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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 Westminster ParliamentKey to Column Numbering
British Policy on Iran
Iran: Export Credit Guarantees, Written Answers, 30 Jun 2008 : Column 674WMr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether it is UK policy to secure the multilateral withdrawal of export credit provision to Iran by European Union countries. David Miliband: United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1803, adopted on 3 March 2008, "calls upon all States to exercise vigilance
in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support
for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits". The first
step will be a new EU Common Position implementing the provisions of UNSCR
1803, including those on export credits. I will inform the House when
this has been adopted. We are also discussing with EU partners the scope
for further action in this area. The UK's Export Credit Guarantee Department
has stopped processing applications for new export credit cover to Iran. Iran: Sanctions, Written Answers, 30 Jun 2008 : Column 674WMr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the answer of 6 June 2008, Official Report, column 1197W, on Iran: sanctions, what UK policy is on (a) monitoring the activities of Iranian financial institutions and (b) a European ban on the operations of Iranian banks Melli and Meillat; and if he will make a statement. David Miliband: The UK has implemented the provisions in previous
UN Security Council resolutions that relate to named Iranian banks. HM
Treasury and the Financial Services Authority monitor the activities of
these and other Iranian institutions closely. Building on UN Security
Council Resolution 1803, which was adopted in March, we are pressing for
a new Common Position to implement it at EU level, including the provision
on increased vigilance over the activities of Iranian financial institutions,
including Banks Melli and Meillat. On 23 June the EU listed more Iranian
entities, including Bank Melli, which imposed an EU-wide freeze of their
funds and other financial assets. Iran: Nuclear Power, Written Answers, 25 Jun 2008 : Column 371WMr. Quentin Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of Russia's involvement in developing the Bushehr nuclear reactor in Iran. Dr. Howells: In 1976 the Shah of Iran contracted with a German company to build two nuclear power reactors at Bushehr. Before the first was completed, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 overthrew the Shah and led to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For many years construction was halted. After the Iran/Iraq War, Russia agreed in 1995 to fit one of their VVER-1000 power reactors into the original reactor building. This reactor, Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant-1, is now nearing completion. The Russians have secured a contract with Iran to supply the first 10 years worth of fresh fuel for the reactor and are willing to supply fuel for its lifetime. The Iranian authorities announced that the first shipment of low-enriched uranium from Russia was delivered to Bushehr on 17 December 2007. Mr. Quentin Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the Iranian response to UN Security Council Resolution 1803. Dr. Howells: There has been no formal response from Iran to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1803. The 3 June deadline in UNSCR 1803 for Iran to 25 Jun 2008 : Column 372W comply with the Security Council's demands has now passed. Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities, or granted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the greater access it seeks, as the IAEA Director General's latest report made clear. A generous engagement package was delivered to Tehran by Javier Solana and five E3+3 Political Directors on 14 June. We hope for a rapid, positive response. If this is not forthcoming, we will push forward on new, tougher sanctions, including a new UNSCR. Mr. Quentin Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent assessment he has made of the state of the Iranian nuclear programme. Mr. Jim Murphy: Dr Mohammad El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported on 26 May that Iran had failed to suspend enrichment-related activities, had made no progress on the transparency measures the UN Security Council (UNSC) and IAEA have long called for and had failed to answer the IAEA's questions relating to studies with a possible military dimension. Dr El Baradei said that these studies were a "matter of serious concern". On 8 April, Iranian President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would increase the number of centrifuges from 3,000 to 6,000. Dr El Baradei has criticised this development. The Government agree with him that it is essential that Iran suspends its enrichment-related activities in accordance with its obligations to the UNSC. Unless Iran does so, the international community will have no confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is of an entirely civilian nature. We have called on Iran to provide answers to the IAEA's questions immediately. There is no justification for further delay. Mr. Quentin Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what his latest assessment is of the threat posed to regional security by Iran’s nuclear programme. Dr. Howells: Iran’s nuclear programme, which continues in breach
of four UN Security Council Resolutions, threatens the stability of the
region. By continuing with an enrichment programme for which we can see
no apparent civilian purpose and in the face of clear international concern,
Iran is doing little to address the serious lack of confidence in its
assertions that its intentions are exclusively peaceful—a fact that the
International Atomic Energy Agency continues to say it cannot verify.
We have a close and ongoing dialogue with our regional allies on the issue
and will be working with them in the coming months to increase the pressure
on Iran to comply with its international obligations. Iran (Nuclear Programme), Oral Questions, 24 June 2008: Column 146Mr. Andrew Mackay (Bracknell) (Con): What recent assessment he has made of developments in the Iranian nuclear programme; and if he will make a statement. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (David Miliband): Dr. el-Baradei, the International Atomic Energy Agency director general, reported on Iran’s nuclear programme on 26 May. I spoke to him last week about his report. He confirmed that Iran had failed to suspend enrichment-related activities; had made no progress on transparency measures, for which the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA had called; and had failed to answer the IAEA’s questions relating to studies with a possible military dimension. He said that these studies were a “matter of serious concern”, and they are the subject of continuing IAEA investigation. Mr. Mackay: Why did the Prime Minister say on 16 June, after his meeting with President George Bush, that that day he would take action that would immediately freeze the assets of Iran’s biggest bank, Bank Melli, when many days later that clearly still has not happened? David Miliband: I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman says that has not happened, because there was political agreement at the Foreign Affairs Council that I attended last Monday, and yesterday the formal technical procedure that froze the assets of Bank Melli went through the European Union. I would have thought that that would be welcomed in all parts of the House. Mr. Douglas Hogg (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con): The Foreign Secretary will have seen the reports over the weekend that the Israeli Government were carrying out exercises that suggested a possible long-term intention to attack Iran and her nuclear establishment. Will the Foreign Secretary make every effort to persuade the Israeli Government that such an action would be profoundly unwise? David Miliband: I am very happy to confirm to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that we are 100 per cent. committed to the pursuit of a diplomatic resolution to the problem in respect of Iran’s nuclear intentions, which are, of course, a threat to stability right across the region. There is now an ever wider coalition ready to put pressure on the Iranian regime, and also to try to make clear to the Iranian people that a major offer of economic, cultural and scientific co-operation is waiting for them. The economic malaise that currently afflicts Iran is the result of the choices made by the Iranian Government, but there is an alternative for them, and we are committed to make sure that the sanctions and incentives reflect that. Mr. David Lidington (Aylesbury) (Con): The Foreign Secretary will recall that the Prime Minister promised in his Mansion house speech last November tougher sanctions on oil and gas investment in Iran, and yet only last week in his joint press conference with President Bush, the Prime Minister said: “Action will start today in a new phase of sanctions on oil and gas.” I wonder whether the Foreign Secretary can explain the reasons for this seven-month delay, and does he accept that if Ministers threaten sanctions and then fail to deliver them, all they end up doing is undermining the credibility of any threat this country can make? 24 Jun 2008 : Column 148 David Miliband: I am genuinely sorry that the hon. Gentleman has taken
that tack because actually there is agreement across the House that a
sanctions and incentives dual track is the right approach to Iran. There
is agreement—from Iran to the United States, to this country and to any
independent observer—that the sanctions are having an effect on the Iranian
economy. The Bank Melli decision has been implemented, as of yesterday,
and UN resolution 1803 has been fully implemented and the further sanctions
to which he referred. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency
discussions were completed only in May, there is the report to the IAEA
board, and, as I said, UN sanctions resolution 1803 is now to be implemented.
There should be a shared commitment to see those fully in force. The fact
that, side by side with those measures, there is a revived offer to Iran
is a good thing, not a bad thing, and I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman
has tried to create division about that. Iranian Nuclear Programme, Oral Questions, 13 May 2008 : Column 1180Mr. David Jones (Clwyd, West) (Con): If he will make a statement on the Iranian nuclear programme. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (David Miliband): Iran continues to enrich uranium and carry out heavy water-related projects in defiance of four UN Security Council resolutions requesting it to stop. We urge Iran to co-operate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency, to implement the additional protocol that it has signed with the agency, to respond to the serious questions that the agency has put to Iran on weaponisation, and of course to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. On 2 May, I chaired a meeting of my E3 plus 3 colleagues to agree a refreshed offer to Iran as part of our dual track strategy to persuade Iran to comply with its international obligations. That will soon be transmitted to the Government of Iran. Mr. Jones: Much of the west's knowledge of the Iranian nuclear programme is the product of information passed to it by the People's Mujahedeen Organisation of Iran, most recently in respect of the nuclear warhead facility at Khojir. Given the historic helpfulness of the PMOI to the west and given also the trenchantly expressed judgment of the Court of Appeal last week, can the Foreign Secretary please say when the Government will make a statement to the House as to the continued proscription of the organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000? [Interruption.] David Miliband: We were deeply disappointed by the result, given the well documented history of terrorist attacks involving the MEK. I am happy to give details. It explicitly claimed responsibility for a number of serious acts of terrorism on Iranian interests for a number of years. [Interruption.] It has never publicly given up violence and gave up its arms only in the face of overwhelming military might in Iraq in 2003. [Interruption.] None the less, my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) will be pleased to hear that we will of course abide by the ruling of the court, and I understand that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will lay an order before Parliament in the next few weeks to take forward that judgment. Mike Gapes (Ilford, South) (Lab/Co-op): The Foreign Secretary is aware that the Foreign Affairs Committee published a report a few months ago on the situation on 13 May 2008 : Column 1181 Iran. In that report we expressed concern that the current strategy to prevent the Iranian regime from developing a nuclear weapon is not very successful. Does the Foreign Secretary share the Committee's view that on present trends Iran could have such a breakout capability in about seven or eight years? What will the Government, with their international partners, do over the coming months and years to make sure that that does not happen? David Miliband: I am obviously not going to comment on intelligence-ours or others'-in respect of the timeline for the Iranian nuclear programme. However, the sense of importance that came through in the Foreign Affairs Committee report is shared by the Government and by our partners as well. Not only the three European countries and the United States, but Russia and China are part of a coalition that sees the dangers of a nuclear arms race in the middle east, which all sane people would see as a danger. Our quarrel is not with the people of Iran, which is a country of huge civilisation and education; in the end, our quarrel is not with Iran's rights under the non-proliferation regime, which ultimately include the right to civilian nuclear power. Our quarrel is with the responsibilities, or the lack of responsibility, exercised by the regime. That is why it is important that we take forward at each stage the dual track strategy. There is the offer to Iran of economic, scientific and cultural co-operation, but if it refuses to co-operate with the international community, it is right that sanctions be in place. Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington and Chelsea) (Con): Does the Foreign Secretary agree that last year's United States national intelligence estimate that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 was deeply misleading, because it referred only to warhead production? Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the real threat is from the uranium enrichment programme, which, far from slowing down, has been accelerated by the Iranians in recent months? Will he do all in his power to ensure that that point is fully understood, both by public opinion in this country and at the United Nations? David Miliband: I do not know whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman is quoting from my article in the Financial Times that appeared after the national intelligence estimate came out, but I certainly echo entirely what he has said. A very important confusion was created by the national intelligence estimate report about the difference between, on the one hand, weaponisation, and on the other, the three processes-above all, the uranium enrichment process-that are important for building a nuclear weapon. It is precisely the dangers of the expanded uranium enrichment programme that have motivated successive United Nations Security Council resolutions that have demanded the suspension of that programme. Last year, the E3 plus 3 put forward a proposal for a "freeze for freeze"-a freeze on sanctions in response to a freeze on the uranium enrichment programme. We are refreshing our offer, but are absolutely clear that underlying it is a determination to ensure that Iran fulfils its responsibilities as well as exerts its rights under the NPT. 13 May 2008 : Column 1182 Mr. Quentin Davies (Grantham and Stamford) (Lab): What is the best estimate available to my right hon. Friend on the number of centrifuges available to the Iranians for uranium enrichment at present? Where are those centrifuges coming from? David Miliband: I am not going to comment on our estimate of the number of centrifuges. My hon. Friend will have seen President Ahmadinejad's claim-I repeat that it is a claim-that 3,000 centrifuges have been increased to 6,000 centrifuges. As I say, that is his claim. I am afraid that I am not able to go into any details on their origins, but obviously we are working across all parts of the international community to staunch the flow not only of equipment, but of personnel and ideas. Mr. Michael Ancram (Devizes) (Con): Following on from the question asked by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), may I ask the Foreign Secretary whether he sets more store by the United States intelligence community's assessment of Iran's nuclear capability, to which he has referred, or by the very much more bullish assessment made by Israeli intelligence, on which he had a report this week? David Miliband: What is bullish and what is bearish in this context I will not go into. What I rely on are British intelligence estimates. That is the right basis for policy- [ Interruption. ] I am very, very surprised to see Opposition Members querying the exceptional quality of British intelligence. [ Interruption. ] I might expect the Liberal Democrats to denigrate the work of public servants, but I will not do that. What is important is that the international community is united in recognising that the problem is serious and that it is not a question of pursuing a vendetta against the people of Iran, or even the regime of Iran. We are seeking a change in behaviour, not a change in the regime. It is right that we devote ourselves diplomatically to achieving that end. Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab): The centrifuges are based on a design stolen by A.Q. Khan; that is how the Iranians acquired them. May I clarify something with my right hon. Friend? Are the use of the centrifuges or the lack of inspection agreements at the core of the problem? How is he proposing to change the inspection regime to ensure that although Iran can continue with a nuclear power programme if it wants to, nuclear weapons conventions will be protected? David Miliband: There are three charges against the Iranian regime: first, in relation to its refusal to comply with UN Security Council resolutions in respect of uranium enrichment; secondly, in respect of IAEA demands for full information on previous programmes, not just the P1 but the P2 programme-I apologise for going into the detail-and thirdly, there is the question of the additional protocol, which the IAEA has demanded that Iran lives up to. These are not my demands; they are demands that have been made by the international community, unanimously on successive occasions, and by the International Atomic Energy Authority-[Hon. Members: "Agency."] I am sorry; I 13 May 2008 : Column 1183 am grateful for the correction. Living within the bounds of UN and IAEA requirements is what we ask of the Government of Iran. I should also add that we are asking nothing more of them than to live within boundaries that are set for every other country; that is a point that we can all do well to remind people of, in Iran and more widely. Mr. David Lidington (Aylesbury) (Con): Can the Foreign Secretary give us a clear assurance that if Iran were now to reject the new offer that he has described to the House, the sanctions against Iranian oil and gas, which the Prime Minister promised as long ago as last November, will finally be imposed? Does he agree, too, that with Lebanese Ministers alleging that Iranian republican guards have been deployed and are fighting on the streets of Beirut, the need for effective pressure on the Iranian regime really is urgent? David Miliband: I certainly reaffirm our commitment to take this up at European level. We said that we would pursue these actions at the European level, because that is the right place to do it, and we will certainly continue to do so. It is worth reporting to the House that the latest figures for the UK's action alone show that £513 million of Iranian assets have been frozen, and EU trade with Iran is down 34 per cent. in the year to March 2007. In respect of the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question, which
takes us into new territory, all I can say is that I spoke to the Prime
Minister of Lebanon on Friday, discussed the very serious situation there,
and expressed my total support for his Government in seeking to maintain
the integrity and democratic legitimacy of the Government of Lebanon.
I hope that in topical questions I may be able to say more about last
night's phone call of the Friends of Lebanon group, which involves 12
countries around the world, mainly from the region. I will be happy to
report on that to the House. Iran: Sanctions, Written Answers, 24 Apr 2008 : Column 2196WMr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the UK has taken to comply with the new sanctions provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1803 on Iran. David Miliband: The UK has implemented UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008) in the following ways: The UK Border Agency and HM Treasury have added the individuals and entities listed in the resolution to their consolidated UK lists of individuals and entities subject to travel bans and assets freezes. Through Common Positions 2007/140/CFSP and 2001/246/CFSP the EU has already banned the supply of goods and technology listed by the Security Council in Resolution 1803 (2008) to Iran, as well export credit insurance for trade concerning the supply of items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime lists. The Security Council has called upon all states to exercise vigilance over the activities of all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad. On 4 March 2008 HM Treasury published a notice on its website alerting the UK financial sector to this provision. The notice is available at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/9/C/ HM Revenue and Customs already conducts routine checks on international
cargo according to specific criteria based on risk and intelligence. Iran: Sanctions, Written Answers, 22 Apr 2008 : Column 1972WMr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the Government will be encouraging the European Union to take in light of the agreement on UN Security Council Resolution 1803 on 3 March 2008; and if he will make a statement. Dr. Howells: Following UN Security Council resolution 1803, we are pressing for further EU measures in the form of a new Common Position and additional listings of entities and individuals that meet the criteria laid out in the existing Common Positions. A range of proposals are under consideration, including further financial and other measures and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will inform the House when these have been agreed. Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when he expects additional EU sanctions on Iran to be agreed; and if he will make a statement. Dr. Howells: On the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1803,
my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and our officials are working
closely with EU partners to design and adopt further EU measures as a
matter of urgency. Discussions are continuing in Brussels. My right hon.
Friend the Foreign Secretary will inform the House of the outcome of those
negotiations as soon as he is able to do so. Iran: Banks, Written Answers, 11 Mar 2008 : Column 330WMr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) what steps will be taken by UK authorities as a result of the inclusion of Iranian banks Melli and Mellat in UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008); and if he will make a statement; (2) what steps the Government plan to take to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in the UK with all banks domiciled in Iran, as required in UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008). [192786] Jane Kennedy: I have been asked to reply. In October 2007 HM Treasury, following agreement by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), advised the financial sector to consider applying increased scrutiny and due diligence to transactions associated with Iran due to deficiencies in Iran's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes. We reiterated this on 29 February 2008 following a second FATF statement. On 4 March 2008 HM Treasury published a notice on its website again advising
caution and alerting the UK financial sector to the financial measures
in UN Security Council Resolution 1803, which mentions Banks Melli and
Sanderat. The notice is available at The UK also monitors the activities of UK financial institutions with all banks domiciled in Iran, in accordance with its international commitments. 11 Mar 2008 : Column 331W Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment has been made of the possible links between Iranian banks Melli and Mellat, including their branches and subsidiaries abroad, and activities contributing to proliferation sensitive activities in Iran; and if he will make a statement. Jane Kennedy: I have been asked to reply. Banks Melli and Saderat, rather than Melli and Mellat, are mentioned in the text of UN Security Council Resolution 1803. The UK shares the concerns of the UN Security Council about Bank Melli's and Bank Saderat's links to the Iranian nuclear and missile programmes. The Security Council has called upon all states to exercise vigilance over the banks to prevent Iran from proliferating nuclear sensitive material. The UK continues to monitor Banks Melli and Saderat in accordance with its international commitments. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/ Global Security Iran, Foreign Affairs Committee Report, 2 March 2008Conclusion and RecommendationsIran's Nuclear Programme 1. We conclude that, whilst Iran's suspension of an active nuclear weapons programme since 2003 is welcome, its continued enrichment activities and questions over its previous conduct mean its potential to develop such a programme remains. We further conclude that although technological constraints are likely to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, if that is its intention, in the near future, there is nevertheless a strong possibility that it could establish a 'breakout' nuclear weapons capability by 2015. (Paragraph 23) 2. We conclude that the E3/EU was too slow to build on Iran's suspension of enrichment activities. By failing to present a compelling offer to Tehran before the ascendancy of President Ahmadinejad, the E3/EU made reaching an agreement a much more challenging task. (Paragraph 31) 3. We conclude that Iran has a legal obligation established by a number of Security Council resolutions to halt its enrichment activities. We also welcome the offers of enriched uranium to Iran by Russia, deliveries of which have already commenced, and the international community. These offers are significant. We further conclude that Iran must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. (Paragraph 39) 4. We conclude that the E3+3's diplomacy over Iran's nuclear programme is currently a long way from successfully achieving all its goals. We acknowledge, however, that its establishment has been useful in maintaining some degree of international unity towards Iran, thus adding to the diplomatic pressure on the Iranian authorities. (Paragraph 57) The Regional Dimension 5. We conclude that the call by President Ahmadinejad for the destruction of the State of Israel and his provocative hosting of the Holocaust denial conference were deplorable and we condemn these actions unreservedly. (Paragraph 63) 6. We strongly oppose President Ahmadinejad's policies towards Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories and reaffirm our support for a two-state solution of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state peacefully co-existing with a secure Israel. We conclude that Iran is a malign influence with regard to the prospects for peace in the Middle East. (Paragraph 66) 7. We conclude that the support originating from within Iran for Iraqi insurgents has been responsible for the deaths of coalition troops and is completely unacceptable and reprehensible. We recommend that the Government continues to take a vigorous and proactive approach in intercepting this support. We further recommend that, in its Response to this Report, the Government sets out its latest analysis of the levels of training, weaponry and finance provided by elements within the Iranian regime to Iraqi militants. (Paragraph 74) 8. We conclude that the reports that Taliban insurgents are receiving support from Iran is a matter of very serious concern. Any such assistance is unacceptable, endangers regional stability and can only hinder efforts to establish closer relations between Iran and the international community. As with Iraq, we recommend that the Government continues to take a proactive stance in intercepting any support emanating from within Iran and that in its Response to this Report it sets out its latest analysis of the level and nature of the support being provided by the Iranian regime to Taliban insurgents. We further recommend that the Government supports greater cooperation with Iran on counter-narcotics. (Paragraph 77) 9. We conclude that, should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon, it is very likely to lead to other states in the Middle East developing their own weapon programmes. This domino effect would heighten regional tensions and seriously weaken the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would also seriously undermine any prospect of moves to a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. (Paragraph 82) The Domestic Dimension 10. We conclude that Iran is a complex and diverse society at present governed by a theocratic regime. Iran's quasi-democratic political system is not fully closed and may lead to reform that will result in a more constructive approach on the nuclear issue. We recommend that the Government should be careful to avoid action that could be manipulated by the hardliners such as President Ahmadinejad to bolster their position against the more pragmatic and reformist elements ahead of his campaign for re-election in 2009. We recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out fully why it has resisted the decisions of both the High Court in the UK and the European Court of Justice that the People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), should no longer be listed as a terrorist organisation. (Paragraph 98) 11. We conclude that Iran's human rights record is shocking. We recommend that the Government presses Iran to remove the death penalty, which includes hanging by strangulation, stoning, flogging and amputation from its statute books. We further recommend that the Government ensures human rights are not treated as a secondary concern to the nuclear issue, and that it underlines to Iran that its poor record in responding to human rights concerns makes it more difficult for the international community to trust its intentions in other fields. (Paragraph 103) Options for the International Community 12. We conclude that the fundamental challenge of Iran's nuclear programme is one of mutual political mistrust—mistrust that is not misplaced on the part of the United States and the European Union. We further conclude that a long-term solution to this crisis will need to go beyond the necessary constraints on Iran's nuclear programme by eventually working towards a wholesale recasting of its relationship with the international community, particularly with the United States and European Union. (Paragraph 109) 13. We conclude that although the sanctions currently in place against Iran act as a disincentive for its nuclear programme, they are not sufficiently robust to coax it into suspending its enrichment. We are concerned that the new political dynamic following the publication of the US National Intelligence Estimate, and underlying differences within the international community, mean future UN and EU sanctions are likely to remain ineffective and may inadvertently help President Ahmadinejad by providing him with a scapegoat for his economic failings. We recommend that the Government in framing its sanctions policy does its utmost to try to preserve unity within the UN Security Council and the EU. (Paragraph 117) 14. We conclude that it seems very unlikely that Iran will accept the demand that it suspend enrichment before substantive talks can begin. It feels it got little reward for its previous suspension, and its present Government has ramped up nationalist feeling on this issue. This stalemate is in no-one's interest but simply pressing for a resumption of Iran-US dialogue without an end to President Ahmadinejad's defiance of UN resolutions will strengthen him and dismay and weaken reformers. We recommend therefore that the Government urges the current US Administration to change its policy and begin to engage directly with Iran on its nuclear programme, as the absence of such engagement has deprived the international community of a significant diplomatic tool. The international community has made clear that if Iran suspends dual use enrichment it can expect cooperation on civilian nuclear power and Condoleezza Rice has said she will meet the Iranians "any time, any place". If this positive offer is accepted then it would become possible to make progress towards a solution. (Paragraph 126) 15. We conclude that the Government is playing a vital role in the E3+3. The UK's diplomatic presence in Iran and its close relationship with the United States put it in a good position to show leadership on this issue. We note the Foreign Secretary has met his Iranian counterpart on several occasions and we recommend that he continues his personal diplomacy and gives consideration to visiting Iran at an early opportunity to push the process forward. (Paragraph 130) 16. We conclude that the publication of the US National Intelligence Estimate has made a military strike against Iran less likely. We remain of the view that such a military strike would be unlikely to succeed and could provoke an extremely violent backlash across the region. We recommend that the Government urges Washington to consider offering a credible security guarantee to Iran if the Iranian Government in turn will offer an equally credible and verifiable guarantee that it will not enter into a nuclear weapons programme and improves its cooperation with the international community in other areas. (Paragraph 140). Full text of the report is available at: Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 © 2008 The Acronym Institute. |