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Big BenProliferation in Parliament

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Welcome to the second edition of Proliferation in Parliament, a monthly service from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.

In this month's issue:

An archive of parliamentary coverage will also be available on our website at: www.acronym.org.uk/parliament. We welcome your comments and feedback. Please send your comments to info@acronym.org.uk.

Index

Latest Developments

Scottish Parliament

Westminster Parliament

House of Commons Defence Committee

Trident

Nuclear Submarines (Trident and Astute)

The NPT, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Missile Defence

Relations with Russia

Space

Iran

Iraq

Latest Developments

Brown unveils huge Cabinet revamp

Gordon Brown has chosen his new Cabinet after taking over as prime minister from Tony Blair.

Every post except Des Browne at defence has changed hands, with seven ministers in Cabinet for the first time... David Miliband, who at 41 becomes the youngest foreign secretary since David Owen in 1977, said he felt "tremendously honoured". He pledged a "diplomacy that is patient as well as purposeful, which listens as well as leads".
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6247502.stm

Key posts relating to Foreign and Defence Policy are as follows:

Prime Minister: Gordon Brown
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6245682.stm

Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs: David Milliband

"The appointment of David Miliband as foreign secretary signals a potential shift in British foreign policy to one in which criticism of the United States and Israel is not off the agenda - as it was under Tony Blair..."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6248980.stm

Lord Brown, Minister for Africa, Asia and the UN

"Another sign of change is the appointment as minister for Africa, Asia and the UN (with a right to attend cabinet meetings) of Mark, now Lord, Malloch Brown. As a key aide to the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, he was critical of the Bush administration. "
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6248980.stm

Secretary of State for Defence: Des Brown

"Since he took on the job last year, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - and the question of whether to withdraw or send more troops - has dominated the agenda. Mr Browne has also been a staunch defender of the government's decision to replace the UK's Trident nuclear weapons system."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4977660.stm

International Development: Douglas Alexander

"Favoured by the leadership for his intellect and presentational skills, as campaign co-ordinator in 2001 he played a central role in delivering Labour's second general election victory."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4978680.stm

Business and Enterprise: John Hutton

"John Hutton is known at Westminster as ultra-loyal and has been described as an "uber-moderniser" and, like Mr Blunkett, a dyed-in-the-wool Blairite..."

"Mr Hutton, 50, MP for Barrow-in-Furness, in Cumbria [where the UK's Trident nuclear submarines are built], since entering parliament in 1992, has four children from his first marriage."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4402834.stm

Attorney General (attending Cabinet when necessary): Baroness Scotland

Secretary of State for the Environment: Hillary Benn

Who's who: Brown's inner circle (Downing Street Staff)

JON CUNLIFFE
Yet another Treasury man, Mr Cunliffe was head of finance regulation there but has been appointed as Mr Brown's head of international economic affairs, Europe and G8 Sherpa (the people who do the deals before the big summits).

The other main foreign post goes to Simon McDonald who is head of foreign and defence policy.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6240362.stm

Further announcements of Ministerial positions are expected on June 29, 2007

UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Margaret Beckett on a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, June 25, 2007

Remarks by Margaret Beckett, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom, Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, June 25, 2007.

I expect that many - if not all - of you here today read an article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal at the very start of this year. The writers would be as familiar to an audience in this country as they are respected across the globe: George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn.

The article made the case for, and I quote, "a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage". That initiative was to re-ignite the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and to redouble efforts on the practical measures towards it.

The need for such vision and action is all too apparent.

Last year, Kofi Annan said - and he was right - that the world risks becoming mired in a sterile stand-off between those who care most about disarmament and those who care most about proliferation. The dangers of such mutually assured paralysis - as he termed it - are dangers to us all. Weak action on disarmament, weak consensus on proliferation are in none of our interests. And any solution must be a dual one that sees movement on both proliferation and disarmament - a revitalisation, in other words, of the grand bargain struck in 1968, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was established.

What makes this the time to break the stand-off? ...

Full text available on the Acronym website at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/doc30.htm.

Scottish Parliament

Scottish Parliament Vote on Trident

On Thursday, June 14, 2007, the Scottish Parliament voted by an overwhelming majority to call on the UK Government not to go ahead with its plan to renew Trident. This was the first chance MSPs have had to debate the issue since the Scottish Parliamentary elections in May. Whilst Defence and Foreign Affairs are not areas that have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament, MSPs argued that given Trident's deployment at the Faslane base near Glasgow, Trident renewal would impact on devolved services and that the Parliament had a right to "express society's views".

Moving the motion, Green Party MSP Patrick Harvie argued that:

"there is a unique situation in Scotland. There are nuclear weapons in a land where the mood of the Parliament and of the country is opposed to them. The Parliament has a right to express society's views. Even if it doesn't take steps to obstruct nuclear weapons—"

which we can within devolved powers—

"it can ask questions within the UK. It can raise a voice of dissent from an important new institution within a nuclear weapon state. This could have effect internationally."

Full text of the motion proposed by Patrick Harvie was as follows:

“That the Parliament congratulates the majority of Scottish MPs for voting on 14 March 2007 to reject the replacement of Trident and calls on the UK Government not to go ahead at this time with the proposal in the White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent.”

This was amended by a Liberal Democrat motion (carried 65 for, 18 against with 43 abstentions) to read:

“That the Parliament congratulates the majority of Scottish MPs for voting on 14 March 2007 to reject the replacement of Trident, recognises that decisions on matters of defence are matters within the responsibility of the UK Government and Parliament and calls on the UK Government not to go ahead at this time with the proposal in the White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent.”

Votes for the amended motion were as follows:

Yes votes: 71
No votes: 16
Abstentions: 39
Not voting: 3

Full text of the debate is available from the Scottish Parliament's website at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/officialReports/
meetingsParliament/or-07/sor0614-02.htm

Details and commentary on the debate and vote are available at the Scottish CND website at: http://www.banthebomb.org/newbombs/Notridentrep.htm

Scottish Parliament Motion on Observer Status for Scotland at the 2010 NPT Review Conference

The following motion was lodged by Glasgow Scottish Nationalist MSP Sandra White on June 8, 2007:

S3M-146 Sandra White (Glasgow) (SNP) : 2010 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty— That the Parliament entreats all Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories to make every endeavour to ensure that the preparatory committee for the 2010 review conference is afforded full support in its principal aims of facilitating and making recommendations in respect of the treaty, which is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to further the goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament and to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; considers it appropriate for Scotland to be accorded observer status to the committee in view of the precedent set by Palestine and the fact that Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the Trident missile system, is stationed in Scotland, and encourages the Scottish Executive to consider what course of action could be taken to achieve this end.

Supported by: Bashir Ahmad, Rob Gibson, Stefan Tymkewycz, Dr Bill Wilson, Kenneth Gibson, Robin Harper, Bill Kidd, Dave Thompson, Dr Alasdair Allan, Christine Grahame, Patrick Harvie, Jamie Hepburn, Bob Doris
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/

Westminster Parliament

Defence Select Committee

Government Response to the Defence Committee Report on Trident:
Committee Chair James Arbuthnot accuses the government of 'misrepresenting' the Committee's Report, May 24, 2007

House of Commons Defence Committee Chair Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative) has condemned the Government for misrepresenting the Committee's report on Trident replacement, published earlier this year.

In a Defence Committee press release, Mr Arbuthnot stated: “The Government’s Response to our Report is welcome, but it misrepresents our report. In saying that we did not challenge the fundamental decisions in the White Paper, it implies that, as a Committee, we endorse the decision to retain and renew the deterrent. This is not the case. The whole purpose of our inquiry was to challenge the Government’s proposals and subject them to scrutiny, not to come down on one side of the argument. Members of the Committee hold differing views on the merits of the deterrent as reflected in the vote in the House.

Now that Parliament has endorsed the decision to retain and renew the nuclear deterrent, it is up to the Government to deliver the programme on time and to cost. Replacing the Vanguard-class Trident submarines will be a huge undertaking, and the MoD must ensure that the problems which beset the Astute programme are not repeated. We plan to monitor closely the MoD’s stewardship of the programme and industry’s performance in delivering an affordable submarine platform. The Government has said that maintaining the deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities of our Armed Forces: we plan to keep them to their word.”

The press release confirms that, "The Government will actively support parliamentary scrutiny of the Trident replacement submarine, missile and warhead programme, the Ministry of Defence tells MPs. In a response to the House of Commons Defence Committee’s report on the Trident White Paper, the Government undertakes to make available to the Committee details of the Vanguard-class submarine life extension programme, and of the options for the replacement of the nuclear warhead, as they become available, together with the associated costs.

The Government’s response... gives additional information on:

  • the timing of decision-making, including why a decision on participation in the Trident D5 missile life extension was required in 2007;
  • the Government’s plans for promoting non-proliferation and the multilateral nuclear disarmament;
  • and the factors which will influence the decision on whether to opt for a three- or four-boat fleet of submarines.

Full text of the Defence Committee Press Release, May 24, 2007 is available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/
defence_committee/def070524___no_54.cfm

The Government's Response to the Defence Committee Report, May 22, 2007, is available at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/551/55102.htm

The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterent: the White Paper, House of Commons Defence Committee, Nineth Report of 2006-2007, March 7, 2007:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/
cmselect/cmdfence/225/22502.htm

Trident

Trident: Freedom of Information, House of Commons, Written Answers, 21 May 2007, Column 1053W

Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what requests he has received under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for the release of advice provided to him on the legality of replacing Trident.

Des Browne: The Department has received no requests under the Freedom of Information Act for the release of legal advice pertaining to the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent beyond the planned life of the existing Trident system.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070521/text/70521w0006.htm#07052114000073

Nuclear Weapons: Transport, House of Commons, Written Answers, 21 May 2007, Column 1052W

Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what factors were taken into account in deciding on the timing of the movement of nuclear warheads from AWE Aldermaston to Scotland on 10 and 11 May.

Des Browne: I am withholding information on individual movements of Defence nuclear material as this would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070521/text/70521w0006.htm#07052114000069

Nuclear Submarines (Trident and Astute)

Astute Class Submarines, House of Commons, Ministerial Statement, 21 May 2007, Column 55WS

The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Mr. Adam Ingram): I am pleased to announce today that the MOD has placed an order with BAE Systems to commence work on the build of the fourth submarine in the Astute Class, which will be known as Audacious.

21 May 2007 : Column 56WS

The Astute class is the next generation of nuclear powered attack submarines. The First of Class, Astute, is on schedule to be launched on 8 June 2007, and is due to enter service in 2009.

The Astute Class will be the largest, most capable and widely deployable attack submarines that the Royal Navy has ever operated, and will replace the Swiftsure and Trafalgar Class, which have been in-service since the 1970s and 1980s respectively. The Astute Class will have improved communications systems to support joint operations and an enhanced ability to operate in shallower littoral environments. BAES (Submarine Solutions) is also responsible for the design and build of the first three boats (Astute, Ambush and Artful).

Today's announcement demonstrates our commitment to the attack submarine programme, as set out in the Defence Industrial Strategy. It also demonstrates our commitment to the Royal Navy. These submarines are needed to fulfil duties around the globe. It demonstrates the best of British technology and our determinationto develop and transform the UK submarine industry over the coming years.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070521/wmstext/70521m0001.htm#07052112000008

Astute Class Submarines, House of Commons, Written Answers, 22 May 2007, Column 1182W

Mr. Gordon Prentice: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the design life is of the Astute class of submarine.

Mr. Ingram: Astute is due to enter service with the Royal Navy in 2009, and has a planned service life of 25 years.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070522/text/70522w0003.htm#070522106000047

Submarines, House of Commons, Written Answers, 24 May 2007, Column 1390W

Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the commitment to maintaining and deploying an eight-boat attack submarine fleet in the 2004 supplement to the 2003 Defence White Paper remains in place.

Mr. Ingram [holding answer 21 May 2007]: As set out in the 2004 "Future Capabilities" supplement to the 2003 White Paper, by late 2008 our attack submarine fleet will consist of eight boats. Thereafter, the existing Swiftsure and Trafalgar class submarines will be progressively replaced by the new and more capable Astute class.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070524/text/70524w0005.htm#07052497000042

Astute Class Submarines, House of Commons, Written Answers, 11 June 2007, Column 756W

Mrs. Curtis-Thomas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what consideration his Department is giving to further orders for Astute class submarines; and when he expects such considerations to be completed.

Mr. Ingram: Three Astute class submarines are on order with BAES (Submarine Solutions). I also refer my hon. Friend to my written ministerial statement of 21 May 2007, Official Report, columns 55-56WS, which confirmed the build of a fourth boat.

Further boat orders are being considered, subject to affordability. We are working with industry as part of the Defence Industrial Strategy to achieve an affordable and sustainable submarine programme.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070611/text/70611w0009.htm#07061182000019

Nuclear Submarines: Scotland, House of Commons, Written Answers, 11 June 2007, Column 761W

Mrs. Curtis-Thomas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department has investigated potential scenarios for the basing of nuclear submarines, including Trident, in locations other than Scotland.

Mr. Ingram: The Royal Navy's nuclear powered submarine fleets, SSN and SSBN, are currently base ported at HM Naval Base Devonport and HM Naval Base Clyde. As announced by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on 18 September 2006, we are, as part of the Defence Industrial Strategy, conducting a Naval Base Review to ensure that we have the right Naval Base infrastructure to meet the needs of the future fleet. No decisions have yet been taken. However, there are currently no plans to change Naval Base Clyde as the home base of the nuclear deterrent or Devonport as the supporting dockyard.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070611/text/70611w0009.htm#07061182000037

Nuclear Submarines, House of Commons, 13 June 2007, Column 1051W

Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the projected cost is of developing a new submarine reactor to replace the PWR2.

Des Browne: Decisions on whether or not to develop a replacement for PWR2 have not yet been taken. Initial projected costs for the procurement of the nuclear propulsion system were factored into the estimated procurement costs of the new ballistic missile submarines, set out at paragraph 5-11 of the White Paper (Cm 6994) on the Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent, published on 4 December. Cost estimates will be refined as work on the concept and assessment phases is taken forward with industry, but at this early stage of the procurement process, we are not in a position to break these estimates down.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070613/text/70613w0006.htm#07061396000075

The NPT, Non-proliferation and Disarmament

Nuclear Fuels: Storage, House of Commons, Written Answers, 14 May 2007, Column 482W

Mr. Jim Cunningham: To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what discussions he has had with ministerial colleagues on the International Atomic Energy Agency proposal for an international nuclear fuel bank; and if he will make a statement.

Malcolm Wicks [holding answer 8 May 2007]: The International Atomic Energy Agency has not proposed the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank. It has, however, asked Governments and interested organisations to share ideas about how the risks of the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the international development of nuclear energy could be prevented. The UK "Enrichment Bond", which has been placed in the Library of the House, is currently being considered by the IAEA, with a number of other proposals. The IAEA is due to bring out a paper in June, taking into account the various suggestions already made, which Ministers will have an opportunity to see.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070514/text/70514w0003.htm#0705145000036

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, House of Commons, Written Answers, 14 May 2007, Column 499W

Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the answer of 23 April 2007, Official Report, column 919W to the hon. Member for Edinburgh North and Leith, on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which states have blocked progress on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Dr. Howells: No member state at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) objects in principle to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). However, some nations have been unwilling to begin negotiations on such a treaty without further progress on their own priorities, even where these are issues that do not command consensus at the CD. In particular, China has previously stated that they are not willing to begin negotiations on an FMCT until their concerns overthe prevention of an arms race in space are sufficiently addressed. In March this year the current six presidencies of the CD tabled a proposal designed to address the concerns of all member states and allow negotiations on an FMCT to commence without further delay. The UK continues to support the proposal and will work hard to secure consensus for its adoption when this year's second session of the conference begins on 14 May.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070514/text/70514w0007.htm#07051411000014

UN Resolutions, House of Commons, Written Answers, 17 May 2007, Column 871W

Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs which states have not presented to the Security Council Committee a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004).

Mr. McCartney: As of 1 May, the following states had not submitted to the Security Council Committee, established pursuant to Resolution 1540, a first report on steps they had taken or intended to take to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Afghanistan; Barbados; Bhutan; Botswana; Burundi; Cameroon; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo; Cote d'lvoire; Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Democratic Republicof the Congo; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Equatorial Guinea; Ethiopia; Fiji; Gabon; Gambia; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Maldives; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Micronesia (Federated States of); Mozambique; Nauru; Niger; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; San Marino; Sao Tome and Principe; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; Somalia; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Timor-Leste; Togo; Zambia; and Zimbabwe.

Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if she will place in the Library a copy of UK reports to the Security Council

17 May 2007 : Column 872W

Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004). [137096]

Mr. McCartney: The UK reports to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) will be placed in the Library of the House and a copy of the reports will be sent to the right hon. Member.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070517/text/70517w0010.htm#070517103000058

Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, House of Commons, Written Answers, 24 May 2007, Column 1486W

Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations she received from other states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the preparatory committee meeting for the next review conference of the Treaty on the UK's compliance with Article 6 of the Treaty.

Dr. Howells: No formal representations were made to the UK by other states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the NPT Preparatory Committee on compliance by the UK with Article VI of the Treaty. Of the many national and group statements made to the plenary session of the PrepCom, only Iran's directly questioned the UK's compliance with Article VI.

Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs which officials and ministers comprise the United Kingdom delegation to the prepatory committee to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010; if she will publish on her Departmental web site all speeches made by the United Kingdom to the Committee in Vienna and list their URLs; and what support was provided by her Department to non-governmental organisations to attend the committee between 30 April and 11 May. [138182]

24 May 2007 : Column 1487W

Dr. Howells: The UK delegation was led by John Duncan, the United Kingdom Ambassador for multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament in Geneva. He was accompanied by officials and experts from our mission in Geneva, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade and Industry and Southampton University. The statements made by the United Kingdom at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty PrepCom will soon be published on the website of the UK Disarmament Mission in Geneva at:

http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/
Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1061396426063.

They are also available on the UN website at:

http://www.un.org/NPT2010/statements/UK_30_04_pm.pdf.

The UK delegation met with UK non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the FCO on 3 April and had further formal and informal discussions throughout the course of the PrepCom. No NGOs sought or received financial support from the FCO to attend this meeting.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070524/text/70524w0029.htm#07052526000063

Missile Defence

Ballistic Missile Defence, House of Commons, Written Answers, 14 May 2007, Column 508W

Mr. Greg Hands: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent assessment he has made of the potential role of ballistic missile defence in UK security policy.

Des Browne: We welcome the recent announcement by the US to augment their ballistic missile defence system with interceptors based in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic, thereby also providing coverage for most of Europe, including the UK. We continue to examine the potential options for the role of ballistic missile defence in UK security policy, both with the US and other NATO allies.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070514/text/70514w0008.htm#07051426000011

Ballistic Missile Defence: USA, House of Commons, Written Answers, 21 May 2007, Column 1049

Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland of 25 April 2007, Official Report, column 1115W, on ballistic missile defence: USA, what legal advice he has received on the compatibility of the upgrading of RAF Fylingdales in support of the USA Ballistic Missile Defence System with the UK's obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Article 1.

Des Browne: The UK had no obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which was a bilateral treaty between the United States and the USSR.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070521/text/70521w0005.htm#07052114000060

Guided Weapons, House of Commons Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 237W

Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent discussions she has had with her US counterparts on the deployment of limited missile capabilities in Europe; what proposals are under discussion; and if she will make a statement.

Margaret Beckett: I have not discussed the extension of the US missile defence system to Europe with the US Secretary of State.

The US has proposed the siting of 10 interceptors in Poland and a surveillance radar in the Czech Republic. Details of these deployments are subject to bilateral negotiations between these countries and the US. However, the US has made clear that the siting of US assets in Europe could contribute to any future NATO system and the US regularly discusses its plans for missile defence with NATO.

The UK is discussing a number of ways in which we might participate further in the US missile defence system. We already contribute to the US missile defence system through the provision of the radar at RAF Fylingdales. Officials regularly discuss and review UK participation in the US system as it develops but discussions are at an early stage and there are no formal proposals.

The issue of when and how to develop a collective alliance territorial missile defence system has also been under discussion in NATO. At the NATO summit last year at Riga it was agreed that there should be further study into territorial missile defence for NATO.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070604/text/70604w0054.htm#07060529000153

Ballistic Missile Defence, House of Commons, Written Answers, 12 June 2007, Column 936W

Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent discussions he has had with his United States counterpart on the deployment of missile defence systems in Europe.

Des Browne: It is not the practice of the Government to make public details of all discussions with foreign Governments as this would, or would be likely to, prejudice international relations. The position on missile defence in Europe is as set out in my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary's reply of 4 June 2007, Official Report, column 237W, to the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague).
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070612/text/70612w0009.htm#07061279000026

USA: Ballistic Missile Defence, House of Commons, Written Answers, 12 June 2007, Column 983W

Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions she has had with (a) the United States Administration and (b) her European Union counterparts on the

12 Jun 2007 : Column 984W

effects on European security of the placing of anti-ballistic missile systems in eastern European Union countries; and what representations she has made to the Russian Government on President Putin's criticisms of anti-ballistic missile systems deployment.

Mr. Hoon: I refer the hon. Member to the reply my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary gave to the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) on 4 June 2007, Official Report, column 237W, and the reply given by my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Dr. Howells) to the hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) on 28 February 2007, Official Report, column 1375W. I have had no additional discussions with the US Government or EU Foreign Ministers. The UK is engaged in discussion of this issue through NATO (including the NATO-Russia Council) and other fora.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070612/text/70612w0020.htm#07061279000043

Azerbaijan: Ballistic Missile Defence, House of Commons, Written Answers, 14 June 2007, Column 1215W

Mr. Gordon Prentice: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what the Government's policy is in response to President Putin's suggestion at the G8 summit that a ballistic missile defence system could be based in Azerbaijan.

Mr. Hoon: President Putin's offer to include the radar at Qabala in Azerbaijan in the US ballistic missile system is a policy issue for the United States government and is subject to the agreement of the government of Azerbaijan. The UK, however, welcomes this constructive Russian approach; and welcomes the US's continuing commitment to discuss with Russia its co-operation in their ballistic missile system.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070614/text/70614w0010.htm#07061440000071

Relations with Russia

Military Aircraft: Russia, House of Commons, Written Answers, 11 June 2007, Column 761W

Mr. Soames: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions RAF aircraft have intercepted Russian military flights in or near British airspace in the last 12 months.

Des Browne: Twice.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/
cm070611/text/70611w0009.htm#07061182000035

Russia: Nuclear Weapons, House of Commons, 11 June 2007, Column 763W

Daniel Kawczynski: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had on recent ICBM tests undertaken by Russia; what assessment he has made of the implications of such tests for UK defence policy; and if he will make a statement.

Des Browne [holding answer 7 June 2007]: I have had no such discussions. The tests have no significant implications for UK defence policy, as Russia already possesses multiple warhead ICBMs. The tests do not represent an introduction of a new capability, but a gradual replacement and enhancement of an existing one.
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Russia: Nuclear Weapons, House of Commons, 12 June 2007, Column 983W

Mr. MacShane: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if she will make a statement on President Putin's threat to acquire new targets in Europe for Russian nuclear missiles.

Mr. Hoon: The UK supports US plans to deploy missile defence assets in Europe. These limited deployments can not undermine a Russian deterrent with missiles still numbered in the hundreds and warheads in the thousands. President Putin since said, in the margins of the G8 Summit, that Russia is proposing co-operation with the US on Ballistic Missile Defence which 'will allow Russia not to change our position on not targeting our missiles'.
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Space

Galileo Project, House of Lords, Written Answer, 16 May 2007, Column WA45

Lord Pearson of Rannoch asked Her Majesty's Government:

What is the current status of the European Union Galileo project; and whether it will have any military purpose.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: At the March 2007 Transport Council, the presidency and Commission reported on the current difficulties with the current contract negotiations with the private sector concessionaire bidding to run the Galileo public/private partnership (PPP). The immediate cause of the breakdown in negotiations is disagreement about industrial work-share between the partners in the bidding consortium.

As a result of the delays, the council gave the bidding consortium a deadline of 10 May 2007 to take the necessary measures to allow the resumption of effective negotiations. At the same time, the Commission was requested to prepare an analysis of the consortium's response and to develop alternative options for taking forward the Galileo project. A more detailed discussion on these issues will follow at the June Transport Council, where it is expected that EU member states will be asked to decide whether to continue with the current negotiations or bring them to an end and request the Commission to explore in detail alternative options for proceeding with the project.

Galileo has been defined and agreed as a civil system since the project's inception. While Galileo's open service, like that of GPS, can be accessed by all and therefore could be used by military forces, Galileo remains a civil programme under civil control. This has repeatedly been confirmed by the EU Transport Council; most recently in its October 2006 council conclusions.
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Galileo Project, House of Commons, Written Answers, 18 May 2007, Column 973W

Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what financial contribution the UK is making to the EU Galileo satellite project; what further requests for funding are anticipated; what steps she is taking to ensure that Galileo is not used for military purposes; and if she will make a statement.

Mr. Hoon: The Galileo programme is jointly funded by the European Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA). The UK has contributed €142 million through ESA and, through contributions to the EU budget, approximately 17 per cent. of the estimated €790 million that the Commission has invested in the programme. The Commission is currently considering funding options for 2007-13, which will require agreement by the Council and the European Parliament. As my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Transport, Dr. Ladyman, set out in his written ministerial statement on the EU Transport Council on 18 October 2006, Official Report, columns 54-56WS, the UK will continue to maintain that Galileo is a civil programme under civil control.
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European Satellite Centre, House of Commons, Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 235W

Mr. Evans: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what proportion of the funding of the European Satellite Centre in Madrid came from the United Kingdom in 2006.

Mr. Hoon: In 2006, the United Kingdom's contribution to the European Satellite Centre amounted to 17.3 per cent. of the centre's total budget of €10.557 million.
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Galileo Project, House of Commons, Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 235W

Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what plans she has to meet European foreign ministers to discuss the Galileo Global Positioning Satellite system. [139060]

Mr. Hoon: The Department for Transport leads the Government's involvement in the Galileo programme. My hon. Friend the Minister of State for Transport, Dr. Stephen Ladyman, is due to discuss Galileo with his counterparts at the next EU Transport Council in June.
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Galileo Project, House of Commons, Written Answers, 6 June 2007, Column 486W

Mr. Paterson: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what the total cost is to British public funds of the British contribution to Galileo in each year since 1997, broken down by Department.

Dr. Ladyman: The information about the UK's contribution to the programme is not available in the form requested. The total UK contribution to the European Space Agency (ESA) element of the programme since 1997 is €142 million.

The European Union (EU) and the member states of ESA jointly fund the design and development programme for Galileo on a 50/50 basis. DTI and DfT co-fund the UK element of the ESA subscription.

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UK subscriptions already paid and future commitments to the ESA element of the programme total €142 million, of which DfT is contributing£22.45 million (approximately €31 million).

Programme subscriptions to ESA are subject to inflationary increases and can vary from predicted profiles. UK contributions to the different phases of the programme are as follows:

€15.3 million-subscription to the definition phase (1998 prices);

€95.7 million-original subscription to the development phase (2001 prices);

€31.0 million-additional contribution for the development phase (2001 prices).

The EU's contribution to the design and development programme is made from the EC budget and is estimated by the Commission to be €790 million. The United Kingdom makes its contributions to the EC Budget as a whole and not to individual spending programmes within it. There is not therefore a specific United Kingdom contribution to the design and development programme.

Mr. Paterson: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport (1) how much the Government plans to contribute to Galileo in the next five years, broken down by Department;

(2) when he expects Galileo to be fully deployed and functioning; [139854]

(3) what the Government's policy is on the European Commission's proposal for national governments of member states to fund the deployment phase of Galileo.

Dr. Ladyman: I refer the hon. Member to the reply given to my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody) on 23 May 2007, Official Report, columns 1353-4W.

Mr. Paterson: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport whether he plans to levy charge on operators or users of existing satellite based positioning systems in order to fund the Galileo project. [140207]

Dr. Ladyman: No.
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Galileo Project, House of Commons, Written Answers, 11 June 2007, Column 726W

Mrs. Dunwoody: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what his policy is on (a) military and (b) civilian applications of the Galileo Satellite Navigation System.

Dr. Ladyman: Galileo has been defined and agreed as a civil system since the project's inception. While Galileo's open service, like that of GPS, can be accessed by all and therefore could be used by military forces, Galileo remains a civil programme under civil control. This has repeatedly been confirmed by the EU Transport Council; most recently in its October 2006 Council Conclusions.
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Iran

Iran: Nuclear Power, House of Commons, Written Answers, 21 May 2007, Column 1091

Mr. Keith Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) what assessment has been made of the level of capability achieved by Iran in the production of fissile material which could be used in a nuclear weapon; and if she will make a statement;

(2) what assessment has been made of the likely date at which Iran will reach its stated goal of installing and operating 3,000 centrifuge machines at its enrichment facility in Natanz;

21 May 2007 : Column 1092W

(3) what assessment has been made of the stage reached by Iran in the installation of centrifuges at its enrichment facility in Natanz;

(4) what is the latest assessment that has been made of the progress by Iran towards the mastery of uranium enrichment technology;

(5) pursuant to the answer of 20 March 2007, Official Report, column 837W, on Iran: nuclear weapons, what definition she uses of mastery of enrichment technology; and what (a) level and (b) scale of (i) centrifuge operation and (ii) enriched uranium production is referred to.

Mr. McCartney: Iran is defying calls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, made mandatory by the UN Security Council, to suspend all uranium enrichment-related, reprocessing and heavy water-related activities. These activities are of proliferation concern because they would enable Iran to develop the capability to produce fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons.

Iran has produced very small quantities of enriched uranium at its pilot fuel enrichment plant at Natanz and is now installing centrifuges in the Fuel Enrichment Plant. The IAEA reported on 22 February that,

"During meetings in Iran in January 2007, Iran informed the Agency of its plan to....continue progressively with the installation of the 18 cascades of the 3,000-machine hall and to bring them gradually into operation by May 2007".

Most recently, in a letter to the Iranian representative to the IAEA on 18 April, the IAEA reported the information Iran had provided to inspectors that

"Iran has put into operation eight cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz and that some UF6 is being fed into those cascades".

We now await the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei's, official report on Iran's compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 which will give a further update of Iranian progress at the Fuel Enrichment Plant, which is due on 23 May.

Enriching uranium is a complex technical process which requires diagnostic testing and the running of multiple cascades over a sustained period. It remains our assessment that Iran has not mastered the process.

We will consider next steps in light of the Director-General's upcoming report on compliance with UNSCR 1747. UNSCRs 1696, 1737 and 1747 make it mandatory that Iran suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities before negotiations aimed at a long-term agreement can commence. We remain committed to a negotiated solution. We continue to urge Iran to take the steps required by the Security Council and IAEA Board, and to return to talks on the basis of the proposals presented to Iran on 6 June 2006 by EU High Representative Javier Solana on behalf of the 'E3+3'.
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Iran, House of Commons, Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 171W

Mr. Roger Williams: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the UK's military position on Iran.

Des Browne: As this House is aware, we have been reviewing our overall bilateral policy towards Iran in the light of the recent detention of naval personnel and given the continued concerns that the international community has over the behaviour of the Iranian regime. We continue to stand by the principles which underpin our policy: we are committed to engagement, through diplomacy and dialogue, to encourage Iran to play a constructive role on the international stage; at the same time, we will work with international partners to maintain a strong line against unacceptable Iranian behaviour, including its nuclear ambitions and its support for terrorism and violence in the region.
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Iran, Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 238W

Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the answer of 26 February 2007, Official Report, column 84W, on Iran, whether any changes to the flexibility about the modalities for opening negotiations were proposed by (a) Mr. Javier Solana and (b) Mr. Ali Larijani during their meetings of 25 and 26 April 2007; and if she will make a statement.

Margaret Beckett: The UN Security Council has set out on behalf of the international community its requirements of Iran. These requirements are not negotiable. However, the UK, together with their partners in the "E3+3" (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and the High Representative of the European Union), remain willing to explore flexibly the modalities of how to begin discussions with Iran on the basis of the established position of "suspension for suspension". This would involve Iran suspending its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as required by the UN Security Council, while the Security Council would suspend implementation of measures adopted under Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747.

In their meeting on 25 April, Dr. Solana explored what flexibility might be available in terms of the process leading up to negotiations, but Dr. Larijani was not able to respond.
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Iran: Nuclear Weapons, House of Commons, Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 238W

Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what measures the Government have taken to prevent specialised teaching or training of Iranian nationals in disciplines which would contribute to Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems in accordance with Article 6 of the EU Council Common Position 2007/140/CFSP.

Margaret Beckett: A voluntary vetting scheme is currently in place which encourages universities to refer post-graduate students planning to study subjects of concern, including disciplines which could contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for counter-proliferation advice. In line with Article 6 of Common Position 2007/140 Common Foreign and Security Policy, we will take the necessary measures to prevent such teaching or training by introducing a mandatory vetting scheme in advance of the visa application stage. Technical work is continuing with a view to introducing this mandatory scheme at the earliest opportunity.
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Iran: Sanctions, House of Commons, Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 239W

Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps have been taken by the European Union to implement the call by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 1747 on 24 March for all states and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran except for humanitarian and developmental purposes; and if she will make a statement.

Margaret Beckett: The EU introduced a prohibition on member states entering into new commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran, including through their participation in international financial institutions, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes, in Common Position 2007/246/ Common Foreign and Security Policy adopted on 23 April.
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Iran: Travel Restrictions, House of Commons, Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 239W

Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether the European Union is implementing a full travel ban on (a) the persons designated under UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 and (b) the individuals designated under Council Decision 2007/242/EC of 23 April; and if she will make a statement.

Margaret Beckett: The EU is implementing a full travel ban on the individuals designated in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and the additional persons who meet the UN criteria listed in Council Decision 2007/242/EC. A series of limited exemptions to the travel ban are listed in Article IV of Common Position 2007/140/Common Foreign and Security Policy. These include permission to permit travel in cases of urgent humanitarian need or where there is a necessity to meet the objectives of UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), including where Article XV of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute is engaged.
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Iran: Nuclear Fuels, House of Commons, Written Answers, 11 June 2007, Column 845W

Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what International Atomic Energy Agency supervision the Iranian Government would be required to accept in order for the UK Government to be satisfied that uranium enrichment in Iran would be confined to entirely peaceful purposes; and if she will make a statement.

Dr. Howells: After many years of hiding its nuclear programme from the world, Iran needs to satisfy the international community, and not just the UK, that its programme is for purely peaceful reasons. The generous and far-reaching proposals presented to Iran on behalf of the E3+3 (France, Germany, UK + China, Russia, US) by Dr. Javier Solana in June 2006 would give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power programme. These remain on the table and we stand ready to negotiate with Iran on the basis of these. But Iran first needs to suspend its enrichment-related activities, as repeatedly required by the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, to gain the confidence of the international community.

We will not be satisfied that Iran's nuclear programme is for entirely peaceful purposes until Iran meets in full the requirements of the international community. These include Iran's obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747, as well as the requirements under IAEA Board of Governors decisions and resolutions. In particular, as the Director-General of the IAEA has stated many times, unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues, and implements the Additional Protocol which it has agreed with the agency, as well as essential transparency measures, the IAEA will not be able to fully reconstruct the history of Iran's nuclear programme and provide the international community with assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme. The Director-General has also stated that these required transparency measures would need to go further than the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol given the 20 years of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. In the Director-General's most recent report on Iran on 23 May, he noted that the agency's level of knowledge of certain aspects of Iran's nuclear related activities had deteriorated over the past year.

Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what response she has

11 Jun 2007 : Column 846W

made to proposals for (a) further incentives for Iran to suspend Iranian enrichment and (b) a further round of sanctions against the Iranian regime; and if she will make a statement.

Mr. Hoon: The report by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. ElBaradei, of 23 May made clear that Iran had not complied with UN Security Council Resolution 1747. As envisaged in the resolution, the Security Council will respond accordingly and will adopt further sanctions on Iran. We remain committed to the twin-track approach and stand ready to enter negotiations with Iran, once they comply with the Security Council Resolutions and the IAEA Board of Governors, on the basis of the generous and far-reaching proposals presented to Iran by Javier Solana in June 2006 on behalf of the E3+3 (France, Germany, UK + China, Russia, US).
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Iran: Nuclear Fuels, House of Commons, Written Answers, 13 June 2007, Column 1088W

Mr. Keith Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what progress has been made in the talks between the EU High Representative Javier Solana and Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani; and if she will make a statement.

Dr. Howells [holding answer 11 June 2007]: Dr. Solana met Dr. Larijani on 31 May for talks in Madrid. Iran continues to give no indication that it is willing to comply with its international obligations and suspend all enrichment-related, reprocessing and heavy-water related activities, as the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr ElBaradei,

13 Jun 2007 : Column 1089W reported on 23 May. The matter will therefore return to the UN Security Council who will consider further measures on Iran.
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Iraq

Iraq: Weapons, House of Commons, Written Answers, 14 May 2007, Column 469W

Mr. Baron: To ask the Prime Minister pursuant to his Oral Answer of 2 May 2007, Official Report, column 1505, on engagements, what the basis was of his claim on 24 September 2002 that, if he were able to purchase fissile material illegally, it would be only a year or two before Saddam Hussein acquired a usable nuclear weapon.

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The Prime Minister: These matters have been examined during the course of the Butler Review and other inquiries, and covered during debates and statements on Iraq and in briefings by my Official Spokesman. All relevant information has been placed in the public domain in as far as that could be done without prejudicing national security.
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Iraq-Kuwait Conflict: Depleted Uranium, House of Commons, Written Answers, 4 June 2007, Column 174W

Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will estimate the number of British Gulf War I veterans who have been tested for contamination by depleted uranium; and if he will make a statement.

Derek Twigg: Under the screening programme overseen by the Depleted Uranium Oversight Board (DUOB), a total of 362 veterans of the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict were tested for the presence of depleted uranium in their urine. Under the separate and ongoing Ministry of Defence biological monitoring programme for service personnel during the current Iraq deployment (Operation Telic), five of the 390 service personnel tested are also veterans of the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. No evidence of the excretion of depleted uranium was found in the urine of tested UK personnel apart from a small number who were involved in blue-on-blue incidents (during Operation Telic) and have embedded depleted uranium shrapnel. I announced in my written ministerial statement on 26 March 2007, Official Report, column 64WS, that the final report of the DUOB was available. It can be accessed on the DUOB website at:

www.duob.org.uk.

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