|
Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, Winter 2008 Westminster ParliamentTrident and the UK Nuclear Weapons Programme
Trident, Written Answers, 18 Dec 2008 : Column 968WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Lewes of 10 November 2008, Official Report, column 777W, on AWE Aldermaston, whether his Department is considering financing any elements of the programme to replace the Trident nuclear warhead through private finance initiatives. Mr. Quentin Davies: There is no programme to develop a new UK
nuclear warhead. There is, however, work being undertaken to inform decisions,
likely to be taken in the next Parliament, on whether and, if so, how
we might need to refurbish or replace our current warhead. There are no
plans to introduce private finance initiatives to fund this work. Trident, Written Answers, 15 Dec 2008 : Column 341WMr. Davidson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects a decision to be taken on the initial Gate Report on the Trident replacement programme; whether the House will make any such decision; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Hutton [holding answer 10 December 2008]: As we have said before, it is our expectation that decisions will be taken on the Initial Gate for the programme to develop a new class of submarine to replace the current Vanguard class in autumn 2009. It is not normal for Parliament to be involved in Initial Gate decisions for 15 Dec 2008 : Column 342W procurement projects. Main Gate for this programme is still several years
away. As we have also said before, we propose to update Parliament on
progress after Initial Gate. Trident Submarines, Written Answers, 10 Dec 2008 : Column 134WAngus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the maintenance cost of Trident submarines in (a) 2008-09 and (b) each of the next five years. Mr. Quentin Davies: The estimated maintenance costs of Vanguard class submarines in 2008-09 and each of the next five years, which cover fleet maintenance and capital spend incurred as part of the long overhaul period (refuel) (LOP-R) maintenance programme, are:
Trident Submarines, Written Answers, 9 Dec 2008 : Column 55WAngus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Trident submarines are on active service; how many are being repaired; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Hutton: There are currently two Vanguard Class submarines
in the operational fleet, which will be joined next year by a third boat
on completion of sea trials following a Long Overhaul Period (Refuel)
(LOP(R)). The fourth boat is currently undergoing a LOP(R). Submarines: Procurement, Written Answers, 26 Nov 2008 : Column 1559WMr. Kilfoyle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the evidence given by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in his Department to the Public Accounts Committee on 19th November 2008 on the UK's Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability, what recent estimate he has made of the procurement cost of four submarines and their associated equipment and infrastructure; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Hutton: As the December 2006 White Paper, The Future of the
United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994), makes clear, our initial
estimate is that the procurement costs will be in the range of £15 billion
to £20 billion for a four-boat solution at 2006-07 prices. The programme
is currently is the Concept phase and the costs will be refined as experts
continue to engage in detailed discussion with industry. Trident, Written Answers, 26 Nov 2008 : Column 1560WMr. Kilfoyle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with reference to the statement by the then Foreign Secretary on 14 March 2007, Official Report, column 309, on Trident, what reports his Department has made on the Trident programme in the last six months; and when he plans to make the next regular report to Parliament. Mr. Hutton: I refer the hon. Member to the answer my hon. Friend, the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr Davies) gave on 20 November 2008, Official Report, columns 671-2W to the hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr Davies). Mr. Kilfoyle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the evidence given by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in his Department to the Public Accounts Committee on 19th November 2008 on the UK's Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability, what the approved procedure is for the initial gateway report on the Trident replacement programme; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Quentin Davies: The Future Nuclear Deterrent capability programme is subject, like all major acquisition programmes, to the Ministry of Defence approvals and scrutiny process detailed in the Ministry's Acquisition Operating Framework. The Acquisition Operating Framework is available on the Ministry of Defence's internet site at The next major approval point is the platform's Initial Gate when the MOD Investment Approvals Board will decide if it is ready to enter the assessment phase that leads to the Main Gate decision point. Mr. Kilfoyle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the evidence given by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in his Department to the Public Accounts Committee on 19th November 2008 on the UK's Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability, what the reasons are for the delay on the (a) Trident replacement programmes and (b) Astute-class submarine programme at Barrow; what estimate he has made of 26 Nov 2008 : Column 1561W the additional costs arising from these delays; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Quentin Davies: There was a six week delay in the two-year concept phase for the Trident successor programme due to the speed of contract letting and the build up and mobilisation of capacity in the supplier base. The Department has since taken action to bring the programme back on schedule and is confident that the submarine concept phase can still be completed in time for initial gate in Autumn 2009. This has not led to any additional costs. There have been a number of reasons for the delays to the Astute programme,
but the underlying cause has been the near 10-year gap in production between
the Vanguard and Astute classes, which led to valuable staff and skills
being lost. As a result, BAE Systems has had to refresh these skills and
recruit the staff numbers needed for a project of this size and complexity.
The cost of the first three Astute boats was approved in 1997 at £2.5
billion; the current forecast is £3.8 billion. Trident Submarines, Written Answers, 26 Nov 2008 : Column 1561WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the adequacy of the available skills base required for the trident nuclear submarine replacement programme; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Quentin Davies: MOD recognises that building the skills required, both in the Department and in industry, to successfully deliver the Trident nuclear submarine replacement programme in the future will be challenging. Initial work is underway to identify the necessary future skills base, building on and learning from experience with the astute programme. An initial audit of the projected skills requirements of the MOD's Future Submarines Directorate for the life of the programme has been undertaken and actions are underway to address its recommendations. These include a significantly increased graduate recruitment and post graduate training programme in the nuclear area, robust succession planning and a significantly increased programme of advanced modern apprenticeships. We are working closely with Cogent, the Sector Skills Council that covers
the nuclear industry, and with the industrial supply chain, including
BAE Systems Submarines, Rolls-Royce and Babcock Maritime to address and
promote an adequate skills base for the life of the programme. We also
continue to work closely with the United States on this issue. Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, Written Answers, 24 Nov 2008 : Column 896WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what budget was allocated to the Defence Nuclear Safety (DNS) Regulator in the latest period for which figures are available; how many staff are employed by the DNS Regulator; how many are field inspectors; what expertise is required to be engaged as a DNS Inspector; and what assessment he has made of the adequacy of the (a) skills base and (b) numbers employed by the DNS Regulator. Mr. Quentin Davies: The Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) has a staff of 23, comprising 20 technical staff, supported by three administrative staff. All of the 20 technical staff engage in (field) inspections and 17 of them are appointed as Inspectors. In addition to the internal manpower costs, DNSR's budget in the current year is for operating costs of £0.2 million. This internal team is supported by dedicated staff in the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and from industry, for which the budget in the current year is £4.254 million (representing around 35 man years). The competence requirements for each post are specifically identified:
they include competence in nuclear technology, safety management, safety
regulation and nuclear accident management. All new inspectors joining
DNSR follow a training programme, and their competence is formally assessed
before they receive delegated authority. The level of skill and numbers
required to effectively regulate the defence nuclear programmes is reviewed
annually by the Defence Nuclear Environment and Safety Board (DNESB) Chairman,
taking account of views of DNESB members and the representatives of the
HSE Nuclear Directorate, the Environment Agency and the Scottish Environment
Protection Agency who attend the DNESB. This is also considered by the
independent Defence Nuclear Safety Committee, who separately advise the
Secretary of State for Defence. Nuclear Power: Emergencies, Written Answers, 24 Nov 2008 : Column 904WMr. Gray: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) departmental officials and (b) members of the armed services are available for mobilisation in the event of a nuclear accident emergency; and what level of training is given to departmental officials on nuclear emergency response. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The number of civilian and military personnel employed within the MOD’s nuclear accident response organisation will vary depending on the type, location and circumstances of any defence nuclear accident. It is therefore not possible to give precise numbers of personnel employed. All those engaged in the nuclear accident response organisation are fully
trained. Nuclear accident response capability is demonstrated on a regular
basis to the satisfaction of the Health and Safety Executive (Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate) and the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator. Trident, Written Answers, 24 Nov 2008 : Column 906WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made, with reference to the Trident submarine replacement programme, of (a) the adequacy of the contingency set aside, (b) the robustness of the calculation of inflation over the programme lifetime and (c) whether value-added tax will have to be paid for all or part of the expenditure on the programme. Mr. Quentin Davies: In compiling the initial estimates of the procurement costs involved in sustaining our independent deterrent capability set out in the December 2006 White Paper: The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994) the Ministry of Defence followed HM Treasury guidance and the figures recognise uncertainty and the tendency for costs to be underestimated. As the costs mature through the Concept phase, they will capture the interdependent nature of the costs of the different elements of the programme. Like the rest of Government, the MOD manages its finances so that inflation is taken into account. The figures set out in the White Paper are shown at 2006-07 prices but the Department's internal budgetary planning allows for the impact of inflation. The additional funding that the MOD received as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review 2007 settlement was provided on this basis. The Ministry of Defence has assumed that VAT will be zero-rated for the
submarine platform in the same way it currently applies to the Astute
programme. The actual tax treatment of all the elements of the programme
cannot be determined until nearer the time the contracts are placed and
the precise manner in which we will procure the programme elements has
been determined. The associated risk that the current VAT treatment assumptions
may change has been recognised in compiling the estimates for the programme. Nuclear Weapons: Decommissioning, Written Answers, 20 Nov 2008 : Column 670WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he has taken to increase the skills available to his Department, its agencies and bodies for which he is responsible for the dismantling of redundant (a) nuclear warheads, (b) nuclear submarine reactors and (c) nuclear production sites. Mr. Quentin Davies: In common with the broader UK nuclear industry, the MOD recognises the long-term challenge of sustaining key nuclear skills. We are working closely with Cogent, the sector skills council that covers the nuclear industry, and with the industrial supply chain, including AWE plc. and Rolls-Royce Submarines as key suppliers on the Nuclear Weapon and Nuclear Propulsion programmes respectively. In addition, we liaise with the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and the Department of Energy to ensure a coherent and co-ordinated approach with the civil nuclear industry and the sharing of best practice. Within the MOD, a firm baseline for current and future skills requirements
has been established and actions are being taken to address shortages.
For example, we have significantly increased graduate recruitment and
post-graduate training in the nuclear area and we are implementing advanced
modern apprenticeships at a number of UK locations. Trident, Written Answers, 20 Nov 2008 : Column 671WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions during the initial gate period for the Trident submarine replacement programme he plans to produce a progress report to Parliament. 20 Nov 2008 : Column 672W Mr. Quentin Davies: In accordance with the usual practice on major
procurement projects, the first full progress report on the programme
to maintain the UK's nuclear deterrent will be made after the Initial
Gate for the new class of submarines. We expect to publish this report
in autumn 2009. There are no plans as yet to provide an interim report. USA: Nuclear Weapons, Written Answers, 19 Nov 2008 : Column 504WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will assess the implications for UK nuclear weapons policy of the speech made by the United States Defence Secretary Robert Gates on 28 October 2008 in respect of United States plans to retain and replace its nuclear weapons system and warheads. Mr. Hutton: In his speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, Secretary Gates considered a number of elements of the United States nuclear weapons policy. His general assessments closely 19 Nov 2008 : Column 505W match those articulated in the 2006 White Paper “The Future of the United
Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” (Cm 6994). Nuclear Submarines, Written Answers, 17 Nov 2008 : Column 152WDr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence in what year each successor submarine for the next generation of the nuclear deterrent is planned to enter service. Mr. Quentin Davies: As previously stated, the first of the new
class of submarines is forecast to enter service in around 2024. Also,
as explained in the December 2006 White Paper ‘The Future of the United
Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent’, a final decision on the number of submarines
that will be procured will be made when we know more about their detailed
design. That decision will determine the timetable for entry into service
of further submarines. Nuclear Weapons: Finance, Written Answers, 13 Nov 2008 : Column 1301WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent estimate he has made of the total life cycle costs of (a) the Polaris/Chevaline and (b) the Trident nuclear deterrent systems, expressed in current cost equivalents and broken down by category. Mr. Hutton: The Polaris/Chevaline system was replaced as the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent capability by the Trident system in the mid-1990s. Consequently, no recent 13 Nov 2008 : Column 1302W estimate has been made of the costs of Polaris and the information requested is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. The costs of the current Trident nuclear deterrent are estimated at around £15.7 billion for acquisition at 2008-09 prices and around £19.3 billion on the same price basis for in-service costs from entry into service until final disposal. These estimates exclude the costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment. Nuclear Weapons, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 307WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a redacted copy of JSP 440 Supplement 1: The Defence Manual of Security, Directive for the Security of Nuclear Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials. Mr. Quentin Davies: I am withholding Supplement 1 of JSP 440 on
the security of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials in the interests
of national security. Nuclear Weapons: Transport, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 307WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what criteria the nuclear weapons convoy group has to meet to pass the annual nuclear standardisation test. Mr. Quentin Davies: Joint Service Publication (JSP) 471, Defence Nuclear Accident Response, and JSP 538, Regulation of the Nuclear Weapon Programme, require exercises to be conducted to demonstrate Nuclear Accident Response capabilities. The Defence Nuclear Weapon Regulator assesses nuclear weapon transport accident response exercises in accordance with the criteria in JSP 471 and JSP 538, including the Nuclear Accident Response Organisation Standardisation Test. An unclassified version of JSP 471 is available from the MOD website at: A redacted copy of JSP 538 is available in the House of Commons Library. Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what guidance his Department has issued on the conduct of risk assessments of potential routes for nuclear warhead convoys; and what factors are taken into account in such assessments. Mr. Quentin Davies: Guidance on the selection of nuclear weapon
convoy routes is set out in Joint Services Publication 483, Nuclear Weapon
Logistic Movement and Associated Nuclear Accident Response. Factors in
the assessment of routes include the type of road, its surroundings and
its proximity to hazards. All potential routes for nuclear warhead convoys
are assessed by a qualified team to ensure the safety and security of
the operation and the public. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 307WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether a design review of the Trident nuclear warhead has taken place in the last 12 months; and if he will make a statement. 4 Nov 2008 : Column 308W Mr. Quentin Davies: No. As part of a comprehensive programme of
routine safety monitoring procedures, a formal design review of the Trident
Re-entry System is undertaken approximately every seven years. The last
such review was undertaken in 2006. USA: Nuclear Weapons, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 308WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the purpose of the Enhanced Collaborations projects between the UK and the US in support of the nuclear weapons programme is; which projects (a) have been and (b) are being undertaken; and when each project started. Mr. Hutton: The enhanced collaborations form part of the technical exchanges between the United Kingdom and the United States of America conducted under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, which support the UK's nuclear stockpile stewardship programme and contribute to the ongoing review of warhead options announced in the 2006 White Paper—The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cmd 6994). As was made clear in the White Paper, decisions on whether and how we may need to refurbish or replace our current warheads are likely to be made in the next Parliament and to inform these decisions we are undertaking a detailed review of the optimum life of the existing warhead stockpile and analysing the options that may be available. In the interests of national security I am not prepared to discuss the
detailed nature of these enhanced collaborations which commenced following
an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Blair and President George
W. Bush in December 2006. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 3 Nov 2008 : Column 71WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the notice required to fire missiles from (a) a Trident submarine on patrol and (b) a second submarine at its berth is; and what notice is required for submarines to take to sea. Mr. Hutton: As set out in the White Paper ‘The Future of the United
Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent’ (Cm 6994), published on 4 December 2006,
a Trident submarine on patrol is normally at several days ‘notice to fire’.
I am withholding further information as its release would, or would be
likely to, prejudice national security and defence of the UK. USA: Military Alliances, Written Answers, 3 Nov 2008 : Column 71WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on what date the next stocktake meeting between the Government and the US Administration under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement is scheduled to take place. Mr. Quentin Davies: Arrangements have not been finalised but consideration
is currently being given to the next stocktake meeting being held in the
UK in early June 2009. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 30 Oct 2008 : Column 1232WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans his Department has for measures (a) to further reduce the operational status of the UK's Trident system and (b) increase transparency with regard to the capabilities of the UK's Trident system as agreed in the plan for action at the 2000 review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. Mr. Hutton: Our plans for the deterrent are set out in the White
Paper “The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent” (Cm 6994),
which was published on 4 December 2006. This White Paper also provides
a clear and transparent statement of the capabilities of the UK's Trident
system. Nuclear Weapons, Written Answers, 27 Oct 2008 : Column 639WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) whether US personnel will be asked to participate in his Department's work on the Warhead Pre-Concept Working Group; (2) whether the Warhead Pre-Concept Working Group has considered options for (a) agent defeat and (b) other warhead modifications, as part of its work; (3) whether work emerging from the (a) theoretical enhanced radiation and (b) residual enhanced radiation weapon warhead concept have been examined as part of the work of the Warhead Pre-Concept Working Group; and whether personnel at AWE Aldermaston have been briefed on these or other advanced nuclear weapons concepts by their US counterparts in the last three years. Mr. Hutton: I refer the hon. Member to the answer my predecessor gave him on 28 November 2007, Official Report, column 453W from which he will be aware that research is currently being undertaken in support of the detailed review described in paragraph 7-4 of the December 2006 White Paper: The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cmd 6994). This review, which was previously overseen by the Warhead Pre-Concept Working Group (WPCWG) is now being coordinated by the Atomic Weapons Establishment within their systems engineering management structure under the direction of the Ministry of Defence. It is examining both the optimum life of the UK's existing nuclear warhead stockpile and the range of replacement options that might be available to inform decisions on whether and how we may need to refurbish or replace the existing 27 Oct 2008 : Column 640W warhead likely to be necessary in the next Parliament. Some of the work included in this review is being undertaken in co-operation with the US and with the assistance of US personnel under the 1958 UK-US Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. I am withholding further details of this ongoing review and related discussions
held with the US under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement in the interests
of national security. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 23 Oct 2008 : Column 478WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent discussions he has had with his US counterpart on progress towards a successor to the D5 missile; and what role UK personnel have played in that work. Mr. Hutton: Neither I nor my predecessor have held any negotiations
with our US counterparts on a successor to the D5 missile. As explained
in the December 2006 White Paper “The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent”
(Cm 6994), decisions on whether we wish to acquire a successor to the
life extended D5 missile, and what form any successor might take, are
unlikely to be necessary until the 2020s. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 14 Oct 2008 : Column 1018WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 29 September 2008, Official Report, column 2440W, on Trident missiles, how many Trident warheads are either operationally available or undergoing maintenance. Mr. Hutton: The UK has fewer than 160 operationally available
Trident warheads. I am withholding further information as its release
would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security. BAE Systems, Written Answers, 10 Sep 2008 : Column 1810WNick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much BAE received from his Department in each year since 1998. Mr. Bob Ainsworth: MOD payments made to BAE Systems plc as a holding company, for the latest five years where complete data are available, are detailed in the following table. All MOD contract payments data refer to extant contracts in the financial year in question. All expenditure is VAT exclusive and expressed at current prices, rounded to the nearest £10 million.
The analysis is based on payments made by the MOD Financial Management Shared Service Centre and its predecessor which processes some 95 per cent. by value of all MOD payments to industry. It excludes, for example, payments made by the MOD Trading Funds and low-value local purchase transactions, for which records are not held centrally. Data on a comparable basis relating to the years before 2003-04 is not
available because we did not then collate spend with all divisions of
the BAE Systems corporate structure and we could not retrospectively do
so other than at disproportionate cost. Nuclear Weapons, Written Answers, 15 Sep 2008 : Column 2079WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the UK's policy on nuclear first use is; and if he will publish the relevant guidelines. Des Browne: The United Kingdom Government would be prepared to use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence. We would not use our weapons, whether conventional or nuclear, contrary to international law. The UK does not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons. A policy
of no first use of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with our and
NATO's doctrine of deterrence. We do not determine in advance how to react
to aggression. This would be decided in the context of all circumstances
prevailing at the time. Our overall strategy is to ensure uncertainty
in the mind of any aggressor about the exact nature of our response, and
thus to maintain effective deterrence. Trident Missiles, Written Answers, 29 September 2008: Column 2440WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Trident warheads were operationally available at the latest date for which figures are available; and when that number fell below 160. Des Browne [holding answer 17 September 2008]: The UK has fewer
than 160 operationally available Trident warheads. I refer the hon. Member
to the answer I gave on 15 November 2007, Official Report, column 366W.
I am withholding further information as its release would, or would be
likely to, prejudice national security. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Winter 2008 © 2009 The Acronym Institute. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||