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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 Westminster ParliamentKey to Column Numbering
Atomic Weapons Establisments & Nuclear Transport
AWE Burghfield: Finance, Written Anwers, 30 Jun 2008 : Column 610WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how the cost of AWE Burghfield’s operations in 2007-08 was apportioned in the Defence budget. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The full costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment
are funded from the Defence budget. For 2007-08, most of those costs were
apportioned through Defence Equipment and Support, with a small proportion
allocated through the Central Top Level Budget for Ministry of Defence
police activities. AWE Burghfield: Floods, Written Anwers, 30 Jun 2008 : Column 610WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock) of 24 January 2008, Official Report, column 2138W, on AWE Burghfield: floods, whether a flood protection strategy has been developed for the Burghfield site; and whether hydraulic modelling has been conducted for the site. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: A flood protection strategy is being implemented at the AWE Burghfield site and a hydraulic model of the catchment area of AWE Burghfield, both upstream and downstream, has been prepared. The model will be used for analysis and simulation of future design options and for the preparation of detailed designs. Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on what date a flood risk assessment for the proposed new Conventional Manufacturing Rationalisation Facility at AWE Burghfield was submitted to the local planning authority. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: A flood risk assessment for the Conventional Manufacturing Facility was sent to West Berkshire Council planning authority with the planning application on 22 May 2008, and can be viewed on their planning application website: http://planning.westberks.gov.uk/rpp/index.asp? Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what studies have been conducted by his Department to establish whether the proposed major housing development at Kennet Valley Park would have implications for (a) flood protection and (b) safety requirements at AWE Burghfield. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: MOD is aware of this proposed housing development and it has been taken into account in the flood protection strategy for AWE Burghfield. 30 Jun 2008 : Column 611W As with any planning application submitted to the local planning authority,
key stakeholders such as the Environment Agency and Health and Safety
Executive will be consulted by the council before a final decision is
made. The local planning authority's response will take account of all
relevant elements of the area's existing land usage, including the proximity
of AWE Burghfield, and any flood protection and safety requirements. AWE Burghfield: Planning Permission, Written Answers, 30 Jun 2008 : Column 611WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether a site development strategy for AWE Burghfield has been (a) prepared and (b) submitted to the local planning authority. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: A Site Development Context Plan was created in 2005 and represents the site development strategy for both the AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield sites from 2005 to 2015. The original Site Development Context Plan was submitted to the West Berkshire council planning authority in November 2005. An update of the plan was sent on 22 May 2008 and is available on the West Berkshire Planning Application website: http://planning.westberks.gov.uk/rpp/index.asp? http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/ AWE Burghfield: Planning Permission, Written Answers, 26 Jun 2008 : Column 447WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the Answer to the hon. Member for Portsmouth South of 5 January 2008, Official Report, column 1061W, on AWE Burghfield, what the timetable is for submission of all proposed planning applications at (a) AWE Burghfield and (b) AWE Aldermaston. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The following table represents the latest programme position for the submission of planning applications for AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield as included in the Site Development Context Plan 2005-15, updated in April 2008.
AWE Burghfield: Manpower, Written Answers, 17 Jun 2008 : Column 849WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many staff there were at AWE Burghfield in each year since 2003; and what the reasons were for changes in the levels of staffing. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The number of full-time equivalent staff employed by AWE plc at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Burghfield is shown in the following table. The figures are taken as at the end of March in each year.
The increase in staffing levels over the past years is consistent with
the Government's commitment to take forward a programme of investment
in sustaining key skills and facilities at AWE. The investment will ensure
that the existing Trident stockpile can be maintained throughout its intended
in-service life and that it remains reliable and safe. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 11 Jun 2008 : Column 258WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the Answer of 24 January 2008, Official Report, column 2138W, on AWE Burghfield, in what way the emergency arrangements infrastructure at AWE Burghfield was affected by the July 2007 flooding; and what steps have been taken to remedy the situation. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: As a consequence of the flooding in July 2007, the fallback incident control room, fallback medical centre and health physics support areas at AWE Burghfield sustained some damage. Contingency arrangements were put in place to ensure full emergency response could be activated if required. These were considered by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) to be adequate at all times for the activities being undertaken. On 22 April 2008, AWE Burghfield undertook its annual exercise on emergency response arrangements, witnessed by the NII, who considered that the exercise adequately demonstrated AWE Burghfield's capability in this area. Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the Answer of 20 May 2008, Official Report, column 178W, on AWE Burghfield, how many of the safety shortfalls identified at AWE Burghfield by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate remain outstanding; and what the target date is for remedial work to be completed. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The safety case issues to which the hon. Member
refers were identified not by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate,
but by AWE plc in its own Periodic Review of Safety. In my answer on 15
January 2008, Official Report, column 1132W, to the hon. Member for Portsmouth,
South (Mr. Hancock), I indicated that 50 work packages were due for completion
by 31 March 2008 and that the remaining 53 were scheduled to be complete
by the end of the year. The 50 work packages were completed by the due
date. The remainder remain on course for completion, as planned. Special Nuclear Vehicles, Written Answers, 9 Jun 2008 : Column 66WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many times special nuclear vehicles were used on the road between April 2007 and March 2008; and how many special escort group operations there were in the same period. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: I am withholding the information requested,
as its release would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 5 Jun 2008 : Column 1061WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his timetable is for the submission of a planning application to replace the gravel gerties at Atomic Weapons Establishment, Burghfield. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The planning application for the assembly/disassembly
facility at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Burghfield, which will replace
the gravel gerties, is currently programmed for submission to West Berkshire
council in the last quarter of 2008. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 20 May 2008 : Column 177WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) pursuant to the answer of 6 May 2008, Official Report, column 835W, on AWE Burghfield, on whose authority live nuclear work was suspended at AWE Burghfield, as described in the Health and Safety Executive Quarterly Report for 1 October to 31 December 2007; on what date work was suspended; what work needs to take place before live nuclear work resumes; on what date work is expected to resume; on whose authority this will take place; and whether he was informed of this suspension; (2) on what date the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate stopped live nuclear work at Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield; for what reason the work was stopped; when he expects work to recommence; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: As a result of temporary disruption due to flooding at AWE Burghfield, the nuclear site licensee, AWE plc, took a decision not to undertake live nuclear working while remedial work was undertaken. This decision was taken on 20 July 2007, in consultation with the nuclear installations inspectorate (NII) and with Ministry of Defence officials, and was consistent with our planned operational programmes. Precise details on these programmes, including live working dates, are being withheld for the purposes of safeguarding national security. While necessary work to repair flood damage was ongoing, the opportunity was taken to maximise completion of existing work identified from AWE's routine Periodic Review of Safety (PRS), as a parallel activity. Work varied in different facilities, examples include: replacing floors, plasterwork and doors; replacing electrical equipment; mechanical, electrical and lighting improvements and new vacuum and compressed air systems. Live working has already resumed. Facilities have been subject to rigorous scrutiny through AWE plc's governance process with inspection by, and authority from, the NII. Ministry of Defence officials maintain a constant dialogue with AWE plc
and NII colleagues have been consulted throughout. The disruption did
not have an adverse effect on the UK deterrent programme, and AWE Burghfield
maintains its capability to support the deterrent safely under highly
regulated arrangements. Radioactive Materials: Transport, Written Answers, 16 May 2008 : Column 1805WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 30 April 2008, Official Report, column 484W, on radioactive materials: transport, what plans he has to ensure that the refurbished truck cargo heavy duty trailers and newly purchased tractor heads are compliant with regulations on radiation hazard, with particular reference to the carrying of radiation hazard warning signs when loaded with special nuclear materials; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The regulations governing the transport of radioactive material, including the requirements for radiation hazard warning signs, are the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Transportable Pressure Vessel Regulations 2007. Provision exists within these for radioactive materials defined as instruments of war, or components thereof, to be exempt. Notwithstanding, arrangements have been put in place for the transportation of special nuclear material that are, so far as is reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by legislation. Hazard warning signs are generally intended to provide information to
responding emergency services in the event of an incident. The Ministry
of Defence police escorting convoys have this and more information to
hand. All factors, including security, will be taken into account in determining
whether hazard signs will appear on the replacement vehicles when carrying
special nuclear material. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 15 May 2008 : Column 1711WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on what occasions his Department has asked AWE Burghfield to cease live nuclear work in the last 12 months; and for what reasons each such request was made. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: There are no occasions when the Ministry of Defence has asked AWE Burghfield to cease live nuclear work. On 20 July 2007, AWE was affected by flooding resulting in temporary
disruption. At that time, AWE plc., the nuclear site licensee, took a
decision not to undertake live nuclear work until remedial work had been
undertaken. This decision was made in consultation with the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate and with Ministry of Defence officials, and was consistent
with our planned operational programmes. Live working has now resumed. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 6 May 2008 : Column 834WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will propose changes to the (a) management and (b) procedures and systems at Atomic Weapons Establishment Burghfield to reduce the likelihood of any future necessary cessation of services on safety grounds; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The nuclear site licensee at AWE Burghfield
is AWE plc, which manages the site under Government owned/contractor operated
arrangements. The external regulator, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
(NII), is satisfied that operations are safe and has not taken action
to stop live nuclear work at AWE Burghfield. Ministry of Defence officials
maintain a constant dialogue with AWE plc and Nil colleagues. There is
therefore no reason for ministerial intervention. Radioactive Materials: Transport, Written Answers, 30 Apr 2008 : Column 484WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with reference to the answer of 7 November 2005, Official Report, column 103W, on special nuclear materials load carriers, what the timetable for the introduction of the new load carrier vehicles is; how many there will be; what the cost of each one is; whether they will be operated by the Ministry of Defence Police; how many miles each one is expected to complete before entry into service; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The current load carrier vehicles are now
planned to continue in service until the end of 2010. It is planned to
replace them with eight refurbished truck cargo heavy duty trailers and
nine newly purchased tractor heads. I am withholding information on the
cost of each vehicle as disclosure of this information would prejudice
commercial interests. The role of the Ministry of Defence Police during
the transport of nuclear materials is to ensure the overall security of
any movements of special nuclear materials. The vehicles will be extensively
tested for reliability before entry into service, including a programme
of verification and validation activities against taut acceptance criteria.
The mileage completed will be that necessary to successfully complete
this programme. Military Exercises: Nuclear Weapons, Written Answers, 24 Apr 2008 : Column 2178WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on what dates the last joint US-UK nuclear weapon accident exercise was held; where it was held; on what dates the next joint US-UK nuclear weapon accident exercise will be held; and where it will be held. Des Browne: The last joint US/UK nuclear weapon accident exercise (Exercise DIMMING SUN 03) was held in Norfolk over the period 16-20 June 2003. The next joint US/UK nuclear weapon accident exercise is scheduled to be held in 2010, the date and location have yet to be determined. Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) names, (b) dates and (c) locations will be of the nuclear weapons emergency exercises being organised by his Department in 2008. Des Browne: Exercise ASTRAL CLIMB 08, which will test the operational
response to a nuclear weapon convoy accident, will be held on 24 September
2008 in Cumbria. AWE Aldermaston: Protest, Written Answers, 27 Mar 2008 : Column 347WMr. David Anderson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make arrangements to enable the making of peaceful protests at Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The MOD recognises the democratic right of
individuals to participate in lawful and peaceful protest activities.
Such activities have taken place at AWE for many years, and there are
well-rehearsed plans in place to ensure minimum disruption and to allow
peaceful protests to occur. Safety and security at AWE are paramount.
Any protestor action that could compromise these will always be dealt
with appropriately. There were demonstrations at AWE as recently as 24
March and Thames Valley Police subsequently congratulated the organisers
for organising an effective and peaceful demonstration. AWE Aldermaston: Protest, Written Answers, 18 Mar 2008 : Column 1043WChris Huhne: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his Department's policy is on the Aldermaston Easter protest. Des Browne: The MOD recognises the democratic right of individuals
to participate in lawful and peaceful protest activities. UK Atomic Energy Authority: Industrial Health and Safety, Written Answers, 17 Mar 2008 : Column 818WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent discussions his Department has held with the Health and Safety Executive on the reporting of abnormal incidents at Atomic Energy Authority sites at (a) Aldermaston and (b) Burghfield. Des Browne: The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) sites at Aldermaston
and Burghfield are owned by the MOD. The nuclear site licensee is AWE
plc, which manages these sites under Government Owned/Contractor Operated
arrangements. Safety is paramount to all stakeholders. MOD officials maintain
a continuous dialogue with AWE plc and the external regulator, the Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate, which is part of the Health and Safety Executive.
This dialogue covers all AWE regulatory matters, including the reporting
of abnormal incidents. Nuclear Weapons: Transport, Written Answers, 13 Mar 2008 : Column 665WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make it his policy to ensure nuclear warhead convoys do not travel on motorways that do not have a hard shoulder reserved for emergencies. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Routes for nuclear weapon convoys are subject
to a rigorous selection process. The safety and security of the convoy
is carefully considered at all stages of this process and all routes are
regularly re-assessed. It is MOD policy, however, not to comment on the
routes used by nuclear convoys, as to do so would, or would be likely
to, prejudice national security. AWE Burghfield: Floods, Written Answers, 5 Mar 2008 : Column 2553WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the Answer of 24 January 2008, Official Report, column 2138W, on AWE Burghfield: floods, and page 22 of the Health and Safety Executive Nuclear Newsletter, November 2007 issue, on what date (a) the Health and Safety Executive nuclear installation inspectorate was satisfied that emergency arrangements were in place and (b) operational activities resumed. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Following the flooding at AWE Burghfield in
July 2007, contingency emergency arrangements put in place were considered
by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) to be adequate at all
times for the activities being undertaken. NII inspected the interim facilities
and witnessed an emergency exercise on 24 October, and agreed that nuclear
operations could recommence on 5 November 2007. AWE Burghfield, Written Answers, 4 Mar 2008 : Column 2343WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the two licence instruments giving agreement to the limited continued use of process facilities for weapons assembly and disassembly at AWE Burghfield were issued; when his Department first required a warhead operations licence; and if he will make a statement. Des Browne: The licence instruments in question were issued on
20 June and 5 November 2007. As the management and operation of atomic
weapons establishment (AWE) sites is conducted under Government owned/contractor
operated arrangements, it is the incumbent contractor which is licensed
for nuclear operations. The first such licence was issued on 16 June 1997.
The requisite licences were subsequently renewed on 29 March 2000 to take
account of a change in contractor. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Summer 2008 © 2008 The Acronym Institute. |