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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 Westminster ParliamentKey to Column Numbering
National Security Strategy
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, Cm 7291, March 2008, ExcerptsNuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction3.10 Sixty years after their invention and almost 40 years after the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear weapons remain potentially the most destructive threat to global security. While the global stockpile has reduced since the Cold War, large arsenals remain. The number of nuclear-armed states has also increased, even if the NPT has helped ensure that fewer states have acquired nuclear weapons than many predicted, and some (for example South Africa and Libya) have abandoned their programmes. North Korea has conducted a test of a nuclear device and tests of ballistic missiles, and Iran continues to pursue nuclear activities in defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council obligations. Both North Korea and Iran are of particular concern because of their attitude to international institutions and treaties, and because of the impact of their activities on stability in regions crucial to global security. But we oppose all proliferation, as undermining our objectives of de-escalation and multilateral disarmament, and increasing the risk of instability in the international system and ultimately the risk of nuclear confrontation. 3.11 We judge that no state currently has both the intent and the capability to pose a direct nuclear threat to the United Kingdom or its vital interests. But we cannot rule out the risk that such a threat will re-emerge over future decades. 3.12 We also monitor: the possibility of nuclear weapons or material or technology (including commercial) falling into the hands of terrorists, who we know have ambitions to acquire it; and the proliferation of the technology behind ballistic missiles, which increases the chance of either new states or non-state actors being able to threaten the United Kingdom directly in the future. 3.13 A number of states retain the ability to produce chemical and biological weapons. Again, we do not judge that they currently pose a direct threat to the United Kingdom, but we will continue to monitor their ability to produce weapons, the development and proliferation of potential delivery mechanisms, and the possibility of material falling into the hands of terrorists... State-led threats to the United Kingdom3.25 Our assessment remains the same as in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review: for the foreseeable future, no state or alliance will have both the intent and the capability to threaten the United Kingdom militarily, either with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or with conventional forces. 3.26 The United Kingdom does, however, remain subject to high levels of covert non-military activity by foreign intelligence organisations. A number of countries continue to devote considerable time and energy to trying to obtain political and economic intelligence, and trying to steal sensitive technology on civilian and military projects. They increasingly combine traditional intelligence methods with new and sophisticated technical attacks, attempting to penetrate computer networks through the internet. 3.27 We also continue to monitor the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism. 3.28 The overall international security landscape has become more complex and unpredictable, and although the probability remains very low, over the longer term we cannot rule out a possible re-emergence of a major state-led threat to the United Kingdom. That could come about through a wider breakdown in the international order, or through the development of, for example, missile technology which rendered irrelevant the distance from a potential enemy, or other forms of threat which render distance irrelevant, for example state-sponsored cyber-attack.... The interdependence of threats, risks and drivers3.53 There are a number of common strands running through the threats, risks and drivers outlined in previous sections. The first is their trans-national nature; the second, the prominence of non-state actors. In part those result from the absence of an immediate state-led threat to the United Kingdom, which leads us rightly to focus elsewhere; and in part they reflect wider trends, including globalisation. The third theme is their interdependence. Understanding those interdependencies is critical to adapting our responses, for example: the potential links between terrorism and organised crime (for example in Afghanistan); the ability of both to subvert governments or economies and cause state failure; the links between state failure and regional conflict, or between nuclear proliferation and regional conflict; and the link between the strength of the rules-based international system and the potential re-emergence of a major state-led threat to the United Kingdom. Countering the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction4.16 Our approach to the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is fully integrated across Government, with cooperation across departments and agencies including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Home Office, the security and intelligence agencies, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). It links to other national security activity, including our wider foreign policy efforts to reduce tensions in regions where there is a risk of conflict that could lead to the use of such weapons, such as the Middle East and south Asia; and to counter-terrorism. Terrorist networks have made no secret of their desire to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. We have a comprehensive strategy to try to stop them succeeding. 4.17 Our approach to proliferation reflects our commitment to act early to reduce future threats, our commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based international system, and our willingness to work with partners beyond government, including the private sector. It is based around four strands: – Dissuade states from acquiring, developing, and contributing to the spread of WMD, and related materials and expertise. – Detect attempts by states, and terrorists, to develop or acquire this capability. – Deny access to WMD and the necessary materials, equipment, technology, and expertise to develop them, while promoting commerce and technological development for peaceful purposes. – Defend our country, our citizens, our Armed Forces and our strategic interests from the threats posed by proliferation. 4.18 In all those strands, we will focus especially on failed and failing states, countries that pose a direct threat to our core values, and regions facing security challenges. 4.19 Dissuade includes: continuing to support and enforce targeted UN and EU sanctions against states not complying with their obligations, while holding out the prospect of improved economic and political relations if those obligations are met. Specifically, we will continue to support the ‘E3+3’ process (France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus China, Russia and the United States) in relation to Iran, and the Six-Party Talks in relation to North Korea. We will press for early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, including completion of its verification system; seek agreement to start negotiations without pre-conditions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; and continue to support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the international community’s approach. In the run up to the 2010 NPT review conference, we will lead the international effort to accelerate disarmament among possessor states, in pursuit of our objective of a negotiated elimination of all nuclear weapons. We have offered to host a technical conference for the five NPT Nuclear Weapons States on the verification of nuclear disarmament. We will also continue to encourage the United States and Russia to see their current bilateral discussions as an opportunity for further reductions. Our own plans to make a further 20% reduction in our operationally available warheads to fewer than 160, less than half the planned level in 1997 – which we announced alongside our 2006 decision to maintain our deterrent – are now complete. 4.20 Detect includes: identifying, collecting and assessing information on attempts by proliferator states and terrorists to develop, acquire or use CBRN weapons; supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), other relevant international agencies, and their inspection regimes; and using our security, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to target proliferation networks and financing. An important element of our ability to deter state-sponsored terrorism is our capability to determine the source of material employed in any nuclear device. We will retain and strengthen our worldleading forensic capability in this area and we will also continue to work to strengthen international expertise in this field. 4.21 Deny includes: working to strengthen control regimes on proliferation-sensitive materials, principally through the tightening of international export controls, but also strengthening the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, and ensuring universal implementation of relevant conventions such as the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; strengthening the capacities of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; and pushing hard for early agreement on a new IAEA-led system including a uranium enrichment bond to help states secure fuel for new civil nuclear power programmes, while minimising the risk of proliferation. We will continue to provide assistance through the Global Threat Reduction Programme to the most vulnerable countries where nuclear material is held, notably in the former Soviet Union. 4.22 Defend includes: maintaining our independent nuclear deterrent, based on our 2006 assessment that we cannot rule out a nuclear threat to the United Kingdom re-emerging over the next 50 years. We will continue to equip our Armed Forces to operate in a CBRN environment, and maintain our capability to deter states from directly sponsoring terrorists. 4.23 We adopt a similar integrated, multilateral approach to tackling chemical and biological weapons. We will work to strengthen international conventions and to press possessor states to meet the agreed 2012 deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons; strengthen the international verification regime; work with experts to minimise the risk of misuse of commercial material; and seek to reduce the risk of CBRN material, including commercial material, falling into the hands of failed and failing states or terrorists, through strengthening codes of conduct and export control regimes, and improving the international monitoring architecture. Countering the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction – future priorities include:
4.67 On defence, in 2006 we decided to maintain our independent nuclear deterrent because, while we are strongly committed to multilateral nuclear disarmament and to the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we cannot rule out a threat to the United Kingdom involving nuclear weapons re-emerging over the next 50 years. 4.68 To help mitigate the threat of weapons of mass destruction, we welcome US plans to place further missile defence assets in Europe to provide cover for allies. We already contribute to ballistic missile early warning and regularly discuss continuing support with the United States. We are also working closely with allies on the development of NATO missile defence options. We strongly support efforts to include Russia through a joint regional missile defence architecture, not least to provide reassurance on the defensive nature and intent of that capability. Tackling competition for energy and building energy security4.89 Our energy strategy also includes diversifying the sources of primary
fuels and the routes by which they can be imported. The United Kingdom
gas market is in the process of investing £10 billion in a new gas import
and storage infrastructure. It also includes shifting to a low-carbon
economy, both in the United Kingdom and across the world: promoting policies
to improve energy efficiency; increasing supplies from renewable sources;
and putting a value on carbon emissions, enabling low-carbon technologies
to compete with other forms of energy production. At home, we are also
encouraging investment in nuclear facilities (although this has security
implications of its own). National Security Strategy, Statement by the Prime Minister, 19 March 2008The Prime Minister (Mr. Gordon Brown): 19 Mar 2008 : Column 926 I can tell the House that Britain will be at the forefront of diplomatic action on nuclear weapons control and reduction, offering a new bargain to non-nuclear powers. On the one hand, we will help them, and we have proposed the creation of a new international system to help non-nuclear states to acquire the new sources of energy that they need, including through our proposed global enrichment bond, and we are today inviting interested countries to an international conference on these important themes later this year. In return, we will seek agreement on tougher controls aimed at reducing weapons and preventing proliferation—first, by ending the stalemates on the fissile material cut-off treaty and the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and, secondly, by achieving, after 2010, a more robust implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty with the aim of accelerating disarmament among possessor states, preventing proliferation and, ultimately, freeing the world from nuclear weapons. And, as a new priority to meet the dangers both of proliferation to new states and of material falling into the hands of terrorists, we propose not only tougher action against potential proliferators such as Iran but new action against suppliers. We are seeking to strengthen export control regimes and build a more effective forensic nuclear capability in order to determine and expose the true source of material employed in any nuclear device. Having already reduced the number of our operationally available warheads by 20 per cent. and made our expertise available for the verifiable elimination of warheads, I can confirm that we, Britain, are ready to play our part in further disarmament. 19 Mar 2008 : Column 937 Tony Lloyd (Manchester, Central) (Lab): I very strongly welcome the parts in my right hon. Friend's statement about nuclear weapons, not least because the terrorists' capacity to obtain them is a serious one. In the same vein, does he recognise that biological and chemical weapons possibly pose an even bigger threat? It is probably easier for terrorists to obtain access to those weapons because of the nature of them. Will he give the same urgency to dealing with chemical and biological weapons—the so-called “poor man's nuclear weapons?” The Prime Minister: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who takes a huge interest in these matters having been a Minister at the Foreign Office. He rightly says that although I emphasised in my statement the measures that we wish to take to promote nuclear disarmament, references are also made in the national security strategy document to the dangers and risks posed by chemical and biological weapons. He is right to say that the dangers of those weapons falling into the hands of potential terrorists mean that we have to examine not only the owners of those weapons but who is supplying them. We now have excellent ability to do post-fact detection of who the supplier is, which should enable us to locate the suppliers of chemical, biological and nuclear weapon parts and take strong action against them. That is an important part of the national security strategy that we have published.
Mr. Nick Clegg (Sheffield, Hallam) (LD): ... The Prime Minister has in the past talked about drawing red lines in Brussels. I wonder whether the time has now come for him also to draw red lines in our relationship with Washington. Why, for instance, has he entered into a secret deal with the United States 19 Mar 2008 : Column 934 Administration to base George Bush's “son of star wars” missile defence system on British soil? Does he seriously think that that enhances our national security? The Prime Minister: ... I have to correct the right hon. Gentleman on one or two issues. The ballistic missile defence system is for the Czech Republic and Poland, not the United Kingdom. The European Union does not have an official role in foreign and security policy; it is an intergovernmental organisation, in part for dealing with defence and security policy. He should understand that that is how the European countries interact for the preservation of security, and that that is why NATO is so important—and also why the Bucharest summit in the next few days is so important. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 © 2008 The Acronym Institute. |