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Proliferation in ParliamentBack to Proliferation in Parliament, Winter 2008 Westminster ParliamentAtomic Weapons Establishments
Atomic Weapons Establishment, Written Answers, 18 Dec 2008 : Column 963WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his estimates are of the capital costs for the proposed (a) small components manufacturing, (b) conventional manufacturing rationalisation, (c) high explosives fabrication and (d) uranium handling facility at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. 18 Dec 2008 : Column 964W Mr. Quentin Davies: I am withholding the information as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice commercial interests. Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Blaneau Gwent of 29 October 2008, Official Report, column 1029W, when he expects the commercial discussions between his Department and AWE plc to conclude. Mr. Quentin Davies: Discussions between the Ministry of Defence
and AWE plc in respect of these matters are continuing. We hope to reach
a final settlement during the next financial year. AWE Aldermaston, Written Answers, 18 Dec 2008 : Column 964WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with reference to the answer to the hon. Member for Lewes, 10 November 2008, Official Report, column 777W, on AWE Aldermaston, if he will place in the Library a copy of the preliminary safety report for the proposed uranium handling facility at AWE Aldermaston which has been provided to the Health and Safety Executive. Mr. Quentin Davies: As I stated in my answer on 10 November 2008,
Official Report, column 777W, should the proposed replacement uranium
handling facility proceed, a preliminary safety report would be completed.
The document to which the hon. Member refers does not currently exist. USA: Nuclear Power, 20 Nov 2008 : Column 672WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many persons are seconded from (a) his Department and (b) the Atomic Weapons Establishment to United States Nuclear Research and Development establishments under the provisions of the 1958 UK-US Agreement for co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence purposes. Mr. Quentin Davies: Numbers of United Kingdom personnel stationed
in the United States under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement
vary in line with operational and other requirements. Currently there
are no Ministry of Defence personnel and four personnel from the Atomic
Weapons Establishment on secondment to the United States Nuclear Research
and Development establishments under the provisions of the Mutual Defence
Agreement. AWE Aldermaston, Written Answers, 17 Nov 2008 : Column 141WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what role the management consortium of the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston, AWEML, has played in responding to the improvement notice served by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive on 3 April 2008. Mr. Quentin Davies: Through its contract with the Ministry of Defence, AWEML is responsible for the safety of operations at AWE sites. This it discharges through its subsidiary, AWE plc, which holds the necessary Nuclear Site Licences and discharge authorisations issued by the external regulators. AWEML provides strategic guidance and direction to AWE plc, particularly in respect of safety and compliance with the regulatory regime. The AWEML board includes an independent safety director, who is engaged specifically to help ensure the correct emphasis and priorities are brought to bear on safety matters at AWE. With regard to the Improvement Notice issued on 3 April 2008, AWEML scrutinised
and endorsed the plan agreed between AWE plc and the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate in response to the issues raised. The AWEML board will be
closely monitoring AWE plc's progress to ensure that the plan is achieved. AWE Aldermaston, Written Answers, 10 Nov 2008 : Column 777WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a copy of the Preliminary Safety and Environment Document for the proposed Uranium Enrichment Facility at AWE Aldermaston. Mr. Quentin Davies: As I stated in my answer on 4 November 2008, Official Report, column 300W, there are no plans to build a uranium enrichment facility at the atomic weapons establishment. Should the proposed replacement uranium handling facility, to which I also referred, proceed, a preliminary safety report will then be completed as required by the Health and Safety Executive. Norman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether construction of the proposed uranium enrichment facility at AWE Aldermaston will be financed through a private finance initiative scheme; and what the (a) principles are and (b) mechanism is by which the project will be financed. Mr. Quentin Davies: As I stated in my answer on 4 November 2008, Official Report, column 300W, there are no plans to build a uranium enrichment facility at the atomic weapons establishment. We have no plans to introduce private finance into the proposed replacement
uranium handling facility to which I also referred. Funding for the project
will be allocated in accordance with normal MOD processes. AWE Burghfield, 10 Nov 2008 : Column 777WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the area protected under the terms of section 128 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCAP) at AWE Burghfield extends beyond the nuclear licensed site boundary; and for what reason the area is shown as extending beyond the licensed site boundary on the SOCAP map prepared by Defence Estates. Mr. Quentin Davies: The area at AWE Burghfield that is protected
under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCAP) is greater
than that of the nuclear licensed site. It extends to the outer perimeter
of the site in accordance with the provisions of section 128 of SOCAP
relating to nuclear sites. AWE Aldermaston, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 300WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects a pre-construction safety report to be submitted to the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate on the planned construction of a uranium enrichment facility at AWE Aldermaston. Mr. Quentin Davies: There are no plans to build a uranium enrichment facility at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). Nor has the process of uranium enrichment ever been undertaken at AWE Aldermaston. AWE currently has the capability to store, cast, machine and recycle
enriched uranium. These capabilities are required for the foreseeable
future, not only for use in Trident warheads, but also for submarine reactor
fuel. Operation of these facilities is licensed by the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate. In order to provide this capability into the future, the
best value for money option is to build a replacement uranium handling
facility. The proposed replacement handling facility programme is in the
assessment phase. If this handling facility proceeds to construction,
the requisite safety reports will be submitted to meet regulatory requirements. AWE Burghfield: Planning Permission, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 300WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 26 June 2008, Official Report, column 447W, on AWE Burghfield: planning permission, what the reasons are for the revisions to the timetable for submitting planning applications for new development at Atomic Weapons Establishment sites. Mr. Quentin Davies: The overall planning programme remains within
the 2005 to 2015 period identified within the AWE Sites Development Context
Plan. Some changes within the projected planning submission programme
have occurred, reflecting the need to address technical issues and a reordering
of priority in some cases. Such changes are to be expected in a complex
capital facilities programme. AWE Management: Emergencies, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 300WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on what date the Royal Berkshire Hospital last took part in a Level 1 emergency exercise for an Atomic Weapons Establishment site; and when the hospital is next scheduled to participate in such an exercise. Mr. Quentin Davies: The Royal Berkshire Hospital plays an important
role in emergency planning for Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) sites
and is routinely invited to participate in Level one emergency exercises.
The hospital last took part in a Level one emergency exercise for an AWE
site on 30 September 2003. AWE supported an exercise at the Hospital involving
simulated management and treatment of radioactively contaminated casualties
in October 2006. The next Level one exercises are planned for late spring
(Aldermaston) and autumn (Burghfield) 2009; precise dates have yet to
be finalised with the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. AWE Management: Floods, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 301WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his most recent estimate is of the costs arising from the July 2007 flooding at the Atomic Weapons Establishment sites. Mr. Quentin Davies: As I indicated in the answer I gave to the
hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Davies) on 29 October 2008, Official
Report, column 1029W, the costs, to the extent that they are not covered
by commercial insurance, are still the subject of commercial discussions
between the MOD and AWE plc. AWE Management: Safety, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 301WNorman Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what procedures are in place to monitor AWE Management Ltd's retention of a nuclear baseline which demonstrates that its organisational structures, staffing and competences remain sufficient to maintain nuclear safety at the Atomic Weapons Establishment sites operated by the company. Mr. Quentin Davies: In common with civil nuclear operators, the
Atomic Weapons Establishment sites are licensed by the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate (NII) and are required to comply with 36 licence conditions.
Licence condition 36 requires that any changes to the nuclear baseline
organisation for managing safety is monitored, assessed and categorised
in terms of its impact on nuclear safety management in order to gain appropriate
regulatory approval. The NII monitors AWE compliance against its licence
conditions through inspection of processes and procedures. AWE Management: Standards, Written Answers, 4 Nov 2008 : Column 301WMr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether AWE plc has complied with the improvement notice served by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive on 3 April 2008 in respect of criticality documentation shortfalls. Mr. Quentin Davies: The improvement notice issued to AWE plc. by the nuclear installations inspectorate (NII) on 3 April 2008 was served following an investigation into breaches of criticality operating rules at Aldermaston. The notice referred to the need for procedural guidance to have greater clarity. Improvements were sought in respect of the company’s arrangements and processes for complying with licence conditions covering operating rules and operating instructions. AWE plc. has agreed an implementation plan with the NII to meet the aforementioned,
which requires the company to complete the necessary improvements by 19
January 2009. The NII has indicated that it is content with AWE plc.’s
progress and that at no time were there any immediate operational risks
from a criticality event. Atomic Weapons Establishment, Written Answers, 3 Nov 2008 : Column 53WJeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much capital spending was drawn down at the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston in each of the last three years; and how much is planned to be drawn down in 2008-09. Mr. Quentin Davies: AWE has incurred capital expenditure of £171 million in 2005-06, £302 million in 2006-07 and £500 million in 2007-08. For 2008-09, the capital expenditure currently planned is £384 million. AWE Sites: Floods, Written Answers, 29 Oct 2008 : Column 1029WMr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the Atomic Weapons Establishment report on the effects of extreme weather events and flooding at its Burghfield and Aldermaston nuclear warhead development and production sites in July 2007; how much the remedial action taken as a result of the report has cost to date; and what assessment he has made of the sustainability of (a) AWE Aldermaston and (b) AWE Burghfield. Mr. Quentin Davies: Following the extremely heavy rainfall on 20 July 2007, immediate action was taken by AWE plc., with the agreement of MOD, to prevent any reoccurrence of the flooding. These measures proved effective when further extreme weather conditions were subsequently experienced across the country. AWE prepared a comprehensive review, learn and improve (RLI) assessment report following the flooding to ensure the continued safety of both sites. The MOD endorsed this report, and its recommendations, many of which were under way or implemented prior to its publication. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate has remained content that nuclear site licence requirements have been met both during and subsequent to the periods of exceptional rainfall. The cost of remediation, to the extent that it is not covered by commercial insurance, is still the subject of commercial discussions between the MOD and AWE plc. The disruption caused by the flooding had no adverse effect on the UK deterrent programme, and both Aldermaston and Burghfield sites maintained the capability 29 Oct 2008 : Column 1030W safely to support the deterrent. Knowledge gained from the events following
the flooding has been taken into account in taking forward the programme
of investment under way at AWE announced in July 2005, which will ensure
that this capability is sustained into the future. Specifically, flood
prevention measures continue to be included in designs for replacement
facilities and the potential risk from flooding forms a key element of
planning applications to the local planning authority. AWE Burghfield: Floods, Written Answers, 27 Oct 2008 : Column 628WHarry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what contingency planning had been conducted at Mr. Quentin Davies: Contingency planning at AWE Burghfield is based on the output of a rolling programme of assessments undertaken as part of the site safety cases. Before the 2007 flooding these concluded that the surface water management system would be adequate to prevent flooding of the operational facilities in normal circumstances. Mr. Quentin Davies: Contingency planning at AWE Burghfield is based on the output of a rolling programme of assessments undertaken as part of the site safety cases. Before the 2007 flooding these concluded that the surface water management system would be adequate to prevent flooding of the operational facilities in normal circumstances. Prior to the 2007 event, localised flooding was experienced at AWE Burghfield, which resulted in further contingency measures being implemented. This involved clearing and dredging the Burghfield Brook, which runs through the site, and reprofiling its banks to allow a greater amount of water to be contained and a constant flow to be maintained. Although the measures taken mitigated the effects of the July 2007 heavy
rainfall, flooding still occurred as run-off from surrounding fields migrated
to the site. Water sampling was completed throughout the site and no abnormal
results were detected. At no time was there any threat to the operational
safety of AWE sites, to the public or the environment. Back to Proliferation in Parliament, Winter 2008 © 2009 The Acronym Institute. |