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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, September - November 2007 Westminster ParliamentKey to House of Commons Column Numbering
Trident and the UK Nuclear ProgrammeNuclear Weapons, Written Answers, 28 November 2007, Column 453WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the function is of the Warhead Pre-Concept Working Group in the nuclear weapons programme; and what the projected cost is of work carried out by this Working Group over the next three years. Des Browne: The Warhead Pre-Concept Working Group was set up to co-ordinate research in support of the detailed review described in paragraph 7-4 of the December 2006 White Paper: “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” (Cmd 6994). This review will examine the optimum life of the UK’s existing nuclear warhead stockpile and assess the range of replacement options that might be available to help inform decisions likely to be necessary in the next Parliament. The value of work being overseen by the WPCWG in 2007-08 amounts to some £10 million. Comparable levels of expenditure are projected for 2008-09 and 2009-10. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 28 November 2007, 454WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether Trident D5 missiles are equipped with permissive action links. Des Browne: No. Robust arrangements are in place for the political control of the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Trident: RAF Corsham, Written Answers, 22 Nov 2007, Column 1033WJon Trickett: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what activities take place at the Corsham Computer Centre in support of the Trident nuclear weapons system; and if he will make a statement. Des Browne: The Corsham Computer Centre is a data processing facility in support of Royal Navy operations. I am withholding specific details of its function as they would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 22 Nov 2007, Column 1030WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the effect of the rebuilding of the facility at Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield on the decommissioning of Trident warheads. Des Browne: None. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 21 Nov 2007, Column 894WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the last health and safety audit was carried out at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Burghfield; what the outcome was with particular reference to the state of Gravel Gertie facilities; and if he will make a statement. Des Browne: The most recent health and safety audit at the Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield was an inspection by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) during the period 5-9 November 2007. The NII have confirmed that no new issues were raised in relation to the material condition or functionality of the facilities, including the Gravel Gerties. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 15 Nov 2007, Column 366WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his timetable is for reducing the number of Trident warheads to below 160. Des Browne: The December 2006 White Paper: The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994) announced a further reduction in our holdings of operationally available nuclear warheads, in line with the UK's commitment to maintain only the minimum necessary deterrent. I can confirm that we have now reduced the number of operationally available warheads from fewer than 200 to fewer than 160. Nuclear Weapons: Expenditure, Written Answers, 30 Oct 2007, Column 1357WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the projected expenditure is in the period covered by the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review on (a) the UK nuclear deterrent programme, including on the atomic weapons establishment and the future submarine programme, (b) the atomic weapons establishment and (c) the future submarine programme. Des Browne: Projected expenditure on all aspects of the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent-operation of and support to the current deterrent system, the costs of the atomic weapons establishment and expenditure on the programme to maintain the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent capability beyond the life of the current system-over the next three years is expected to be:
30 Oct 2007, Column 1358W Expenditure at the Atomic Weapons Establishment is expected to be:
The estimated costs of the programme to maintain the United Kingdom's deterrent capability beyond the life of the current system, as set out in the December 2006 White Paper, 'The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent' (Cm 6994) and endorsed by Parliament on 14 March 2007, over the next three years are:
Trident, Written Answers, 29 Oct 2007, Column 983WJeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to his answer to the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) of 26 July 2007, Official Report, column 1252W, on Trident, how often in each year he expects to present to Parliament interim reports on meeting progress targets in the programme development before the Initial Gate of the replacement for Trident; whether he plans to include financial expenditure details with each interim report; and if he will make it his policy to present each report to Parliament accompanied by an oral statement. Des Browne [holding answer 24 October 2007]: Interim reports on the programme to maintain the UK's nuclear deterrent will be provided depending on progress. We are in the early stages of this programme and there are no plans as yet to provide an interim report. Atomic Weapons Establishment: Sales, Written Answers, 29 Oct 2007, Column 957WJeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for The Wrekin of 26 July 2007, Official Report, column 1247W, on the Atomic Weapons Establishment: sales, what criteria will be adopted to establish the acceptability of prospective purchasers; and which factors will be taken into account in the analysis of the acceptability of prospective purchasers. Mr. Bob Ainsworth [holding answer 24 October 2007]: The criteria for ensuring UK security in this matter are the same as those that we would employ in establishing whether we would place a contract with any company. Suitability is established through appropriate checks on corporate, financial and security matters. Security checks are carried out in accordance with the relevant requirements of Joint Service Publication (JSP) 440. The factors that will be considered in the analysis of prospective purchasers, will support our aims to ensure the protection of UK strategic interests and continued programme stability through the retention of the skills and capability that underpin the ability to manage the enduring performance of AWE plc. An exhaustive list of pre-determined factors is not available, primarily because some will arise as a consequence both of events and of the track record of the companies concerned. However, an ability to interact effectively with, and to complement the skills of, the existing consortium partners will be essential re-requisites. Public Accounts, Debate, 23 Oct 2007, Column 219Mr. Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con): I have not yet mentioned the Ministry of Defence. Suffice it to say, given the mismanagement of technical and commercial risks on the Astute submarine programme, which was highlighted in the major projects report, that we will watch progress on the massive Trident replacement programme with two eyes fully open. If hon. Members will forgive the pun, little of this is rocket science; the simple adoption of methods tried and tested in much of the public and private sectors could save the taxpayer billions. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/ Nuclear Weapons: Transport, Written Answers, 17 Oct 2007, Column 1124WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether in-house provision of the service for the road transport of nuclear weapons by HM Naval Base Clyde is still under consideration. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: We are not proposing to pursue that option, the operation will remain with AWE plc for the foreseeable future. Nuclear Weapons: Transport, Written Answers, 16 Oct 2007, Column 942WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether approval has been granted for the main gate business case for the Defence Nuclear Weapons Transportation Continuation project. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Main Gate Business Case for the Nuclear Weapon Transportation Capability Continuation Project was approved on 7 May 2007. Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the option to use a refurbished truck cargo heavy duty trailer for future high security vehicle or special nuclear material movements is still under consideration. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Yes. Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what reason it is his Department's policy that convoys carrying special nuclear materials should not look the same as convoys carrying nuclear weapons; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The nature of individual convoys will determine their constitution. I am withholding details of the procedures governing convoy operations as its release would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security and defence of the UK. Armed Forces: Aircraft Detection, House of Lords, Written Answers and Statements, 12 October 2007Lord Trefgarne asked Her Majesty's Government:
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence & Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (Lord Drayson): The Royal Air Force is responsible for the detection and identification of aircraft and the dissemination of the recognised air picture within United Kingdom airspace and its approaches, using assets such as RAF control and reporting centres at RAF Boulmer and RAF Scampton and remote air defence radars and communications sites. RAF Sentry aircraft, Royal Navy Type 42 air defence assets and Sea King air surveillance and control mark 7 helicopters all have the ability to contribute to the recognised air picture when operating around United Kingdom airspace and waters. Royal Air Force Tornado F3 and Typhoon aircraft maintain continuous quick reaction alert readiness and are normally based at RAF Coningsby and RAF Leuchars. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ Defence Procurement Debate, 9 October 2007, Column 228Linda Gilroy (Plymouth, Sutton) (Lab/Co-op): Locally, the MOD has agreed to Babcock's purchase of DML, which operates our local dockyard, and it has been cleared by the Competition Commission. The terms of business agreements are being cleared: the dotting of the i's and crossing of the t's on the important contract arrangements for the nuclear facility and the Trident contract—an important part of which we operate at Devonport—as well as major contracts to refurbish the Vanguard class submarines. The new owner has been broadly, if somewhat cautiously—as is our way in Plymouth—welcomed. A British company is involved, rather than the rather distant American ownership that 9 Oct 2007 : Column 229 we previously experienced. Babcock has formed Babcock Marine, the headquarters of which will be based in Plymouth. We look forward to working with the company, and we hope that, having acquired the significant additional base of Devonport, it will be able to use the new arrangements as a springboard to become a major marine defence company in the United Kingdom. Willie Rennie: I was surprised that during the Minister's opening remarks, there was not one mention of Trident. After all, earlier this year, the former Prime Minister at the time told us that
We were told earlier this year that this will be one of the UK's biggest construction projects, so why was no substantive mention made of it? Where is the report on the great progress that has been made on Trident since then? Why was it so urgent that we had to take the decision earlier this year? Linda Gilroy: I believe that the hon. Gentleman visited Plymouth with the Select Committee on Defence, so he must surely have understood the urgent need to keep the skills base intact. I invite him to read the Hansard record of my speech tomorrow. Willie Rennie: I am well aware of those arguments, but I would have thought that if this were such an important project, the Minister would have gone into great detail about the progress made. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Gentleman is right that I did not mention Trident in my remarks. Just a few months ago, there was a White Paper, a three-month consultation and a debate that took a decision on Trident. People are free to say what they like, but I did not think it necessary to comment on that when covering the range of defence procurement, given that the House had commented on it so comprehensively—at least, it had the opportunity to do so. Nuclear Weapons: Procurement, Written Answers, 12 Sep 2007, Column 2074WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when development work began on the high surety warhead at Aldermaston; how much has been spent on the warhead; and what the total projected cost for the new warhead is. Des Browne: There is no programme to develop a new warhead at AWE Aldermaston. In section 7 of the December 2006 White Paper: The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cmd 6994) we explained that decisions on whether and how we may need to refurbish or replace our current warhead are likely to be necessary in the next Parliament. As part of the work to inform those decisions we are now reviewing the optimum life of our existing warhead stockpile and identifying the range of replacement options that might be available. AWE Aldermaston: Floods, Written Answers, 3 Sep 2007, Column 1614WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what flood protection measures were taken in respect of AWE Aldermaston during the recent heavy rainfall; what assessment he has made of the robustness of these protection measures; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: AWE Aldermaston has flood protection systems in place that have been agreed with the Environment Agency. These include a series of small reservoirs that were installed in the early 1990s to allow run-off water from the site to be collected and assessed prior to a managed discharge. Water flowing from areas of the site such as roads and car parks are diverted to local watercourses. I can confirm that these protection arrangements worked well and performed as designed. Nuclear Weapons, Written Answers, 3 Sep 2007, Column 1629WHarry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what guidelines his Department follows on the proximity of storage of nuclear weapons to (a) residential properties and (b) other nuclear weapons. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: UK nuclear weapons, in common with all MOD conventional weapons, are stored according to their conventional explosives content in explosives facilities which are assessed and licensed in accordance with the requirements of the Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regulations (MSER) 2005. The MOD applies these regulations through Joint Services Publication 482-MOD Explosives Regulations. JSP 482 stipulates specific safety separation distances to be maintained between explosives and residential properties and public roads and between adjacent explosives storage and processing facilities. Nuclear warheads are stored safely in accordance with arrangements prescribed by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. Specific regulations are covered by the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 3 Sep 2007, Column 1630WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions his Department has had with (a) the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, (b) the Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield and (c) others on the safety of the Trident warhead assembly/disassembly plant at Burghfield, with particular reference to (i) working practices and (ii) facilities. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The safety of the assembly/disassembly facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) is not in question. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate maintains a continuous dialogue with the nuclear site licensee (AWE plc) and with the MOD on all aspects of the safety of facilities and operations at AWE, where safety is paramount to all stakeholders. Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on what date his Department received the first communication from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate on the safety of the warhead assembly/disassembly facility at Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate maintains, and has since first licensing, a continuous dialogue with the nuclear site licensee at Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield, and with the MOD on all aspects of the safety of facilities and operations, including the warhead assembly/disassembly facility. Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has to replace the warhead assembly/disassembly facility at Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: A number of options remain under consideration. Final decisions have yet to be taken. Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent research he has (a) commissioned and (b) evaluated on the merits of using (i) probabilistic risk assessments and (ii) deterministic risk assessments for assessing risk at Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: No specific research has been commissioned into these techniques and none is needed. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate licence conditions for the Atomic Weapons Establishment demand that appropriate safety cases are generated as a matter of routine in the evaluation of risk. Deterministic and probabilistic risk assessments are tools employed in defining and ranking the postulated hazards. The use of such risk assessment techniques is considered best practice within the nuclear industry. Their use by AWE plc is regularly benchmarked against-and compares favourably with-other nuclear operators. 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