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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 Westminster ParliamentKey to Column Numbering
Chemical & Biological Weapons
South Africa: Chemical and Biological Warfare, Written Answers, 12 May 2008 : Column 1403WAndrew Mackinlay: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the Answer of 7 May 2008 to Question 192701, on South Africa: chemical and biological warfare, whether the evidence given to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission considered in the investigation included evidence that Wouter Basson used a house in the home counties of England to meet UK scientists and to circumvent the sanctions regime against South Africa; and if he will make a statement. Dr. Howells: As stated in my reply to my hon. Friend on 7 May
2008, Official Report, column 935W, UK investigations initiated following
allegations of assistance to South Africa's Project Coast, considered
information from a variety of sources including evidence given to the
Truth and Reconciliation Committee. I can neither confirm nor deny details
of specific evidence considered during these investigations. Chemical Weapons Convention: Correction to Oral Answer, House of Lords, Written Answers, 29 Apr 2008 : Column WS3The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Malloch-Brown): On 18 March 2008, during the debate on the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), in response to a question by the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, I said that, "it is certainly correct that there are toxic chemicals that fall outside the so-called schedule 1 to this convention. One of the issues for review and for any successor convention after 2012 will be to make sure that there is a more comprehensive list of such chemicals".-[Official Report, 18/3/08; col. 136.]. I should have said that the CWC's prohibitions apply to all toxic chemicals and their precursors, unless they are intended for permitted purposes and provided that they are of a type and in a quantity consistent with such purposes. The schedules of chemicals do not limit the scope of the convention's prohibitions; they provide only a framework for the application of verification measures. Reinforcing the comprehensive nature of the CWC has been a key UK objective for the Second Review Conference and the subject of one of the UK's four working papers submitted to the preparatory working group. It has also been a priority for the EU as set out in the EU's common position 2007/469/CFSP of 28 June 2007. The CWC is a key component in the disarmament and non-proliferation agreements
and regimes and will remain so after the 2012 deadline for completion
of destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. We have already started
to consider how the CWC will need to adapt to face future challenges and
see this as a key issue to be addressed in the years ahead. Armed Forces: Chemical Weapons, House of Lords, Written Answers, 21 Apr 2008 : Column WA215Lord Avebury asked Her Majesty's Government: Whether they will propose that the role of incapacitating biochemical weapons in military operations and law enforcement be discussed at the Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness
Taylor of Bolton): The issues surrounding so-called incapacitating
biochemical weapons and their potential impact on the Chemical Weapons
Convention are highly complex and most states party to the convention
have yet to express clear ideas on the implications for the convention.
The UK believes that thorough study of the complex technical and legal
implications is required and therefore does not consider the issue ready
for detailed discussion at the second review conference. But we are willing
to examine, with other states party to the convention, the options for
taking forward work after the conference, if it appears that consensus
on how to move forward seems achievable, and if a suitable mechanism and
scope for discussions can be decided. Chemical Weapons Convention, Written Statement, 31 Mar 2008 : Column 31WSThe Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr. Bob Ainsworth): The UK's
chemical protection programme is designed to protect against the use of
chemical weapons. Such a programme is permitted by the Chemical Weapons
Convention, with which the United Kingdom is fully compliant. Under the
terms of the convention, we are required to provide information annually
to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In
accordance with the Government's commitment to openness. I am placing
a copy of the summary that has been provided to the organisation outlining
the UK's chemical protection programme in 2007 in the Library of the House. Chemical Weapons Convention, House of Lords Debate, 18 Mar 2008 : Column 135Lord Archer of Sandwell asked Her Majesty's Government: Whether they have any proposals to make to the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention to address questions of non-compliance. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Malloch-Brown): My Lords, the United Kingdom will participate actively in the Second Review Conference. Compliance is central to the effectiveness of the convention and we take seriously the need to ensure it. The UK has focused on strengthening mechanisms to detect and deter non-compliance, including maintaining the credibility of the verification system. The EU has agreed its priorities for the conference, including issues of compliance as set out in its common position. Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, I thank my noble friend, and not just conventionally, for that encouraging Answer, but does he agree that, precisely because the convention is drafted carefully and comprehensively, it has been partly overtaken by time? Does he agree, for example, that proliferation no longer consists exclusively of passing on weapons to other people but could consist of transferring details of a technological process that could be fairly simply implemented? Will he assure the House that the preparatory work for this conference, both governmental and non-governmental, will be reflected in discussions if not in technical amendments? Lord Malloch-Brown: My Lords, I assure my noble friend that there has been extensive consultation with non-governmental organisations and academics and that the preparatory conference is being led by a distinguished British diplomat, our ambassador in the Netherlands, so I hope that his concerns are being well addressed. Lord
Howell of Guildford: My Lords, does
the Minister accept that this is one convention that has had some success
over its 16 or 17-year life? Will he also accept that, if the British
Government decide to press really hard at the forthcoming April conference
both for a speeding up of the destruction of chemical
arsenals, particularly in Russia and the United States, and for more effective
compliance in China, Russia, Iran, Sudan and one or two other countries,
he will have my full backing and that of this side of the House? Lord Malloch-Brown: My Lords, I am very happy to accept a success. The noble Lord is right: there are 183 parties to this convention, only five countries with declared stockpiles and a very robust mechanism for investigating others about which there might be suspicions. We hope that, by 2012, all stockpiles will have been destroyed. There are just one or two countries that may not meet that deadline, but in general he is right that this is a success. Lord Lee of Trafford: My Lords, an article in yesterday's Times highlighted the current suffering of more than 55,000 Iranians as the result of Saddam Hussein's ghastly chemical attacks 20 years ago during the Iran-Iraq war. Today's Iraq is one of only seven countries that have neither signed nor acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Does the Minister agree that US/UK pressure should be applied to ensure that Iraq signs up to the convention without delay? Lord Malloch-Brown: My Lords, I certainly agree with the noble Lord and I believe, although I will have to confirm it in writing, that Iraq is one of those countries that are preparing to sign. Lord Judd: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, in view of the immense significance of this type of potential warfare and therefore of the convention, it is crucial that at the Second Review Conference we should be represented by senior ministerial leadership, thereby not only engaging at a ministerial level in the conference but demonstrating that the Government are giving this issue the priority that it deserves? What have the Government been able to do to raise awareness in the chemical industry in this country about the significance of the CWC? Lord Malloch-Brown: My Lords, we have been trying to raise the level of ministerial attendance at such conferences to signal our support. We are concentrating in the discussions here on seeking the opinions of the industry among others and on communicating to it the importance of compliance. I very much take my noble friend's point on promoting and advertising the goals of this treaty to the industry. Lord Walton of Detchant: My Lords, does the Minister agree that in the further consideration of this convention it should be borne in mind that toxicology is not in every respect an exact science? From time to time, certain chemical substances are released into the environment that may not at first sight appear to be chemical weapons; they may be thought to be innocuous in very small doses but they may be very harmful to the individual in larger doses. Will that point be taken into account in considering the effects of this convention? Lord
Malloch-Brown: My Lords, it is certainly
correct that there are toxic chemicals
that fall outside so-called schedule 1 to this convention. One of the
issues for review and for any successor convention after 2012 will be
to make sure that there is a more comprehensive list of such chemicals. Lord Anderson of Swansea: My Lords, will Her Majesty's Government bring forward specific measures relating to emissions problems that have arisen since the last review conference, such as those on dual use and definitions? Also, I did not quite catch the earlier answer: will we be represented by a Minister? Lord Malloch-Brown: My Lords, on the latter point, I honestly cannot say at this point, because I am not aware of the dates of the conference, although I suspect that I would be the Minister involved. We will certainly make every effort. On the noble Lord's first question, the whole point of this review procedure, or preparation procedure for the review, is to catch up with changes that require further investigation. We support the scientific advisory board, as well as training courses, financially, to try to keep the convention current. Lord Elton: My Lords, how many of the seven countries that have not signed the convention have significant stockpiles of chemical weapons? How many of the 183 countries that have signed the convention have significant derogations from it? Lord
Malloch-Brown: My Lords, on the 12 that have
not signed, I am afraid that I cannot give the noble Lord that answer
immediately, but I shall return to it. Of the 183 that have signed, five
still have stockpiles, and a further country has destroyed its stockpile. South Africa: Chemical and Biological Warfare, Written Answers, 17 Mar 2008 : Column 866WAndrew Mackinlay: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the Answer of 27 February 2008, Official Report, columns 1707-08W, on South Africa: chemical and biological warfare, at which conferences and on what occasions UK officials and scientists had contact with South African counterparts who were subsequently identified as having worked on Project Coast; and if he will make a statement. Dr. Howells: The information requested is not held centrally.
UK officials and scientists would routinely have been present at a number
of types of meetings and conferences, including those on the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention, the negotiations leading to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, chemical/biological defence and public health issues,
at which South African counterparts may have been present. To identify
each occasion where UK officials or scientists had contact with relevant
South African counterparts would incur disproportionate cost. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 © 2008 The Acronym Institute. |