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UK Nuclear Trade Policy (India)

• UK Nuclear Trade Policy (India), Written Ministerial Statement, 10 Nov 2008 : Column 34WS

UK Nuclear Trade Policy (India)

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Bill Rammell): Following the statement on civil nuclear co-operation with India on 6 September 2008 by the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) which provides an exception from the NSG guidelines for exports to civil nuclear facilities in India that are safeguarded by the IAEA, the UK Government have reviewed its policy towards nuclear-related exports to India. The details of the new policy position are as follows and will take effect immediately:

Since March 2002 UK policy has been to refuse all licence applications for trigger list items to India. That policy has changed and we will now consider on a case-by-case basis licence applications for peaceful use of all items on the NSG trigger list and NSG dual-use list when they are destined for IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India. Applications will be considered against the NSG guidelines for nuclear transfers, in accordance with the NSG statement of 6 September 2008.

In line with our nuclear suppliers group commitments we will continue to refuse:

applications in respect of all items on the NSG trigger list and NSG dual-use list, when they are destined for unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, or when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such activities.

We will also continue to consider on a case-by-case basis all applications to export other items assessed as licensable, including those assessed as licensable under the WMD end-use control, taking into account in particular:

the risk of use in, or diversion to, unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, or acts of nuclear terrorism;

the risk of possible onward transfer of these items to other states for proliferation purposes, including the recipient state’s export control performance; and

the potential utility of the items concerned for, and contribution that they would make to, such activities.

We will continue to consider applications for exports that will contribute to the physical protection or security of military nuclear facilities or assets in India. Licences may be issued in exceptional cases, consistent with our obligations and commitments.

We will continue to encourage contacts between UK nuclear scientists, academics and those working in or with the UK nuclear industry with their Indian counterparts, except where we consider that such contacts might be of assistance to the weapons-related aspects of its nuclear programme. Where such contacts involve the transfer of technology which require export licences we will continue to consider applications for such licences on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the provisions of UK export control legislation.

Licensing policy towards Pakistan remains unchanged.

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