 Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 91, Summer 2009
Laying Substantive Groundwork for 2010: Report of the 2009 NPT
PrepCom
Rebecca Johnson
The third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Review
Conference for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was
heralded as a much-needed success story. This was largely credited
to the Obama administration's more positive approach to
multilateral diplomacy and arms control, though the Chair of the
meeting, Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe was widely
commended for his careful preparations and effective leadership
style.
In a more constructive atmosphere than seen at NPT meetings for
a long while, the PrepCom expeditiously adopted the agenda and all
significant procedural decisions for the review conference, which
will be held in New York, 3 - 28 May, 2010. Barring any unforeseen
and dramatic deterioration in relations, this means that the review
conference next year has the best possible chance of opening
smoothly and getting down to work without the kind of frustrating
procedural delays that marred the 2005 Review Conference.[1] Though the PrepCom was not able to
agree on substantive recommendations to transmit to the review
conference, the negotiations on the Chair's three successive drafts
have laid some useful groundwork. In particular, they provide a
reality check on the commitments that different states will want to
achieve - or prevent - next year and offer a useful structure for
forward-looking recommendations. If states parties choose to adopt
this format it would enable the recommendations for future work to
be negotiated separately from the review of past implementation,
which will also need to be carried out in 2010.
Notwithstanding their rhetoric encouraging Chidyausiku to keep
trying because "we are nearly there", few delegates really believed
that consensus on any significant recommendations would be
achievable a year before the real decisions need to be taken.
Somewhat to their surprise, they found themselves closer to
accomplishing this task than any previous PrepCom, but the
negotiators next year will have cause to thank them for not locking
the possibilities down prematurely.
The PrepCom has given a boost to hopes of a productive review
conference in 2010, but it also demonstrates how much work will
need to be done over the next year, politically as well as
diplomatically, to achieve the kind of agreements that will
genuinely strengthen the non-proliferation regime and provide a
basis for building security in a world free of nuclear weapons.
President Obama's speech in Prague on 5 April set the context
for the United States to engage more constructively on disarmament
issues. The timing was opportune, and though the President's
non-proliferation team was not yet fully in place, the constructive
engagement of the US delegation, headed by Dr Rose Gottemoeller,
contributed to the positive atmospherics and successful adoption of
the procedural agreements for 2010. The United States took a more
progressive position than its predecessor on the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) and highlighted its forthcoming negotiations with
Russia on verifiable nuclear arms reductions before START expires
in December, which were warmly welcomed. It also reiterated recent
positions that placed emphasis on the need for full compliance and
the strengthening of tools to detect and punish treaty
violations.
Though the P-5 intended to demonstrate unity by issuing a joint
press release on the last day, this could not mask the fact that
there were visible differences among the major nuclear-weapon
states on a number of issues. Apart from being able for the first
time in years to mention the CTBT positively and welcome the
US-Russian negotiations for a follow-on START agreement, the
statement was bland and brief. With the group of nonaligned states
(NAM) also unable to agree on anything but the basics, it was
interesting to see the growing number of cross-group and
cross-regional alliances coming together to pursue shared
objectives. These contributed to better multilateral dynamics -
very different from 2005 - which enabled Chidyausiku to pilot the
PrepCom through its decisions and debates, if not the
recommendations for 2010.
The agenda and procedural decisions
In multilateral diplomacy, the agenda is viewed as providing a basis
and framework for discussion, and those wishing to obstruct negotiations
can make the agenda their first battleground. This happened in 2005, when
states parties to the NPT learned the bitter lesson that failure to adopt
a review conference agenda in advance can lead to days - even weeks -
of wasted time. The failure of the 2005 review conference was presaged
at the 2004 PrepCom when (with France aiding and abetting) the United
States refused to accept the agenda that had been proposed by the Chair
and Secretariat. US opposition to that agenda, a strategy that had been
masterminded by Bush administration rottweiler John Bolton, opened up
a can of worms. A small number of delegations joined in by insisting on
introducing or removing references in subsequent drafts. Each suggestion
was viewed through the political lens of opponents as providing legitimation
either for states parties to walk away from consensus decisions taken
by previous review conferences or, alternatively, to pile additional issues
on to the NPT plate. Since the PrepCom could not adopt an agenda or other
procedural decisions, these had to be addressed before the 2005 Review
Conference could organize its work. The consequence was weeks of time-consuming,
bad-tempered and debilitating procedural debates at the Review Conference.
In the end an agenda was only adopted in the third week of the four-week
meeting, held together with an asterisk and footnote. Little time was
left for substantive discussion and no agreement was possible on either
the review or any recommendations.
This year, the United States was clearly determined to avoid a
repetition of the 2004-5 mess. Taking a more flexible approach, the
Obama administration signalled that it was keen to enable the 2010
Conference to start from day one with a workable agenda.
Chidyausiku consulted widely, and concluded that without the toxic
political atmosphere of 2004-5, the simplest approach would work
best. Basing his proposal on the agenda used in the successful 2000
Review Conference, which took into account the "decisions and the
resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference", he added "and the Final Document of the 2000 Review
Conference".
Associated with the agenda, the PrepCom also agreed to allocate
specific issues for consideration by the three main committees.
While broad questions of strengthening the tools and institutions
of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, peace and security, and
making the NPT universally applicable are to be covered by all the
committees, Main Committee 1 is specifically tasked with reviewing
the operations of the key provisions relating to the non-transfer
of nuclear technologies, Articles I and II, and to nuclear
disarmament, as specified in Article VI and the '13 steps'
disarmament action plan agreed in 2000. Main Committee 1 is also
required to address the use of nuclear weapons, including security
council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) on security
assurances by the nuclear-weapon states not to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT.
Main Committee II is intended to focus more directly on Article
III, which contains the obligation on non-nuclear states to
conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA. This is where
proposals will be considered that deal with issues such as
strengthening the safeguards regime and making full-scope
safeguards the standard for receiving nuclear technology. This
Committee also addresses Article VII on nuclear-weapon-free zones
and other regional issues. The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
is considered part of this Committee but it looks likely now that
the Review Conference will establish a special 'subsidiary body' to
give separate attention to this issue. Since the UN General
Assembly's study and subsequent adoption of annual resolutions on
disarmament education, both committees are also expected to deal
with ways to promote public education on these issues.
Developments related to safety and security of fissile materials
and what delegations call the "peaceful uses of nuclear energy"
comprise the subject matter of Main Committee III, together with
"other provisions of the treaty". Since North Korea's announcement
of its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, these debates have
generally focused on article X, with consideration about how to
respond and what conditions to impose if states parties wish to
leave the treaty. The aim of most proposals to date is to dissuade
potential proliferators from withdrawing from the treaty and
developing nuclear weapons, by addressing their stated security
concerns or increasing the political and economic costs of
withdrawing. The issue is highly sensitive, however, raising
concerns among some states that their right to withdraw could
become restricted or subject to sanctions.
To the great relief of all concerned, the Chair's proposals on
the agenda and allocation of items were adopted without any
opposition on the third day of the PrepCom. Another decision that
has caused problems in the past but received unanimous assent from
this PrepCom concerned agreement on background documentation to be
prepared by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and various
nuclear-weapon-free zone secretariats.
Amongst the other procedural decisions that will smooth the way
for the 2010 Review Conference, the PrepCom agreed draft rules of
procedure and designated the main Chairs and post-holders for the
Conference. Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan of the Philippines,
nominated by the NAM, has been endorsed as president-designate for
2010. In accordance with usual practice, these designations will
need to be confirmed at the beginning of the 2010 review
conference. In a further decision, the 2010 Review Conference dates
were set back one week, and will therefore take place from May
3-28, 2010. This shift was necessitated by the UN's "Capital Master
Plan" for conference services and facilities while its New York
headquarters are being refurbished.
Contrasting Action Plans for Future Work on Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation
Once the critical procedural decisions for 2010 had been taken,
the rest of the meeting was devoted to matters of substance, as
decisions taken in 2000 formally required the third PrepCom to
develop recommendations for consideration at the review conference.
With the unusual luxury of time, delegations had the next six days
in which to address their substantive concerns and ideas for future
action, This was done through statements and working papers and
covered many of the most important non-proliferation and
disarmament issues. These contributions added to a range of
proposals and ideas that had been put forward during the previous
two PrepComs[2] , which had
been summarized in working papers issued by the Chairs of those
meetings, Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan[3] , and Ambassador Volodyrmyr Yelchenko of Ukraine[4] . Using the previous chairs'
working papers and states' various proposals and arguments as a
basis, Chidyausiku and the NPT Secretariat did their best to
identify areas of agreement that could be recommended to the 2010
review conference. [The first two drafts are appended at the end of
this article for purposes of comparison.]
Divided into eight sections, the first draft reconfirmed or
indicated ways to implement commitments deriving from consensus
agreements adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and
the 2000 Review Conference, the two most recent meetings at which
NPT parties were able to take decisions. It then looked further
forward, suggesting recommendations that would take into account
the transforming commitments of deeper disarmament, such as
marginalizing nuclear weapons to pave the way for the world free of
nuclear weapons that is increasingly being evoked by leaders around
the world, including President Obama. Though this draft took into
account many of the ideas and proposals for making future progress,
it was inevitable that it did not please everyone.
After receiving formal and informal objections and alternatives,
the Chair put forward a revised draft a few days later. This
appeared to satisfy even fewer delegations. A bit like the three
bears' porridge, the first draft was regarded as hot on
disarmament, but unappetizingly lukewarm on compliance, with no
mention of full-scope safeguards. The second draft was warmer on
safeguards and compliance but so cool on disarmament that many
considered it to be a step backwards from the 2000 agreements. By
the time a third draft showing tracked options was circulated on
the last morning it was clear that the PrepCom was not going to get
agreement on substantive recommendations to send to the review
conference. There was something for everyone, but not enough all
round.
Though it would have been a mistake to lower the common
denominator until there was enough agreement in 2009 to adopt the
recommendations, the drafts demonstrate useful areas for potential
agreement that will help governments as they prepare for 2010. They
also highlight a number of important issues that may require
certain governments to consult with each other and revise their own
positions with the aim of resolving their differences sufficiently
to enable sensitive subject matter to be addressed without
deadlocking or derailing the review conference.
Perhaps the most striking development was contained in the
recommendations on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East,
which survived all three drafts. Calling the resolution "an
essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference and of the basis on which the treaty was indefinitely
extended", the recommendations included establishment of a
subsidiary body at the review conference "to consider concrete
practical steps to promote the earliest implementation" of this
resolution, and for the review conference to consider appointing a
special coordinator and convening a future conference on the issue.
These recommendations were based on proposals from the League of
Arab States, the NAM and others. Many are now hoping that with
constructive US leadership in 2010, it will be possible to move
forward on the basis of these proposals. This could prove very
important in view of the fact that disagreements related to
proliferation and security concerns in the Middle East - notably
the nuclear programmes of Israel, a non-NPT party, and Iran - have
brought past review conferences to the brink of failure.
Also welcome was the reappearance of commitments to bring the
CTBT into force, after years of opposition from the Bush
administration. President Obama's promise to pursue US ratification
has ensured that CTBT entry into force was prominently advocated in
the first draft of the recommendations. This underscored the
importance of Article VI and "the growing expectations for progress
to achieve nuclear disarmament", and called for an "action plan"
setting "practical, achievable and specified goals, and measures
leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons".
In addition to the CTBT and negotiations on a "verifiable
fissile material treaty", a further paragraph updated the
practical disarmament commitments adopted in 2000, listing
further deep and verifiable reductions in both strategic and
non-strategic nuclear arsenals, expanding transparency, ensuring
irreversibility, reducing the operational status of nuclear forces,
diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies,
refraining from the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and
strengthening monitoring and verification for nuclear dismantlement
and fissile materials.
Reflecting growing momentum for a nuclear weapon prohibition
treaty to be put on the agenda for serious consideration, as
contained also in the UN Secretary-General's five-point action plan
for disarmament, the first draft also called on the review
conference to "Examine, inter alia, ways and means to commence
negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or
framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament and
to engage non-parties to the Treaty". The nuclear-weapon states -
particularly France and Russia - lobbied hard against this
language, and so it was dropped from the second draft, despite
majority support from the non-nuclear-weapon states.
The second draft also reflected the nuclear-weapon states'
insistence that any reference to a fissile material treaty
should include the word 'cut-off' to underline their position that
a fissile materials production ban should not address stocks.
Additionally, China opposed text that encouraged all nuclear-weapon
states to declare a moratorium on the production of plutonium and
highly enriched uranium for weapons pending conclusion of such a
treaty. Though China is widely believed to have halted such
production years ago, its persistent opposition to declaring a
moratorium may continue to be a problem in 2010 and beyond.
Russia pushed for caveats that would make the fulfilment of any
disarmament commitments contingent on "international
stability and the principle of undiminished security for all".
Though they may sound innocuous, such phrases are included to
provide a let-out for states that want to hang on to the status
quo. The security of non-nuclear-weapon states (and, some might
argue, of the nuclear possessors themselves) may have long been
diminished by the nuclear arsenals and policies of the
nuclear-weapon states. Yet if certain nuclear powers associate
their own possession of nuclear weapons with stability and
security, they could argue that any step towards disarmament would
change the status quo and might diminish the security they feel.
The context of such conditionalities can be particularly
significant. As placed in the first revision to the Chair's draft,
the phrase appeared to provide the nuclear powers with a ready-made
justification for refusing to take any disarmament actions. The
third draft sought to address some of the contradictions, but left
loopholes that could continue to constitute a barrier to further
disarmament undertakings.
Western insistence ensured that the second and third drafts
contained stronger language on compliance, with specific references
to the importance of universalizing full-scope safeguards
and increasing the IAEA's "ability to detect undeclared nuclear
activities". Elsewhere, the draft recommendations on nuclear safety
went beyond the nuclear waste and accident concerns of earlier
review conferences. Covering nuclear terrorism and the need
to prevent blackmarket supply networks, trafficking and acquisition
of nuclear weapons or related materials by non-state actors, these
recommendations referred to the importance of implementing a number
of relevant security council resolutions, such as 1540 (2004), 1673
(2006) and 1810 (2008).
The purpose of this brief analysis is to give a flavour of the
process and some of the key issues, not to provide a comprehensive
representation of the recommendations or the working papers and
proposals from which they were derived. The first two Chair's
drafts on recommendations are reproduced verbatim after this
article for readers to judge for themselves. In any case, the
PrepCom was unable to adopt any of the drafts, so though these
drafts may serve as guides, there is all to play for in May
2010.
Dynamics and Key Players
While the Obama administration can claim most credit for
improving NPT dynamics, others played their part. Iran, which had
nearly derailed the 2007 PrepCom by blocking agreement on the
agenda, did not try to impede consensus on the agenda or other
procedural decisions. After tabling several substantive working
papers, Iranian delegates gave their familiar combative speeches
but chose to support the Chair and go along with positions put
forward collectively by the NAM. Egypt vied with Iran to raise
concerns about lack of progress on disarmament, but on seeing three
core elements of its proposals on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle
East reflected in the draft recommendations, Egypt had an important
vested interest in maintaining constructive dialogue with the P-5
on this issue.
Like the United States, Iran and Egypt were more willing to
compromise at this PrepCom than in recent years. Iran's relatively
constructive attitude was perceived by some as indicating a desire
to come in from the cold and renew engagement with the United
States and other NPT parties to resolve international mistrust over
its nuclear programme. Since the PrepCom was taking place just
weeks before an important election, it is likely that domestic and
pre-election politics were also influential. A further factor
likely to have influenced Iran's behaviour at this PrepCom (but
which cannot be counted on in 2010) was its friendly relations
between with Zimbabwe, as two states that have incurred
international censure over human rights (and in Iran's case, its
nuclear programme). Having supported Zimbabwe as the NAM's nominee
to Chair the PrepCom, it would not have been in Iran's interests to
undermine Ambassador Chidyausiku.
The change in NPT dynamics put the spotlight on other players.
In the delicate negotiations on the agenda, France, which had
partnered the United States in opposing a similar agenda in 2004[5] , was unsuccessful in its
attempts to reinstate contested language from 2005 that would take
into account developments since 2000. In view of clear opposition
to this from NAM countries, and with Britain supporting America's
flexible approach, France came under pressure from the rest of the
Western group to join the consensus and allow the Chair's proposed
agenda to be adopted without this additional language. Signalling
its continuing resistance to implementing the 2000 commitments on
disarmament, France reasserted itself later.
In a partnership that may have challenging implications for
2010, France and Russia together played the most prominent role in
diluting and distorting the disarmament recommendations put forward
in the Chair's first draft. China, too, belied the virtuous
exhortations of its public statements, giving concern with some of
its behind-the-scenes tactics. As noted above, China reportedly
exerted heavy pressure on the Chair to remove references to a
moratorium on fissile materials production.
Though there were a number of cross-issue, regional and
cross-regional groups submitting collective working papers, none
appeared candidates for taking the kind of leadership role in 2010
that was played by the New Agenda Coalition in 2000. The New Agenda
Coalition is still alive, but internal differences for much of the
past decade have diluted their ability to formulate an effective
strategy and relevant programme of action beyond advocating a
protocol on security assurances. Some NAC members, however, are
involved in other initiatives and may join with other like-minded
governments to work on a new initiative and strategy.
Since 2005 Norway has continued to coordinate the seven nation
initiative (N-7) and has provided leadership for progressive
groupings of NATO states, though it is not clear whether any of
these will be taken up more widely. As the International Commission
on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) is due to
report before the Review Conference, this could be an opportunity
for Australia and Japan to bring a cross-regional group of states
together to call for implementation of its recommendations. This
would only be useful if the Commission were able to put forward new
and progressive recommendations, such as Security Council action to
prevent the use of nuclear weapons or, at the very least, calls for
the nuclear-weapon states to adopt no first use policies.
As interest grows in getting the objective of a nuclear weapons
convention onto the mainstream political agenda, it may be that a
group of non-aligned and other non-nuclear-weapon states could
strategise to take that demand forward. Malaysia and Costa Rica
have to date taken the lead on promoting this in both the United
Nations and NPT contexts, and have circulated the NGO-drafted model
nuclear weapon convention to stimulate discussion on the issue.
Now, to increase the chances of bringing the objective of a nuclear
weapon convention from the margins into the mainstream, a more
strategic approach will be necessary, preferably led a cross-group
alliance. This would no double include Malaysia and Costa Rica but
others need now to take more responsibility to make this happen. At
the very least (as a first step) multiple calls and collective
action would be useful to overcome the resistance of the
nuclear-weapon states to any mention of this objective in NPT
documents.
Implications for 2010
Though there were ritual expressions of disappointment and
accusations that some delegations had not been willing to "go the
extra mile", the failure to agree recommendations for 2010 was not
necessarily a bad thing. On the contrary, many participants were
actually relieved.
The drafts may have been hedged around with caveats claiming
that they would be "conveyed without regard to priority, without
prejudice to other initiatives that States parties may wish to
offer, and without any intention to represent a comprehensive
summary of all initiatives proposed". These are belied by the fact
that in diplomacy, once text is agreed it tends to get embedded in
the minds of advocates who then use the prior agreement to resist
revisions.
The process and the Chair's three drafts were useful because
they highlighted the major areas of contention and aspiration that
need to be worked on over the coming year. By not adopting
recommendations in 2009 the PrepCom has avoided tying the hands of
delegations to the 2010 Review Conference to lowest common
denominator positions when it may be possible to achieve more next
year. With the United States only just getting its
non-proliferation team together and undertaking a review of its
strategic security and nuclear posture later this year, whose
interests would have been served by adopting text on
recommendations now?
The drafting process also demonstrated the kind of relatively
short decision document on forward-looking recommendations that
might be possible in 2010. The structure of the first draft, which
resembles the precedent set by the Decision on Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference[6] , was retained in the subsequent revisions, though
there were disagreements over section headings. This format made
sense, and was regarded as having ticked the essential boxes of
universality; nuclear disarmament; strengthening safeguards to
prevent proliferation; peaceful uses of nuclear energy, safety and
security; regional non-proliferation and disarmament, including the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East; measures to address treaty
withdrawal; institutional measures to strengthen the regime; and
engagement with civil society, including disarmament and
non-proliferation education.
Such an approach, if carried forward in 2010, could be helpful
in enabling states parties to negotiate next steps in parallel with
their review of the treaty's operation. In previous review
conferences it has been particularly difficult to gain consensus on
how to characterize past performance, so it would be helpful if
states agreed to separate out the tasks of deciding on future
actions and reviewing the past record. It will be ten years since
the 2000 review conference, the last time NPT governments managed
to agree anything substantive, so there are likely to be highly
contested differences of view on whether there has been adequate
compliance by some states or sufficient progress on disarmament.
The 2010 Review Conference will also have to navigate around some
states' combative sensitivity to criticism. This is likely to be
especially fraught with regard to the nuclear-weapon states that
are in the process of renewing or modernizing nuclear weapon
systems and countries that have been investigated for
non-compliance with their safeguards or NPT obligations, such as
Iran and Syria.
Attempts to name specific countries or criticize the nuclear
powers for failing to live up to their obligations have caused
deadlock in the past. Even the 1995 Review and Extension Conference
failed to agree on a final document covering the review of the
treaty. It may be helpful for governments to be reminded of the
strategy employed by the President of the 1995 Conference, Jayantha
Dhanapala, to ensure that the most important decisions could be
adopted even though the review negotiations in the main committees
had become bogged down in disagreements about whether the previous
five years should be characterized positively or negatively. While
the committees kept working to resolve their differences about the
past, Dhanapala conducted separate negotiations on the
forward-looking principles for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament and strengthening the review process. The committees
failed, so without these decisions, as well as the resolution on
the Middle East, it would have been made extending the NPT more
difficult.[7]
Similarly, in 2000, while the main committees focused on the
review, the 'thirteen steps' programme of action on nuclear
disarmament was negotiated first in a subsidiary body on practical
disarmament measures and then in a minilateral side-bar meeting of
the P-5 and New Agenda Coalition, chaired by Norway. On this
occasion, though the negotiations on the review of the treaty's
operation and commitments for the future were negotiated
separately, the political environment was sufficiently positive to
enable the forward-looking commitments to be combined with the
review and adopted as a single final document.
It is too early to predict what might happen in 2010, but a
constructive outcome would be greatly facilitated if states parties
recognize and accept that the forward-looking recommendations and
the text reviewing and evaluating the past decade's developments
need to be negotiated separately.
Substantive challenges
Among all the relevant issues that were debated, three issues
emerged from the PrepCom that will determine the success or failure
of the review conference:
- practical nuclear disarmament steps, which many think need now
to go well beyond just managing the status quo to encompass
measures that marginalize nuclear weapons in security doctrines and
lay the groundwork for negotiations on agreements leading to the
abolition of nuclear weapons;
- mechanisms to take forward the objectives of the 1995
Resolution on the Middle East; and
- strengthening the NPT regime to deal more effectively with
questions of compliance, withdrawal and implementation.
By airing these issues through statements, working papers and
the Chair's drafts on recommendations in a context that was
reasonably cooperative and forward looking, the PrepCom performed a
very useful service.
The major change in debates on disarmament is that NPT parties
want practical steps to be framed in terms of nuclear abolition
((whether called a nuclear weapon convention or something else) and
not just status-quo management. President Obama's leadership is
necessary for this: starting with the US-Russian negotiations on a
follow-on START treaty bear fruit and US ratification of the CTBT,
which would reinvigorate efforts to bring the treaty into full
legal effect. International eyes will be watching to see whether
Obama will adopt a new nuclear posture that de-emphasizes the role
of nuclear weapons in deterrence, a precondition for building
security in a world without nuclear weapons.
He has made a good start by re-establishing a constructive
arms-control relationship with Russia, but must reach out to China,
both to allay its concerns about future threats from missile
defences or space-based weapons and to forge a more effective
partnership to address the proliferation challenges coming from
North Korea. Though North Korea is now outside the NPT, the shadow
of its 2003 withdrawal from the treaty and subsequent development
and testing of nuclear weapons pervaded the PrepCom, most notably
in discussions on the importance of the CTBT and how to interpret
and apply the Article X provision on withdrawal.
Like President Obama, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown has also
expressed support for a world without nuclear weapons. In view of
the Labour government's expressed wish to become a 'disarmament
laboratory', perhaps we could see closer British and American
cooperation to provide leadership to bring the other nuclear
possessors - the non-NPT parties as well as the declared
nuclear-weapon states - onto the path towards disarmament. The UK
is expected to release the report of its research project on
verifying disarmament before or during the 2010 Review Conference.
The British Ministry of Defence and Aldermaston Atomic Weapons
Establishment carried out this project together with Norway and the
UK-based Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre
(VERTIC).
The summaries from the 2007 and 2008 PrepComs and the 2009
PrepCom Chair's draft recommendations suggest that states will want
to update - but not roll back - the 13 Steps from 2000. In addition
to calls to identify further concrete steps and negotiate a more
urgent action plan to implement these commitments, many want to go
further. A number of non-nuclear-weapon states were unhappy that
the moderate reference to a nuclear weapon convention was dropped
out of the draft recommendations, and more are likely to include it
as a practical objective in their statements and working papers in
2010. Some may seek to have debate on a time-table for nuclear
abolition or at least a target date for concluding negotiations on
a nuclear weapon convention, which would itself need to identify a
time-table for implementing its various provisions, including
elimination schedules. Precedents include the Global Zero Action
Plan, issued on 29 June 2009[8] , with endorsement from many eminent people, and
the much earlier G-21 Programme of Action for the Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons, published in August 1996 by 28 members of the
non-aligned states in the CD.[9] There will also be further calls for reducing the
role of nuclear weapons in doctrines and policies, for taking
existing weapons out of continuous deployment (or at least for
de-alerting), for eliminating tactical/non-strategic nuclear
weapons and, of course, for deeper reductions in the arsenals of
all the weapon states.
It is widely recognized that the problems besetting the Middle
East cannot all be addressed or resolved in the NPT context.
Nevertheless, it is clear that strengthening the non-proliferation
regime means that more must be done to engage with the concerns of
people and states in the Middle East, where Israel's nuclear
arsenal and Iran's nuclear ambitions constitute a
proliferation-driving subtext that continues to undermine regional
stability and could derail efforts to strengthen the
non-proliferation regime in 2010 and beyond. During the PrepCom,
Iran and Egypt both showed signs of their internal dilemmas, not
least over whether to court the Obama administration or remain
aloof and condemnatory. The recommendations on the Middle East
resolution offer a good start, but the international community also
needs to find better ways to engage Iran and reduce the
proliferation dangers arising from its nuclear programme.
Finally, the PrepCom has demonstrated yet again that there is a
need to develop some concrete and practical options for
strengthening the NPT's institutional powers, resources and
authority, whether through converting the current review process
into one with annual decision-making meetings or by giving
intersessional powers to a secretariat or nominated bureau.[10]
Conclusions
Because it proved impossible to agree on recommendations for
2010, some diplomats have characterized the 2009 PrepCom as a
procedural success but a substantive failure. This assessment is
based on a misunderstanding of both the role and the significance
of the PrepCom. The chief role of the third PrepCom is to lay the
groundwork for the 2010 Review Conference. A critical part of this
preparatory task is to decide on the agenda, officers and
background documentation, which this meeting achieved. A further,
equally important function of the PrepCom is to bring issues of
expectation and contention to governments' attention so that they
can be addressed in the months leading up to the review conference.
The PrepCom managed this too, and probably better than if the Chair
had insisted on securing consensus to transmit some of the
recommendations. All in all, the PrepCom's conduct and debates give
cause for hope, but show that leadership and quiet diplomacy will
be necessary to turn hopes into agreed action plans to reduce
nuclear dangers and promote sustainable disarmament and
non-proliferation.
In sending the NPT a direct message in which he reiterated his
commitment to seeking the "peace and security of a world free of
nuclear weapons", President Obama had a beneficial influence on the
conduct and outcome of the 2009 PrepCom and has begun to restore
the NPT's credibility. It had been hoped that the new mood would
carry over to the Conference on Disarmament, and at first that
appeared to be so. Two weeks after the PrepCom ended, the CD was
able to agree on a programme of work, including negotiations on a
verifiable fissile material treaty. Regrettably, however, the CD
was unable to operationalize its programme of work and thus failed
to move beyond the last eleven years of paralysis. Next year will
be critical.
For the review conference in 2010 to be judged successful, there
will need to be agreement on renewed principles and objectives for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, together with an action
plan and some practical steps for reducing nuclear dangers,
strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and accelerating
progress on nuclear disarmament. The real challenge, however, is
not about what kind of document can be adopted in 2010, but what
kind of agreements and commitments are undertaken, and whether the
NPT parties have the political will and institutional capacity to
ensure their implementation.
Although the positive atmospherics of the 2009 PrepCom give
cause for hope, the 2010 Review Conference will only be successful
if it results in decisions that are taken seriously and
implemented. For this, the key governments need to look beyond 2010
and work hard over the next year to address the proliferation
challenges and develop convincing action plans with the requisite
resources to carry forward to objective of a world free of nuclear
weapons. There are many challenges ahead and the President of the
2010 Review Conference, Ambassador Cabactulan, has his work cut
out!
Notes
[1] See Rebecca Johnson, 'Why the 2005
NPT Review Conference Failed', Disarmament Diplomacy 80 (Autumn 2005) pp
3-32; and Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, 'President's Assessment of
the 2005 NPT Review Conference', Disarmament Diplomacy 81 (Winter 2005), pp
3-5.
[2]
See Michael Spies, "Proposals, Positions and Prospects: Issues
facing the 2010 NPT Review Conference", Disarmament Diplomacy 90 (Spring 2009), pp
12-29.
[3]
See Rebecca Johnson, "Back from the Brink? The 2007 NPT PrepCom
Report", Disarmament Diplomacy 85
(Summer 2007), pp 3-17.
[4]
See Rebecca Johnson, "The 2008 NPT PrepCom: Good Meeting, but was
it Relevant?", Disarmament Diplomacy 88
(Summer 2008), pp 3-26.
[5]
See Rebecca Johnson, "Report on the 2004 NPT PrepCom", Disarmament Diplomacy 77 (May/June 2004), pp
23-31.
[6]
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part
I, New York, 1995, NPT/CONF.1995/32
[7]
See Rebecca Johnson, Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty: Risks and Reckonings, ACRONYM Report No. 7 (London,
September 2005), at www.acronym.org.uk/acrorep/acro7.htm.
[8]
Global Zero Action Plan, 29 June 2009. http://www.globalzero.org/files/pdf/gzap_3.0.pdf
[9]
Proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear
weapons, CD/1419, 7 August 1996. See also Disarmament Diplomacy 7 (July/August 1996), pp
27-29.
[10]
Michael Spies, "Proposals, Positions and Prospects: Issues facing
the 2010 NPT Review Conference", op. cit.
Dr Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of the Acronym
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. Grateful thanks to Carol
Naughton for sharing her notes and observations.
See also:
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