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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, Winter 2008 Westminster ParliamentDebate on the Queen's Speech: Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Commons 10 December 2008
Debate on the Queen's Speech: Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Lords, 4 December 2008
House of Commons Defence Debates
House of Commons, Debate on the Queen's Speech, Foreign Affairs and DefenceThe Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (David Miliband)10 Dec 2008 : Column 563 The most lethal and immediate proliferation challenge is the nuclear one. This Government have made it clear that they are committed to a world without nuclear weapons, as per our non-proliferation treaty responsibilities. US President-elect Obama has done the same, so we will work with the US and other allies to bring the comprehensive test ban treaty into force, thereby banning all nuclear weapons test explosions. Early US ratification would do much to encourage the few states remaining outside to follow suit. We will also work together to push forward multilateral negotiations on a treaty to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, thus helping to make reductions irreversible, and to secure renewed agreement among all NPT states that tougher prevention measures are needed to tackle proliferation in the future. That brings me to the issue of Iran, which will be one of the most difficult issues in 2009. Iran continues to increase its enrichment programme in the face of repeated International Atomic Energy Agency requests for more access and information, and in defiance of five UN Security Council resolutions. The threat is real—we are talking about a matter of years, not decades—and in 2009 it will continue to grow with every day that passes, as Iran continues to enrich and to increase its capacity to enrich, so we need urgently to make diplomacy work. That means a more vigorous pursuit of our dual-track approach: the pressure of sanctions coupled with the promise of engagement and reintegration if Tehran co-operates with the UN Security Council and the IAEA. If Iran continues to ignore the UN Security Council and disregards the requests of the IAEA, it will face increasingly tough sanctions and worsening diplomatic isolation. The alternative is for it to accept the E3 plus 3’s generous offer of June this year, which would give Iran financial and technological assistance to develop its civilian nuclear capacity—that is what it claims to want—and a range of other benefits. We will lead the effort to make its choice clear, through national measures and with our partners in the EU and UN. As our June offer made clear, we are not opposed to Iran or other countries having access to civilian nuclear capacity, as long as there is absolute confidence that there is no leakage into a nuclear weapons programme. Far from being opposed, we see civilian nuclear technology as a crucial part of the answer to climate change and energy insecurity, but we need to manage the risks that this technology might be diverted for more malign purposes... Mr. William Hague (Richmond, Yorks) (Con)10 Dec 2008 : Column 581 The situation in Afghanistan is obviously at or near the top of the foreign policy priorities of the new Administration in Washington, and so it should be. Alongside it, presumably, will be the ever more urgent need for a diplomatic solution to the impasse over Iran’s nuclear programme. The plain fact is that Iran today is on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, with all the massive risks that that brings of nuclear proliferation in the middle east or war with Israel. According to the latest report by the International Atomic Energy Authority, by next month—that is, January—Iran will have accumulated a stockpile of nearly 1,000 kg of low-enriched uranium, an amount considered to be enough to produce 20 kg of weapons-grade uranium, or enough for one nuclear weapon after further enrichment. What stands between Iran and that goal is not, unfortunately, a united international community, but a series of technical hurdles whose resolution is only a matter of time. We do not know, of course, what opening will be made to Iran by the new US Administration, but we do know that time is running out if the world is not to enter a new era of nuclear insecurity. And whatever initiative the US takes, the chances of Iran responding positively to it must surely be increased if President-elect Obama is speaking from a position of strength and of strong but peaceful European pressure on Iran. It is now more than a year since the Prime Minister announced that he was working for a ban on European investment in Iranian oil and gas fields, yet as of today there are no restrictions on European companies making 10 Dec 2008 : Column 582 new investments in such fields. There is still no formal Europe-wide ban on export credit guarantees that subsidise trade with Iran, and a swathe of Iranian companies are still involved in Iran’s nuclear programme, which the United States has targeted but which European nations have not. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary agrees with me that America’s carrot will be more attractive to Iran if Europe carries a bigger stick. We recognise that it is difficult to achieve European agreement on these issues but it is galling to hear Iran’s deputy Commerce Minister boast, as he did last month, that 67 per cent. of Iran’s $140 billion foreign trade in 2007 came from Europe, and from Germany, France and Italy in particular. He also said: “EU members are not paying any attention to the UN resolutions against Iran”. I think that that was an exaggeration, but the fact that he felt able to say that is alarming in itself. The looming danger of Iran’s nuclear programme means that we need the EU as a whole to adopt the sanctions that we have called for. It should impose a formal ban on export credit guarantees, mirror US financial sanctions and place unequivocal restrictions on investment in Iranian oil and gas... However, alongside that vital priority, the Iranian situation reminds us that nuclear proliferation is the other great issue facing the entire world. It seems entirely possible that within the next decade the great danger posed to our national security by international terrorism will be overtaken in magnitude by the dangers of nuclear proliferation. As the Foreign Secretary rightly noted towards the close of his speech, the non-proliferation treaty, which is subject to an international review conference in 2010, is under assault from within, with its member states locked in recrimination and stalemate. It is also being assailed from without, by the actions of countries such as Iran and North Korea and by the sheer march forward of science, which is making it easier by the day to acquire and to peddle nuclear technology. Jeremy Corbyn: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that one of the non-proliferation treaty’s limitations is that it automatically excludes Israel, India and Pakistan? Might not a better way forward be to promote a nuclear weapons convention, a proposal currently being led by Australia? That might create a better forum for nuclear disarmament. 10 Dec 2008 : Column 583 Mr. Hague: It is certainly a weakness of the non-proliferation treaty that the nations to which the hon. Gentleman refers are not signatories to it. That is undoubtedly true, but I am rather sceptical about whether it is possible to invent a completely different vehicle that is more effective than an updated, improved and strengthened non-proliferation treaty. Even with the absence of those three countries, many features of the treaty are essential to preventing proliferation elsewhere. We should not turn a blind eye to the sort of initiatives that he mentions, but we have to work with the framework that we have. I hope that the British Government will launch and help to lead a massive diplomatic effort to persuade other nations to accord counter-proliferation the very highest priority in international affairs. We welcome the steps that the Government have already taken to put Britain at the forefront of the debate on nuclear weapons reductions and to propose a means of bringing the fuel cycle under international control, including hosting a conference on the matter next year. However, in my view such action now needs to be raised to a higher level of political priority and governmental commitment, from the Prime Minister down. The Opposition have put forward a package of eight proposals for the strengthening of the non-proliferation treaty. Among the initiatives to tackle nuclear proliferation we propose concrete steps to improve our ability to disrupt the financing of nuclear proliferation, to enhance our ability to track and block the trade in nuclear weapons technology, to strengthen the IAEA and the international system of safeguards and inspections, and to close loopholes in the non-proliferation treaty. We hope that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will make a major push—and major speeches for international consumption—on that vital matter, and that they seek a common approach with America that could combine the influence of one of the world’s most powerful nuclear weapons states—the US—with the moral authority of the UK as a nuclear weapons state with a very good record in reducing its own nuclear arsenal. Sir Malcolm Rifkind: Will my right hon. Friend give way? Mr. Hague: I am on my last paragraph, and I said that I had given way for the last time, but given that it is my right hon. and learned Friend who asks, I will give way. Sir Malcolm Rifkind: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, and I applaud what he just said. Does he agree that it would make an enormous contribution towards the likelihood of the non-proliferation treaty being continued, and would put far greater pressure on Iran, if the United States and Russia, which both still have approximately 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads—infinitely more than they need for their mutual defence—could be persuaded to initiate negotiations? President Obama has implied that he would be willing to support such negotiations for a massive further reduction in the number of nuclear warheads of the two powers, which, together, have 95 per cent. of the world’s nuclear weapons. Mr. Hague: Certainly, we should hope for that, and the Governments that my right hon. and learned Friend mentions should take the lead. Perhaps the new US Administration will follow up on what happened under 10 Dec 2008 : Column 584 previous US Administrations, and perhaps there will be further massive reductions in those still colossal arsenals. Of course, people do not always recognise the many things that have been achieved in that area. Thousands of Russian nuclear warheads have been powering part of the American electricity grid for some years. That is one of the successes for non-proliferation and for co-operation between Russia and the United States. As for whether that process could go much further, and whether it would enhance the moral authority that we need if we are to persuade other countries not to develop nuclear weapons, the answer is yes, absolutely; I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend... Harry Cohen: The right hon. Gentleman has said some fine words on a couple of issues, certainly on Iraq and on nuclear non-proliferation. I agree with him that the latter needs a much higher priority. However, the situation was made worse by the United States’ deployment of missiles in other European countries; the Russians responded to that badly. Did he and his party support that deployment of US missile defence? Did he speak up against it, as part of his approach to non-proliferation? Mr. Hague: I am a little worried to hear that the hon. Gentleman is in such agreement with me; that is a little disturbing. More seriously, we are at least able to differ on the issue that he raises. When one looks at the dangers of proliferation and of the Iranian nuclear programme, the basis for, and rationale behind, the plans that the United States put forward for missile defence can clearly be understood. The issue has to be seen in that context. That is why he has not heard words of condemnation on the matter from the Opposition. Before he and I fall out about anything else—we have agreed on so much—I will conclude with a point on non-proliferation. If we stand back from our daily preoccupations, from varying crises and from any party political issues, we see that non-proliferation is perhaps the most important subject of all in our international work, and it is an issue on which Britain can make a decisive difference. If the Government launch an initiative like the one that I mentioned, they will find solid and enthusiastic support across the House. Mr. Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD):10 Dec 2008 : Column 589The right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks ended his speech by referring to nuclear non-proliferation, and I strongly agree with him about that issue. He may be surprised to discover that I read his recent speech in which he made eight recommendations on how to take that work forward; indeed, I have also read a recent speech by the Foreign Secretary in which he laid out the Government’s proposals. All parties in the House are thinking the same thoughts about the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and how we must take it forward, particularly as we work with President Obama. However, there is one aspect of that policy area on which the Liberal Democrats disagree with both the Conservatives and the Labour Government: their support for the renewal of our Trident nuclear deterrent. That was a premature decision taken ahead of the 2010 non-proliferation treaty review conference. Given the objectives and urgency of the matter that the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks rightly discussed, that decision sent the wrong signal to the international community at a key point, when we want to change completely the nature of the debate. The British Government have led on a number of aspects of non-proliferation—particularly research and development into new verification technologies, in which we are partnering Norway and a non-governmental organisation, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, or VERTIC. That is all very well, but we have sent the wrong signal in respect of our own nuclear weapons, which means that we cannot influence the debate as we ought to. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) (Lab)10 Dec 2008 : Column 598 The Foreign Secretary said quite a lot in his introductory remarks about nuclear weapons. Although I strongly support the non-proliferation treaty and associated purposes, the fundamental flaw is that India, Pakistan and Israel are not signatories to it—and because of its structure, they can never be signatories to the treaty or members of the non-proliferation system. I am not advocating breaking it up or leaving it. It is valuable and does have a purpose. Indeed, South Africa, Argentina and Ukraine, for example, have disarmed themselves of nuclear weapons within the terms of the NPT. However, 10 Dec 2008 : Column 599 there has to be something else in addition, which is why we should look seriously at a nuclear weapons convention of the sort promoted by Australia, formally known as the Canberra commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons, which is due to report in advance of the 2010 review. There is growing support for the concept of a nuclear weapons convention that all states can join. At least that would be a forum for discussion and debate on the demilitarisation of nuclear weapons around the world. It would also help us. I agree with the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) that if we were not planning an expansion of the Trident nuclear missile fleet and the weaponry that goes with it through the work that is going on at Aldermaston, we would have a much stronger moral voice within the NPT and nuclear disarmament system. Israel is a nuclear power. That fact is often ignored; no one wants to go into that area. However, if there is to be disarmament around the world, it has to include India, Pakistan and Israel. If we wish to have effective pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons, we should put equal pressure on Israel, first, to take its weapons off alert and, secondly, to take them out of operation altogether so that the dream of a middle eastern nuclear-free zone—there are effective nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa and soon, hopefully, in central Asia—can be achieved. Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington and Chelsea) (Con)10 Dec 2008 : Column 600 I listened with interest to the remarks of the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) about nuclear weapons. On the Trident decision, the point on which I think he is mistaken is that the need is for multilateral, not unilateral, nuclear disarmament. I do not believe that the Government’s decision is irreversible. I have no doubt that if there were scope for major progress on nuclear disarmament over the coming period, it could be revisited in the context of what was happening around the world. The Gracious Speech itself was very light on the subject of nuclear weapons, but I pay tribute to what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague), the shadow Foreign Secretary. He paid great attention to the subject, and I very much agreed with the thrust of his remarks. I believe that the whole issue of nuclear weapons will be increasingly important over the next 12 months and the period thereafter, partly because the first foreign policy crisis with which President Obama will have to deal will be the question of nuclear weapons in Iran—and how 10 Dec 2008 : Column 601 he deals with that will also be influenced by what is happening on the wider nuclear weapons front—but also because I believe the time has come for major consideration of where the world is going with regard to the overall question of nuclear weapons. Over the last two days, I have attended an international conference in Paris arranged by the new Global Zero organisation. It may be thought that the conclusion that was reached was not a surprising one, but it was surprising in one sense. I shall come to that in a moment. The conference reached the conclusion that there was an urgent need for a massive reduction in the number of nuclear arsenals around the world, and for serious consideration of the question of ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Members may ask what was surprising about that, given that over the years many conferences have reached the same conclusion. It was extraordinary, however, in view of the composition of the conference. To put it mildly, none of the usual suspects were there. It was not a collection of professional peace campaigners. Among those present were a former President of the United States, a former American national security adviser, Foreign Ministers and former Defence Ministers of NATO countries and nuclear weapons states, and air marshals, generals and other senior military personnel from countries with nuclear weapons. The conference followed an initiative taken nearly two years ago in articles that appeared in the American press signed by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz and others. In this country, a number of us have made similar proposals. An early-day motion is currently before the House, signed by 277 Members including, I believe, some 57 of my hon. Friends. We have to ask why those of us who have so often been identified with realpolitik are becoming strongly convinced of the need for a fundamental debate on the overall question of nuclear weapons, along with a change of approach to one of greater urgency. Essentially, it is because realpolitik means being influenced by real events and not by idealism or theoretical issues, and the real world has changed substantially since the end of the cold war. As the Foreign Secretary implied and my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks said, much has been achieved. At the end of the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union between them had between 26,000 and 27,000 operational nuclear weapons. That figure is now down to about 12,000—between 5,000 and 6,000 each. Nuclear weapons have also been successfully eliminated from Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine in the former Soviet Union, and there have been local achievements, such as South Africa giving up its nuclear weapons and Libya being persuaded not to conduct a weapons of mass destruction programme. In the past few years, however, that whole process has stalled dramatically. There is no evidence of any further impetus with regard to the United States and Russia, who between them have 95 per cent. of all the nuclear weapons in the world. That is becoming an increasingly serious matter because the continuation of the non-proliferation treaty, which comes up for debate in 2010, can no longer be taken for granted. Not only have we seen serious new proliferation in recent years, such as in Israel, India and Pakistan, but now there is the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as well; the North 10 Dec 2008 : Column 602 Korea situation is not yet resolved, and we know that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would only be a matter of time before the Arab states did so as well. There is, therefore, a serious new urgency, and the arguments that were valid during the cold war are no longer valid in the same way. The countries that had nuclear weapons during the cold war were overwhelmingly the great powers involved in that cold war, and they needed nuclear weapons because of the perceived conventional superiority of the Soviet Union and the need to prevent any war—conventional or nuclear—from breaking out. Because they have 95 per cent. of all nuclear weapons, the key to progress lies with the United States and Russia. If they were both able to make massive further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, they would know they could do so without any change in the relative power of the two states and their ability to deter any possible attack on themselves. Even if we believe in deterrence, we do not need 5,000 nuclear weapons to prevent an attack by our enemy; 500 would clearly destroy the world several times over. There is, therefore, no logical argument of defence why the Russians and the Americans cannot now approach a further stage in these negotiations by at the very least reducing their nuclear arsenals to 500 or 400, or even 200 or 300, without any change in fundamental defence strategy. Jeremy Corbyn: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not think it would be helpful if the US were to stop the whole national missile defence programme as something that is seen as antagonistic towards Russia—and as something that promotes the industrial and military interests in Russia? Sir Malcolm Rifkind: I think both that the United States has been premature in giving such emphasis to a ballistic missile programme long before there is any real threat of the kind suggested and that the Russians have grossly overreacted to some unarmed missile defence systems that might be placed in the Czech Republic and Poland. Therefore, I think both countries have to look at this afresh and try to move forward in a more sensible way. To return to my theme, if the Americans and Russians were able to make such major progress, that would itself send a massive signal to the NPT negotiations and help to ensure a continuation of that treaty. In addition, it would very greatly strengthen future President Obama in dealing with the Iranian threat. If he is able to demonstrate to the world not only that the United States is making massive reductions in its nuclear arsenal, but that he is prepared to negotiate—as he has said he is—with the Iranians on a resolution to the problems they face, either the Iranians will respond positively or if they fail to do so President Obama would be able to expect, and would receive, much greater international support for any tough measures that might then be needed against the Iranians. Therefore, no loss would be involved in the American position; instead it could be enormously enhanced. The second half of this debate is about not only a reduction in nuclear arsenals, which would ultimately have to include the United Kingdom, China, France and other nuclear powers, but whether it is possible actually to contemplate their elimination. That is, of 10 Dec 2008 : Column 603 course, a very difficult issue, because there is a crucial difference between a country reducing the number of nuclear weapons it has to 150, 100 or even 50 and removing them completely. If a country has even five or 10 nuclear weapons and its opponent has the same, the relative position between the two countries remains the same. Compared with a country that does not have nuclear weapons, a country with five or 10 weapons is enormously powerful in a way that the other is not; in the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. Bringing the amount of weapons down to a very small number will not be easy, but going to zero will be infinitely more challenging. That does not mean that it cannot be done, because we have been enormously successful in, effectively, abolishing chemical weapons, and that is a very encouraging precedent. To be able to contemplate achieving a reduction to zero, there must be a huge improvement in the verification and transparency regimes, not only for the weapon states themselves, but for civil nuclear programmes. That is because the fissile material in such programmes is also relevant to the potential production of enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons. We would also need to be confident that the verification and control systems would prevent the fissile material from getting to terrorist organisations, because those would be the people who could wreak enormous damage on the wider world. That is the basis on which we would have to address this issue, but there is a second aspect to it. One of the arguments that many, including myself, have used over the years, and which needs to be addressed if we are ever to contemplate the elimination of nuclear weapons, is that our eliminating them—assuming that we can do that—might, in practice, make conventional war more likely. Might it not be argued that nuclear weapons have helped to prevent conventional wars from breaking out? That was a powerful argument during the cold war; indeed, in one of his last speeches as Prime Minister, Winston Churchill said that “it may well be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.”—[ Official Report, 1 March 1955; Vol. 537, c. 1899.] Those are very powerful words. Even in recent years, there is at least an argument to be made that India and Pakistan are now much less likely to renew the conventional wars that they have had several times in the past 30 or 40 years, because both are now nuclear powers and they know that a conventional conflict might lead to a nuclear exchange. So this is not a foolish argument and we cannot simply dismiss it lightly. However, although the argument is valid, it is becoming progressively less so; indeed, it is becoming outweighed by other factors. The crucial argument that was relevant during the cold war was that if a conventional war ever broke out between the Soviet Union and the NATO powers, it would, in effect, be a third world war. It would not just be a local conflict; it would be a global conflict of dimensions comparable with both the first and second world war. There is no prospect of a global conflict of that kind in the foreseeable future. The great powers have not the remotest intention of going to war with each other, and there is no fundamental issue that might 10 Dec 2008 : Column 604 even lead towards that in the foreseeable future. The wars that we are trying to avoid are essentially local conflicts in various parts of the world. That is still a serious matter, but one cannot use the argument that we must therefore have nuclear weapons in those countries, because the logic would then apply to 180 countries around the world, and that would result in an unsustainable situation. In any event, even if the India and Pakistan situation in respect of the outbreak of conventional conflict has, in some way, been assisted by the fact that they are now both nuclear weapon states, that must be set against the downside that flows from what has been happening in recent years. The proliferation of nuclear weapons states has increased alarmingly, is increasing and, if we are not careful, will continue increasing so that it will encompass many more states around the world. We are talking not only about nuclear weapons states, but about the fissile material that is available, because when that fissile material is available and people such as A. Q. Khan in Pakistan are prepared to sell information to rogue states, the risks of that information getting into the hands of terrorist organisations become far more serious. Jim Sheridan (Paisley and Renfrewshire, North) (Lab): The right hon. and learned Gentleman is obviously well versed in these issues. He mentioned the ambitious challenge for President-elect Obama in trying to reduce weapons in the US. Does he share the concerns that that challenge may not be achievable, given that there are elements in the US that do not want it to happen? One recalls what happened when President Kennedy tried something similar. Sir Malcolm Rifkind: President-elect Obama will start with far greater authority than any other recent American President. If he is determined, a massive reduction in American and Russian arsenals can be achieved, at the very least because there is a mutual interest for both countries in achieving that. Going beyond that will require a degree of leadership, and we will have to see. I have reached the following conclusions on the issues that I have mentioned. First, whatever people’s views on nuclear weapons, there can be no credible, logical or rational reason why we cannot massively reduce the number of nuclear weapons from the 27,000 around the world—mostly in the US and Russia—to a tiny number, even if the deterrent argument still holds sway. Personally, I believe a deterrent is necessary unless we can achieve multilateral disarmament. Secondly, only by making major progress in that direction can we be sure of the continuation of the non-proliferation treaty. If we are having such problems with proliferation when the treaty exists, one can imagine how disastrous it would be it if fell and was not renewed. Thirdly, the progress that has to be made cannot be unilateral. It is no use asking for gestures from individual countries. At the very least that will do no good, and it may do a lot of harm. Multilateral disarmament is the best hope for progress. Fourthly, major enhancement of the verification and transparency regimes is needed, even though they are already quite sophisticated. With the advances in modern technology, the verification that will be available over the next few years will be of a much higher order. My 10 Dec 2008 : Column 605 final point is that we are not talking about these things happening in a year, or two years or five years. If we are to make the kind of progress required, it will be 10 to 20 years before we get down to low levels. It is only at that stage that we will be able to reach the final decision about whether it is acceptable to go from very small numbers of nuclear weapons to the actual elimination of this class of weapons, as we did with chemical weapons. It may be possible, or it may prove to be too difficult. It is not a decision that we have to reach now, and the mere attempt to move in that direction will undoubtedly be beneficial. In any scenario, having far fewer nuclear weapons than currently exist is infinitely preferable to the status quo, not least because it reduces the prospect of accidental conflict as well as removing large amounts of fissile material from the world. These are fundamental issues that do not depend on whether we are right wing or left wing, Labour or Conservative. They affect every human being for the most obvious of reasons. Victor Hugo once remarked: “More powerful than the march of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.” The Global Zero concept is an idea whose time has come, and if it can help to stop the march of mighty armies, that is an objective worth achieving. Mr. Michael Ancram (Devizes) (Con)10 Dec 2008 : Column 609 I should like to say how very strongly I supported the speech by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). He has shown us a lead that I hope our party and the Government will follow. As he knows, the only point on which I disagree with him is that I do not think that we can play a leadership role—the role that I would like to see the British Government, and people such as him, play—in moving towards multinational disarmament while committing ourselves to renewing our Trident deterrent, not now but in 20 years’ time. That gives the wrong message. As my right hon. and learned Friend knows—we have debated the matter before in the Chamber—that is why I voted as I did in the debate on the renewal of Trident... It is certain that isolating Iran has not stopped it moving forward towards obtaining a nuclear weapon. It has turned from the door that we closed in the west of Iran and opened the door in the east, so that for all their protestations in the Security Council, China and Russia are still trading with and have close relationships with Iran. I spend some time in the Gulf. There is another implication of the policy that we were pursuing. We were saying to our friends in the Gulf, “We hope you will join us in trying to create these restraints on Iran.” The Foreign Minister of one Gulf country said to me, “Hold on. It’s all very well for you to say that, but you 10 Dec 2008 : Column 611 and the Americans are here today. You won’t be here tomorrow or the day after, but Iran will always be there. If you expect us to take an antagonistic view of Iran and isolate it as you are trying to do, you are asking us to operate against our own interests.” There is every reason why we should support President Obama’s initiative to reopen dialogue with Iran and, to use the words of the Foreign Secretary, use diplomacy to try and achieve the purpose that we want to achieve in Iran, and move away from the stick that has been waved, largely by the Americans and occasionally by us, which has ultimately operated against our interests and has had no effect on Iran at all. Mr. Robert Walter (North Dorset) (Con)10 Dec 2008 : Column 617 I particularly congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) on his challenging speech about nuclear weapons and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) on his speech about engagement with Syria and Iran. My one slightly negative observation about our engagement with Iran is that I was due to speak at a conference in Tehran last Sunday, but unfortunately the Iranian authorities refused me a visa... Dr. Liam Fox (Woodspring) (Con)10 Dec 2008 : Column 640 The subject of Iran was raised a number of times. The primary question for the international community is whether it finds the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran acceptable. We have set out three reasons why we believe that the prospect is unacceptable. The first is the nature of the regime and its leadership, not least its threat to Israel’s very existence. The second is Iran’s record in exporting terror to other parts of the region. Adding fissile material to that situation would be utterly irresponsible. The third is that if Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state, others in the region will want to join the nuclear club. I was recently in Turkey, where it was made clear to me that if Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state, so will Turkey, and so will Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Do we really want a new nuclear arms race in the world’s most unstable region? If we are to influence Iran’s behaviour, we must have international solidarity on matters such as sanctions. We will require the co-operation of countries such as Russia, yet Prime Minister Putin was recently reported as saying that Russia is aware of what Europe is still doing in Iran and that it will not hand over this valuable market to Europe. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) said, President-elect Obama would be in a much stronger position if there was international unity, yet Europe is failing to show resolution where it matters. As he said, there is no ban yet on European investment in Iranian oil and gas fields 10 Dec 2008 : Column 641 and no ban on Europe-wide export credit guarantees, which subsidise trade with Iran. If we want security, we cannot say one thing and do another. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) made a passionate speech about the need for multilateral disarmament. It is fair to say that with bipartisan support, the United Kingdom’s approach is within the spirit and the letter of the non-proliferation treaty because our new nuclear deterrent will be at a lower warhead level than is currently the case. We are making our contribution; others must do the same. However, his speech echoed other contributions about the need for a new framework for non-proliferation. We will be in a world where more countries will want access to civil nuclear power. At the very least, we will need to be able to control the fuel cycle, with new structures and safeguards, if that is not to become a new proliferation problem. The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Hutton)10 Dec 2008 : Column 643 The issue of nuclear proliferation was raised by several Members, including the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) and my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn), and, towards the end of his remarks, by the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey). It is true that with the non-proliferation treaty review conference coming up in 2010 we have an opportunity to make some headway and progress. We have proposed initiatives covering the treaty’s three main pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Government are doing all they can to support a successful outcome to the NPT review, and it is important that we make progress, but I strongly agreed with the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea when he described nuclear disarmament as essentially a multilateral process; it must be so. I took issue—as I have often done—with my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North in his approach to these matters. I also take issue with what he said about the nuclear White Paper. He said that we were planning an expansion of the Trident fleet. As he knows, that is not the Government’s policy. We are taking the necessary measures now to prepare for the need for an eventual replacement of the current Vanguard class, but we are doing so on a prudent basis and it remains a minimum nuclear deterrent. The hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton got it wrong, too. He described our decision to replace the nuclear deterrent as premature. That is fundamentally wrong. We set out in the nuclear White Paper a clear time scale for the replacement and the reasons why it is necessary. If he does not agree with the time scale, which represents the best advice we have received from the military, he and his party are countenancing something that should not be countenanced: a gap in the deterrence capability of the UK. Jeremy Corbyn: Will the Secretary of State take this opportunity to assure the House that no work is going on in the replacement of nuclear warheads or the development of new nuclear warheads at Aldermaston or any other defence establishment? 10 Dec 2008 : Column 644 Mr. Hutton: I can give that assurance. I thought I recently answered a parliamentary question on that from my hon. Friend. We made it clear in the nuclear White Paper that we will come back to this House to have a vote on that if and when the need arises. I have only eight minutes left now, so I am running out of time as I still have 78 issues to respond to. Let me end my comments on nuclear proliferation with the following remarks. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea has had responsibility for this policy, and I have a great deal of respect for his judgment on these matters. He will know that when Ministers need to make decisions about nuclear deterrence, they are not thinking about the next two, three or five years, but have to take into account the next 40 or 50 years. That is the lifetime of the weapons system that we are designing and, as Members will know when they look at the detail of the White Paper, the new fleet will begin to come into service from about 2024 onwards. We are therefore thinking about a time frame that covers up to the middle of this century. Of course, we would all welcome a world free of nuclear weapons, because that is the sane and, it is to be hoped, it will be the happy outcome of all these discussions, but we must defend ourselves. We must take a reasonable judgment against risk. We know perfectly clearly that others are rearming as well, and the Government are not prepared to deny future generations the benefit and security that current generations have enjoyed from the nuclear deterrent. House of Lords, Queen's Speech Debate, Foreign Affairs and Defence, 4 December 2008http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ Lord Howe of Aberavon4 Dec 2008 : Column 69 Lastly, I support an even more ambitious objective of George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, supported by Senator Nunn and former Defence Secretary William Perry: the bigger, more important historic opportunity to reverse the reliance on nuclear weapons and ultimately to end their threat to the world. It is important that statesmen of that distinction are committing themselves to an objective that is longer term and more ambitious—with the changed position of nuclear weapons as they proliferate around the world—than the one that I have just sketched in relation to relations with Russia. Lord AddingtonI move on to one of the other aspects raised in the Queen’s Speech—the situation with Iran and Iran’s nuclear programme. Will the Government try to encourage the new American Administration to think twice about 4 Dec 2008 : Column 94 putting emphasis on things such as missile defence and, instead, once again allow the diplomats to become involved? I doubt very much whether the people of Iran, even with their most bellicose leaders, have a suicidal urge to attack the United States or its immediate allies with nuclear weapons. The US and its allies would be quite capable of retaliating to a point where Iranian society would cease to exist. Are we going to encourage our most powerful ally to try talking to Iran in an attempt to stop its people feeling so frightened and threatened that they indulge in a suicidal arms escalation in the area which they cannot conceivably win? It would not be impossible, even with conventional weapons, to destroy that country as it currently exists. Can we look at that issue? There is also the fact that missile defence has this wonderful aspect where one can say, “Oh, we are all safe now”, then we just press a button and it goes away. It is a few months since I did any heavy reading on this, but basically the assumption was that we might just get any missiles that are coming, provided that there are not too many of them. So there is an escalation factor. When it comes to inspiring fear and illogical responses, there are people who seem to be quite happy at being frightening and bellicose. The current Russian regime seems to enjoy being frightened and intimidated by the deployment of weapon systems. It may be true that the missiles placed in Poland and the Czech Republic would be incapable of stopping weapons striking from the former Soviet Union, but the principle is there. Are we getting ourselves into an escalation of threat, which means that we are crowding out the space for diplomacy? Surely, any action to which we are party must allow for that space for diplomacy, whether it is action on the ground or the potential placing of weapons. Let us remember that if Iran decides to commit effective suicide on a national level, it does not have to launch a missile; it need only put a nuclear device on a ship and sail it to the American coast or, indeed, our coast. I am sure that they are quite capable of understanding that. Unless we are prepared to sink every ship in the sea—I will not comment on Somali pirates now—we cannot defend ourselves long term by simply having that sort of system in place. It can always be flooded by more missiles or simply circumvented by another form of delivery. I shall be interested in the Government’s response. First, will we take on board in our entire procurement and training instruction, at least for the Army, that an efficient operation and successful outcome in Afghanistan is our primary objective? Secondly, are we prepared to step back to give Iran a chance to step back as well? Allowing that country to back down with good grace is the best outcome that we could conceivably have. Baroness Turner of Camden4 Dec 2008 : Column 119 Despite my strong feelings about the Iranian Government and concern that a Government of this type should acquire nuclear weapons, I do not support military intervention; neither does the PMOI. But international pressure could be applied and due recognition given to those like the PMOI whose political agenda is very different and includes gender equality and opposes the brutality of the present regime. On international co-operation, it is appropriate to consider the current state of our relations with Russia. I sometimes wonder whether our Foreign Office has really adjusted to the fact that the Soviet Union no longer exists and that the Cold War is over. Russia is often represented in our media as aggressive, assertive and bullying, a description that is frequently applied to Vladimir Putin. He is often demonised in sections of our press. However, anyone who has visited Russia, as I have, knows that he is popular. Furthermore, as far as many Russians are concerned, there are good reasons for this. He has brought stability, following the anarchy of the Yeltsin years. The chaotic privatisation of Russian state-owned industry brought enormous wealth to a few and impoverishment, unemployment and humiliation to many. Things have improved in recent years and Putin is credited with having brought about these changes. There is also no doubt about the way in which the last war, which they call the great patriotic war, still resonates with many Russians. Nearly 27 million Russians died and the Nazi armies reached quite close to Moscow. Leningrad, as it then was, suffered the most appalling siege and this is still remembered in St Petersburg. US missile sites in adjoining countries and the possible eastward extension of NATO give Russians the feeling that they are being surrounded, which is not surprising, given their recent history. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Malloch-Brown):4 Dec 2008 : Column 139 I want to say a word about Iran, which did not get much mention today. I shall say again that I think we all agree that there is an offer on the table to Iran, and more importantly there is now the clear intention of a new Administration in Washington similarly to take a fresh look at these issues and work out how to move forward effectively and successfully in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions while giving the country a sense of its own security, and thus allow it to progress, because progress so far has frustratingly eluded us. Brief mention was made of nuclear issues and it is worth recording that the cluster munitions treaty, which is so important to many noble Lords, was just yesterday signed in Oslo by the Foreign Secretary. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ House of Commons Defence Policy Debate, 30 October 2008Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)30 Oct 2008 : Column 1114 My last point is about Trident. The Secretary of State was absolutely right to say that one of the universal principles that guide the policy perspectives of anyone in a democracy is that of standards of democracy and consent. I found it slightly jarring to contrast those comments with one of his first visits in post to Faslane, an excellent facility that will be a tremendous base for conventional naval forces in Scotland. The Secretary of State chose to travel to Faslane and to criticise those of us who do not want Scotland to be home to a system of weapons of mass destruction. It is not just the SNP that believes that; the Scottish Churches, the Scottish TUC, the majority of voters and the majority of Labour voters in Scotland believe it. I hope that the Secretary of State, who is not present now, takes the opportunity to reflect on the fact that when he talks about democratic consent he should apply that to public opinion in Scotland... 30 Oct 2008 : Column 1078 Mr. Hutton: At the same time, the continuance of our nuclear deterrent will remain a fundamental part of Britain's defence policy, with a new generation of submarines to replace the Vanguard class—designed and built, with pride, in my constituency—in the years ahead. House of Commons Defence in the World Debate, 9 October 2008Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport) (Lab) 9 Oct 2008 : Column 470 ... My constituents none the less have concerns, which I should like to raise. I do not apologise for focusing, rather parochially, on Plymouth rather than raising wider strategic issues. On the MOD website, Members will find three statements of aims: to be fit for the challenge of today, to be ready for the tasks of tomorrow, and to be capable of building for the future. How can Plymouth, as part of the United Kingdom defence infrastructure jigsaw, help and be assisted to meet those aims and requirements? There are—not least in the current climate, and given our commitment to operations around the globe, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq—heavy demands on personnel and budgets. In addition, the MOD is committed to finding value-for-money savings—some £2.7 billion—which are expected to be reinvested in defence. In the light of those heavy pressures on budgets, it is not surprising that Plymouth has been facing uncertainty about the future of both the naval base and the size and role of the industrial set-up within the dockyard. That is not good for my constituents, and I do not think that it is good for United Kingdom defence or for the Royal Navy and Royal Marines based in and around Plymouth. Rather perversely, that uncertainty has been running in parallel with huge increases in Government spending in the dockyard on its facilities, nuclear and non-nuclear, and on the residences used by the Navy, as well as on the commercial purchase of the industrial interest by Babcock International. Babcock is continuing to grow, with revenue increasing by 57 per cent. in 2007-08. That makes it one of the leading suppliers of support to the Royal Navy, and we welcome its presence in the city... I suppose that all the improvements we have seen in the dockyard should have sent a signal to all involved that there was a real commitment to it on the part of all the major players. However, that is not how they were perceived, and when the naval base review was set in train and there was talk of surface work being removed from Plymouth, a few hares were set running. In response to the ongoing indecision about the dockyard's future, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy)—whom I am delighted to see in the Chamber—set up a dockyard strategy group, drawing in all the city's leaders, trade unions and Members of Parliament, as well as the regional development agency and other concerned parties, to ensure that Plymouth's concerns about the future direction of United Kingdom defence and our part in it were clarified and the future of our work force was assured. The strategy group knew that Plymouth was “fit for the challenge of today”, but we needed to be sure that we were “ready for the tasks of tomorrow”, and that we could sustain the skilled work force that was required to meet those demands. On the industrial side, Babcock operates very efficiently—as did its predecessor, DML—and for that reason it has continued, in a difficult economic climate, to win a steady stream of orders. In the last year, we have also seen major work, including the completion of HMS Victorious, which has already returned to sea after her three-and-a-half year refit. HMS Ocean, currently the Navy's largest ship, is out on sea trials following maintenance at a cost of £30 million. The Royal Navy's activity in Plymouth continues to fire on all cylinders to meet the demands placed on it in theatres around the globe. HMS Illustrious—which I was fortunate enough, as part of the armed forces parliamentary scheme, to join for a “Thursday war” recently—has just completed her operational sea training and will soon be back on patrol. For the uninitiated—I suspect there are not many of those in the Chamber today—a Thursday war takes place each week in the sea off Plymouth and involves assessments being carried out on every aspect of a ship's company and their work under operational conditions by the expert team from flag officer sea training to ensure that the crew has reached a level of professionalism to allow them to perform in any type of scenario. If anyone has the opportunity of participating in one of these events, I recommend that they do so as they are eye-opening. Even in the light of all this activity, we are still facing a pattern of future work subject to dips and troughs. That is inevitable given the improved reliability of modern warships and submarines, and so when the future of the naval base was called into question, the city and the work force wanted answers to a range of questions. We wanted reassurance that the Ministry of Defence really understood the implications of any decision it took in terms of socio-economic outcomes and the synergy that exists between the naval base, the MOD's commercial partners and the city's residents. We also wanted to be sure that the MOD was working closely with other Government Departments to—quoting again from one of its web pages— “make a contribution in the regions”... Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con) 9 Oct 2008 : Column 502 On the question of defence equipment, one of the greatest foreign policy challenges before us is that of failed states, rogue states or states that are infiltrated by terrorist organisations and radical groups. One country is causing particular concern: I heard a foreign policy expert speak recently on Iran. I hope that Iran and President Ahmadinejad will review their position with regard to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international community, and that they will allow monitors back in to examine the so-called civilian nuclear programme and the so-called civilian space programme so that the current impasse with that country can be dealt with diplomatically rather than in any other way. On how that situation may be dealt with, there are only two options if the diplomatic and peaceful route does not proceed as we all want it to. First, we have conventional intervention, which is quite unthinkable, whether it is possible or not, and who would be involved? Secondly, there is nuclear intervention, and of course, no one endorses or wants to see that. However, we have a difficulty from the point of view of geo-political strategy and that of stability. We do not have the needed flexibility in our current defence equipment. Our military commanders do not currently have certain options available to them and in the future they might need to consider other means to deal with a threat. If we are unable to use the conventional or nuclear option, what other options are there if diplomacy fails? During the debate on Trident last year, I mentioned hypersonic mass technology. As the hon. Gentleman said, we need to look again at defence equipment and at whether it matches the threats faced by our country and the NATO alliance. I hope that the Government will work closely with the American Administration and the great state of Alabama, which are developing conventional intercontinental ballistic missiles. These missiles are non-nuclear, but they have a far bigger and more powerful punch than any conventional missiles at the moment. Tomahawk missiles and cruise missiles would not be effective enough to deal with the threats in some parts of the world today, which is why we need to ensure that Britain is in the vanguard of developing such weapons. They are not fully developed at the moment, but they could come on-stream in two or three years. They can strike at any target within two hours, launched either from a submarine or a land site. I hope that the Government 9 Oct 2008 : Column 503 will consider such technology, and that the new Ministers will take a fresh look at whether we have the weapons to deal with current threats. They would cost fewer lives and less money than sending in a conventional army, or the use of nuclear weapons, which is completely unacceptable in my view. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Winter 2008 © 2009 The Acronym Institute. |