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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, September - November 2007 Westminster ParliamentKey to House of Commons Column Numbering
Defence Policy, Adjournment Debate, 16 October 2007, Column 702Dr. Liam Fox (Woodspring) (Con): No debate about international terrorism would be complete without considering the question of Iran. Would it ever be an acceptable outcome for the British Government for Iran to become a nuclear weapons state? 16 Oct 2007 : Column 715 Des Browne: The British Government could not make clearer their position in relation to Iran’s ambition to be a nuclear weapons state. As I have said from the Dispatch Box time and time again, my view is that Iran’s behaviour—its interference in a malign fashion in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq—suggests that the country poses a strategic threat to the peace of the region in which it wants to play an important role. The irony is that Iran could play a positive role in the region; the country has shared interests with the countries in whose internal politics it seeks to interfere. I am in no doubt that the international community has adopted the right position in relation to Iran, and also that we have to stay together and pursue the arguments with the Iranians. Most importantly, we have to recruit in support of the arguments as many of the regional partners as possible, because they are the people to whom Iran will pay the greatest attention. I am conscious of the time, and of the fact that a significant number of people want to contribute to the debate, so I shall now sum up. It is the first duty of Government to protect their people and the national interest. The Government have a clear policy framework for delivering that duty. I have endeavoured in my speech to cover some of that broad front, but of necessity I have had to make discriminating judgments and have not been comprehensive. By working with friends, allies and international institutions to reduce threat and prevent conflict, and by ensuring that our forces have the capability to intervene around the world if necessary, we will achieve our objectives. 16 Oct 2007 : Column 725 Dr. Fox: The real strategic question is whether Iran should be allowed to become a nuclear weapon state. I suggest to the House that there are three reasons why Iran should not be allowed to do so. The first is the nature of the regime itself. It has already been shown to be involved in destabilising Iraq and it is almost certainly involved in providing weapons to Afghanistan. We have heard the rhetoric from the leadership of the regime and we know what that could mean for the wider region. Secondly, if Iran is allowed to become a nuclear weapon state, other countries will want to follow. We would be likely to see nuclear proliferation, which might affect Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and other countries in the region, creating a destabilising, expensive and pointless nuclear arms race in one of the world’s most dangerous regions. Thirdly, we know, as the Secretary of State mentioned, that Iran has been more than capable of carrying out terrorism by proxy. What that could mean in terms of terrorist blackmail from a nuclear armed state is something that none of us would want to imagine. Chris Bryant: I wholly agree with the hon. Gentleman in that I do not want Iran to develop a nuclear capacity, which is why I support the European efforts to keep up important negotiations. However, if the United States of America were to propose military strikes on Iran, would he encourage it to do so, or would he actively oppose that? 16 Oct 2007 : Column 726 Dr. Fox: I understand and sympathise with the importance of the hon. Gentleman’s question, but if we get into the hypothetical debate of ruling things in or out at a time when we are involved in high-level, delicate negotiations with Iran, the only people we are likely to give comfort to are the Iranian regime. It has to be made clear that we do not want Iran to become a nuclear-weapon state. Iran is, indeed, signed up to the non-proliferation treaty, in which it pledges not to become a nuclear weapon state. The international community is taking the correct approach at the present time, and to rule anything out would be to weaken our hand in negotiations. I do not think that we should be any more specific than that. I visited Iran a few weeks ago, and having been there and discussed the matter with Iranian politicians, I understood just how complex those negotiations can be and how difficult it can be to get across to some Iranian politicians that this is a quarrel not with the United States or the United Kingdom, but with the whole international community. The better that that community is able to speak with one voice—not splinter into what-ifs—the better our chance of getting a properly negotiated settlement in Iran that is to everyone’s benefit. 16 Oct 2007 : Column 757 Mr. David Hamilton (Midlothian) (Lab): I want to consider the decision in the House some months ago about Trident. Again, I was in a minority on that matter, which is a big issue not only in the UK Parliament but in the Scottish Parliament. Most Scottish Members of Parliament, and Members of the Scottish Parliament, voted against Trident. The First Minister, who is also a Member of this House, has made it clear that he will do anything he can to stop the maintenance of the nuclear facility at Faslane. It is important that hon. Members understand that, because the issue could affect our defence capability. The First Minister argues that he could relate his opposition to EU regulations. A Green party Member of the Scottish Parliament wrote to the First Minister asking for an inquiry into the transfer of nuclear warheads around Scotland. The First Minister replied that he shared the opposition to nuclear weapons and reassured the Green party that he would go even further, take some steps to ensure that nothing was moved in or out of Faslane, and use European legislation to deal with that. It is important that the UK Parliament understands that. I revert to the point that I made earlier: when we are part of a democratic force, we accept the defeats as well as the victories. We were defeated on Trident in the UK Parliament. If people do not accept defeat, they should go back and try a different angle to win the fight. We cannot have a Scottish debate without having a UK debate. The UK Parliament makes the decision. It would be inappropriate if one part of Scotland—for example, Shetland—said that it wanted to be 16 Oct 2007 : Column 758 independent and take all the oil without giving any to the rest of Scotland. That would change the dynamic, and the same applies to the position that I have described. 16 Oct 2007 : Column 768 Mr. Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Lab): Is the hon. Gentleman not trying to have it both ways? He wants the benefit of a critical mass of UK defence expenditure and what that brings to the Scottish industrial base, but he also wants independence, under which he would lose all that. No orders would be placed in Scotland if Scotland was not a part of the United Kingdom. Stewart Hosie: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention because it allows me to make my point. In the past 10 years there have been 4,700 MOD job losses in Scotland. In addition to the shortfall in actual recruitment and procurement from Scotland, the MOD has shrunk there. The job losses are as follows: 1,000 at RAF Lossiemouth, 160 at RAF Leuchars, 180 at RAF Kinloss, 350 at HMS Gannet, 1,500 at Rosyth shipyard since 1997, 1,500 at Coulport since 1999, in addition to some 900 or so at the Clyde shipyards, and eight bases and two supply depots have been run down and closed. Therefore, the argument that a Union dividend protects jobs and services and MOD facilities simply is not true. Mr. Kevan Jones: Does not the hon. Gentleman’s party leader want to add to that? If he carries out his threat to stop the UK nuclear deterrent being sited at Faslane, there will be more job losses not only at Faslane itself, but at Coulport, where the missiles are stored, and in the ancillary industries linked to the nuclear deterrent. I am sorry, but the hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways. Stewart Hosie: That is an interesting point, but previous answers from the MOD contradict that, particularly when they are put alongside research conducted by the Scottish Trades Union Congress and others. The MOD stated in a parliamentary answer of February 2005 that the number of civilian jobs that directly rely on Trident was 936, with 300 jobs indirectly relying on it—a total of about 1,200 jobs. The STUC tells us that the cost of Trident—the £1 billion a year from general taxation that is simply the capital cost, notwithstanding the £25 to £75 billion lifetime cost—is equivalent to 3,000 jobs in other services, because the money will have to come from somewhere, and I suspect that the Government will not want to raise taxes. Mark Pritchard: Is the hon. Gentleman therefore saying to the House—and to Scotland and his constituents—that those 1,200 jobs do not matter and that their loss is a price he is willing to pay for removing the nuclear deterrent from Scotland? Stewart Hosie: Absolutely not. It is important to remember that Scotland has fewer naval and air force bases than a comparable country such as Norway. We are committed to retaining all the bases, to provide the basis for a properly funded conventional defence force 16 Oct 2007 : Column 769 in Scotland. No one is talking about jobs being lost. My point is that the argument that we hear time after time from the Government overstates the number of dependent jobs. The proportion of personnel recruited and equipment procured from Scotland is considerably less—about £750 million less—than the annual share of the budget allocated to it. Mr. Kevan Jones: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way again. Has he visited Faslane or Coulport? It is mind-boggling to imagine what a conventional force might do with the specialist equipment for handling and resupplying nuclear submarines; I am not sure what conventional defence use the storage facility at Coulport could have. Stewart Hosie: The naval bases on the west and east coasts would be maintained because they would be the east and west coast naval bases for the Scottish defence forces. That is vital... Stewart Hosie: The third point is a point of principle about Trident. The lifetime cost of its replacement will be between £25 billion and £75 billion. We know that 61 per cent. of the Scottish people oppose it and think that the Scottish Parliament should have the power to decide the issue. We know that the majority of Scottish Labour MPs oppose the Trident replacement. The vote in the Scottish Parliament was, I think, 71 to 16 against replacing Trident, so there is a massive groundswell of 16 Oct 2007 : Column 770 opinion—political and public—against replacing the Trident nuclear missile system in Scotland. The Government must of course take cognisance of that—and that, of course, is before we enter into any discussions about the morality or legality of nuclear weapons... I do hope that the Minister will, in summing up, look at the three substantive issues that I have raised... I am sure that he will want to make a robust defence of why the Government want to spend £75 billion on a replacement for the Trident nuclear weapons system, at a time when there is overstretch, when there are constant complaints about a shortage of equipment and when the recruitment policy—not just in Scotland but elsewhere—is putting huge pressure on service personnel, who are being sent out for repeat tours, against the guidelines of the MOD. 16 Oct 2007 : Column 784 Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con): I would like to deal with a few areas that have not been elaborated on so far. First, given that this is a broad defence policy debate, I would like to discuss the ballistic missile defence shield. The fact is that in July and November last year I asked two questions about it— [Interruption.]—and I am pleased to see that the Secretary of State is in his place to hear my thoughts on the matter. It is time that we had a proper debate on Britain’s role in the ballistic missile defence shield. Some people say that the current technology does not work. Well, that is what they said about the tank when it was first rolled out and we know that it has developed somewhat since 1915. I believe that the technology is getting there. There is no doubt that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increased number of countries with access to intercontinental ballistic missiles means that Britain is more vulnerable now than ever before, as other Members have suggested. It certainly will be in the next few years if Members do not accept my premise on that point. That being the case, we need to be clear that our first duty as MPs is to ensure that we defend our nation. We must therefore ensure that we are part of the American ballistic missile defence shield. Of course, a very expensive price tag is attached, which is why I suggest that the quid pro quo for the Americans having their eyes and ears at Fylingdales and one or two other places in this nation is that the Pentagon picks up the bill for the ballistic missile 16 Oct 2007 : Column 785 defence shield, so that it is not a spending commitment but a commitment, as I am sure the Secretary of State would agree, to ensuring that this nation and our constituents are protected in future. Japan is making its own way. It has the Americans using Aegis destroyers off its coast, with ship-based missiles that can track and intercept incoming missiles to Japan. There are also other platforms, such as airborne ones with specially adapted 747s, and land-based systems that might be placed in Poland and the Czech Republic. It is right that we should have a debate on whether we should have land-based or other forms of platform that can track and intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles that might come our way in the future. Of course, some people say that, if we do that, we will put the United Kingdom at risk. In fact, we are already at risk if we supply the eyes and ears to the Americans, through Fylingdales and other bases. If there were a simultaneous attack on the UK and America, the UK would be in a farcical position. Someone from Permanent Joint Headquarters or the equivalent could phone the Pentagon and say, “There are missiles coming on your eastern seaboard”, and the Americans could interdict those missiles, but we could do absolutely nothing about the missiles coming to the UK. It is a mistake of any Government—indeed, any Parliament—to say that that threat will never be realised and that that risk is minimum. We must be prepared for the unexpected; so I hope that the Secretary of State will take this opportunity to say that there will be a full debate about the future of the ballistic missile defence shield and the UK’s role in it. That brings me to the Trident replacement. I remember the former Foreign Secretary controversially opening the debate on that and the Secretary of State closing it. In that debate, I welcomed the Trident replacement, but I also mentioned new technologies. The hon. Member for Portsmouth, North talked about the flexibility of weaponry, and again she was absolutely right. The trouble with nuclear weapons is that there is very little flexibility. Yes, we must have a deterrent; yes, the deterrent has worked; but I humbly submit that we need something more than conventional weapons and something less than nuclear ones. Of course, if we use nuclear weapons, there is nuclear fallout, huge international political fallout and moral fallout. They are the weapons of last resort. We need a new weapon that gives us more flexibility to send a very powerful message to our would-be enemies if we need to do so that is greater than that associated with conventional weaponry. So what is that new technology? It is hypersonic technology, and the Secretary of State knows a lot about it. Hypersonic mass technology will give us such flexibility, because it allows the UK to tell a rogue state or an enemy that, by ratcheting up or ratcheting down, we can take out a military town, a military city or even a military hamlet. Of course, conventional weapons are limited in their capability. If we wanted to focus on a military town to send a message to a rogue state that was threatening us with intercontinental ballistic missiles, perhaps nuclear tipped, we would perhaps not want to consider the nuclear option. So we need a middle way, and it might be hypersonic mass technology. 16 Oct 2007 : Column 786 Mr. Kevan Jones: I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s speech, but I am also looking at the expression on his Whip’s face, and he is rather perplexed by what is being proposed. Will the hon. Gentleman explain how that technology would be paid for and what it would cost? Mark Pritchard: It is a question of opportunity cost; what is the cost of not responding to our enemies? The greater cost would be to make the error of judgment of using a nuclear weapon, which would carry a greater political, moral and even financial cost. It would contaminate a whole country or region. The consequences of using nuclear weapons are perhaps more severe than the consequences of using the technology to which I am referring. If the hon. Gentleman has other ideas, I would be happy for him to submit them to me at some point and to discuss them with him. I know that he is a distinguished member of the Select Committee on Defence, but tonight he has been unusually a little bit prickly for some reason, even though he is mostly amiable. It is a bit untoward of him, at best, to attack my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox), given that it is absolutely right that Her Majesty’s Opposition should ask difficult questions. When we do not ask questions, his party says that there is no opposition; when we do, it says that we are being party political. 16 Oct 2007 : Column 797 The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr. Bob Ainsworth): My hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr. Jones) reacted as I did to the speech of the hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox). Of all the speeches I heard during the debate, the two from the Conservative Front Bench were the most extraordinary. The hon. Member for Woodspring showed that he was capable of applying himself to give us analysis and a constructive view when he talked about Iran. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was sitting on the Treasury Bench at the time, and neither he nor I could disagree with what the hon. Gentleman said. However, almost all the rest of the speech that he treated us to was a catalogue of misrepresentation and abuse of the facts. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, September - November 2007 © 2007 The Acronym Institute. |