dealt with through the Treaty amendment process.
The United States has expressed the view that "constructive" consensus was only possible on responding to the withdrawal of treaty violators, noting there was no consensus on penalizing withdrawal per se or on making withdrawal more difficult. This approach contrasts with some proposed principles articulated by several of its allies, including Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
A wide range of views exist on what international mechanisms should be recognized or established to guide states in responding to the notice of intent to withdraw from the Treaty. Suggested measures range from convening an extraordinary meeting of NPT parties to automatic consideration of the matter by the UN Security Council:
Positions. Indonesia raised concerns about the UN Security Council dealing with withdrawal cases in light of its limited membership and application of the P-5 veto power. Indonesia expressed support for withdrawal cases to be dealt with through an emergency meeting of NPT parties instead.
The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted a resolution, in connection with the decision to extend the treaty indefinitely, calling for steps toward achieving a Middle East NWFZ. The resolution, inter alia, endorsed the peace process, called for non-NPT states to join as NNWS, called for all states in the region to place their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and called for all states to take practical steps in appropriate forums toward establishing such a zone.
In 2000 NPT parties reaffirmed the 1995 resolution, but contributed little toward its implementation beyond requesting governments to report on steps they have taken to promote it.
Proposal: Intersessional Standing Committee
The NAM[99] and the Arab League[100] have called for establishment of a Standing Committee to follow up intersessionally on implementation of the 1995 resolution and to report to the 2015 RevCon, in particular on Israel's prompt accession to the NPT and implementation of comprehensive safeguards.
Proposal: Concrete measures to implement the 1995 resolution
Egypt has presented a non-exhaustive list of concrete measures aimed at operationalizing the 1995 Middle East resolution. It calls on the 2010 Review Conference to consider:
Positions. The League of Arab States has also called for some interim steps to implement the resolution, including: for the UN to convene an international meeting on the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East; for an emphasis on the need for nuclear weapon states to fulfil all their commitments under Article I of the NPT; and to report on the implementation of these commitments during the 2015 review cycle.[102]
Iran has expressed the expectation that NPT parties will take collective and practical steps toward establishment of a Middle East NWFZ.[103]
Similar to elements in Egypt's proposal, Algeria has called for a regional monitoring mechanism to report on implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution, with a focus on Israel's accession to the NPT and adoption of comprehensive safeguards.[104]
The United Kingdom[105] and the United States[106] took note of Egypt's proposals during the second PrepCom. The United Kingdom said it would give the proposals careful consideration.
Proposal: Prohibiting nuclear trade with Israel
The Arab League has called on the RevCon to obtain a commitment from the NWS not to transfer any nuclear weapons to Israel or assist Israel in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to obtain a commitment from all states to not transfer any nuclear material, equipment or assistance to Israel.[107]
Positions. Iran also expressed support for a ban on the transfer of all nuclear-related material, equipment or assistance to Israel.[108]
For many governments, also connected to the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely was the call made in Decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference for universal adherence to the Treaty. The Conference called on all states not party to join, particularly those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It further stated that every effort should be made by states to achieve this objective.
In paragraph 4 of its agreed final document, the 2000 RevCon decided to "to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty". Toward this end, however, the RevCon did little more than call on all remaining states to join the Treaty as NNWS, specifically naming India, Israel and Pakistan in this context.[109]
Proposal: Universality Adherence Support Unit
Egypt proposed "the creation of an NPT Universality Adherence Support Unit, within the framework of the NPT [as] a further measure towards realizing the agreed upon objective of Treaty Universality." In the same working paper, Egypt called for the 2010 RevCon to adopt a universality action plan, "which would encompass a series of practical steps for the systematic and progressive achievement of full and complete NPT Universality." Egypt also called on the RevCon to request states to report to each PrepCom and RevCon on the specific steps taken toward achieving universality of the Treaty.[110]
Disarmament and non-proliferation has not been formally dealt with in the NPT context. Prioritized in particular by Japan, multilateral efforts have recently centred around implementing the recommendations contained in UN Secretary-General report A/57/124. Since the 2005 RevCon, a group of eight countries (Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden) have worked to promote this topic in the NPT context.
Proposal: Consideration of steps to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education
Japan has suggested that efforts on education in the NPT context should include "deepening discussions among security and disarmament experts on the security benefits of and challenges to the NPT regime, and providing knowledge on these issues to the public," and that these efforts should hold the need to develop critical thinking skills in an informed citizenry as one of the objectives. Japan further recommended that experiences in education efforts should be shared among member states, international organizations, and civil society.[111]
Positions. In a personal capacity, Japan has called for the recommendations in A/57/124 to be reaffirmed and followed. In order to implement the recommendations, Japan suggested that humankind should "share as objective information the experiences of nuclear devastation and the persistent effects of radiation on the environment and human health" and that governments should support such efforts by civil society.
On behalf of the group of eight referred to above, plus the twelve co-sponsors[112] of the 2006 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, Japan also called on all states to join such initiatives.[113] The NAM likewise supported steps and actions to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education.[114]
In 1995 and 2000, NPT parties agreed to various measures to strengthen the review process. Decision 1, adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, provided for a ten-day preparatory committee to be convened in each of the three years prior to a review conference, codified the structure of three main committees, and provided for the establishment of subsidiary bodies at each review conference to focus on specific topics.
Nevertheless, the 2006 Report of the international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Dr Hans Blix, described the NPT as the "weakest of the treaties on WMD in terms of provisions about implementation", citing the lack of a standing secretariat or provisions to convene special or extraordinary meetings and to assist in preparing for review conferences.[115]
Various developments and concerns since 2000 have highlighted the need for institutional reforms. These have included the DPRK's withdrawal from the Treaty in 2003, the lack of any mechanism to evaluate or judge compliance with the Treaty, and a desire to further elaborate the reporting mechanism. It is not surprising, therefore, that there have been a growing number of proposals for institutional reforms to strengthen the NPT. Originally tabled during the 2005 review cycle, many of these concepts have been re-tabled for 2010.
Canada continues to propose the establishment of a small standing bureau of the NPT. In its working paper on the subject, Canada elaborated that: "This bureau would convene extraordinary sessions in the event that a State party submits a notification of intent to withdraw from the treaty, or if other situations arise that threaten the integrity or viability of the NPT. Its members would also act as stewards of the Treaty and provide much-needed continuity throughout the review cycle. They could also interact with other diplomatic entities or processes relevant to the Treaty's purposes."[116]
Similar to Canada's proposal, Ukraine has called on the RevCon to take a decision to create a standing NPT office "to handle administrative matters" related to the Treaty. Ukraine suggested that such an office could "organize other important Treaty-related meetings, including extraordinary sessions in the event when a State Party submits a notification of intent to withdraw from the Treaty." Ukraine suggested such an office "could also serve as a focal point in terms of collecting and managing reports under NPT Article VI and those related to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East."[117]
Positions. At the 2008 PrepCom, the United States expressed opposition to creating any standing NPT body. The US delegation argued that the problems facing the NPT regime were political rather than procedural and that there were no institutional gaps that needed to be filled.
During the 2008 PrepCom, Switzerland and New Zealand expressed support for establishing either a standing bureau or a standing secretariat.
Canada also continues to call for the convening of annual one-week meetings of NPT parties with decision-making powers. Such annual meetings "could consider and decide on any issues covered by the Treaty" and bring the NPT "in line with contemporary practice of the other major conventions related to weapons of mass destruction." The proposal is intended to "take some pressure off the Review Conferences...without an increase in overall meeting time" while leaving sufficient time for preparatory work.[118]
Positions. Offered as food for thought, Ukraine proposed dividing future sessions of the Preparatory Committee into two parts: reviewing the implementation of the Treaty; and development of new measures to strengthen the NPT regime.[119]
In the multilateral disarmament fora, and particularly in the NPT context, issues that were once categorized as technical or procedural have increasingly become recognized as political subjects. The outcomes of procedural matters, such as the specific wording of a conference's mandate, agenda or decisions to convene subsidiary bodies on specific topics, are treated by governments as consolidated expressions of political priority. As noted above, decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference codified the structure of the three main committees and provided for the establishment of subsidiary bodies at each review conference to focus on specific topics. Beyond agreement on this basic structure, however, there have been protracted disagreements around the mandates of each conference and its main committees and which topics merit consideration through subsidiary bodies.
The 2005 RevCon was unable to begin its work until the end of its third week of deliberations due to disagreement over its agenda. Disagreement centred around inclusion of references to the 1995 and 2000 outcomes, which went to the heart of the RevCon's mandate. Specifically, the United States and France opposed and ultimately blocked the inclusion of language basing the review on developments relating to the 1995 and 2000 decisions and agreements as well as the treaty's articles. The solution ultimately reached in 2005 involved the President of the conference distributing a statement expressing the understanding that "the review will be conducted in the light of the decisions and the resolution of previous Conferences, and allow for discussion of any issue raised by States Parties."[120]
The RevCon eventually agreed to convene one subsidiary body under each of its main committees, respectively dealing with: nuclear disarmament and security assurances, regional issues including implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and other provisions including withdrawal. These were described as open-ended, meaning that the mandate did not specify any particular outcome such as a protocol or recommendations.[121]
Looking toward the 2010 RevCon, a number of delegations have circulated proposals on mandates and subsidiary bodies, generally duplicating past priorities. It is the task of the third PrepCom to reach agreement on these procedural issues in order to agree to an agenda for and submit recommendations to the RevCon.
Proposal: Review of past outcomes in the RevCon mandate
The NAM has called for the RevCon mandate to include, in addition to the review of operation of the Treaty as provided in Article VIII, "in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference."[122]
Various proposals have been made, including:
Positions. Support for the establishment of specific subsidiary bodies typically breaks down along north/south lines. The NAM strongly backs the bodies on the Middle East and on nuclear disarmament and security assurances. In 2005, the western group insisted on a subsidiary body devoted to dealing with withdrawal, to which the NAM agreed despite considerable reluctance by some members.
[1] For analysis of the conduct and outcomes of the first two PrepComs for the 2010 Review Conference, see Rebecca Johnson, 'Back from the Brink? The 2007 NPT PrepCom Report', Disarmament Diplomacy 85 (Summer 2007), pp 3-24; and Rebecca Johnson, 'The 2008 NPT PrepCom: Good meeting, but was it relevant?' Disarmament Diplomacy 88 (Summer 2008) pp 3-26.
[2] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.22.
[3] Ambassador Chang Dong-hee, Head of the delegation of Korea to the Conference on Disarmament, Cluster 1 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 30 April 2008.
[4] Statement by Ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen, Permanent Representative of Norway, General Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 29 April 2008; Statement of Ambassador Doru Romulus Costea, Permanent Representative of Romania to the UN in Geneva, General Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 29 April 2008.
[5] Declaration by the Seven Foreign Ministers, July 2005, www.7ni.mfa.no/PD/PDe.htm.
[6] Statement by Ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen.
[7] Adam Parsons, Jessica West and Ernie Regehr, "Transparency and Accountability: NPT Reporting 2002-2007," Project Ploughshares: April 2008, p 9.
[8] Ibid., p10.
[9] "Transparency and Accountability", p 10.
[10] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.26.
[11] Statement by Ambassador Luiz Felipe de Macedo Soares, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament, General Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 28 April 2008.
[12] Statement of Ambassador Bersheda, 6 May 2008.
[13] Statement by Ambassador Sumio Tarui, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Debate on nuclear disarmament and security assurances at the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 2 May 2008.
[14] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.6.
[15] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.14.
[16] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.17.
[17] Statement by Ambassador Caroline Millar [delivered by Craig Machlaughlan], Disarmament Ambassador of Australia, Cluster 1 debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, 30 April 2008.
[18] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.46.
[19] Statement by Ambassador Kari Kahiluoto, Permanent Representative of Finland to the Conference on Disarmament, Cluster 1 debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, 30 April 2008.
[20] Statement by Ambassador Knut Langeland, Disarmament Affairs, Cluster 1 debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, 30 April 2008.
[21] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.70; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.5.
[22] NPT/CONF.2005/WP.61.
[23] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.15.
[24] Statement by the Russian delegation, Debate on nuclear disarmament and security assurances at the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 2 May 2008.
[25] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.43.
[26] Statement by the Chinese delegation, Debate on nuclear disarmament and security assurances at the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 2 May 2008.
[27] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.59.
[28] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.29.
[29] Statement by Ambassador Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Debate on nuclear disarmament and security assurances at the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 2 May 2008.
[30] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.68.
[31] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.36.
[32] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.27.
[33] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.57.
[34] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.45.
[35] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.60.
[36] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.71.
[37] For an assessment of the legality of the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, see The Legal Framework for the Non-Use and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," Briefing Paper for Greenpeace International: February 2006.
[38] Ibid.
[39] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.28.
[40] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.39.
[41] Statement by Ambassador Caroline Millar, Disarmament Ambassador of Australia, Cluster 2 debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, 2 May 2008.
[42] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.30.
[43] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.40.
[44] Statement by Ambassador Muktar Djumaliev, Permanent Representative of Kyrgyzstan to the UN in Geneva, General Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 30 April 2008.
[45] Statement by Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, General Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 28 April 2008.
[46] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.24.
[47] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.50.
[48] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.40; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.52; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.64; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.73 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.36.
[49] Statement by Mr Febrian Alphyanto Ruddyard, Delegation of Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned Parties to the NPT, Cluster 2 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, 2 May 2008.
[50] Statement of the League of Arab States, General Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 30 April 2008.
[51] Statement by the delegation of Egypt, Cluster 2 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 5 May 2009.
[52] Statement by the delegation of Indonesia, Cluster 2 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 5 May 2009.
[53] Statement by Ambassador Soltanieh, Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna, Cluster 2 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 5 May 2009.
[54] Statement by the delegation of Syria, Cluster 2 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 5 May 2009 [via simultaneous oral translation to English].
[55] For instance, under the comprehensive safeguards agreements, the IAEA lacks authority to report a case to the Security Council for safeguard violations that do not involve diversion of nuclear material. The IAEA also lacks authority to investigate for potential weaponization programmes, absent a nexus to the concomitant use or diversion of nuclear materials.
[56] It should be noted that the Council has moved toward sidestepping this formulation (of declaring a situation to constitute of threat to international peace and security) in the adoption of Chapter VII sanctions resolutions against Iran and DPRK.
[57] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.27.
[58] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.18.
[59] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.56.
[60] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.18.
[61] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.4.
[62] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.40.
[63] NPT/CONF.2000/28, page 3, paragraph 9: "The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and the General Assembly by IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C. of the statute of IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by IAEA." In 2000, NPT parties thus declined to express the view the that the Security Council should enforce the Treaty per se, as the G10 and others have called for, and limited their view of the Council's authority to that contained in existing instruments.
[64] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.50.
[65] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.73.
[66] Statement of Ambassador Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, Charge D'Affairs to the UN, WTO, and other international organizations in Geneva, general debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 29 April 2008.
[67] Statement by the delegation of Malaysia, General Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 29 April 2008.
[68] Febrian Alphyanto Ruddyard, 2 May 2008. This could be a reference to the fact that in September 2005, the IAEA found Iran to be in non-compliance "in the context of Article XII.C" of the IAEA Statute, rather than with its safeguards agreement. To have found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, IAEA inspectors would have had to have reported that Iran had diverted nuclear materials to non-peaceful use. However, the Agency's findings since November 2004 that all declared nuclear materials in Iran have remained in peaceful use made it difficult to argue for a more clearly worded finding.
[69] p 7, paragraph 42.
[70] p 8, paragraph 56.
[71] p 7, paragraph 43.
[72] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.51.
[73] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.40.
[74] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.51.
[75] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.40; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.51.
[76] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.40.
[77] See NPT/CONF.2010/PC.1/WP.52.
[78] The EU, for instance, is working with the IAEA to reach a definition regarding minimum standards for export controls. See NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.38.
[79] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.38.
[80] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.37.
[81] Statement by the delegation of Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned Parties to the NPT, Cluster 3 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, 6 May 2008.
[82] Statement by the delegation of Egypt, Cluster 3 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 6 May 2008.
[83] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.1/WP.38.
[84] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.52.
[85] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.64.
[86] Statement by the delegation of Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned Parties to the NPT, General Debate, 28 April, 2008.
[87] Statement by the delegation of Egypt, 6 May 2008.
[88] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.61.
[89] Unless otherwise noted, all positions discussed were indicated in statements made during the 2008 NPT PrepCom meeting in Geneva. See www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements.html.
[90] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.16.
[91] Rebecca Johnson, "Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed", Disarmament Diplomacy, No 80, Autumn 2005.
[92] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.25.
[93] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.22.
[94] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.25.
[95] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.11.
[96] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.22.
[97] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.24. Iran argues there is no urgency or necessity to deal with withdrawal from the Treaty, as it is not a priority issue and "would only divert the attention of the States Parties from their real tasks."
[98] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.22.
[99] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.7.
[100] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.22.
[101] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.20.
[102] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.2.
[103] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.68.
[104] Statement by the delegation of Algeria, Regional Issues debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 5 May 2008.
[105] Statement by Ambassador John Duncan, Regional Issues debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 6 May 2008.
[106] Statement by Dr Christopher Ford, Regional Issues debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 6 May 2008.
[107] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.28.
[108] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.68.
[109] The only other non-party at the time of the 2000 RevCon was Cuba, which has since acceded to the Treaty.
[110] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.30.
[111] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.9.
[112] Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Indonesia, Norway, South Africa, Spain and Thailand.
[113] Joint Statement on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, delivered by Ambassador Sumio Tarui, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Cluster 1 Debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 30 April 2008.
[114] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.6.
[115] Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm: 2006, p 63.
[116] NPT/CONF.2005/WP.39; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.42.
[117] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.36.
[118] NPT/CONF.2005/WP.39; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.42.
[119] Statement of Ambassador Yevhen Bersheda, Head of the delegation of Ukraine, Cluster 3 debate of the 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, Geneva, delivered 6 May 2008.
[120] NPT/CONF.2005/31*
[121] NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.2
[122] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.6.
[123] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.6; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.28; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.2; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.58; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.3.
[124] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.3.
[125] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8; NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.36
[126] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.36.
[127] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.10.
[128] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.36.
[129] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.34.
[130] NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.34.
This review of NPT proposals and the updates on Iran and North Korea were researched and written for the Acronym Institute by Michael Spies, with assistance and contributions from Ray Acheson. Michael Spies is a research associate with the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and was the editor of volumes 25 (2006) and 26 (2007) of the Arms Control Reporter, published by the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. Ray Acheson is project director of the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The review also drew upon the Reaching Critical Will News in Review, a daily monitor of the NPT preparatory and review proceeding (See www.reachingcriticalwill.org.).
© 2009 The Acronym Institute.
