 Proliferation in Parliament
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Proliferation in Parliament offers a digest of news, debates and developments in the UK Parliament and Government on issues relating to nuclear weapons, disarmament and proliferation. This Summer 2010 edition, compiled by Kat Barton, looks at developments since the 6 May 2010 General Election up until the close of Parliament for the summer recess in July 2010.
Previous editions of Proliferation in Parliament are available at www.acronym.org.uk/parliament.
Introduction
In an example of how politics and change can be constrained by logistics, the UK General Elections, which took place on 6 May 2010, coincided with the start of arguably the most important diplomatic event in the disarmament and non-proliferation calendar: the 2010 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Prime Minister Gordon Brown and New Labour were ousted, but David Cameron’s Conservative Party failed to win an overall majority. There followed several days of confusion before Conservative leader David Cameron and Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg negotiated a Coalition Agreement to form the UK’s first coalition in over 60 years, headed by Cameron as Prime Minister, with Clegg as Deputy Prime Minister.
In view of the Lib Dem opposition to the renewal of the Trident nuclear weapons system, defence and foreign policy were not immune from difficult negotiations. Incoming Tory Defence Secretary Liam Fox was quick to warn his Lib Dem coalition partners that there would be “no compromise over the renewal of the Trident nuclear programme”.
Following the US transparency initiative announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the NPT, in which the US arsenal was announced to contain 5113 active nuclear weapons, the new UK government’s first action on nuclear issues in the international arena was Foreign Secretary William Hague’s announcement to the Review Conference that the total number nuclear warheads in the UK’s arsenal were 225 – more than the ceiling of 160 operationally available warheads that the Labour government counted. The UK delegation at the NPT Review Conference also announced that there would be a review of UK declaratory policy.
This Proliferation in Parliament digest covers how Trident and nuclear policy were dealt with in the run-up to the General Election, the subsequent Coalition negotiations and in government statements and parliamentary debates, questions and answers during the first few weeks of the new government.
Trident in the General Election
Because New Labour adopted many of the defence policies of previous Conservative governments, nuclear weapons have not featured highly in the run-up to recent general elections. This changed in May 2010, as for the first time ever, the leaders of the three main political parties, Gordon Brown (Labour), David Cameron (Conservative) and Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat) participated in live, televised ‘Leaders’ Debates’ in which they put forward their policies on a range of issues. To the surprise of many, the renewal of the UK’s Trident nuclear weapons system became a controversial election issue when, in the first of the three 90-minute debates, Clegg questioned the logic of excluding Trident – “one of the biggest items of defence expenditure” – from the defence review expected to be held after the general election.
In response, David Cameron asserted that “we should always have the ultimate protection” of nuclear weapons – use of the term ‘always’ suggesting not just inflexibility, but a determination to close off any examination of the actual role and necessity for such weapons at a time when US President Barack Obama and a large number of senior British and international politicians and military officers (albeit now mostly retired) have concluded that national and international security would be best safeguarded by pursuing the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Gordon Brown’s response was to echo the emotive language of Conservative accusations against Labour nuclear policies in the 1980s, dismissing what he described as “Nick’s proposal to unilaterally abandon our nuclear deterrent”. His tactic was later mirrored by Tory Defence spokesperson Liam Fox and then Labour’s Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth who rounded on the Liberal Democrats for their “ridiculous” policy of being “committed to cutting Trident”. Subsequently, Lib Dem MP Ed Davey created further confusion when he declared: “We are not a unilateralist party, we may well need a nuclear deterrent going into the future.”
Shortly after the debates, four retired generals – including two members of the House of Lords – lent weight to the Lib Dem policy on Trident when they argued in a comment piece for The Times that “All political parties must allow a full and open debate about the Trident replacement as part of the strategic defence review”. This was followed not long afterwards by the publication of a contrasting letter in The Telegraph by other senior military figures who chastised the Lib Dems as “showing naivety” and voiced support for the Conservatives.
Unsurprisingly, Trident was very much at the top of the agenda for MPs in areas where local employment is dependent on nuclear-related defence contracts – a fact that was reflected by several local news pieces including two BBC News articles from Devon (Devonport naval dockyard) and Cumbria (Barrow naval shipyard). It was an entirely different story in Scotland, where the nuclear warheads and submarines are stored and deployed and opposition to Trident is particularly strong: ruling Scottish National Party (SNP) leader Alex Salmond was reported by the Financial Times as saying “There is no justification for an approach that puts vanity projects like Trident and its replacement before the education, the health and the safety of the people of our nation”. In a further direct challenge to political leaders who advocate possession of nuclear weapons, Scottish church leaders published a joint letter urging voters to support candidates who oppose funding for Trident.
On election day, in a piece that highlighted the unusual level of attention afforded to Trident over the preceding weeks, The Telegraph labelled it one of “the few strongly debated defence issues during the election campaign”.
Coalition negotiations to form a new government
Even so, the new MP for Barrow and Furness, John Woodcock (Labour), sought reassurance from the Coalition that it would definitely press ahead with the programme to build the new nuclear submarines in his constituency, later using his first speech in the House of Commons to warn against the “danger of delay” (North West Evening News).
The Conservatives and Lib Dems spent some time negotiating over a basic agreement, eventually publishing the finalised Coalition Agreement on 20 May 2010. Whilst the original agreement called for a Strategic Security and Defence Review (Lib Dem policy), as opposed to just a strategic defence review (Conservative pre-election policy), the finalised version referred to a Strategic Defence and Security Review, clearly a reassertion of the Conservatives putting defence decisions ahead of security assessments. The final Coalition Agreement made clear the government’s commitment to maintaining “Britain’s nuclear deterrent”, although in a concession to the Lib Dems it was agreed that the renewal of Trident would be “scrutinised to ensure value for money”, and the Lib Dems were left free to “continue to make the case for alternatives”.
Following the example set by the United States with the publication of its Nuclear Posture Review in April 2010, the government announced that it would be re-examining the UK’s declaratory policy to ensure that it is “fully appropriate to the political and security context in 2010 and beyond”. The re-examination will take place as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) that the government committed to undertake – see below – and will be conducted “against a background of the political and security environment facing the UK”.
To provide MPs with information and analysis of the issues relating to nuclear security to be considered by the UK Parliament, the House of Commons Library published two reports by in-house policy analyst Claire Taylor. The May 2010 research paper ‘Key Issues for the New Parliament 2010’ highlighted the upcoming tensions facing parliamentarians concerning “squaring available spending against the MoD’s obligations and aspirations” as well as “compromises over the exclusion of the Trident replacement programme from any defence review”. The June 2010 paper ‘Progress towards nuclear disarmament?’ drew attention to the new government’s role in determining the level of parliamentary scrutiny of the Trident renewal programme and in considering the merit of various technical proposals. The report also stressed the need for a decision in this Parliament on whether to replace or refurbish the UK’s nuclear warhead and suggested that the SDSR “may well recommend that the UK bring its declaratory policy into line with the US Nuclear Posture Review”.
A response to a written question on 17 June 2010 revealed that following the Coalition’s establishment of the National Security Council in May, a Cabinet sub-committee on Nuclear Deterrence and Security has been set up, although no date for a first meeting has yet been set.
As part of the compromise between the Conservative commitment to hold a ‘Strategic Defence Review’ and Lib Dem proposals for a ‘Strategic Security and Defence Review’, the Queen’s speech on 25 May 2010 contained the Coalition pledge to conduct a Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR). It was already Tory policy to keep Trident out of any strategic review, so it came as no great surprise that the Tory-Lib Dem coalition made the same decision. This is despite some extremely vocal lobbying to the contrary by the Lib Dems prior to the election, notably the assertion by then Lib Dem Defence spokesperson – now Armed Forces Minister – Nick Harvey that “Omitting the single largest procurement project from the strategic defence review makes a complete mockery of the whole exercise”.
Post-election, there have been even more voices calling for Trident to be included in the review. These begun with Early Day Motion (EDM) 110 ‘Trident and the Strategic Defence and Security Review’ and two written questions by Michael Weir (SNP MP for Angus) and Caroline Lucas (Green Party MP for Brighton Pavilion) respectively, followed by Plaid Cymru. Shortly afterwards, an amendment to the Queen’s speech was proposed, requesting “that your Government includes as part of its Strategic Defence and Security Review a full examination of the Trident nuclear missile system and any possible replacement”. The fact that the Lib Dems are now in government has certainly not prevented – often senior – members of the party from challenging the government position on this issue. In June for example, in a comment piece for The Guardian, Baroness Shirley Williams called for a wider debate on Trident saying that “Trident cannot be excluded from the painful examination of public expenditure in all departments of government”. Lib Dem MP Julian Huppert (Cambridge) questioned the Prime Minister on whether he agreed with the four generals (see above) that Trident should be included in the review, to which the PM reiterated his commitment to the “nuclear deterrent”, saying, “we should always keep that insurance policy against great danger”. Then, in July, Sir Menzies Campbell, former Lib Dem leader and a party spokesman on defence and foreign affairs, complained: “It makes no sense whatsoever to exclude Trident, the strategic deterrent, from a proper strategic review”, saying that to do so “skews” the review. In contrast, concerned that a full review might result in a policy change that would affect the jobs of his constituents in submarine-building Barrow-in-Furness, John Woodcock MP demanded assurances from the government that Trident would not be included in the review.
In his first speech on the SDSR – at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 14 June 2010 – Defence Secretary Liam Fox confirmed that Trident would be excluded from the review. According to The Guardian, Fox argued that ‘the reason why the government had excluded Trident, apart from ‘value for money’ considerations, was that “there needs to be a deterrent at all times’”. The commitment to undertake a ‘value-for-money’ study raised questions in Parliament as to the aim of the process. Government spokespeople responded by underscoring that the study’s role is to ensure that the UK’s “essential minimum deterrent” is “maintained as cost-effectively as possible”, rather than to address the “overall question of whether the successor to Trident remains the most effective form of deterrent”. Shortly after this, the local newspaper for Barrow-in-Furness, the North West Evening Mail, reported on a government decision to temporarily suspend a contract related to long-lead items of equipment for the successor to Trident, pending the outcome of the value-for-money study.
The main debate on the SDSR took place in the House of Commons on 21 June 2010 and included much discussion on Trident and its exclusion from the review. Interjections by MPs included Sir Menzies Campbell’s comment that “we should not be using defence as some kind of job creation scheme” and John Woodcock’s suggestion that “some who argue for a cheaper deterrent really mean that we should not have a deterrent at all”, whilst Kevan Jones (Labour MP for North Durham) chose to highlight the obvious inconsistencies between the Lib Dem position before and after the election.
The debate also provided an opportunity for the government to clarify the purpose of the value-for-money study. In this regard, Nick Harvey described the study as “a value-for-money study of the existing plan” and, in the clearest representation of the process to date, said: “I have to stress that it is not a review in which we look at all the possible alternative ways in which we might provide a successor, and see which works out the cheapest. It is a progress report on the work taking place on the Trident successor project.”
In terms of process for the SDSR, it was announced that the MoD part would be completed roughly by the end of July whereupon it would go to the Cabinet Office, who are co-ordinating the review, and ultimately on to the National Security Council where decisions will be taken.
A subsequent Commons debate on 5 July 2010 determined that the value-for-money study would be completed by the end of July and would inform both the SDSR and the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) which is due to be published in the autumn. The debate also revealed that the value-for-money study would cover the following aspects of Trident renewal: the timetable itself, submarine numbers, the number of missiles, missile tubes and warheads, infrastructure and other support costs, and the industrial supply chain.
On 6 July 2010, a response to two written questions – by Kris Hopkins and Caroline Dineage (both Conservative MPs - for Keighley & Ilkley and Gosport respectively) – further established that members of both Houses are invited to make formal submissions on the SDSR to the Defence Secretary and that MPs will also have further opportunities to debate the issues in Commons before the SDSR concludes.
Reflecting both the widespread concern over Britain’s dire financial straits and the overstretch in the armed forces as British service personnel continue to die in Afghanistan, John Cryer MP (Labour MP for Leyton & Wanstead) said that “There is a growing public perception that the Trident replacement is being insulated from any kind of scrutiny-including the defence review - while the Government continue to tear conventional forces to bits”.
With so much discussion about the value for money of current plans for Trident renewal, Dr Eilidh Whiteford (SNP MP for Banff & Buchan) and Jeremy Corbyn (Labour MP for Islington North) both submitted written questions seeking the most recently available estimates of the costs of the total procurement and in-service costs for replacing Trident including the submarines, nuclear warheads, missiles and necessary infrastructure costs associated with the proposals, as well as the estimated running costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston. In response, Defence Secretary Liam Fox referred members to the 2006 Labour government White Paper which quoted the total procurement costs of Trident replacement to be £15-20 billion (at 2006-7 prices) with running costs predicted at around 5 to 6% of the defence budget.
When pressed on the possibilities of alternatives to Trident, the government made it clear that they regard alternatives to Trident as having already been analysed and discounted and insisted that alternatives will not be considered as part of the value-for-money review. In addition, Liam Fox affirmed the government’s commitment to maintaining UK nuclear weapons, specifically via a Trident missile system and continuous at sea deterrence (CASD). In relation to this, when David Blunkett (Labour MP for Sheffield, Brightside & Hillsborough) – in an earlier debate – raised the possibility of nuclear sharing between the UK and France, Foreign Secretary William Hague said that the government would feed the idea into the SDSR.
In mid-July, it was revealed that the government is planning for an Initial Gate decision – the point at which approximately 15% of the £15-20 billion procurement costs will be committed – towards the end of 2010, following consideration by the Investment Approvals Board in the autumn.
Speaking at an event at Chatham House the following day, Liam Fox suggested that the number of submarines could be cut from three to four to save costs, although he described the £20 billion price tag for Trident replacement as “pretty good value”. Nonetheless, the Treasury clearly has some concerns over where the money for Trident will come from asserting – just two days after Fox’s “pretty good value” comment – that the cost of replacement should come out of the MoD’s core budget, reportedly much to the dismay of Dr Fox.
Amidst the discussion and questioning around Trident renewal, several written questions relating to the current operation of the UK’s nuclear weapons system were submitted. One, from Caroline Lucas sought to establish whether – following the announcement by William Hague of the size of the UK’s nuclear warhead arsenal – the government planned to enable international verification of the UK’s stockpile, to which Alistair Burt – Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs – responded that it did not, citing national security interests. Other questions related to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, in particular the exchange of staff under the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, AWE compliance with the NPT and the AWE Nuclear Safety Committee. In addition, with regard to the safety of the UK’s fissile materials, Peter Luff, Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, revealed that the fissile material for the UK’s remaining 65 tactical nuclear weapons – which are no longer considered operational – has not been removed from the stored warheads.
Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt, who briefly visited New York during May for consultations with UN and NPT representatives, welcomed the NPT outcome, stating that the government had achieved their objective of a “politically-binding action plan to strengthen the Treaty’s three pillars”.
In the course of a debate in the House of Lords on 9 June 2010, questions were raised as to the contribution the government will now make to the work required to make progress on the action points agreed at the NPT Review Conference. Baroness Sue Miller (Lib Dem) argued, “Without those practical steps, wishes will remain aspirations as opposed to realities.”. In a similar vein, noting the unprecedented and overwhelming support for a nuclear weapons convention to abolish nuclear weapons expressed by the non-nuclear powers, Baroness Shirley Williams, formerly Gordon Brown’s advisor on non-proliferation (despite being a Lib Dem peer), enquired as to “how far we can make precise the future steps towards disarmament”.
The question of concrete progress on the agreed 2012 regional conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMD FZ) also featured, with Lord David Hannay (Crossbench) asking the government to press hard for the appointment of a facilitator for the conference. Later, speaking in the Commons on 30 June 2010, Alistair Burt confirmed the government’s support for the planned Middle East WMD FZ conference, calling it an “important step forward” to which the government is “committed to working constructively” so as to ensure success.
In a written statement to the Commons on 14 June 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague presented the UK government’s report on the outcome of the Review Conference, in which he emphasised discussions and agreements on non-proliferation and nuclear security whilst holding up the action plan on nuclear disarmament as evidence that the five nuclear weapon states are “taking their disarmament obligations seriously”.
Meanwhile, a more direct (written) question by Mark Lazarowicz (Labour MP for Edinburgh North & Leith) asked the government not to seek an update to Trident during the period of post-Review Conference discussions on the future of nuclear disarmament. Dismissing such pleas, Liam Fox on 6 July 2010 reiterated the previous government’s stance that “as soon as it becomes useful for the UK to include its nuclear stockpiles in broader disarmament negotiations, we stand ready to participate and to act”. Similarly, when Mike Hancock (Lib Dem MP for Portsmouth South) challenged the Defence Secretary on whether his re-examination of UK declaratory nuclear policy would include consideration of compliance with commitments made by the UK at the Review Conference, he was told that is not the purpose of the review.
The UK’s role in international negotiations came up again in a written question regarding the steps the Government plan to take to seek to persuade the remaining ‘Annex 2’ countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Annex 2 reference is to the list of 44 nuclear capable states identified in the CTBT text as necessary for entry into force. Of these, 6 (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the United States) have signed but not ratified, and 3 (India, North Korea and Pakistan) have not yet even signed. Alistair Burt responded by assuring that the government would “take all appropriate opportunities to promote signature and ratification” and would support the CTBT Organisation in their efforts – particularly with regard to US ratification of the treaty.
Proliferation Challenges
Some of the issues raised in Parliament recently had to do with challenges to the non-proliferation regime. The publication in late May of a report claiming that the ruling military junta of Myanmar (Burma) is seeking to develop nuclear weapons prompted Lib Dem MP Jo Swinson (East Dunbartonshire) to pose two written questions on the subject. The first related to export controls and reflected a concern over UK and other European exports to the Myanmar regime which could potentially be used in the production of nuclear weapons. The second asked what information had been received by the government regarding alleged North Korean assistance to Burma in acquiring nuclear weapons technology. The minister responsible, Jeremy Browne (Minister of State at the Foreign Office), used almost identical language in his response, emphasising existing measures to marginalise the military regime and highlighting the fact that the UK’s continues to urge it to abide by Burma’s international obligations. He said that no specific EU measures are in place which restrict the export of dual use machinery to that country, adding that should there be “authoritative evidence” that Burma is in breach of its international obligations, the UK would raise the matter with other EU member states.
Another written question to receive a standard response was that of Mark Lazarowicz MP who asked what steps the government is taking to encourage India & Pakistan to participate more fully in international negotiations on nuclear security. The minister responsible – Alistair Burt – spoke of nuclear security as a policy priority for the government and said they would be encouraging active participation by India and Pakistan in the next Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012.
The IAEA’s most recent assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme was received by Parliament via responses to two written questions which informed parliamentarians that (as of 31 May 2010) Iran had shown no sign of suspending its uranium enrichment related activities and that it continues to stockpile enriched uranium and is now enriching up to nearly 20%. David Cameron avoided being pinned down to a particular date in response to a question which sought to set a deadline for assessing the government’s ‘twin-track’ strategy of combining sanctions with engagement and assistance in dealing with Iran, saying that the process is an ongoing one which “should be continually assessed”. Other questions relating to Iran came after adoption of a fourth round of sanctions on Iran through UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (9 June, 2010, adopted by a vote of 12 in favour to 2 against (Brazil, Turkey), with 1 abstention (Lebanon)). Responding to an enquiry about the implementation of the sanctions, Alistair Burt said the government is working with EU partners to ensure “harmonised implementation” of UN measures and is seeking tough additional EU measures, referring in particular to the European Council Declaration of 17 June 2010 which set out a range of areas where the EU will pursue additional sanctions against Iran. He also welcomed the creation of a UN Panel of Experts, mandated by Resolution 1929, who will examine and report on the implementation of sanctions against Iran and said that the government will be submitting a report “in coming months” to the UN Secretariat on the measures the UK has taken to implement the latest round of sanctions.
During a House of Lords debate on foreign policy, Baroness Shirley Williams expressed her disappointment at what she perceived as the “western dismissal” of an attempt at mediation by Brazil and Turkey which had brokered a revised version of an earlier IAEA-supported fuel-swap proposal for Iran. Speaking in the same debate, Lord Patrick Wright of Richmond (Crossbench) echoed Baroness Williams’ concerns over the rejection of the proposal and questioned the wisdom of strengthening sanctions that “show no signs of having any practical effect”. In addition, he argued that if proponents of mutual deterrence theory regard Indian and Pakistani possession of nuclear weapons as evidence that their theory works, should Iran not “draw the same lessons of deterrence”?
Following the publication of a Guardian newspaper report based on documents uncovered by Sasha Polakow-Suransky regarding Israeli possession of nuclear weapons, Alistair Burt said that the UK government had seen nothing to substantiate the claims and had not had any discussions with the Israeli government regarding the matter. Later, in a response to a request for the government to take steps to encourage the Government of Israel to declare the number, type and location of its nuclear weapons, he reiterated that it is UK government practice to encourage “all states to be as transparent as possible about their civilian-and, where applicable, military-nuclear programmes and capabilities”, saying that the UK continues to “call on Israel to sign up to the non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state”.
Finally, during the foreign policy debate in the Commons on 26 May 2010, William Hague expressed concern over North Korea’s nuclear programme and expressed support for South Korean President Lee’s announcement of proportionate action in response to the sinking of a South Korean naval ship and referral of the incident to the UN Security Council.
Index
1) Introduction
Coalition Agreement
No compromise over Trident
Hague announces UK nuclear weapon stockpile and review of declaratory policy
2) Trident and the General Election
The Leaders Debate
Rounding on the Lib Dems
Davey: ”We are not a unilateralist party”
Generals’ comment piece in The Times
Letter in The Telegraph
Trident as a local issue
Scotland opposes Trident
A strongly debated issue
3) Coalition negotiations to form a new government
Barrow MP seeks reassurance
Basic Agreement
Coalition Agreement
UK declaratory policy
HoC Library report on ‘progress towards nuclear disarmament’
Outlining the issues facing the new Parliament
Cabinet Committee on Nuclear Deterrence and Security established
4) Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
SDSR announced in the Queen’s speech
Lib Dems pre-election lobbying
Calls for Trident to be included in the review: EDM 110
Calls for Trident to be included in the review: 2 written questions
Plaid Cymru joins the chorus
Amendment proposed to Queen’s Speech
Shirley Williams calls for a wider debate
Asking the Prime Minister
Menzies Campbell says excluding Trident “skews” review
Barrow-in-Furness’ MP demands assurances
Liam Fox’s first speech on the SDSR
Questions raised over value-for-money study
Sub work temporarily suspended
Main HoC Debate on SDSR
Nick Harvey clarifies ‘value-for-money’ study
Process for the Trident value-for-money study
Opportunities to contribute to SDSR
Trident insulated from scrutiny
5) Trident Replacement: costs, alternatives and dates
Costs of Trident renewal and maintenance
Alternatives to Trident
Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD)
France-UK nuclear sharing
Initial Gate decision date
Fox: Sub numbers could be cut to save costs
Treasury calls for Trident to be paid for by MOD budget
6) UK nuclear weapons: Current Operation
Verification of UK warhead numbers
AWE: Exchange of staff under the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement
AWE: Compliance with NPT
AWE Nuclear Safety Committee
Safety of UK fissile materials
7) Britain’s International Obligations, the NPT and other international treaties
NPT 2010: UK Government objectives
The need to make progress
An abolition treaty and future steps towards disarmament
Middle East WMD FZ conference: UK contribution
William Hague post-Rev Con speech on the NPT
UK compliance with 2010 NPT Rev Con
UK declaratory nuclear policy & the Rev Con
CTBT entry into force: UK role
8) Proliferation Challenges
Burma:
Report on Burma’s nuclear ambitions
Export controls & North Korean assistance
India & Pakistan:
Nuclear security
Iran:
Most recent assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme
Twin-track strategy
Implementation of sanctions
Disappointment at dismissal of Brazil and Turkey mediation attempts
Sanctions questioned
Israel:
Guardian report on evidence of Israeli nuclear weapons
Burt: Nothing to substantiate claims
Israeli nuclear weapons – UK government should encourage openness
North Korea:
Hague raises concern
Introduction
Coalition Agreement
Published by the Cabinet Office on 20 May 2010
‘We will maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent, and have agreed that the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for money. Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives. We will immediately play a strong role in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and press for continued progress on multilateral disarmament.’
No compromise over Trident
Liam Fox: no compromise with Liberal Democrats over Trident
Rosa Prince, The Telegraph, 17 May 2010
‘Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, has warned his Liberal Democrat coalition partners that there will be no compromise over the renewal of the Trident nuclear programme.’
Hague announces UK nuclear weapon stockpile and review of declaratory policy
Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Commons Debate, 26 May 2010, Column 181
Mr Hague: …The conference to review the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which I just mentioned, began during our election campaign and has entered its final week in New York. In opposition, my party promised decisive UK leadership in this effort if elected, and the coalition agreement pledged an immediate and strong UK role at the conference. So I am pleased to announce today that, for the first time, the Government will make public the maximum number of nuclear warheads that the United Kingdom will hold in its stockpile-in future, our overall stockpile will not exceed 225 nuclear warheads. This is a significant step forward on previous policy, which was to publish only the number of warheads classed as ‘operationally available’, the maximum number of which will remain at 160. We believe that the time is now right to be more open about the nuclear weapons that we hold. We judge that that will further assist in building the climate of trust between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, which has been lacking in recent years, and will contribute to efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide. I can assure the House that this disclosure poses no threat to the security of the United Kingdom. Together with similar announcements made by the United States and France, it helps to set standards of transparency that all states with nuclear programmes should follow.
I can also announce that the Government will re-examine the UK’s declaratory policy as part of the strategic defence and security review. The purpose of our nuclear weapons is to deter attack, and the UK has long been clear that it would consider using them only in extreme
26 May 2010 : Column 182
circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies. This country has been deliberately ambiguous over the precise circumstances of use, although we have offered some assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. We have decided that the time is right to look again at our policy-the US has done the same in its recent nuclear posture review-to ensure that it is fully appropriate to the political and security context in 2010 and beyond. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), is, as I speak, attending the review. He will repeat these announcements there and will meet other delegations to help promote a positive outcome of the conference. These concrete actions show how seriously we take our obligations to strengthen the non-proliferation treaty and to move towards the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons while ensuring that we maintain our credible minimum nuclear deterrent.
UK nuclear warhead total revealed
James Blitz, Financial Times, 26 May 2010
‘Britain revealed for the first time on Wednesday the full size of its atomic weapons arsenal in an effort to boost international confidence in the scope and nature of its independent nuclear deterrent. But while the announcement allowed William Hague, the foreign secretary, to bring the UK into line with recent reform of nuclear weapons policy in the US, it still left key questions unanswered on the future of the submarine-launched deterrent.’
Trident and the General Election
The Leaders Debate
Extract from ‘The Leaders Debate’
ITV, 15 April 2010
‘Nick Clegg: I actually agree, strongly agree, and it‘s something I‘ve been calling for for years, that we should have a complete review about whether our military equipment is right for the job that we are asking our brave soldiers and brave servicemen and women to do. Because of course the world is changing and the threats to this country are changing with it. What I simply don‘t understand is if we hold that review, as I think is going to be likely after the general election, whoever wins that election, both David Cameron and Gordon Brown want to rule out one of the biggest items of defence expenditure of all, which is the Trident nuclear missile system. This was a system that was designed at the height of the Cold War to flatten St Petersburg and Moscow. Is it really that important?
Alastair Stewart (Chair): Let me bring David Cameron in on that point.
David Cameron: Let me answer that directly because I think it‘s important. I think the most important duty of any government, anyone who wants to be Prime Minister of this country, is to protect and defend our United Kingdom. And are we really happy to say that we‘d give up our independent nuclear deterrent when we don‘t know what is going to happen with Iran, we can‘t be certain of the future in China, we don‘t know exactly what our world will look like? I say we should always have the ultimate protection of our independent nuclear deterrent. That‘s why we voted to make sure that happened.
Alastair Stewart: Gordon Brown.
Gordon Brown: I‘ve got to deal negotiations over Iran, and we‘ve got the problem over North Korea. If countries unilaterally decide to have nuclear weapons and break the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then we need multi-lateral action with all of us working together. We are nuclear weapon states. We can make a huge difference in the reduction of nuclear weapons overall, if we can persuade countries not to have nuclear weapons in the first place or force them not to have them, if we can then have a reduction in nuclear weapons all round. But I don‘t favour Nick‘s proposal which would unilaterally abandon our nuclear
deterrent when we know Iran and North Korea and other countries are trying to get...’
Rounding on the Lib Dems
Tories back Trident to foil Lib Dem surge
Amy Wilson, The Telegraph, 17 April 2010
‘Dr [Liam] Fox [the then shadow defence secretary] hit out at Liberal Democrat plans to cancel the Trident replacement nuclear deterrent, saying it put the future of Plymouth dock at risk because there won‘t be enough work, and said the decision would mean ‘the end’ of BAE Systems‘ shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness.’
Election: Lib Dem Trident policy ridiculous - Ainsworth
news.bbc.co.uk, 17 April 2010
Lib Dem Defence spokesperson, Nick Harvey, is quoted as saying: "It is absurd to decide now that we are absolutely determined to be a nuclear power from 2030 through to 2060." But then (Labour) Defence Secretary, Bob Ainsworth said: "Nick‘s position appears to be that he wants to continue to have an independent nuclear deterrent but he wants a cheap one. And a cheap one would be a vulnerable and ineffective one and that is the fact. It is a ridiculous policy.’
Davey: ”We are not a unilateralist party”
‘The Full Election Story: 19 April’ BBC live blog
Justin Parkinson, Andy McFarlane and Victoria King, news.BBC.co.uk, 19 April 2010
‘1447 Lib Dem foreign affairs spokesman Ed Davey says his party is not unilateralist on nuclear weapons, but Trident does not best support the UK‘s strategic needs. There would be a nuclear deterrent of some kind if the Lib Dems win power, he adds. David Miliband says nuclear policy requires the "greatest care". He also accuses the Conservative of wanting to "overturn 60 years of co-operation" with China. For the Tories, William Hague says he and his colleagues have "excellent relations" with the Chinese.’
Generals’ comment piece in The Times
Money spent on Trident can’t go on troops
Edwin Bramall, David Ramsbotham, Hugh Beach, Patrick Cordingley, The Times, 21 April 2010
‘Any genuinely comprehensive review needs to weigh up all of these issues and answer the question: “Is the UK’s security best served by going ahead with business as usual; reducing our nuclear arsenal; adjusting our nuclear posture or eliminating our nuclear weapons?”’
Generals add their fire to Clegg’s attack on Trident
Deborah Haynes and Roland Watson, The Times, 21 April 2010
‘The generals say that the next government would threaten both frontline Forces and global disarmament talks unless it considers different ways of spending the £80 billion required to replace the fleet of submarines.’
Letter in The Telegraph
Lib Dem‘s policy of scrapping Trident “shows naivety”
Caroline Gammell, The Telegraph, 5 May 2010
‘Getting rid of Britain’s Trident nuclear programme would place this country in danger, senior military figures argue in a joint letter to The Daily Telegraph.’
Trident as a local issue
Devon candidates clash over Trident nuclear submarines
bbc.news.co.uk, 14 April 2010
‘Devon MPs have clashed over the future of the UK‘s Trident nuclear submarines which are refitted at Devonport base in Plymouth.’
Barrow candidates disagree on Trident
News.BBC.co.uk, 27 April 2010
‘The future of Barrow‘s BAE shipyard has been top of the election agenda in the Cumbrian port.’
Scotland opposes Trident
SNP vows to break “cosy consensus” on cuts
Andrew Bolger, Financial Times, 12 April 2010
‘“We will break through the cosy Westminster consensus on cuts,” said Mr Salmond. “There is no justification for an approach that puts vanity projects like Trident and its replacement before the education, the health and the safety of the people of our nation.”’
Scottish Churches call for voters to back anti-Trident candidates
First published in: Church of England Newspaper, 18 April 2010
‘Church leaders in Scotland have released a joint Easter letter urging voters to support candidates who will oppose funding for a new generation of Trident nuclear missiles.’
A strongly debated issue
General Election 2010: Trident policy the major flashpoint in subdued defence debate
Thomas Harding, The Telegraph, 6 May 2010
‘The issue of replacing the submarines and their missiles has been among the few strongly debated defence issues during the election campaign… The future of the Trident nuclear deterrent is certain to “be on the table” in any potential coalition involving the Liberal Democrats.’
Coalition negotiations to form a new government
Barrow MP seeks reassurance
Woodcock: “We need Trident reassurance from coalition”
North West Evening Mail, 17 May 2010
‘Barrow-in-Furness’ new MP has said he will seek answers over the Trident review that emerged from the coalition talks. John Woodcock claims the Tories and Lib Dems have ripped up Labour’s unequivocal commitment to pressing on with the successor programme of the Barrow-built submarines which carry the UK’s nuclear deterrent on day one of their new government. The coalition has agreed to maintain the nuclear deterrent, but now says “the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for money”’.
MP’s first speech warns against Trident delay
North West Evening Mail, 28 May 2010
‘Barrow-in-Furness’ new MP has used his first speech in the House of Commons to set out the importance of the shipyard and warned against stalling the Trident successor programme.’
Basic Agreement
Full Text: Conservative-Lib Dem deal
News.BBC.co.uk, 12 May 2010
‘This document sets out agreements reached between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats on a range of issues. These are the issues that needed to be resolved between us in order for us to work together as a strong and stable government. It will be followed in due course by a final Coalition Agreement, covering the full range of policy and including foreign, defence and domestic policy issues not covered in this document…
Re: nuclear policy:
‘The parties commit to holding a full Strategic Security and Defence Review alongside the Spending Review with strong involvement of the Treasury.
The Government will be committed to the maintenance of Britain's nuclear deterrent, and have agreed that the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for money. Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives. We will immediately play a strong role in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and press for continued progress on multilateral disarmament.’
Coalition Agreement
Published by the Cabinet Office on 20 May 2010
‘We will maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent, and have agreed that the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for money. Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives. We will immediately play a strong role in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and press for continued progress on multilateral disarmament.’
UK declaratory policy
Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Commons Debate, 26 May 2010, Column 181
Mr Hague: …The conference to review the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which I just mentioned, began during our election campaign and has entered its final week in New York. In opposition, my party promised decisive UK leadership in this effort if elected, and the coalition agreement pledged an immediate and strong UK role at the conference. So I am pleased to announce today that, for the first time, the Government will make public the maximum number of nuclear warheads that the United Kingdom will hold in its stockpile-in future, our overall stockpile will not exceed 225 nuclear warheads. This is a significant step forward on previous policy, which was to publish only the number of warheads classed as "operationally available", the maximum number of which will remain at 160. We believe that the time is now right to be more open about the nuclear weapons that we hold. We judge that that will further assist in building the climate of trust between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, which has been lacking in recent years, and will contribute to efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide. I can assure the House that this disclosure poses no threat to the security of the United Kingdom. Together with similar announcements made by the United States and France, it helps to set standards of transparency that all states with nuclear programmes should follow.
I can also announce that the Government will re-examine the UK‘s declaratory policy as part of the strategic defence and security review. The purpose of our nuclear weapons is to deter attack, and the UK has long been clear that it would consider using them only in extreme
26 May 2010 : Column 182
circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies. This country has been deliberately ambiguous over the precise circumstances of use, although we have offered some assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. We have decided that the time is right to look again at our policy-the US has done the same in its recent nuclear posture review-to ensure that it is fully appropriate to the political and security context in 2010 and beyond. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), is, as I speak, attending the review. He will repeat these announcements there and will meet other delegations to help promote a positive outcome of the conference. These concrete actions show how seriously we take our obligations to strengthen the non-proliferation treaty and to move towards the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons while ensuring that we maintain our credible minimum nuclear deterrent.
Nuclear Weapons, Written Questions, 23 June 2010, Column 236W
Caroline Lucas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 7 June 2010, Official Report, column 511W, on Trident, what the re-examination of the UK‘s declaratory nuclear policy will include; and what issues related to the replacement of Trident in addition to value for money issues will be considered within the framework of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. [3809]
Dr Fox: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) will re-examine all the constituent parts that together form the UK‘s declaratory nuclear policy. This will be done against a background of the political and security environment facing the UK.
In addition to the Trident value for money review, the SDSR will look at wider maritime and other conventional forces required to support the nuclear deterrent and the sustainability of the UK submarine industrial base.
House of Commons research outlines key issues for the new Parliament
From ‘Key Issues for the New Parliament 2010’, House of Commons Library Research, May 2010
Extract from ‘Strategic Defence Review’ section, p113, written by Claire Taylor:
‘Where from here?
The extent to which the new coalition Government will embrace the recommendations of the green paper remains to be seen. What is certain is that squaring available spending against the MOD’s obligations and aspirations will not be easy, while compromises over the exclusion of the Trident replacement programme from any defence review may need to be made. While the Labour Government and the Conservatives had both indicated their intention to ring fence Trident, the Liberal Democrats have consistently called for a ‘like-for-like’ replacement of the UK nuclear deterrent to be scrapped and for all other remaining options to be considered as part of a new defence review.’
House of Commons Library report on ‘progress towards nuclear disarmament’, Claire Taylor, 15 June 2010
Extract: ‘Several analysts have concurred that the review may well recommend that the UK bring its declaratory policy into line with the US Nuclear Posture Review in order to harmonise UK and US nuclear policy and avoid any potential confusion within NATO.323 It will also be for the new government to determine whether parliamentary scrutiny of the programme going forward will also be subject to further debate and votes in the House, as several commentators have called for and whether technical proposals put forward under Labour, such as the reduction to a three-boat class, will now be pursued. As outlined above, the decision on whether to replace or refurbish the UK’s nuclear warhead will also be required within the lifetime of the current Parliament.‘
Cabinet Committee on Nuclear Deterrence and Security established
Deputy Prime Minister: Cabinet Committees: Nuclear Weapons, 17 June 2010, Column 519W
Mr Watson: To ask the Deputy Prime Minister when he next expects the Cabinet Committee on Nuclear Deterrence and Security to meet. [236]
Mr Letwin: I have been asked to reply.
The National Security Council has agreed the formation of a sub-committee to consider issues relating to nuclear deterrence and security. The date of the first meeting has not yet been finalised, but it is anticipated it will take place shortly.
Strategic Defence & Security Review
SDSR announced in the Queen’s speech
Queen’s speech at a glance
The Independent, 25 May 2010
‘* Full strategic defence and security review.
* Maintenance of Britain‘s nuclear deterrent, with continued scrutiny to ensure that the renewal of Trident is value for money. Liberal Democrats will “continue to make the case for alternatives”.’
Lib Dems pre-election lobbying
Liberal Democrats call for immediate review of UK Trident policy
Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, 2 April 2010
‘Britain‘s Trident nuclear missile system must be debated in the forthcoming strategic defence review, the Liberal Democrats said today… [Sir Menzies] Campbell said today: "I simply don‘t understand why both Labour and the Conservatives think we can have a strategic defence review which excludes Trident."’
Calls for Trident to be included in the review: EDM 110
EDM 110: Trident and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, 26.05.2010
Corbyn, Jeremy
That this House welcomes the Government‘s intention to hold a strategic defence and security review; notes with concern the stated intention to conduct it without giving due consideration to the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the defence of the UK; believes that not only does the commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty require nuclear weapons and disarmament to be considered within the framework of the review but that the threat of spending cuts to the defence and other Government budgets makes this all the more important; and urges the Secretary of State for Defence to ensure that the review includes both the UK‘s ongoing possession of nuclear weapons and the replacement programme.
Calls for Trident to be included in the review: 2 written questions
1) Defence: Trident, Written Questions, 2 June 2010, Column 5W
Mr Weir: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has to include the renewal of Trident in the Strategic Security and Defence Review. [722]
Dr Fox: We will maintain Britain‘s nuclear deterrent, and have agreed the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for money.
Mr Weir: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he plans to examine the value for money of the proposal to renew Trident. [723]
Dr Fox: Yes.
2) Defence: Trident, Written Questions, 7 June 2010, Column 11W
Caroline Lucas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether plans for the replacement of Trident will be included in the Strategic Defence Review. [1300]
Dr Fox: Both the value for money review of the Trident programme and the re-examination of the UK‘s declaratory nuclear policy will be conducted within the framework of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Plaid Cymru joins the chorus
Plaid joins the call for “outdated” Trident’s future to be scrutinised
David Williamson, WalesOnline.co.uk, 7 June 2010
‘Plaid Cymru has joined forces with the Greens and the SNP to call for the future of the Trident nuclear missile system to be debated as part of the Strategic Defence Review.’
Amendment proposed to Queen’s Speech
Votes and Proceedings - Queen’s Speech: Standing Order No. 33, Division No. 2 [Economic Affairs and Work and Pensions], House of Commons Debate, 8 June 2010, Column 295
Amendment proposed: at the end of the Question to add:
"but respectfully request that your Government includes as part of its Strategic Defence and Security Review a full examination of the Trident nuclear missile system and any possible replacement."- (Angus Robertson.)
Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 33), That the amendment be made.
The House divided: Ayes 27, Noes 330.
Shirley Williams calls for a wider debate
A middle way on Trident
Shirley Williams, Comment is Free, The Guardian, 22 June 2010
‘We need a wider debate on Trident, which has been excluded from Liam Fox‘s forthcoming strategic defence review. Some military leaders support him because they do not want Trident‘s future to be discussed in the same context as are troop numbers and conventional equipment. But Trident cannot be excluded from the painful examination of public expenditure in all departments of government.’
Asking the Prime Minister
Prime Minister: Engagements, House of Commons Debate, 23 June 2010, Column 291
Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD): Does the Prime Minister agree with several generals, many members of the public and me that Trident should be included in the strategic defence and security review? Does he agree that if there is a case for retaining it, that would come out in the review; and if there is not a case, it should not be kept?
The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will know that that matter was carefully negotiated in the coalition agreement between our two parties. My view is clear: Britain should retain the nuclear deterrent and we should always keep that insurance policy against great danger. Although I think that there is a case for looking at the costs of the Trident system and seeing how we can bear down on them, I do not believe that we should have the wider review that he suggests.
Menzies Campbell says excluding Trident “skews” review
Menzies Campbell says keeping out Trident “skews” strategic defence review
Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, 19 July 2010
‘Sir Menzies Campbell said: "Maybe it‘s the shape of the missiles but every time Trident is mentioned there is an outbreak of priapism on the Tory backbenchers. There is a real risk that the whole strategic defence review will be skewed because of the obsession with Trident. It makes no sense whatsoever to exclude Trident, the strategic deterrent, from a proper strategic review."’
Barrow and Furness MP demands assurances
Woodcock wants Trident review to be ruled out
North West Evening Mail, 7 June 2010
‘An MP is demanding assurances from the new Government Trident will not be included in the defence review – as calls grow in Westminster for the successor programme to be reviewed.’
Liam Fox’s first speech on the SDSR
Liam Fox raises prospect of British troops starting to leave Afghanistan next year
Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, 14 June 2010
‘He [Liam Fox] said the reason why the government had excluded Trident, apart from ‘value for money’ considerations, was that "there needs to be a deterrent at all times". In the current state of technology, Trident was "the most cost effective [system] that we want, a continuous-at-sea nuclear deterrent", he added.’
Questions raised over value-for-money study
Defence: Trident, Written Answers, 14 June 2010, Column 250W
Christopher Leslie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence by what mechanism he intends to assess the value for money of the renewal of Trident. [1147]
Dr Fox: The Government are committed to a value for money review of the Trident programme within the framework of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. This is aimed at ensuring that the United Kingdom‘s essential minimum deterrent is maintained as cost-effectively as possible. The Ministry of Defence is working with other Government Departments on this assessment.
Chris Evans: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the matter of the renewal of Trident will be included in the Strategic Defence Review. [2062]
Dr Fox: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) on 7 June 2010, Official Report, column 11W.
Public Spending, House of Commons Debate, 17 June 2010, Column 1049
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op): In the light of the bizarre extension to the successor deterrent programme, will the Chief Secretary tell us whether the Trident value-for-money review will consider the overall question of whether the successor to Trident remains the most effective form of deterrent?
Danny Alexander: The hon. Gentleman has no doubt studied carefully the coalition programme for government, and he will know that we have agreed to proceed with the successor deterrent to Trident. The value-for-money review will do precisely what it says on the tin: we want to get the best value for money from the project and not waste taxpayers‘ money unnecessarily on the renewal.
Sub work temporarily suspended
Brakes slammed on £66m of sub work
North West Evening Mail, 18 June 2010
Barrow-in-Furness’ local newspaper reports on a government decision to temporarily suspend a contract related to long-lead items of equipment for the successor to Trident (which is not in any case being handled at BAE Systems plant in Barrow). The MOD is quoted in the article as saying “Although work on the concept phase will continue, new commitment to long lead items for the boats will be held pending the outcome of the VFM [value-for-money] study”’.
Main HoC Debate on SDSR
Strategic Defence & Security Review, House of Commons Debate, 21 June 2010, Column 54
The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox): As I just said in response to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), in 2007 the Conservative party in opposition supported the decision to renew the Trident system based on the analysis set out in the 2006 White Paper, and we remain committed to continuous at-sea deterrence.
As the coalition agreement has made clear, we are scrutinising the Trident renewal programme to ensure that we get value for money, and my Liberal Democrat colleagues will continue to make the case for alternatives. However, we underestimate the value of deterrence at our peril and we do ourselves a disservice if we merely confine the concept to nuclear weapons. We know from historical experience that a declaration of peaceful intent is not sufficient to dissuade aggressors and that a weakening of national defences can encourage them. All our forces, including conventional forces, have a powerful deterrent effect, which we should seek to maximise. Recently, we have not recognised that as much as we should have. I want the SDSR to change that-to take a fresh look at what we are doing to dissuade aggression and at how we might do it better.
Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab): I happen to agree with the Secretary of State‘s stance on nuclear weapons and Trident. Will he say a little more about the extent to which he regards Trident to be, as well as a deterrent, part of our obligations as a permanent member of the Security Council-as one of the P5, at the top table?
Dr Fox: It is not an obligation, but I certainly think that it adds credibility to our position as a member of P5. As I have said, our position on nuclear weapons is that in a dangerous world, when we are looking to 2050 or beyond, we cannot play fast and loose with Britain‘s defences. We do not know what threats will emerge or what will happen in terms of future proliferation, and we are simply not willing to take a gamble.
Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD): The Secretary of State began this passage of his speech by talking about returning to first principles. That allows me to take up an issue that he dealt with a moment or two ago, which is this: in determining the structure of our armed forces, in determining the location of bases, and in determining procurement decisions, must we not accept that the motivation has to be what is in the best interests of defence? If I may be excused for putting the matter pejoratively, we should not be using defence as some kind of job creation scheme.
Dr Fox: I have a degree of sympathy with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says, but it is worth pointing out, at a time when the economy is going through a great deal of trouble, that the defence industry provides 300,000 manufacturing jobs-jobs that actually make and sell things to the benefit of this country‘s balance of payments. The defence industry contributes a very high value to Britain‘s exports, and it punches above its weight. It will be the aim of the Government to increase Britain‘s defence exports, partly as a way of securing British defence jobs in the longer term, because the more markets we have, the less the British defence industry is dependent on the British domestic economic cycle.
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op): I agree with the Secretary of State about industrial capacity. Before he moves on from the deterrent, will he clarify whether the value-for-money Trident review is solely considering the ballistic missile submarine system, or are alternative systems being considered?
Dr Fox: There are a number of elements in the Trident renewal programme, and we are looking for value for money in each of them, and trying to see where we can, if possible, get that capability for lesser cost. However, there is no question but that we will move ahead with a continuous, minimum, credible at-sea nuclear deterrent for the United Kingdom.
Strategic Defence & Security Review, House of Commons Debate, 21 June 2010, Column 85
John Woodcock: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Very difficult decisions are involved in this review, but we must not overlook the advantage that home-grown, home-made kit gives our armed forces out in the field of combat.
Of course, as parliamentarians and as individual human beings, our instinctive feeling towards the ultimate weapons of mass destruction that the deterrent represents is one of deep hostility and revulsion. It is a responsibility on all of us to strive for a world free from nuclear weapons. So for all the thousands of people who depend on it in my constituency, if abandoning the deterrent now would make the world safer from the threat of nuclear holocaust, it would be my duty to embrace that. However, unilaterally scrapping or delaying the renewal of Trident would make our country and the world less safe, not more so. Instead, it is vital that we secure genuine progress on the multilateral non-proliferation talks that are currently under way. While the threat persists, as we know it will for the foreseeable future, it would, as the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) argued well, be wrong to jeopardise our country by stalling on renewal.
We must guard against the dangerous spread of woolly thinking on this issue. We must not repeat the costly mistake of the last Conservative Government, who left too long a gap between completing the Vanguards and starting the Astutes; and we must resist opting for a platform that, while still capable of great evil and destruction, is no longer an effective deterrent against a hostile strike. Today, I am afraid, the Secretary of State again refused to say whether the new value-for-money review of Trident is considering only the cost of a new ballistic missile submarine platform, or alternatives to it. As the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) said, the surprise decision last week to suspend work on the successor programme suggests that the review may be more significant than we had first thought, because the former approach-driving out unnecessary costs as a programme develops-is what any Government should do all the time. The latter approach, however-considering alternatives to the successor-needlessly reopens a question settled in the 2006 deterrent White Paper. Even if new Ministers end up reaching the same conclusion as the previous ones, this could cause serious delays in a timetable which is already very tight, and ultimately spell a further gap in the order book that could again see skills lost and thousands laid off.
If the Government reach a different conclusion, however, serious consequences would follow for the public finances, jobs and the security of the nation. As far as I can tell, the Secretary of State has said that the Government remain committed to a submarine-based deterrent, so let us consider the alternatives that fit those criteria. On the option of refitting the Vanguard class submarines, we could do that, but relying on a relatively short and very expensive life extension would mean taking a massive punt with our national security.
It is also time to puncture the seductive myths around the second alternative: redesigning the Astute-class submarines so that they could carry nuclear warheads. There is a myth that this option would be cheaper, but it would not. It would not simply be a case of nailing an existing warhead to an existing Tomahawk missile and shoving it aboard one of the seven Astutes that are already slated to be built. We would need to construct many more new warheads from scratch, at vast expense and possibly in contravention of our non-proliferation treaty obligations. We would need to procure a new missile system, again at huge cost. We would need a costly redesign of the sub, as one cannot just slot a nuclear missile into a tube designed to fire a conventional Tomahawk. Finally, we would need many more submarines than we have at present. A fleet of conventional Astutes would still be needed to guard the new ones-they could not just double up-and missile size constraints mean that it could well be necessary to build many more vessels than the four ballistic missile boats they would be replacing.
This would not only cost UK taxpayers more but leave them significantly more vulnerable. The range of cruise missiles is much lower than that of ballistic missiles, and they can be much more easily stopped, so the UK would be left with chilling nuclear weapons, but without the strategic deterrent capacity that ultimately makes the horror of nuclear war less likely. That is truly an option that would deliver less for more.
I suggest that some who argue for a cheaper deterrent really mean that we should not have a deterrent at all. They should just come out and say that. To those who usually dislike American dominance but seem happy to leave the US and the French with the responsibility of protecting the world from nuclear war, I say, fine, but let them make that clear too. It is wrong for our country‘s security and our ultimate aim of a nuclear-free world, and yes, it is wrong too for jobs in my constituency and across the country. However, a debate on those terms would at least prevent us from wasting money chasing an unrealistic middle way at a time when there has never been a more pressing need to ensure that every pound of defence spending is invested wisely.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con): It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), and he will not be surprised to hear that I agree with almost every word-no, actually with every word-that he said about the nuclear deterrent. I hope that that does not damn his political career for eternity. He paid generous tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Fylde (Mark Menzies) and for Lancaster and Fleetwood (Eric Ollerenshaw) for their maiden speeches, which I am happy to endorse.
Perhaps I can cheer the hon. Gentleman up a little by letting him into a secret. When my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was aspiring to the leadership of our party, he held a series of interviews with his hon. Friends, of whom I was one. When I went in, I asked him only two questions. One need not concern us today, but the other was about his attitude to the nuclear deterrent, and I am delighted to say that he was extremely robust about it. If the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members care to check the response of our current Prime Minister to the statement of former Prime Minister Tony Blair on the subject in December 2006, they will see that it was once again extremely strong. That was the only occasion when I was ever called in to have anything to do with drafting a response to a Government statement. Our current Prime Minister made two alterations to what his speechwriter and I had drafted between us, both of which were to toughen up his response, not to weaken it. Although our coalition partners may hope to chip away at the edges on this matter, if I know the Prime Minister as well as I think I do, at least on this subject, they will undoubtedly be disappointed.
Strategic Defence & Security Review, House of Commons Debate, 21 June 2010, Column 128W
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab): That brings me to the nuclear deterrent, where I must say we have got one whole of a dog‘s breakfast. The Minister for the Armed Forces said before the election:
"The Labour and Conservative policy of like-for-like replacement of Trident is absurd"
and that
"Labour wants to press ahead with a £100 billion nuclear weapons system designed for the Cold War and won‘t even consider Trident in the upcoming defence review. That makes no sense."
I understand from the coalition agreement that Trident will be scrutinised to ensure value for money but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) ably pointed out, we are not quite clear what the value-for-money review actually means. Does it mean going back to the proposals of the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife for a cruise-based alternative, or is it just about tinkering with the figures? The new Chief Secretary to the Treasury clearly did not have a clue when he addressed the House last week. In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness, he said:
"The hon. Gentleman has no doubt studied carefully the coalition programme...The value-for-money review will do precisely what it says on the tin: we want to get the best value for money from the project and not waste taxpayers‘ money unnecessarily on the renewal."-[ Official Report, 17 June 2010; Vol. 511, c. 1049.]
Everyone would agree with that, but are we reopening what the Liberal Democrats were putting forward?
Eric Joyce: I wholeheartedly agree with my hon. Friend. Does he not think that Labour should conduct its own review in opposition and include Trident in it?
Mr Jones: Well, no, I do not, because I have to say that I agree with the Conservative Front-Bench team that we must make sure to replace Trident. I must also say that my hon. Friend threw me a little when he said in his speech that he was now supportive of myself and other former Ministers; I am glad he has turned over a new leaf in opposition.
Dr Fox: As the hon. Gentleman agrees with the Government‘s position on this, given his own experience will he enlighten colleagues as to why the previous Government came to the decision that Trident was the most effective and cheapest way of providing us with a continuous at-sea deterrent?
Mr Jones: Well, because it is, and we had the White Paper in 2006 that said that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness raised an interesting point-idea that we can play stop-go with the building of nuclear submarines is wrong; instead, we need to keep the skills base together. People must recognise that key point. That policy is what led to the problems we are currently facing with Astute. The options were looked at in detail and it was found that, in terms of the procurement of warheads and of the boats themselves, Trident is the most cost-effective way to proceed.
However, I must ask the Minister for the Armed Forces whether, in terms of the review, we are talking about basic principles or simple value for money? A yes or no answer will suffice. Alternatively, is this, as we all suspect, simply a bit of political posturing to keep the unilateralists in the Liberal Democrats on board while not scaring the cold war warriors in the Tory party such as the hon. Member for New Forest East?
Nick Harvey clarifies ‘value-for-money’ study
Strategic Defence & Security Review, House of Commons Debate, 21 June 2010, Column 132W
Nick Harvey: …A variety of Members, including the shadow Defence Secretary, raised the issue of Trident. I think that I should clarify as best I can, because there seems to be some confusion-or perhaps I should say that some people seem moderately determined to be a little confused-about the value-for-money review of the existing plan for the Trident successor. It is a value-for-money study of the existing plan. If the study were to conclude that a particular aspect of the existing plan did not represent good value for money, it might start looking at different ways of doing things, but I have to stress that it is not a review in which we look at all the possible alternative ways in which we might provide a successor, and see which works out the cheapest. It is a progress report on the work taking place on the Trident successor project. The Ministry of Defence work on that should be completed by roughly the end of next month. The report will then go to the Cabinet Office, and ultimately these things will be decided by the National Security Council.
Process for the Trident value-for-money study
Defence: Trident, House of Commons Debate, 5 July 2010, Column 2
2. Chris Heaton-Harris (Daventry) (Con): When he plans to publish the results of the Trident value-for-money study. [5304]
The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox): The Ministry of Defence‘s work on the value-for-money study should be completed at the end of this month.
5 July 2010 : Column 3
The findings will go to the Cabinet Office, and will then be considered by the National Security Council. The council‘s conclusions will inform the strategic defence and security review and the comprehensive spending review, which will be published in the autumn.
Chris Heaton-Harris: I thank my right hon. Friend for his answer. Will the results of the value-for-money study include plans on the infrastructure that supports our deterrent?
Dr Fox: It might help the House if I tell my hon. Friend that the programme will cover the timetable itself, submarine numbers, the number of missiles, missile tubes and warheads, infrastructure and other support costs, and the industrial supply chain.
Opportunities to contribute to SDSR
Defence, Written Questions, 6 July 2010: Column 156W
Kris Hopkins: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what opportunities are available for hon. Members and Members of the House of Lords to contribute to the Strategic Defence and Security Review. [5367]
Caroline Dinenage: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what opportunities are available for (a) hon. Members and (b) Members of the House of Lords to contribute to the strategic defence and security review. [5373]
Dr Fox: The Government scheduled a debate on the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) on 21 June. In that debate I invited Members of both Houses to make submissions on the review formally to me. In addition, there will also be further such opportunities in the House to debate the matter before the SDSR concludes.
Trident insulated from scrutiny
Topical Questions, House of Commons Debate, 5 July 2010: Column 19
John Cryer (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab): There is a growing public perception that the Trident replacement is being insulated from any kind of scrutiny-including the defence review-while the Government continue to tear conventional forces to bits. I am thinking particularly of the cuts in aircraft, which have already been mentioned. How long will the Secretary of State be happy with that situation?
Dr Fox: There will be no plans for any part of the defence of the United Kingdom until the defence review is completed in the autumn. We will, of course, face a very adverse financial position because of the utter financial incompetence of the outgoing Labour Government, who have left the country with record debts, and, sadly, we will have to make decisions about defence and other Government budgets in that light.
Trident Replacement: costs, alternatives and dates
Costs of Trident renewal and maintenance
Defence: Trident, Written Answers, 3 June 2010, Column 77W
Jeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his most recent estimate is of the cost of (a) replacement of the Trident submarine system and (b) the programme for the replacement of the warheads. [147]
Dr Fox [holding answer 2 June 2010]: The 2006 White Paper ‘The Future of the UK‘s Nuclear Deterrent’ (Cm 6994) stated that the total procurement costs of the successor deterrent capability will be in the region of £15 billion to £20 billion, at 2006-07 prices, for a four-boat fleet. This comprises £11 billion to £14 billion for the submarines, £2 billion to £3 billion for the possible refurbishment or replacement of the warhead and £2 billion to £3 billion for infrastructure.
On current plans, we will be in a position to release more up-to-date costs later this year after the final Initial Gate paper has been considered.
Dr Whiteford: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent estimate he has made of (a) the total procurement costs associated with implementing the proposals in the White Paper on The Future of the United Kingdom‘s Nuclear Deterrent, Cm 6994, (b) the cost of four successor submarines, (c) the cost of refurbishing or replacing the Trident warhead, (d) the infrastructure costs associated with these proposals and (e) the cost of replacing the Trident missile system. [711]
Dr Fox: The 2006 White Paper ‘The Future of the UK‘s Nuclear Deterrent’ (Cm 6994) stated that the total procurement costs of the successor deterrent capability will be in the region of £15-£20 billion, at 2006-07 prices, for a four-boat fleet. This comprises £11-14 billion for the submarines, £2-3 billion for the possible refurbishment or replacement of the warhead and £2-3 billion for infrastructure.
On current plans, we will be in a position to release more up-to-date costs later this year after the final Initial Gate paper has been considered.
In addition, the 2006 White Paper made clear that the Trident D5 missile is expected to last until the 2040s. At this range, any estimate of the cost of a replacement missile would be highly speculative: the equivalent cost for the Trident D5 missile was some £1.5 billion at 2006-07 prices.
Dr Whiteford: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his most recent estimate is of the annual in-service cost of the nuclear deterrent programme once the successor submarine is in service. [712]
Dr Fox: As the 2006 White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom‘s Nuclear Deterrent‘ (Cm6994) makes clear, once the new fleet of ballistic missile submarines come into service we expect that the in-service costs of the UK‘s nuclear deterrent, which will include the Atomic Weapons Establishment‘s costs, will be similar to today, around 5 to 6% of the defence budget.
Dr Whiteford: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent estimate he has made of expenditure on the UK nuclear deterrent programme, including
(a) the atomic weapons establishment and the successor submarine programme, (b) the atomic weapons establishment and (c) the successor submarine programme in each year from 2008-09 to 2019-20. [713]
Dr Fox: The expenditure of the nuclear deterrent programme in the period covered by the 2007 comprehensive spending review is:
£ million
Actual expenditure
Predicted expenditure
Area
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
Future Submarine Programme
140
290
350
Atomic Weapons Establishment
800
870
950
Spending plans for 2011-12 and beyond will be set as part of the Government‘s spending review process.
Alternatives to Trident
Defence: Trident, Written Answers, 3 June 2010, Column 78W
Mr Weir: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will consider the merits of alternatives to a like-for-like replacement for Trident. [720]
Dr Fox: The Government are committed to the maintenance of Britain‘s nuclear deterrent. We will scrutinise the renewal of Trident to ensure value for money.
Defence: Trident, Written Questions, 23 June 2010, Column 236W
John Woodcock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment will be made of the merits of alternatives to the Trident successor deterrent programme in his Trident value for money review; and if he will make a statement. [3838]
Dr Fox: The alternatives to a submarine launched ballistic missile submarine have previously been analysed comprehensively and discounted, either because they could not provide an effective deterrent capability or because they cost more. The value for money study is reviewing the existing plan for the Trident successor.
NATO: Trident, House of Commons Debate, 5 July 2010: Column 7
Diana R. Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab): What recent discussions he has had on alternatives to the Trident nuclear deterrent. [5309]
The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox): The Government are committed to retaining a minimum nuclear deterrent based on Trident. We have commissioned a review to scrutinise existing plans to renew the deterrent, to ensure value for money.
Diana R. Johnson: Have the Liberal Democrats put forward their alternatives to Trident as set out in the coalition agreement, and if so, what are they? They kept very quiet during the general election about what they were.
Dr Fox: I am responsible for a lot of things, but the Liberal Democrats‘ answers on specific points of policy are a matter for them, not for me. The coalition agreement is very clear that although the Government have set out their policy, the Liberal Democrats are very good at coming forward with their own particular solutions, as I can make clear to the hon. Lady.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con): In the inexplicable absence of any Liberal Democrat on his feet, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he agrees that as an alternative to Trident, the idea of putting nuclear-armed cruise missiles on Astute class submarines would be more expensive and less effective, would put
5 July 2010 : Column 8
the submarines at risk and, because one cannot know what sort of warhead is on a cruise missile until it has landed, could start world war three by accident? Does he agree that apart from that, it is a great Liberal Democrat idea?
Dr Fox: I am unlikely to be tempted down that route.
As the House will know, when we considered the entire issue in 2006 and 2007 we looked at options for other systems, including cruise missiles, silo-based missiles and air-launched weapons. Those other options were discounted due to effectiveness and cost. That analysis has not changed, and alternative systems will not be considered as part of the value-for-money review.
Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD)
Defence: Trident, Written Questions, 22 June 2010, Column 120W
John Woodcock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the terms of reference are of his Trident value for money review; and if he will make a statement. [3837]
Dr Fox: The Government are committed to a continuous at sea nuclear deterrent based on a Trident missile system. The value for money review is to ensure that plans to replace the current Vanguard class submarine are being taken forward in the most cost effective manner possible.
France-UK nuclear sharing
Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Commons Debate, 26 May 2010, Column 182
Mr David Blunkett (Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough) (Lab): I, too, offer my congratulations to a fellow south Yorkshireman. In the spirit of what he is describing, and in the light of the domestic defence review, it might be possible for the Foreign Secretary to contemplate sharing the cost of and future planning for any renewal of nuclear capacity for this country in order to reduce massively the cost to the British people and avoid cuts in essential services elsewhere. Such an approach would involve co-operation between the UK and France in an entirely new environment.
Mr Hague: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his good wishes. As he knows, the Government are committed to maintaining a nuclear deterrent. As with all Government programmes, we will, of course, be reviewing the Trident programme for value for money. He has put forward a radical idea and we will feed that idea, as his representation, into the strategic defence and security review.
Initial Gate decision date
Defence: Trident, Written Answers, 3 June 2010, Column 78W
Mr Weir: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the Initial Gate decision for the successor submarine project is due to be made; what reasons were given by the Defence Board for a postponement of the Initial Gate decision; and whether he plans to provide for approval of the proposal by Parliament before the decision is made. [721]
Peter Luff: We postponed the Initial Gate decision to allow more time to review fully the possible design options.
It is not normal for Parliament to be involved in Initial Gate decisions for procurement projects. I do however, propose to update Parliament on progress after Initial Gate. The main investment decision point, and the point at which we would issue the main contracts to industry for the construction of the new submarines, is still several years away.
Defence: Trident, Written Questions, 12 July 2010, Column 447W
Katy Clark: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects the Investment Approvals Board to consider the report of the Initial Gate review for the Trident replacement programme; whether he plans to publish that report; and what opportunities hon. Members will have to scrutinise that report. [7751]
Dr Fox: We are currently planning for Initial Gate decision towards the end of 2010, following consideration by the Investment Approvals Board in the autumn. It is not normal for Parliament to be involved in Initial Gate decisions for procurement projects. I do, however, propose to update Parliament on progress after the Initial Gate decision through the publication of a report.
Fox: Sub numbers could be cut to save costs
Big defence projects may be axed but not Trident replacement, says Liam Fox
Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, 13 July 2010
‘for the first time he held out the prospect of fewer nuclear missiles and warheads and even reducing the number of planned Trident submarines from four to three. Fox described the capital costs of a successor to the existing Trident system – officially estimated at £20bn over the next decade – as "pretty good value".’
Treasury calls for Trident to be paid for by MOD budget
Fox in Treasury wrangle over Trident
James Blitz and Alex Barker, Financial Times, 15 July 2010
‘Liam Fox, the defence secretary, is locked in high-stakes talks with the Treasury over the future funding for Britain’s nuclear deterrent, as he resists pressure on his department to absorb the £20bn cost of renewing the system into its core budget.’
Current operation of UK nuclear weapons
Verification of UK warhead numbers
Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Nuclear Weapons, Written Questions, 9 June 2010, Column 166W
Caroline Lucas: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to his contribution of 26 May 2010, Official Report, column 181, whether he plans to establish procedures to allow the international community to verify the stated magnitude of UK nuclear warheads. [1521]
Alistair Burt: We have no plans to establish procedures to allow the international community to verify the UK‘s nuclear warhead stockpile. The UK has made this announcement in order to be more open, but we have to limit access to military sites in order to protect our national security interests and to adhere to safety and security measures.
The UK recognises the importance of an effective verification regime to achieving the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and has been pursuing internationally acclaimed research with Norway and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, a non-governmental organization, on the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement.
AWE: Exchange of staff under the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement
Defence: Nuclear Weapons, Written Questions, 17 June 2010, Column 503W
Caroline Lucas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) US personnel visited the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and (b) AWE staff visited US establishments under the terms of the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement in each of the last three years. [2045]
Mr Gerald Howarth: The total number of personnel visiting the Atomic Weapons Establishment and US installations under the terms of the UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement in each of the last three years is as follows:
Number
UK visitors to the US
2007
591
2008
522
2009
527
US visitors to the UK
2007
548
2008
806
2009
518
AWE: Compliance with NPT
Defence: Atomic Weapons Establishment, Written Questions, 21 June 2010, Column 6W
Mr Mike Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has taken steps to establish whether development of the proposed new hydrodynamics facility at AWE Aldermaston is consistent with the recommendations and actions from the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. [3615]
Peter Luff: Proposals for a replacement hydrodynamics facility at AWE Aldermaston have been developed to ensure full compliancy with our non-proliferation treaty (NPT) obligations.
AWE Nuclear Safety Committee
Defence: Atomic Weapons Establishment, Written Questions, 23 June 2010, Column 234W
Caroline Lucas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence at what intervals the Atomic Weapons Establishment‘s Nuclear Safety Committee met in the last 12 months; and what the names are of the committee members. [2026]
Peter Luff: Meetings of the Atomic Weapons Establishment‘s Nuclear Safety Committee are held on a monthly basis. Additional meetings are held as required in response to business requirements, but no such meetings have been required in the last 12 months.
With regard to the names of the committee members, I will write to the hon. Member shortly.
Safety of UK fissile materials
Defence: Ammunition, Written Questions, 30 June 2010: Column 555W
Mark Lazarowicz: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the fissile material in each of the United Kingdom‘s 65 non-operational nuclear warheads has been removed from the weapons and stored separately. [4904]
Peter Luff: The warheads in question are necessary to sustain the operationally available stockpile. They are held to support routine logistic, maintenance and warhead assurance activities and therefore they retain their fissile material.
Parliament, the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the UK’s International Obligations
NPT 2010: UK Government objectives
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Written Questions, 2 June 2010, Column 17W
Jeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what the UK‘s objectives are for the outcome of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York in May 2010. [146]
Alistair Burt: I am delighted that we achieved our objective of a politically-binding action plan to strengthen the Treaty‘s three pillars. We pushed hard for success: on 26 May 2010 my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made public the maximum number of nuclear warheads the UK holds and announced a review of our declaratory policy. I attended the Conference to meet delegations to help promote a positive outcome. This conference was an important milestone in our long-term vision for a world without nuclear weapons.
The need for progress
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, House of Lords Debate, 9 June 2010, Column 639
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: To ask Her Majesty‘s Government what contribution they will make to the work required to achieve progress on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons following the resolution passed at the review conference in May.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford): My Lords, as we promised on taking office, we pushed hard for agreement of a final document at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. We will give the highest priority to reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, keeping them out of the hands of terrorists and cutting their numbers worldwide, and we will work with partners to translate those commitments into action.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer. There was considerable acclaim at the conference for the UK‘s leadership role over the past few years in the verification of the disarmament process and, in particular, for our work with Norway. Will he ensure that the Government continue that work, that it is resourced and that Aldermaston retains and develops the expertise needed? Without those practical steps, wishes will remain aspirations as opposed to realities.
Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness. Her concern about and interest in these matters is second to none. At the review conference, it was felt that the treaty had been, thankfully, revitalised and a series of action plans and activities were agreed between the participants, including an action plan for existing nuclear powers; an action plan for non-proliferation checking, although, of course, we have a long way to go on that; civil nuclear energy co-operation; verification procedures with Norway, to which the noble Baroness referred; strengthening nuclear security controls; and calling a regional conference in the Middle East to discuss possible Middle East freedom from weapons of mass destruction. This is a big achievement-a big step-and we should be very grateful that we have managed to make this kind of progress.
Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, the IAEA‘s illicit trafficking database has recorded 336 incidents involving unauthorised possession of nuclear materials and associated criminal acts in the past 15 years. There have also been incidents of terror teams carrying out reconnaissance of nuclear weapon trains in Russia. Can the noble Lord tell us, first, whether Her Majesty‘s Government are satisfied with the security arrangements around the nuclear facilities in this country and what steps they are taking to protect them? Secondly, what steps are they taking to ensure that security arrangements around both civil and military nuclear facilities elsewhere are being properly maintained?
Lord Howell of Guildford: I thank the noble Lord for his question. We are satisfied, but we are always on guard and always watchful for any need for improvement. The international security of nuclear materials was discussed, analysed and strengthened at the Washington conference in April that preceded the nuclear NPT review conference. A whole series of measures was put forward there and agreed. In so far as one can, one can say that these measures are a step forward in what is undoubtedly, as the noble Lord fully realises, a very dangerous situation.
An abolition treaty and future steps towards disarmament
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, House of Lords Deb, 9 June 2010, Column 641
Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, the Minister described the excellent outcome of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. However, the great bulk of non-nuclear powers decided to press for a nuclear weapons convention to abolish nuclear weapons completely by 2025. In the light of that, will the nuclear posture review, which has been welcomed and mentioned by the coalition Government, look into how far we can make precise the future steps towards disarmament that we shall take as a Government? Will it also look at the future of the British deterrent?
Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who obviously has enormous knowledge of this subject. The idea of a nuclear weapons convention is a fine one, but we take the view, as I think do other Governments, that it is in practice a question of one step at a time. We want to try to move towards the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. A whole series of things need to be done before one comes to the happy situation where the nuclear world is disarmed and a convention could then get full support. If we try to rush to a convention first of all, we might end up delaying the detailed work that is needed on the path to get there.
Middle East WMD FZ conference: UK contribution
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, House of Lords Debate, 9 June 2010, Column 640
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, will the Minister accept my congratulations to both the Government he represents and the previous Government, since they overlapped during the NPT review, on the work that they put in to achieve a consensus outcome, which I agree was a major step forward? Will the Government press the Secretary-General of the UN extremely hard to appoint a facilitator for the 2012 conference on a nuclear weapons-free Middle East, which has now been decided on, so that a really distinguished, impartial person can get down to work on this very difficult subject without delay? Will they ensure that the Secretary-General of the UN tells his facilitator that he should apply the phrase, "Don‘t take no for an answer"?
Lord Howell of Guildford: I am grateful to the noble Lord. Part of the action plan for the existing nuclear powers is to involve the UN Secretary-General much more closely and to seek his co-operation in the directions that the noble Lord has described. I cannot vouch for the precise patterns which he will follow, but his full involvement in these matters is a major intention of the signatories to the new conclusions.
Middle East: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Written Questions, 30 June 2010: Column 591W
Mark Lazarowicz: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what his policy is on the creation of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone. [4902]
30 Jun 2010 : Column 592W
Alistair Burt: The agreement at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to hold a regional conference in 2012 on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone was an important step forward. It will allow all states in the region to play a role in the process. We are committed to working constructively with all states in the region to ensure the conference is a success.
William Hague post-Rev Con speech on the NPT
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, Written Ministerial Statements, 14 June 2010, Column 39WS
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague): The House may welcome a report on the outcome of the review conference of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) held in New York from 3 to 28 May and Government action and policy in this regard.
It is the view of the Government that we are facing the risk of a new age of nuclear insecurity. In recent years, the NPT has come under unprecedented pressure from a combination of factors: the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea; the risks of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear materials; the expected global renaissance in civil nuclear energy potentially leading to the dissemination of sensitive technology; and a fraying of the international consensus that has underpinned the treaty due to a perception that the nuclear weapon states have not done enough to meet their nuclear disarmament commitments under the NPT.
But all states benefit substantially from the NPT, in terms of both enhanced security and co-operation on civil nuclear energy. It is too important to be allowed to be undermined.
14 Jun 2010 : Column 40WS
As I said in the Foreign Affairs debate on 26 May 2010, Official Report, column 181:
"stemming an uncontrolled spread of nuclear know-how and equipment, deterring any country that might be tempted to try to acquire nuclear weapons from doing so and keeping nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists must be a top foreign policy priority of any British Government.... In opposition, my party promised decisive UK leadership in this effort if elected, and the coalition agreement pledged an immediate and strong UK role at the conference.”
I am delighted therefore that the conference successfully reached agreement to revitalise the treaty as the cornerstone of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote the safe and secure use of civil nuclear energy and to pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
I warmly congratulate the president of the conference, Ambassador Cabactulan of the Philippines, and all the states parties to the NPT for successfully putting aside the failures of the past to make this review conference a success.
The UK pushed hard for this success. During the Foreign Affairs debate in this House on 26 May, as an immediate contribution further to assist in building the climate of trust between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, I announced the ceiling figure for the UK‘s overall nuclear warhead stockpile (225) and that the Government will re-examine the UK‘s nuclear declaratory policy as part of the strategic defence and security review. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt) attended the review conference on the same day to repeat these announcements there as well as to meet other delegations to help promote a positive outcome.
The negotiations were not easy and the outcome necessarily represents compromise between the states parties. But it also marks, after the failure to secure agreement at the previous review conference in 2005, the first time in 10 years that the international community has been able to come together to agree on the collective efforts that will be required. President Obama‘s leadership, with the conclusion of the New START agreement, the US nuclear posture review and the Washington nuclear security summit in April provided critical political impetus.
The UK‘s Objectives
We wanted the conference to agree on a balanced outcome with specific forward action plans to strengthen implementation of the treaty‘s non-proliferation and disarmament provisions and to support civil nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks. We also wanted the conference to decide how to implement the resolution, adopted at the 1995 review and extension conference, on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, particularly as agreement on this was critical to achieving consensus on the other elements.
Achieving consensus among 189 states parties on such a substantive agenda was deliberately ambitious and we recognised that it would be challenging. The conference none the less succeeded in reaching agreement, for the first time in the NPT‘s history, on a detailed and balanced set of actions to revitalise the treaty, establishing benchmarks for future progress.
That sends a strong signal both of united commitment among the overwhelming majority of states which abide by their responsibilities under the treaty, and of warning to Iran, North Korea and any other state or terrorist
14 Jun 2010 : Column 41WS
group which might be tempted to try to acquire nuclear weapons. It affirms that the world is ready to stand united against this threat and to rebuild the trust and partnership necessary as well as ensuring access to the peaceful applications of nuclear technology to all those countries desiring it in accordance with the NPT. It is proof that multilateral diplomacy can bear fruit, even in this sensitive area.
Non-Proliferation
We need to strengthen the regime of checks and controls to ensure that nuclear technology can be shared while reducing to a minimum the risk that technology and material could be used to provide a weapons capability to countries that do not now possess one.
It is highly encouraging that, for the first time in an NPT document, the conference recognized that comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocol are essential for the IAEA to carry out its international safeguards responsibilities and that they represent the enhanced standard for verification of the NPT. All parties are encouraged to conclude and bring into force additional protocols.
The conference underscored the importance of the IAEA exercising fully its mandate and authority to verify states‘ nuclear activities and supported strengthening the IAEA and assuring that it has sufficient resources. It called for strengthened export controls and urged states parties to improve their standards to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and become parties to the international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.
But enhancing the IAEA‘s ability to detect safeguard violations is not enough. Potential violators must know that if they are caught, they will pay a high price. Given that the conference worked by consensus, it was regrettably not possible for the actions of Iran-the only country at the conference which had been found by the IAEA board of governors to be currently in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations-to be directly criticized in the concluding documents. The conference none the less emphasised the importance of addressing questions over compliance with the treaty and the role of the UN Security Council to take appropriate measures in cases of violations reported to it.
On 9 June, the UN Security Council imposed further sanctions on Iran for its ongoing violations of previous resolutions and its failure to co-operate with the IAEA over its nuclear programme. We will be working with our partners to introduce further EU measures against Iran in the coming months.
The situation in North Korea, which did not attend the conference as it claims to have withdrawn from the treaty, was identified as constituting a threat to the peace and security of north-east Asia and the entire international community, and posing a critical challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. North Korea was urged to fulfil its commitments under all relevant non-proliferation and disarmament obligations.
For the first time in any NPT final document, the conference recognized that withdrawing parties are responsible for violations committed prior to withdrawal, and that consultations and actions by nuclear suppliers are needed to discourage abuse of the treaty‘s withdrawal provision.
14 Jun 2010 : Column 42WS
The non-parties to the treaty, India, Israel and Pakistan, were urged to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon states and to place all their nuclear facilities promptly under comprehensive agency safeguards without conditions.
Nuclear Disarmament
The long-term vision of a world without nuclear weapons was reflected in an action plan which demonstrates to the international community that the five nuclear weapon states are taking their disarmament obligations seriously, and which sets out measures which will help us all-nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states alike-to make real progress in the coming years. The conference recognized the achievement of the US-Russia New START agreement, and steps taken by other nuclear weapon states, and reflected the shared interest in achieving deeper reductions of all types of nuclear weapons and reducing their role.
My announcements on 26 May demonstrated the UK‘s resolve to make further nuclear disarmament steps possible: by building trust, by setting high standards for others to follow, and by ensuring that our nuclear declaratory policy is fully appropriate to the political and security circumstances of 2010 and beyond. We circulated papers at the conference detailing the UK‘s strong disarmament record and on our joint research with Norway into the complex science of verifying warhead dismantlement, demonstrating the substantial action that we are taking.
The nuclear weapons states agreed to consider collectively further steps on transparency, negative security assurances and nuclear weapons-free zones. The conference encouraged the early entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and the start of negotiations, without further delay, of a fissile material cut-off treaty.
Civil Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security
Oil prices and climate change will make nuclear energy attractive to many, just as growing populations and economies in the developing world will make it increasingly necessary. There is already increased demand for the construction of new nuclear facilities worldwide.
Proliferation control needs to keep pace with this fast-changing reality. Nuclear energy will only fulfil its full potential if it is developed within a culture of openness, transparency and confidence. In this regard, the conference recognized the importance of continuing discussions to secure the introduction of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. It also called for greater efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA‘s technical co-operation programme, which contributes to development in some of the poorest regions of the world.
The conference acknowledged the successful Washington nuclear security summit in April, in which the UK played a leading role, and encouraged carrying forward its recommendations, including recognition of the IAEA‘s role in promoting nuclear security co-operation and best practices, and the need to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector.
The Middle East
The outcome on the middle east represented a major step forward, with agreement to hold a regional conference in 2012 to discuss issues relevant to a middle east zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Responsibility for the regional conference is shared between the UN Secretary-General and the NPT depositary states (Russia, the UK and the US).
14 Jun 2010 : Column 43WS
The UK has long supported such a zone as an achievable goal-we co-sponsored the resolution on the middle east at the 1995 review conference-while recognising that its realisation lies in progress towards a comprehensive peace in the middle east and in ensuring that other states in the region, including Iran and Syria, are fully implementing and upholding the existing international agreements.
The agreement on the middle east involved difficult compromise from all parties involved. The singling out of Israel in the final document, and without any reference to Iran, will make progress more difficult: Israel was not a formal party to the discussion and has already made clear its difficulty with the decision. Building confidence among all the parties in the region and giving them full ownership of the conference will be essential for success. The UK will play a full and active role.
Conclusion
This review conference was an important milestone in our long-term vision for a world without nuclear weapons. Now we have a map to help us move forward. We will now work, with our international partners, to capitalise on these achievements and to translate these commitments into concrete action in the years ahead.
UK compliance with 2010 NPT Rev Con
Defence: Trident Missiles, Written Questions, 6 Jul 2010: Column 159W
Mark Lazarowicz: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will undertake not to seek an update of the Trident D5 system during the period of discussions between China, France, Russia, the UK and the US on future nuclear disarmament following the UN Review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [4794]
Dr Fox: The 2010 review conference was an important milestone for the UK‘s long-term vision for a world without nuclear weapons. The UK has made it clear that, as soon as it becomes useful for the UK to include its nuclear stockpiles in broader disarmament negotiations, we stand ready to participate and to act.
Maintaining the UK‘s nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the current system is fully consistent with our obligations as a recognised nuclear weapon state under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Therefore, the UK will continue to progress in replacing our existing nuclear deterrent.
UK declaratory nuclear policy & the Rev Con
Nuclear Weapons, Written Questions, 23 June 2010, Column 235W
Mr Mike Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his re-examination of the UK declaratory nuclear policy will include consideration of compliance with the commitments in the final document of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. [3613]
Dr Fox: The Strategic Defence and Security Review will examine all relevant elements of the UK‘s nuclear declaratory policy. It is not the purpose of this review to examine compliance with the Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon), which sets out action plans for the international community to make progress against the three pillars of the NPT. The outcome of the NPT RevCon was a good result, and the Government fully support the Chairman‘s record and agreed action plan from the NPT RevCon.
CTBT entry into force: UK role
Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Nuclear Test Ban: Treaties, Written Questions, 6 Jul 2010: Column 230W
Mark Lazarowicz: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the Government plan to take to seek to persuade Annex 2 countries to (a) sign and (b) ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and how many staff his Department has assigned to undertake work in connection with that Treaty. [4903]
Alistair Burt: The Government will continue to take all appropriate opportunities to promote signature and ratification of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), with particular focus on the remaining nine annex 2 countries. We will also continue to support the CTBT Organisation‘s own efforts to promote entry into force, including through CTBT article XVI (entry into force) events.
The Government will continue to support the United States of America (US) Administration‘s commitment to ratify the treaty, recognising that US ratification is likely to provide an impetus for other annex 2 countries to follow suit.
My nuclear team works on CTBT, together with colleagues from the Ministry Of Defence.
Proliferation Challenges
Burma
Report on Burma’s nuclear ambitions
Nuclear Related Activities in Burma, Robert E. Kelley & Ali Fowle, For the Democratic Voice of Burma, May 2010
Export controls & North Korean assistance
Burma: Export Controls, Written Questions,, 1 July 2010: Column 618W - 619W
Jo Swinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what reports he has received on the purchase by the Burmese government of dual use goods which could be used in the development of nuclear weapons; and whether he has taken steps to ensure that no such dual use goods can be exported to Burma from the (a) UK and (b) EU. [5158]
Mr Jeremy Browne: We are concerned by reports suggesting that Burma may be developing a covert nuclear programme in collaboration with North Korea.
We continue to urge Burma to act strictly in accordance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to abide by the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement, and declare all nuclear material in its possession. Should there be authoritative evidence that Burma is in breach of its international obligations, the UK would raise the matter with other EU member states.
Our ambassador to Rangoon has recently lobbied the Burmese regime on their obligations under UN sanctions and raised proliferation issues with senior members of the military. We will continue to raise our concerns at the highest possible level.
Bilaterally the UK actively discourages trade and investment with Burma which could benefit members of, or those persons associated with, the Burmese military regime. The EU has had restrictive measures in place against Burma since 1996. The EU Council Decision (formerly an EU Common Position) was renewed for a further year in April. EU sanctions against Burma are calibrated to address the deteriorating political situation and abuses of civil and human rights by the military regime. There are at the present time no specific EU measures in place which restrict the export of machinery to Burma with a potential dual use of this nature.
Jo Swinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions he has had with his German counterpart on the alleged breach by Germany of the EU Common Position on Burma
1 July 2010 : Column 619W
through the export to that country of industrial equipment with a potential dual use in a nuclear weapons programme. [5160]
Mr Bellingham: The EU has had restrictive measures in place against Burma since 1996. EU restrictive measures against Burma are calibrated to address the deteriorating political situation and abuses of civil and human rights by the military regime. The EU Council Decision (formerly an EU Common Position) was renewed for a further year in April. There are no specific EU measures in place which restrict the export of machinery to Burma, with a potential dual use of this nature. Bilaterally the UK actively discourages trade and investment with Burma, which could benefit members of, or those persons associated with, the Burmese military regime.
We continue to urge Burma to act strictly in accordance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to abide by the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement, and declare all nuclear material in its possession. In light of the activities suggesting Burma is acting in contravention of its international obligations, the UK is seeking to raise the matter with other EU member states.
Our ambassador to Rangoon has recently lobbied the Burmese regime on their obligations under UN sanctions and raised proliferation concerns with senior members of the military regime and we will continue to raise our concerns at the highest possible level.
Jo Swinson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what reports he has received of assistance given by North Korea to Burma in the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology. [5161]
Mr Jeremy Browne: We are concerned by the allegations that Burma may be developing a covert nuclear programme in collaboration with North Korea. We take such issues very seriously. We continue to urge Burma to act strictly in accordance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to abide by the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement and declare all nuclear material in its possession.
We continue to urge all countries, including Burma, to respect their obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 which clearly prohibit the export from North Korea of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to North Korea‘s nuclear weapons programme.
Our ambassador to Rangoon has recently lobbied the Burmese regime on their obligations under UN sanctions and raised proliferation concerns with senior members of the military regime. Burma cannot afford to risk the grave consequences of breaching the measures that have been adopted to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
India & Pakistan
Nuclear security
Foreign & Commonwealth Office: India and Pakistan: Nuclear Weapons, Written Questions, 6 July 2010, Column 229W
Mark Lazarowicz: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the Government are taking to encourage India and Pakistan to participate more fully in international negotiations on nuclear security. [5404]
Alistair Burt: Nuclear security is a policy priority for the Government. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister attended the recent G8 summit in Canada, which concluded with a clear declaration of the importance of nuclear security and a commitment from G8 leaders to continue work together for our shared peace and security, including fulfilment of commitments made at the Washington Nuclear Security summit in April, which both Pakistan and India participated. We will continue to encourage the active participation of both countries in the run up to the next Nuclear Security summit in Seoul, 2012.
Government Ministers and officials will continue to discuss nuclear security with the Governments of India and Pakistan, within the context of a broad strategy of engagement that focuses not just on security, but on developing our cultural, educational, scientific contact and commercial links.
Iran
Most recent assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Iran: Nuclear Power, Written Questions, 2 June 2010, Column 16W
Mr Amess: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what his most recent assessment is of the state of development of Iran‘s nuclear programme; and if he will make a statement. [72]
Alistair Burt: The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will issue his report on Iran on 7 June. Iran has shown no sign of suspending its enrichment programme as required by numerous UN Security Council Resolutions, and continues to stockpile enriched uranium. Iran has also announced its intention to build more enrichment plants and has started enriching uranium to 20 per cent. a significant step towards weapons grade enrichment, despite having no credible civilian purpose for the fuel. We continue to share the IAEA‘s concerns about the possible existence in Iran of activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. The UN Security Council is currently considering a new sanctions resolution in order to urge Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
Iran: Nuclear Power, Written Questions, 5 July 2010: Column 29W
Andrew Gwynne: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent assessment he has made of Iran‘s uranium enrichment programme; and if he will make a statement. [4996]
Alistair Burt: The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued his latest report on Iran on 31 May 2010. The report makes it clear that Iran has shown no sign of suspending its enrichment related activities as required by six UN Security Council Resolutions, and continues to stockpile enriched uranium. Iran is enriching uranium up to nearly 20%, a significant step towards weapons grade enrichment, despite having no credible civilian purpose for the fuel. We continue to share IAEA concerns about the possible existence in Iran of activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
Twin-track strategy
European Council, House of Commons Debate, 21 June 2010, Column 40
Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con): The Council called on the Foreign Ministers at their next meeting to implement the United Nations sanctions against Iran. Does the Prime Minister agree that that is a big step in the twin-track strategy of combining sanctions with engagement and assistance, and does he have in mind any event or date that would trigger a definitive assessment of whether or not the twin-track strategy against Iran is actually working?
The Prime Minister: I am grateful for my hon. Friend‘s question. The key is to try to get the maximum number of countries behind the most specific list of sanctions possible. I think that what we have had in recent years is a lot of talk about sanctions and a lot of commitments to sanctions. Now is the time for countries actually to come up with what they are specifically going to target in terms of bank accounts, trade finance, oil and gas works and the rest. That is what should happen. My hon. Friend asked for a specific date as to when this should be assessed; I think it is an ongoing process. What we are trying to do here is tip the balance in the mind of Iran in terms of making progressing with a nuclear weapon more expensive, in order to get it to think again. There is no one date for that; it should be continually assessed.
Implementation of sanctions
Iran: Sanctions, Written Questions, 22 June 2010, Column 116W
Mr Amess: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps he (a) has taken and (b) plans to take to enforce sanctions against Iran; and if he will make a statement. [2932]
Alistair Burt: This Government are committed to the rapid and rigorous enforcement of the measures adopted under UN Security Council Resolution 1929 and we are working to implement measures as soon as possible. Upon adoption the UK Borders Agency added additional designations to their watch list and the Treasury took the necessary steps to ensure that newly designated entities will have their assets frozen if they attempt to operate within the UK. British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies have also been notified of action that they are required to take.
We are working with EU partners to ensure the harmonised implementation of UN measures and we are seeking tough additional EU measures. The 17 June European Council Declaration on Iran is a statement of intent. We welcome the creation of a UN Panel of Experts, mandated by the resolution, who will examine and report on the implementation of sanctions against Iran. The Government will submit a report to the UN Secretariat on the measures it has taken to implement the latest round of sanctions in coming months.
Dr Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs which countries have informed him of an intention to participate in the enforcement of sanctions against Iran. [3126]
Alistair Burt: UN Security Council resolution 1929 was passed on 9 June 2010 and set out new sanctions against Iran. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter all member states are now required to apply these sanctions.
In addition the European Council issued a Declaration on Iran on 17 June 2010, which set out a range of areas where the EU will pursue additional sanctions against Iran.
Disappointment at dismissal of Brazil and Turkey mediation attempts
Foreign Policy, House of Lords Debate, 1 July 2010: Column 1911
Baronness Williams of Crosby: …My second example was brought to our attention only recently, and it was a bad example. It is the western dismissal of the attempt by Turkey and Brazil-two of the leading non-nuclear countries-to try to do something about Iranian proposals for refining nuclear materials. Instead of taking it seriously and suggesting that a further negotiation might bring about a real move by Iran towards putting most of her low-enriched uranium into safe situations, the West simply dismissed it, as if it were somehow an inappropriate intervention by those two great countries. That was deeply unwise and, to reflect where we are with the Foreign Secretary‘s remarks, not least about Turkey, we must start taking those countries seriously and show that we doing so. That does not mean accepting everything they say, but it means looking with great attention and care at what they propose.
Sanctions questioned
Foreign Policy, House of Lords Debate, 1 July 2010: Column 1916 - 1917
Lord Wright of Richmond: …In that context I wonder, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, whether it was wise for the UN Security Council to have rejected both Brazil and Turkey‘s ingenious attempts to find a solution to Iran‘s nuclear ambitions and instead to strengthen sanctions that show no signs of having any practical effect. Unless we change our mentality, as the noble Lord, Lord Desai, put it, and adjust to the new emerging relationships such as those between Iran, Syria, Turkey, Qatar and Brazil, we shall find ourselves left behind in the struggle for political and economic influence in parts of the world that are of massive significance to this country and for the future of a peaceful world.
I share the hope that Iran can be dissuaded from its apparent ambition, although publicly denied by the Iranians at a very high level, to acquire nuclear weapons. But I was struck by the reply of the noble Lord, Lord Howell, to the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, two days ago when he commented that the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan,
"could be a good example of the theory of mutual deterrence working".-[Official Report, 28/6/10; col. 1510.]
Should we be surprised if Iran, neighbour as it is to a nuclear Pakistan, threatened by attacks on its nuclear facilities by a nuclear Israel, and neighbour to Iraq from whose aggression in the Iran-Iraq war it suffered more than a million dead, might draw the same lessons of deterrence as India and Pakistan? Whether it has or not, I believe that the arguments for working towards a nuclear-free Middle East are now as strong as they have ever been.
Israel
Guardian report on evidence of Israeli nuclear weapons
Revealed: how Israel offered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons
Chris McGreal, The Guardian, 24 May 2010
‘Secret apartheid-era papers give first official evidence of Israeli nuclear weapons’
Burt: Nothing to substantiate claims
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Israel: Nuclear Weapons, Written Questions, 10 June 2010, Column 217W
Caroline Lucas: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what reports he has received of the documents uncovered by Sasha Polakow-Suransky regarding Israel and possession of nuclear weapons; whether he has had discussions with the Israeli Government on this matter; and if he will make a statement. [1301]
Alistair Burt: We are aware of press reports but have had nothing to substantiate these claims. We have not had any discussions with the Israeli Government regarding this matter.
Israeli nuclear weapons – UK government should encourage openness
Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Israel: Nuclear Weapons, Written Questions, 6 Jul 2010: Column 229W
Mark Lazarowicz: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if the Government will take steps to encourage the Government of Israel to declare the number, type and location of its nuclear weapons. [5470]
Alistair Burt: We are aware of the widespread assumption that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. We have always encouraged all states to be as transparent as possible about their civilian-and, where applicable, military-nuclear programmes and capabilities. We continue to call on Israel to sign up to the non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.
North Korea
Hague raises concern
Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Commons Debate, 26 May 2010, Column 182
Mr Hague: ...North Korea‘s nuclear programme is another area of serious concern where robust international diplomacy is needed. In that context, we deplore the unprovoked act of aggression by North Korea that led to the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel. We strongly support President Lee‘s announcement of proportionate action in response to that act, as well as a referral of the incident to the UN Security Council.
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