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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, December 2007 - February 2008 Westminster ParliamentKey to Column Numbering
UK Nuclear Infrastructure
AWE Management, Written Answers, 24 Jan 2008, Column 2138WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) name, (b) function, (c) estimated cost and (d) projected in-service date is of each of the 23 new build projects in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Site Development Context Plan 2005 to 2015. [181444] Des Browne: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 7 January
2008, Official Report, column 29W. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 15 Jan 2008, Column 1131WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 17 December 2007, Official Report, column 1035W, on AWE Burghfield, how many safety shortfalls (a) were identified by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) during the risk assessment, (b) were resolved by the delayed 27 September 2007 target date, (c) will shortly be resolved and (d) will remain unresolved under the current single operation licensing regime imposed by the NII for each warhead handling operation; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: As I indicated in my answer to the hon. Member on 7 January 2008, Official Report, column 28W, the safety case issues in question were identified not by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), but by AWE plc in its own Periodic Review of Safety. A total of 1,000 safety shortfalls were identified and these ultimately translated into 337 improvement packages requiring further action. Of these improvement 15 Jan 2008 : Column 1132W packages, 234 were completed by 27 September 2007 with a further 50 due to be completed by 31 March 2008. The remaining 53 improvement packages are due to be completed by 31 December 2008. It is important to note that NII has made a full assessment of AWE's
Periodic Review of Safety and is satisfied that appropriate progress is
being made at AWE Burghfield to address the findings. It is emphasised
that, if NII believed a particular operation were unsafe, it would not
allow it to take place, and has appropriate regulatory powers at its disposal
to cease operations. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 7 Jan 2008 : Column 27WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what operational restrictions have been imposed at AWE Burghfield following the report from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. 7 Jan 2008 : Column 28W Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) now requires AWE plc to seek prior authorisation for assembly/disassembly work. Such activities have always been allowed to proceed, with no impact on operations at AWE Burghfield, which remains fully operational and safe. It is emphasised that, if NII believed a particular operation were unsafe, it would not allow it to take place, and has appropriate regulatory powers at its disposal to cease operations. AWE Burghfield remains operational as the NII is satisfied that all appropriate licence conditions are being met by AWE plc. Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence why AWE Burghfield did not meet the deadline of 27 September to address the shortfalls identified as a result of its periodic review of safety. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Some of the issues identified by AWE plc as a result of its periodic review of safety required the procurement of specialist equipment where the acquisition time was such that the equipment could not be brought into service by the deadline of 27 September. Consequently, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) has agreed a new programme of work with AWE plc. It is important to note that NII is satisfied that appropriate progress is being made at AWE Burghfield to address the findings of the periodic review of safety. Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what safety care shortfalls were identified by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate at AWE Burghfield. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The safety case issues in question were identified not by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), but by AWE plc in its own periodic review of safety. These were associated primarily with risk assessment techniques and the clarity of audit trails. A revised safety case addressing these issues was adopted in September 2007 and NII is satisfied that appropriate progress is being made at AWE Burghfield to address the findings of the periodic review of safety. Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what responses he has made to the letter from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate dated 9th May, Annex 1, with particular reference to its conclusions on the safety of continuing to operate at AWE Burghfield; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The letter from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
(NII) was to AWE plc and not MOD. MOD officials work very closely with
both the AWE nuclear site licensee, AWE plc, and the external regulator,
the NII The latter is satisfied that operations at AWE Burghfield are
safe and the Department's internal nuclear safety regulator supports this
position. No useful purpose could therefore be served by the intervention
of the Secretary of State for Defence in matters which are essentially
for AWE plc to address with the NII. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/ AWE Management, Written Answers, 7 Jan 2008 : Column 29WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) name, (b) function, (c) estimated cost and (d) projected in-service date is of each of the 23 new build projects in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Site Development Context Plan 2005-15. Des Browne: The 23 projects included in each of the functions in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Site Development Context Plan 2005-15 are listed in the following table. Where applicable, the names of projects are indicated where they have been finalised. The function of each project correlates with the headings in the plan. Costs not shown are being withheld as their disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice commercial interests. Projected in-service dates are shown in five-year bandings in order to avoid prejudice to national security and/or defence interests. These facilities are required to support the UK's current warhead in-service. Decisions on whether and how we may need to refurbish or replace this warhead are likely to be necessary in the next Parliament.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/ AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 17 Dec 2007, Column 1035WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the current risk assessment at AWE Burghfield was adopted; and what plans there are to revise it. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: AWE plc implemented a revised risk assessment for
operations at Burghfield in September 2007. This replaced the previous
risk assessment, which had been adopted in 2002. Any further reviews will
be undertaken in consultation with the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, December 2007 - February 2008 © 2007 The Acronym Institute. |