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Missile Defence
Defence in the World, House of Commons Debate, 8 May 2008, Excerpts on Missile DefenceThe Secretary of State for Defence (Des Browne): 8 May 2008 : Column 875 In his leadership campaign, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg) promised to drag me to the Dispatch Box—that may be a paraphrase, but I do not think that it does him an injustice—to discuss ballistic missile defence. I have waited and waited, however, but he has done no such thing. Then again, the Liberal Democrats have been promising to do that for the best part of two years now, and the issue has warranted only one or two interventions from them in any debate, so I suppose that a Liberal Democrat promise is made to be broken. Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD): We had two particular objections to the ballistic missile defence programme proposed by the Americans—it did not have the blessing or support of fellow NATO members, and there did not appear to be any meaningful dialogue with the Russians about what was being proposed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg), my colleagues and I have been delighted to note that both those substantive misgivings have faded away materially in recent months. NATO has now embraced the programme, which can no longer be portrayed as a simply American initiative, and a much more productive dialogue appears to be taking place with the Russians about the nature of the defence. I notice some surprise on the Secretary of State's face, and he may want to elaborate on those points. In a sense, however, much of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam was saying has been overtaken by events. Des Browne: I am glad to have been able to drag the hon. Gentleman to his feet, and I shall deal in more detail with the ballistic missile defence programme later in my speech, but none of what he said is new to those of us who are involved in discussing the matter with the US, our NATO allies and Russia. The process has been 8 May 2008 : Column 876 going on for a considerable time. If the developments that have been happening quite overtly have come to the attention of the Liberal Democrats and allayed their concerns, I shall be pleased to hear that they now support the position in relation to ballistic missile defence that NATO has adopted for a long time. Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford) (LD): Will the Secretary of State give way? Des Browne: I shall not give way any more on this matter, as I shall deal with it specifically in my speech. I am absolutely certain that my speech will pre-empt the point that the hon. Gentleman wants to make. I am sure that, in his closing remarks, my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces will seek to address any concerns that go beyond the ones that I raise in the debate. The Government's collective aim is to shape the international environment to protect our citizens, promote our economy and defend our values. The global context in which we operate to achieve that has already been well documented, in the strategic defence review and its supplementary documents and annexes, and most recently in the national security strategy. Those documents identify the threats arising from terrorism, failed and failing states, weapons proliferation and competition for natural resources. Now, other factors such as competition for food and water and a global economic slowdown add to the complexity of that environment. We recognise those challenges, which surpass political borders. They are collective challenges, and occasionally they generate individual threats... 8 May 2008 : Column 890 Having focused on current operations, I should now turn to future threats. It is the prime responsibility of any Government to ensure, as far as possible, the safety and security of their people, and that responsibility is at the core of Government policy. We do not believe that any state with ballistic missiles currently has the intent to target them against the UK mainland, but we know that ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction are proliferating among states of concern. The pace of that proliferation, as well as the intentions of the states developing those capabilities, is hard to gauge. However, we do know that intentions can quickly change, and we must be ready to respond to those changes. At Bucharest, NATO again clearly set out its position on ballistic missile defence: “Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat.” Therefore, this is not just a US-UK issue, or a US issue with a number of other allies. This is, and has long been, a NATO issue. From the public discussion paper we issued in December 2002, we have been very open about the assumptions and reasoning behind our policy on ballistic missile defence. As we have said many times before, the UK Government have no plans independently to acquire ballistic missile defence assets, nor do we have existing plans to host US ballistic missile interceptor sites in the UK. Nor are we engaged in any secret discussions with the US on these issues, as the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg) would have us all believe. We already contribute to the US system, through the early warning radar information provided by RAF Fylingdales and by allowing the satellite data routed through RAF Menwith Hill to be used in the BMD system, and we also have close co-operative arrangements with it on technology programmes. When I announced to the House last July that the upgrade to the radar at RAF Fylingdales was complete, I noted: “There is no change to the existing UK-US mission for the radar and the station remains under full UK command.”—[ Official Report, 21 July 2007; Vol. 463, c. 71WS.] There have been accusations that the Government slipped out the announcement on RAF Menwith Hill just prior to the recess. That was not the case. After consulting with the Cabinet on a US request to use the satellite downlink at the station for BMD purposes, I 8 May 2008 : Column 891 replied to the US Defence Secretary on 17 July, and the announcement on 25 July was both timely and proper. We would be foolish not to keep a vigilant eye on the world and on changes in the strategic threat. If in the future we decide that the acquisition of such technology becomes essential to the security of the United Kingdom, we will re-examine the position. However, such a re-examination would not come from a desire to follow blindly the defence policy of any other nation, but from a recognition of our need to provide for our own national security against emerging threats. We cannot delay our planning and consideration of this issue until the strategic environment is such that a ballistic missile defence capability becomes a necessity. In terms of such highly complex systems, many years of development are required to produce something that is feasible and credible. If there is a need to take further steps on participation in missile defence, the Government will—as they have done consistently in the past—present those propositions to the House and have the necessary discussions, but we would only seek to do this when there are proposals or propositions to be made that go beyond the principles agreed with Parliament in 2003, and at present there are none. I hope that that—brief—contribution makes the Government position clear, and that now the Liberal Democrats and their leadership will, instead of constantly suggesting that they will have to drag us to the Dispatch Box to debate this matter, engage in the discussion and tell us what their party's position is in relation to this essential part of the security of this country and of our NATO allies, almost every one of which is signed up to exploring the potential of this form of defence. Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD): 8 May 2008 : Column 914 Before I finish, I want to ask the Government what preparations they are undertaking in advance of the non-nuclear proliferation treaty review conference in 2010. Britain played a very constructive and laudable part in the success of the 2000 NPT review conference, and Robin Cook in particular deserved a great deal of credit for that. In my view and that of my colleagues, last year's decision to keep Britain in the nuclear club well beyond Hiroshima's centenary in 2045 was premature. Given that the Government have taken that decision, however, I would hope that they want to balance the message that that sent out with evidence of a clear commitment to non-proliferation. Indeed, I very much hope that at the 2010 conference the British Government will provide the leadership that they provided at the 2000 conference. I believe Britain has an opportunity to lead disarmament and reassert some authority that may have been lost through our involvement in Iraq. We need to try to gain some of that ground and push for obligations to be met, as well as meeting our own commitments to international disarmament. Mr. Quentin Davies (Grantham and Stamford) (Lab): 8 May 2008 : Column 925 The fourth and final issue that I want to address and that was raised by the Secretary of State is the quite different one of anti-ballistic missile defence. I totally agreed with what he said: the Government are absolutely right to renew and update our co-operation with the Americans on this subject, giving them the benefit of the output at Menwith Hill and Fylingdales. The Government are also right to keep the matter under review. I do not want to draw any conclusions as to what we should be doing over the next few years in this area, but it is a very serious problem. The fact is that the Iranians are investing in ballistic technology to an extraordinary degree. They have developed the Shahab 2 missile and are now developing the Shahab 3, with which they can potentially already achieve a range of more than 1,000 km. One has to ask why they are doing that. If we believe last December's American defence community report—it said that the Iranians abandoned their nuclear weapons programme in 2003, which would be very good news indeed—we have to ask what other kind of payload the Shahab 3s are designed to carry. Presumably, it is biological or chemical weapons—weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Ahmadinejad may be a lunatic but even he cannot be quite so mad as to spend this vast amount of money in developing ballistic missiles simply in order to carry high explosive. The cost-impact ratio would be utterly ridiculous by any standards. There is a real threat and problem there. The Secretary of State is right that, for the foreseeable future, we need not think about locating terrestrial land-based anti-ballistic missile systems in this country. But I am reassured that the Americans are in agreement with the Polish and Czech Governments on locating systems there. We should keep the matter under constant review and come back to it from time to time in the House. I appreciate that the Secretary of State took the initiative in raising the subject this afternoon. No one asked him to do so or raised it with him and I hope that the Government will continue to keep us informed. There will be consensus among reasonable people in this House on taking whatever responsible measures may be required in the light of the threat over the next few years. I put it no more strongly than that. Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East) (Con): 8 May 2008 : Column 948 Let me move on to some of the contributions made in the debate. The Secretary of State and the shadow Secretary of State focused on Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo, as we might expect, and on future threats. The Secretary of State was mainly concerned about ballistic missile defence and my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) was concerned about the possibility of a re-emergence of Russian offensive activities. We have to be somewhat chagrined to see the handover that took place in Russia recently; it is not quite what we had in mind when we thought that Russia was going down the democratic path. Willie Rennie (Dunfermline and West Fife) (LD): 8 May 2008 : Column 946 Two important developments in disarmament are coming up. First, there are due to be talks on nuclear proliferation in 2010, and I hope that the Prime Minister will make them a top priority. He included them in the security statement that he made only a couple of months ago, but almost as an afterthought. I hope that the talks rise higher in the Government's list of priorities and that, instead of playing about with numbers, they make it clear that their aim is to get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. That would be a bold ambition, but it is one that needs to be delivered. The Prime Minister should take the lead in the talks, so that other countries realise that Britain regards getting rid of nuclear weapons as a top priority. The second development in disarmament is that a special conference on
cluster munitions will be held at the end of this month, when many countries
will come together to talk about possibly ending their use. I do not know
whether the Government still hold on to the false differentiation between
smart and dumb cluster bombs. I hope that we can get rid of all such differentiations,
and realise that cluster bombs of all type should be banned. Armed Forces: US Missile Defence, House of Lords, Oral Question, 3 Mar 2008 : Column 864Lord Wallace of Saltaire asked Her Majesty's Government: 3 Mar 2008 : Column 864 Whether NATO and its member Governments have been appropriately consulted about the implications of the deployment of United States missile defence systems in Europe and the bilateral negotiations through which these deployments have been agreed. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Taylor of Bolton): My Lords, first, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in offering sincere condolences to the family and friends of Sergeant Duane Barwood, who was killed on operations in Iraq on 29 February. On the Question, missile defence is an important security issue for NATO and continues to be discussed regularly at a high level. The alliance has carried out its own studies into the military and political implications of ballistic missile defence and how that might link with the US system in Europe. Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, we on these Benches offer our condolences to the family and friends of Sergeant Barwood and to the seriously injured soldiers who continue to come back both from Iraq and from Afghanistan. On the Question, I congratulate the Government on their ability to maintain whatever consultations are taking place in this country entirely outside the press or any report to Parliament, in sharp contrast with the Czech Republic and Poland, where at least there appears to be a public debate. Is the Minister aware that several of us in this House heard former Senator Sam Nunn say here on Thursday, as part of the Nuclear Threat Initiative: “I don’t think NATO has been at all well enough engaged in missile defence discussions”? Given that there is talk in the US system about a mid-course, ground-based defence system for Europe—in other words, something that serves the United States but does not protect Europe—how far is NATO discussing a much more collaborative, multilateral missile defence system than this American system? Baroness Taylor of Bolton: My Lords, the situation in the Czech Republic, and indeed in Poland, is very different from the one that we have here, because they have specific proposals for placing interceptors in those countries. Therefore there is a high level of engagement among their parliamentarians and in their Government. We do not have that situation here. If we did, we would have further parliamentary engagement, but there are no plans to go down that route. The noble Lord asked about NATO involvement. He will be aware that NATO had a feasibility study, which reported in 2006 and which recognised the growing threat from long-range missiles. Further research has been undertaken in the NATO context, and a significant amount of information has been made available. There will in fact be a NATO summit in Bucharest in April this year, and it is anticipated that further discussions on this matter will be placed on the agenda. 3 Mar 2008 : Column 865 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, does the Minister agree that, whatever the rights and wrongs of the lack of consultation both with Russia and within NATO before the US took the decisions with the Czech Republic and Poland, the most important thing now is surely that, in the period ahead, consultations continue with Russia and a serious effort is made to see whether the offer made by the Russian Government to join up with anti-missile defences can be turned into a viable process? If the Government do believe that, are they making that view known to the US Administration, and what are they doing within NATO to try to ensure that there are further talks with the Russians? Baroness Taylor of Bolton: My Lords, there are discussions between the Americans and the Russians, and various proposals have been made on both sides. We think it right that those discussions should continue in good faith and that NATO is informed of the general progress of those discussions. We support the search for a solution wherever possible. This will also be discussed at the NATO conference to which I referred earlier. Lord Howe of Aberavon: My Lords, did not Presidents Bush and Putin agree as long ago as 2002 in Moscow on the case for consultation on this between those two countries? Have not former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger repeatedly expressed their view that such multilateral, co-operative discussions on ballistic missile defence systems should include agreement on plans for countering missile threats to Europe, Russia and the United States from the Middle East? Baroness Taylor of Bolton: Yes, my Lords, the noble and learned Lord is right to make those points and considerable discussions have taken place. The US has provided Russia with considerable assurances that the ballistic missile defence system does not threaten Russia and is not aimed at protecting the US against a Russian ballistic threat. The proposals put forward by both sides are serious and are being considered at a very high level. We should all hope that those discussions lead to some resolution and some agreement being reached on the way forward. It is always better if we can work multilaterally. Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, in view of the extreme importance of very close Russian and NATO co-operation on issues concerning nuclear proliferation, which is, of course, crucial—without it we cannot get very far— does the Minister agree that fresh consideration should be given by NATO to that earlier Russian proposal for co-operation, which is now to many senior Americans appearing as a much more attractive possibility than they thought at the time? Baroness Taylor of Bolton: My Lords, all I can do is reassure the House that those who are entering into these discussions are doing so in good faith. Assurances have been given and there is an intent to find a way forward. However, this is a complex issue and it is one on which we have been trying to assist 3 Mar 2008 : Column 866 through our relationships with NATO and through direct US/Russian discussions. People need a great deal of reassurance and as much clarity as possible would be helpful to everyone. Lord Inglewood: My Lords, in her response to the Question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, the Minister did not tell the House whether NATO and its member Governments had or had not been consulted. Were they consulted or were they not? Baroness Taylor of Bolton: My Lords, NATO is kept very well informed
of the discussions, but the decisions on whether to place interceptors
in the Czech Republic and Poland are the subject of bilateral agreements
between those countries and the United States. It is only proper that
that is the case, and it is also only proper that NATO should be informed
as much as possible. Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 10 Jun 2008 : Column 118WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether (a) he, (b) Ministers and (c) officials have had recent discussions with counterparts in the United States administration on the possibility of deploying anti-missile interceptors at United Kingdom bases. Des Browne: No discussions of this nature have taken place. Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many discussions he has had with (a) NATO and (b) Russia on Ballistic Missile Defence in the last 12 months. Des Browne: The issue of ballistic missile defence is routinely
discussed at a high level in a number of NATO and bilateral fora. Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 14 May 2008 : Column 1593WLinda Gilroy: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent discussions he has had with his EU counterparts on the implications of missile defence policy for EU foreign policy. Mr. Jim Murphy [holding answer 13 May 2008]: I have had no discussion
with my EU counterparts on the issue of missile defence in the context
of EU foreign policy. The European security and defence policy gives the
EU the capability to undertake civilian and military crisis management
operations. It has no competence to consider ballistic missile defence. Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 14 May 2008 : Column 1580WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had with (a) his United States counterpart and (b) the NATO Secretary-General on the prospective third site for a European-based missile defence system following the Secretary-General's speech on missile defence delivered on 5th May in Geneva. Des Browne: The issue of ballistic missile defence is discussed
routinely, both bilaterally with the United States Administration, and
in NATO forums. It is not the practice of the Government to make public
details of all discussions with foreign governments as this would, or
would be likely to, prejudice international relations. Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 8 May 2008 : Column 1131WMr. Drew: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a copy of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning the Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station at Fylingdales Moor of 1960. Des Browne: I presume that the hon. Member is referring to the
document entitled Exchange of Notes between the United States of America
and the UK relating to a Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station at Fylingdales
Moor dated 15 February 1960. This document is available on the United
Nations website at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/l_60000/10/40/00019975.pdf.
I shall also place a copy of the document in the Library of the House. Ballistic Missile Defence System, Written Answers, 28 Apr 2008 : Column 49WGreg Mulholland: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent discussions he has had with NATO counterparts on the ballistic missile defence system. Des Browne: The issue of ballistic missile defence is discussed
regularly at ministerial level in NATO. Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 21 April 2008: Column 1707WMr. Davey: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on what dates and with whom in the US Administration he has discussed talks between Russia and the US on deployment of the US Ballistic Missile Defence programme. David Miliband: The UK continues to discuss ballistic missile
defence issues with the US Administration, on a number of levels. It is
not the practice of the Government to make public details of all discussions
with foreign governments. We are, however, kept well informed of discussions
between the US and Russia on the deployment of US missile defence assets
and we welcome the continued constructive engagement by both sides in
the debate. RAF Menwith Hill, Written Answers, 21 April 2008: Column 1663WMr. Drew: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what conditions in the agreement with the US for its use of (a) RAF Menwith Hill and (b) RAF Fylingdales would apply in the event of its premature termination. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: RAF Menwith Hill is made available to the United States Visiting Force under the terms of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 1951, and other confidential arrangements. The Status of Forces Agreement does not have a termination date. RAF Menwith Hill will continue to be made available to the United States Visiting Force for as long as it is in our mutual defence interests. Under the terms of the agreements which apply to the use of RAF Fylingdales
for ballistic missile early warning and ballistic missile defence, the
US Government retains ownership and control of all of its assets in the
event of either party terminating the Agreements. Should either party
decide to terminate the arrangement that currently exists, that party
would be obliged to continue its participation until the effective date
of termination, so as to minimise the impact to the other participant.
In this situation, any costs that are incurred by the terminating participant
would not exceed its total financial commitment for jointly approved activities.
Outwith these agreements, RAF Fylingdales would remain in place to execute
its ballistic missile early warning and space surveillance missions in
defence of the UK. Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 3 Apr 2008 : Column 1216WMr. Davey: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what the legal status is of the US facilities at RAF Menwith Hill and RAF Fylingdales; and on what international treaties their status is based. Des Browne: I have been asked to reply. RAF Fylingdales is under the direct command of RAF Air Command. RAF Menwith Hill is made available to the United States Visiting Force (USVF) under the terms of the NATO Status of Forces 3 Apr 2008 : Column 1217W Agreement (SOFA) 1951, and other arrangements which are appropriate to
the relationship that exists between the UK and the US for the purpose
of our common defence. The Secretary of State for Defence retains legal
possession and control over all Ministry of Defence sites, including those
made available to the USVF. The bases operate with the full knowledge
and consent of the Secretary of State and in full accordance with UK law. Air Force: Military Bases, Written Answers, 2 Apr 2008 : Column 937WMr. Drew: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is the duration of the contract with the US administration for its use of (a) RAF Menwith Hill and (b) RAF Fylingdales. Des Browne: There is no contract for the use of RAF Menwith Hill. The base is made available to the United States Visiting Force under the terms of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951, and other confidential arrangements. The use of RAF Fylingdales to provide the US with ballistic missile early
warning data is governed by the Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Ballistic
Missile Early Warning Station at Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire 1960. This
agreement is scheduled to remain in force while the North Atlantic Treaty
remains in force. The use of the upgraded early warning radar at RAF Fylingdales
to provide data for the US ballistic missile defence system is governed
by the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Ballistic Missile Defence.
This agreement is scheduled to last for 25 years, and began in 2003. Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 31 Mar 2008 : Column 513WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much the anti-terrorist unit patrolling RAF Menwith Hill has cost the Ministry of Defence Police Agency in each year since such patrols began. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: I am withholding the cost of the Ministry of Defence police deployed at RAF Menwith Hill for the purpose of safeguarding national security. Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) on what date the space based infra-red system at RAF Menwith Hill became operational; (2) on what date work began on the installation of equipment at RAF Menwith Hill as part of the US ballistic missile defense system. Des Browne: Installation of ground terminal equipment at RAF Menwith Hill to allow missile early warning data to be received from the Space Based Infra Red Satellites (SBIRS) was initiated following the then Government's agreement to the plan in March 1997. The eventual operational date for the SBIRS system is a matter for the US Government. The necessary components to allow the downlink at RAF Menwith Hill to route satellite early warning data to the US Ballistic Missile Defence system arrived in September 2007, and were installed in November 2007. Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on what date the component of the US ballistic missile defence system at RAF Fylingdales became operational. Des Browne: The upgrade of the radar and associated systems at
RAF Fylingdales to allow it to operate as part of the US ballistic missile
defence system was completed on 9 August 2007. Topical Questions, Foreign & Commonwealth Oral Questions, 25 March 2008, Column 18Mr. Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD): Given that the Prime Minister said in his national security strategy statement last week that accelerating global nuclear disarmament was a key objective, can the Foreign Secretary explain how that fits with the Government’s agreement that RAF Menwith Hill could be used for the US ballistic missile system, particularly when President Bush rebuffed President Putin’s offer to work together on the issue? If the Government really think that a one-sided ballistic missile defence system is such a good way of promoting nuclear disarmament, will the Foreign Secretary accept the recommendation made by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and let the whole House have a proper debate on Britain’s involvement with the “Son of Star Wars” project? Mr. Jim Murphy: The fact is that the United Kingdom welcomes the US expansion of the ballistic missile defence into Europe. We think that the sitings in the Czech Republic and Poland are an important protection against a potential attack by a rogue state. It is clear that the system offers no challenge whatever to Russia’s strategic missiles, in terms of either its location or its capacity. That is generally accepted. The fact is that the US has offered to share the information, importantly, with Russia and with NATO allies. We welcome that very much indeed. We should not be criticising the US for seeking to deal with the threat; instead, we should be showing a united effort in trying to deal with those rogue states that the missile defence system is designed to protect us from. US Ballistic Missile Defence Programme, Written Answers, 25 Mar 2008 : Column 131WTim Farron: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions he has had with the US Administration on development of their ballistic missile defence programme in the UK. Dr. Howells: I refer the hon. Member to chapter 4, section 4.68
of the recently published National Security Strategy which deals with
the United Kingdom's response to the current and emerging security challenges.
We already contribute to ballistic missile early warning through the facilities
at RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill, and we regularly discuss with
the US ongoing support. NATO: Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 10 Mar 2008 : Column 14WJeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he expects a new agreement at the forthcoming NATO conference in Bucharest (a) to seek to integrate the US Missile Defense system and NATO's European theatre missile defence system and (b) enable NATO to share authority for the current US Missile Defense system. Des Browne: Ballistic missile defence (BMD) is an important issue
for NATO and it will be discussed at the Bucharest summit. Further work
is required to assess the political and military implications of BMD on
the alliance; it is too early to judge the outcome of this work. EC Defence Policy, Written Answers, 6 Mar 2008 : Column 2785WMrs. Curtis-Thomas: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what the EU's policy is on responding to a threat of an attack against Europe using missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Howells: We consider the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
the forum to develop a collective defence policy on how to respond to
the threat of attack against Europe using missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. The EU Lisbon Treaty states "commitments and co-operation
in this area (European defence) shall be consistent with commitments under
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those states which
are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence
and the forum for its implementation". Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 6 Mar 2008 : Column 2707WMrs. Curtis-Thomas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his policy is on the possible development of a European research and development programme for technical and industrial capabilities related to the US missile defence system. Des Browne: The UK continues to work with European allies, through
NATO, on a number of research and development programmes related to missile
defence. Ballistic Missile Defence, Written Answers, 5 Mar 2008 : Column 2553WMrs. Curtis-Thomas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the implications of missile defence systems for the UK's defence industry. Des Browne: UK defence industry has the opportunity to participate
in the work to develop missile defence systems. The MOD supports this
effort through the work of the UK Missile Defence Centre, which provides
assistance and advice to UK industry. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 © 2008 The Acronym Institute. |