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Trident Replacement:
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Armed Forces [Excerpts], June 29, 2006
29 Jun 2006 : Column 1332
Lord Trefgarne: We are now faced with the prospect of the Trident system
coming towards the end of its life. In the offices which I once held I
was responsible for at least considering the detail of bringing the Trident
system into service. It has served us well and will, indeed, serve us
well for a few more years yet. But given the time it takes to devise and
procure a replacement, we need to start thinking about that now.
There are at least three alternatives to be considered. The first is
an air-launched replacement. I do not believe that any serious commentator
now believes that that would be the right solution. It was, indeed, the
first of our nuclear deterrents. I understand that long before my time
the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, played a very distinguished part
in deploying the air-launched nuclear deterrent of those years. Aircraft
would be gravely vulnerable in the modern circumstance, even deploying-as
I presume they would-some stand-off weapon, and so would their bases.
I suggest that it is widely believed that an air launch solution should
not be further considered in any detail.
What about a land-based solution? For many years at least part of the
United States' deterrent comprised a land-based system, deployed from
deep silos in various parts of the United States. It has the advantage
that very large missiles can easily be operated from deep land-based silos,
but they, too, can be vulnerable in times of tension and in other circumstances.
I do not think that anybody now seriously proposes an intercontinental
land-based solution. However, land-based solutions are not necessarily
confined to intercontinental missiles. Much more recently-indeed, during
my time at the Ministry of Defence-the United States deployed land-based
cruise missiles in the United Kingdom in response to the new SS20 threat
which emerged at about that time. Your Lordships will recall, as I do
only too well, the difficulty that surrounded Greenham Common and Molesworth
in the deployment of that land-based cruise missile system.
I submit that the final option is the submarine-based system, which we
have deployed with such success for 30 years or more now-first, the Polaris
system and more recently the Trident system. Both the Polaris system and
the Trident system have served us well. There could, indeed, be variations
on a submarine-based system. The intercontinental missile system-Trident
and Polaris were such systems-could be supplemented, or may even be replaced,
by a cruise missile system launched from submarine torpedo tubes. That
has some attraction still, but I believe that an intercontinental missile
system is what we shall need. 29 Jun 2006 : Column 1333
The reason for that is that, with present technology at least, a cruise
missile system would need to be effected to be able to deploy not only
in the deep waters of the great oceans but much closer to the land masses,
and therein lies a risk. The risk is that in all the years that we have
been deploying a submarine-based, intercontinental system, we have been
able to say-and I hope we can still say-that the system has never been
detected or compromised while on patrol. That is a crucially important
consideration, and I hope the noble Lord when he replies can confirm that
that continues to be the position. It is crucially important that the
missile-carrying submarines operate secretly and covertly and are not
subject to any risk of detection. If one is considering the possibility
of a cruise missile system launched from submarine torpedo tubes, there
is a risk that the submarines would have to deploy too close to the continental
masses for comfort.
That, I suppose, underlines the regret that I have expressed to your
Lordships before that we decided a few years ago to abandon the conventional
submarines that we then possessed, the Type 2400. We had just four of
those, but they have recently been disposed of to, I understand, another
country. It is a pity that we no longer have conventional submarines for
operating in comparatively shallow waters. That means that the nuclear
submarines presumably have to operate in areas such as the Gulf, and that
needs special care.
I summarise by saying that I hope and believe that we will continue to
maintain our deterrent posture. I hope and believe that we will continue
to maintain our independent nuclear deterrent posture and that it will
be a submarine-based, intercontinental missile-based system.
29 Jun 2006 : Column 1336
Lord Dykes: I turn finally to the vexed question looming up at the other
end of the scale—the grand strategy; the massive equipment—which is of
our nuclear deterrent and the future procurement problems involved in
renewing our nuclear arsenal. We start off with the extraordinary news
that the by now almost self-appointed next leader of the Labour Party
and Government is pledging to find the replacement for Trident, to be
commissioned in a few years' time and completed by 2024. Was this a combination
of warding off his own sceptical Back-Bench colleagues in another place
and anticipating the report of the Defence Committee on this theme? I
do not think that it is right for any Government just to make this decision
before Parliament and the nation have had a full and lengthy opportunity
to consider all the options.
The conclusion, after all, may indeed be that we should maintain our
existing capacity or upgrade to the modernised replacement, to which the
noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, referred in detail. However, the end of the
Cold War, if coupled with a successful modernised and renewed non-proliferation
treaty, could offer alternative prospects without in any way undermining
this nation's safety and future welfare. Would it be a submarine system,
as now, or air-launched missiles? The debate is just starting, and much
more detailed thought needs to be given to those matters.
However, most worrying of all is the notion that we could still rely
totally on the United States for the new system. Although the warhead
could be British-made, the so-called independent deterrent would still
be something of a continuing myth, except ironically for the French—President
Chirac was making strange bellicose noises at the west coast navy base
in France six weeks ago.
Are we not, after all, both legally and for practical reasons obliged
to honour our commitments to the NPT, both in its present form and perhaps
in a new form if that should be necessary? It is astonishing how we fail
to perceive the accusation of hypocrisy from such quarters as the non-nuclear
powers, who are watching what we and other nuclear countries are up
29 Jun 2006 : Column 1337
to very carefully, when we have plainly not met all our duties under
the treaty but continue to exhort other countries such as Iran, North
Korea, India and Pakistan to do the necessary under it.
In fact, the non-proliferation side of the equation has been more successful
than what has been achieved by the old nuclear club although, to be fair,
the United Kingdom has made some important reductions in its arsenal.
But the club members are legally committed under the NPT to move to the
elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Russia has some 5,000 warheads,
some of which are possibly in a questionable maintenance state; America
has more or less the same; and France and the UK together have some 5
per cent of those unnecessarily massive arsenals. The START II and START
III negotiations and agreements faltered badly and have not achieved their
objectives at all.
In the debate introduced here on 6 June by my noble friend Lady Williams
of Crosby, Hans Blix was mentioned and reference was made to some 27,000
nuclear weapons that are still scattered around the globe. The report
sent to Kofi Annan by Hans Blix's Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
strongly emphasised a call on Britain and France to reduce their existing
arsenals. This House will return to these solemn challenges on many future
occasions, I am sure. The debate is now on.
29 Jun 2006 : Column 1342
Lord Craig of Radley: The first—it is obviously the key issue—is whether
this country needs such a capability in future. Looking 30, 40 or more
years ahead, it is impossible to forecast any set of circumstances in
which the government of the day would find such a potent capability vital.
Trident was adopted in the early 1980s when our defence policy was concentrated
on NATO and Europe. We did not foresee the end of the Cold War less than
a decade away or our subsequent involvement in large-scale expeditionary
warfare thousands of miles from these shores. The deterrent posture of
the Cold War has little relevance today because changes in deployment
and operation have been necessary. I cannot contemplate using nuclear
weapons against a terrorist or largely asymmetric threat. If they could
not be used, their deterrent effect is non-existent. Their use, or threat
of use, must be for situations where national security is mortally threatened.
I recall discussions from as long ago as 1989 with my then opposite number
in the United States, Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in which his firmly stated position was that any decision to use US nuclear
weapons would be confined to dealing with a major threat to the security
of the United States itself. Whatever the NATO rubric of an attack on
one being deemed an attack on all, that would not, he said, guarantee
the US using nuclear weapons on behalf of others in NATO, even the UK.
Only if the threat was to the United States itself would their use be
contemplated.
29 Jun 2006 : Column 1343
Post Cold War, it is highly unlikely that the Crowe position on the use
of US nuclear weapons will have changed. To rely on another nuclear-capable
country, no matter how friendly, to come to our rescue by threatening,
let alone using, nuclear force on our behalf is not realistic. If the
threat we faced were seen as mortal to our security and way of life, only
a national deterrent capability would be credible, and then only if underwritten
by a realistic determination to be prepared to use it. It would also lack
credibility to rely solely on a nuclear capability not backed by other
military resources. Conventional military strength is an important part
of a deterrent or counterforce posture, as are other non-military threats
or actions in achieving a desired outcome. Conventional forces must therefore
be maintained and, indeed, strengthened from today's levels that have
been cut too far. Our conventional strength is now tied to a defence planning
assumption that we would not become involved in major confrontation or
conflict without strong allies. This dichotomy between major action only
with allies and unilateral nuclear action if we face mortal danger nationally
needs some explanation or elaboration that I hope Her Majesty's Government
will provide.
Another consideration about retaining a national nuclear capability is
the degree to which it is seen and recognised to be independent. At the
use or threat of use end, given the right security of communication, capability
and national control is there. Reliance on others and their facilities
beyond our shores for supply, maintenance, modification or repair has
been cited as reasons for denying that Her Majesty's Government have true
independence. But it is not credible to argue that no operational capability
will be available, even when relying on offshore support, if Her Majesty's
Government were ever to have to consider its use. The present combination
of nationally provided warheads on US missiles does not deny Her Majesty's
Government the possibility of independent use.
Nevertheless, we must revisit the arguments that led to the adoption
of the current procurement and support arrangements for Trident. Will
the United States' view about this country retaining a nuclear capability
with major assistance from it mesh with its revised global stance and
ambitions? I believe that it will, although our recent experience over
access to technology in the joint strike fighter that we are building
with the Americans has not been a happy one.
A further consideration is the invulnerability of the nuclear capability
to pre-emptive attack and destruction. Until there is a breakthrough in
underwater detection, the submarine and missile combination provides a
high degree of protection and a high assurance that the capability would
be available for use if necessary even if a surprise attack on it were
ever attempted or contemplated.
Less well protected would be land-based weapons or weapons relying on
launch from aircraft platforms. There is potential scope for trading security
from sabotage or attack with the relative lower cost of less
29 Jun 2006 : Column 1344
and invulnerable systems. This too must be examined. While a nuclear
weapon has an awesome capability, it is in truth even more a political
rather than a military weapon. So the politics of possession must also
be weighed in the balance.
The position of the United Kingdom in the United Nations and on the Security
Council may in future depend on this country remaining in the nuclear
nations' club. I leave it to others to weigh this argument, but it should
not be overlooked in the process of the decision taking. No Act of Parliament
is required for the Government to proceed to a replacement system. But,
as Mr Straw said last Thursday in another place:
"Decisions on Trident's replacement have yet to be taken. When they have
been taken, they will be put to Parliament in a White Paper. I cannot
anticipate at this stage the most appropriate form of debate, but it will
be in a form that shows proper respect for the House".—[Official Report,
Commons, 22/6/06; col. 1468.]
I am certain that your Lordships would also insist on a debate in this
House.
I believe that the Government are right in principle to maintain an independent
nuclear capability as insurance for the unforeseens and for the leverage
it can provide. But it should be backed by a better level of conventional
capability that we can deploy today. What form our nuclear capability
should take needs much further knowledge-based discussion than has so
for been possible in public.
Noble Lords will have noted from Mr Straw's statement that the Government
intend to reach decisions first, ahead of informed debate; that is to
announce and defend, in the classic way adopted by all past governments
on this issue. Perhaps the Minister would like to confirm this for the
House.
29 Jun 2006 : Column 1368
Lord Garden: I have one question on the nuclear deterrent, which reflects
a point that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, made: what assumptions
have been made about the funding profile beyond 2010? Has the Ministry
of Defence already allowed for the Trident replacement, or must this be
found at the expense of other capabilities?
29 Jun 2006 : Column 1378
Lord Drayson: However, in the remaining time, I want to touch on the
issue of Trident. As a number of noble Lords have highlighted, my right
honourable friend the Prime Minister has said that there will be a White
Paper by the end of the year setting out the options relating to the potential
replacement of the nuclear deterrent. The Ministry of Defence is actively
working on those options, which will then be described to both Houses
of Parliament; there will be an opportunity to debate them thoroughly.
I am sure noble Lords will recognise the importance of decisions relating
to the potential replacement of the nuclear deterrent and to the maritime
industry.
Nuclear Proliferation, June 6, 2006
7.38 pm
6 Jun 2006 : Column 1198
Baroness Williams of Crosby rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what
steps they have taken to counter the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I am grateful to the Government Whips
for having found time for this debate on such an important matter, and
to colleagues in all parts of the House who have decided to stay on to
take part in this discussion.
When I first tabled this Question several months ago, Iran was still
a distant thundercloud on the horizon, and the recommendations of the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Hans Blix, were, at
most, a gleam in his eye. We now face the fact that much of the structure
of law and treaty, which to some extent restricted and confined the development
of nuclear weapons, is in a state of advanced erosion. We have to look
at a structure in which, for example, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
is close to breaking down, with a number of countries refusing to sign
it and others refusing to obey it. We also have to recognise that the
United States and many other major powers have failed to ratify the famous
test ban treaty, even though, up to now, it has been obeyed in practice
although it has no legal standing.
Since the Cold War ended, far from there being a new era of disarmament
and a new willingness in the world to begin to create and structure a
new system of law, we have seen governments become increasingly sluggish,
with lagging interest in disarmament and less enthusiasm about trying
to deal with some of the new challenges that confront us. What we need
now is a new structure and the reinforcement of some of the best parts
of the old structure. That will require a great deal of careful thinking
by governments. Most of the law regarding nuclear weapons has been based
for the past 40 years on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is amazing
that it has survived so long and has been largely obeyed until recently.
Much of its structure has suffered because of the extent to which the
major powers have been seen by the rest of the world as failing to keep
their side of the bargain. The major nuclear powers at the time of the
passage of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty confidently insisted that
they would accept a major degree of disarmament of the nuclear arsenals
that they held. In the SALT agreements and in the major efforts made by
President Bush the First-if I may call him that-there was a real attempt
to try to reduce nuclear arsenals throughout the world. Some years ago,
that effort seemed to run into the sand.
Even today, with the Cold War long ended and with no obvious enemy for
the West, some 12,000 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert are deployed
throughout the world. Of them, 90 per cent are controlled by the United
States or Russia. Another 13,000 nuclear weapons are not so deployed,
and they are held by a great many countries but, again, the great majority
of them are held by the United States and Russia. I have to underline
the phrase "hair-trigger alert". Nuclear 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1199 weapons
can move from deployment to being used in a matter of seconds, and that
is the tiny thread on which the safety of the world hangs. What is so
extraordinary is that every one of those 12,000 nuclear weapons represents
a major loss of resources that could have been used to deal with starvation,
hunger and disease in the world. What makes it even more extraordinary
is that nowadays nobody has any idea who the enemy is meant to be, except
terrorism, and everybody agrees that the enemies who cannot be met by
nuclear weapons are individual terrorists. So the situation is not only
tragic; it is also, to a great extent, absurd.
The fact that the major nuclear powers failed to keep their side of the
bargain has been a substantial factor in influencing the attitude of non-nuclear
countries. A few months ago, I was in India. I went to the major nuclear
research centre and found a group of high quality, high level nuclear
scientists who argued passionately that India had no obligation to join
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or not to go ahead with the development
of nuclear weapons since the western world, in the shape of the major
nuclear powers, had not taken its part of the treaty seriously and therefore
there was no moral obligation on other countries to take it seriously
either.
In his introduction to the report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission, which I strongly recommend to the House, Hans Blix says that,
"the nuclear-weapon states no longer seem to take their commitment to
nuclear disarmament seriously".
Global efforts are also needed to secure and clean up fissile materials
that are scattered around the world, many of them in perilous and dangerous
places. In his important recent speech on foreign policy at Georgetown
University, the Prime Minister, Mr Blair, said, when referring to world
globalisation:
"What this means is that we have to act, not react; we have to do so
on the basis of prediction, not certainty".
Almost every major expert in the world on terrorism predicts that nuclear
weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists or other organised criminals
at some time in the next 10 years unless far more radical steps are taken
than have been taken so far to control the fissile materials lying around
the world.
Let me refer briefly to some of the current crises. One of them, which
is rather overlooked in this country, is the Indian-American special agreement.
Under it, the United States agreed to provide nuclear materials to India
for her civil power needs, but did not look carefully at the shortage
of uranium in India. That meant that the more the United States was willing
to provide civilian uranium, the easier it was for India to divert her
own materials to weapons development. In the United States, a lobby is
now suggesting that Congress should, at the very least, insist that associated
with the Indo-US agreement-which in many ways is a very troubling extension
of the areas in which the NNPT operates-there should be a commitment by
India to a fissile material cut-off, which means that any fissile material
that she does not 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1200 use will not be exported or
used for other purposes. India has said that, in principle, she is willing
do so. Pakistan has said the same.
The second current crisis that I want to refer to briefly is North Korea.
The agreement reached in 1994 on the exchange of civil nuclear materials
for a decision by North Korea not to continue with nuclear weapons production
was breached when the Bush Administration decided not to continue to supply
light water for North Korean reactors. The latest information we have
on North Korea is that an agreement was reached last September, but it
depended upon implementation by both sides. Each side has said that the
other side must implement before it will, and so far, there has been no
agreement on concurrent implementation, which might break the logjam.
Can the Minister update us on that?
On Iran, one has to say, "Thank God for Condoleezza Rice" and possibly,
"Thank God for Jack Straw" because at least America is now willing to
talk directly to Iran. Without that, it is quite clear that negotiations
would have gone no further. Having said that, Iran is currently deeply
concerned about security guarantees and feels itself to be surrounded
by potential enemies. Unless we can broaden the basis on which Iran is
brought back within the international community and within the IAEA, there
is little hope that the problem will be resolved any time soon. In that
context, the United Kingdom and its allies should look very closely at
some of the rather ambitious proposals put forward by the Blix commission,
which were echoed by Prince Hassan of Jordan, for a much wider security
guarantee in the Middle East that would attempt to establish a non-nuclear
region. Such a guarantee would embrace Israel as well as Iran and the
Arab world and would also embrace a commitment by the West and other counties,
such as, for example, the Arab sheikhdoms, to provide development aid
and, particularly, to try to draw up treaties involving water and energy.
Finally, there is the issue of loose fissile materials all round the
world. Most people are unaware that the total budget spent by the IAEA
on securing nuclear materials, as distinct from inspecting them, is $15
million. Except for $1.3 million, all the money comes from voluntary contributions.
The statutory contribution required by the treaty is only $1.3 million,
which finances precisely four full-time experts. The rest are all on short-term
contracts. It is crackers, to put it no stronger, that so little is being
spent by all of us on securing nuclear materials in countries such as
Iran, North Korea, Israel and elsewhere.
Therefore, in conclusion, I ask the Minister whether Her Majesty's Government-the
Prime Minister has recently shown a lot of interest in such matters as
fuel banks-should not take to the European Union's General Affairs Council
the issue of whether the EU could not contribute to the IAEA the very
small sums of money required to establish a proper nuclear security system
under the IAEA's ambit so that we can make sure that the loose fissile
materials around the world are controlled and are under serious international
inspection. 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1201
I am grateful to everybody who has attended this debate, I am sorry that
we have only an hour to discuss such a hugely complex topic.
7.51 pm
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, the Question on the Order Paper in
the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, could not be
more timely or, indeed, more essential to debate. The international disciplines
the world put in place more than three decades ago, as the noble Baroness
said, are under acute stress and show increasing signs of fragility. Last
year two major global conferences, the NPT review conference in May and
the UN summit in September, concluded without a single word being agreed,
let alone any measures to strengthen the international regime.
Two countries-North Korea and Iran-have, in one case, broken out of the
regime and in the other failed to satisfy the IAEA that their long-standing
clandestine uranium enrichment programme was not designed as a step towards
doing so. Three countries-India, Israel and Pakistan-have never belonged
to the treaty and show no signs of moving towards it. The five recognised
nuclear powers have little to show, and nothing at all recently, on their
nuclear disarmament. This is a sorry story on a matter which, as long
ago as 1992, was clearly identified by the UN Security Council as a threat
to international peace and security.
First, I say a few words about the two most urgent cases, North Korea
and Iran. We should have no illusions. If the international community
cannot find an effective response to these two cases, there is no readily
available fall-back position, no plan B and no second row of trenches.
If countries that want to-even countries with a proven track record of
assisting terrorism and challenging the UN charter, and which have signed
and ratified the NPT-can acquire nuclear weapons with impunity, then we,
the international community, have failed. But finding that effective response
cannot just be a matter of coercion, of wielding enough sticks to bring
about compliance; we must also be ready to discuss with these countries
their security concerns that motivate them and, in so far as they are
legitimate, we have to address them. That "we" means "all" those principally
concerned, including the United States, which is why I too welcome warmly
last week's statement by the US Secretary of State of willingness to join
such a dialogue with Iran as the US is already doing with North Korea.
We have to put forward in any such dialogue a convincing alternative to
the path on which those countries have set out, one which offers real
advantages and which guarantees legitimate access to civil nuclear power.
But simply addressing those two problem cases is not enough; nor will
it be successful if all we do is to find ad hoc solutions to them and
if we fail to strengthen the multilateral non-proliferation system as
a whole. In March of this year Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General
of the IAEA, in a powerful speech in Karlsruhe, set out a comprehensive
analysis of what needs to be done. Just last week, as the noble 6 Jun
2006 : Column 1202 Baroness mentioned, Hans Blix published the report
of his distinguished commission on the same policy areas. I would welcome
the Minister's response to those two sets of ideas. What are we doing
to make the additional protocol for IAEA safeguards the gold standard?
What, above all, are we doing to provide internationally guaranteed assurances
of the supply of enrichment and reprocessing services to any country in
good standing with the IAEA so that it can pursue a civil nuclear programme
without any need or temptation to acquire the whole fuel cycle?
If anything like the current level of oil prices continues over a significant
period, a large number of civil nuclear plants will be constructed worldwide
in the years to come. Each of those will require enriched uranium and
the reprocessing of spent fuel. If we do not do more now to address this
political weakness in the regime, to provide a solid basis for a voluntary
moratorium on new enrichment and reprocessing installations, we will surely
rue the day-naturally, when it is too late. I warmly welcome the support
the Prime Minister gave in his Georgetown speech on 26 May to such an
approach. What are we going to do to make a reality of it? What is the
critical path towards decisions on it?
Later this year the Government have promised that there will be a national
debate on the future of Britain's own nuclear deterrent. I certainly do
not want to anticipate that debate today, but I would be grateful for
an assurance from the Minister that, in framing their position on this
issue, the Government will take full account of their commitments under
the non-proliferation treaty-and reiterated at subsequent reviews of that
treaty-to move towards nuclear disarmament. I know our past record in
this matter is better than some others, but it really is important to
avoid conducting this national debate with a blithe disregard to its possible
impact on other countries which do not possess nuclear weapons but which
may be contemplating the case for doing so. Too many of the statements
by existing nuclear powers in recent times have ignored that dimension;
and too few of their actions have reflected any awareness of the commitments
they assumed when the NPT was negotiated.
Today's short debate provides an opportunity to air concerns about a
matter of fundamental importance to international peace and security.
Can we expect that any action will be taken on these issues when the G8
heads of state and government meet in St Petersburg in July? Of course
that grouping cannot take binding legal decisions, but it can give a powerful
sense of direction and momentum to a debate which, so far, seems to be
drifting rather aimlessly towards a dangerous fall. Energy security is
one of the main themes of that summit but we will not achieve any kind
of security, of energy supply or of anything else, if we do not respond
effectively to the challenge of nuclear proliferation.
7.57 pm
Lord Dykes: My Lords, the tone of pessimistic urgency in this stark subject
has been aired very 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1203 competently already by the
two previous speakers. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Williams
for launching this debate and I agree strongly with what the noble Lord,
Lord Hannay, has just said. Surely, this is the moment of reality and
truth for, particularly, the advanced west to consider these matters,
stark as they are-and I think that there is general agreement about that.
Despite the fact that we in the United Kingdom can claim to have made
some impressive reductions here and there, none the less the task and
the obligation for us is very considerable indeed. Yet, there is a continuum
of complacency about these matters, an insouciance which is positively
alarming. We have to think about the longer term too. The awkward questions
facing us from people such as Bruce Kent-a very controversial figure-get
the response, which more and more people tend to believe, that maybe there
should not be a replacement for Trident after all. Even Sir Stephen Wall
is quoted in his recent letter. And there are the other aspects of the
immediate crisis looming up.
I wish to save time by not repeating the points, with which I agree,
of the previous speakers and by focusing mainly on EU3 and Iran. I have
a few preliminary words. The problems facing the NPT are so serious that
a complete rethink is necessary, and the sooner a new document is presented
to the international forum the better. I think that that is the only solution
now, bearing in mind the erosion that has taken place, primarily from
the insouciance and, indeed sadly, the incompetence of the United States
in allowing things to develop as they have done. Nothing was sadder than
seeing in the autumn when the millennium targets were enunciated and the
subsequent review meeting just what a shambles that crucial meeting was
on future nuclear disarmament.
It was so sad to see that the third world had very little confidence
in what the first world, the advanced western nuclear powers, and, indeed,
China, had to offer. What an example that remarkable country South Africa
has shown in being the only country, apart from the ex-Soviet countries,
to have renounced nuclear weapons. We need not just consider marginal
gestures by the western powers, led by the United States, but substantial
reform moves in the future. It is preposterous that Israel is not included
in these matters. I believe that it has to be included in whatever NPT
mark 2 might succeed the existing arrangements. Its arsenal is very considerable
indeed, and it is protected by the United States as well as by the whole
international community. It is the unbeatable military power in the Middle
East, and there is no need for it to have a large and provocative nuclear
arsenal in the future.
India and Pakistan have already been mentioned, and I entirely agree
with the points that have been made. North Korea is a special case of
intransigence, but also of co-operation. Now we really do return to the
idea, as President Clinton enunciated, of working with North Korea to
get sensible solutions there. China has its own particular relationship
with Taiwan, 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1204 and that might have unfortunate
nuclear implications in the future. Heaven forfend that it might, but
anything can happen in this dangerous world.
Against that background, what the European Union has achieved so far
in its initial contacts and negotiations over a considerable period with
Iran, which is a special case and a special problem at the moment, has
stood it in good stead and showed that it can make that contribution.
Although it was a special one-off, ad hoc, separate mechanism of the EU3
and not part of the overall collective Union effort, it has done Europe
a whole host of good in the way in which it has been handled. I believe
that more will now come. We have had Xavier Solana's crucial visit to
Iran yesterday and today, and we await the results of that visit and the
offerings that he is bringing now to continue the process on behalf of
the UN Security Council and the European Union, but representing the European
Union in this context. Iran knows what its obligations are. They must
be faced up to, which means that people in Tehran must accept the realities
of the obligations that Iran has had for a long time under the NPT.
I quickly repeat that the preamble to the NPT declares that the state
parties affirm,
"the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear
technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived
by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices,
should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,
whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States".
The whole world is now watching to see how Iran is handled by the west,
by the UN Security Council and by the EU3. The questions for Iran are
crucial, need repeating and need to be answered properly. Does Iran really
want a nuclear bomb? The answer may, sadly, be yes. I hope not, but the
resumption of the anti-NPT activities commenced a long time ago in 1985
during the dreadful war with Iraq. Will UN sanctions be imposed? I hope
not. The EU3 has already made very generous offers, which will be repeated
and augmented, I believe, by Solana's visit yesterday and today.
Iran's economic structure makes it very vulnerable to economic and financial
sanctions, as it knows. If Tehran persists in its nuclear activity, will
the US intervene and strike? Why would this be necessary? Jack Straw quite
rightly said that that would be nuts; indeed, tribute has been paid to
him tonight. The US is now already effectively ruling out such an intervention,
thanks to the efforts of Condoleezza Rice.
The United States' relationship with Iran has been very tragic and based
on a built-in dilemma for the United States that Washington's extensive
diplomatic and military support for the Shah's repressive regime was a
cause of deep resentment for many Iranians. More recently, liberal American
society and its dubious culture, including pornography, drugs, gambling
and all the other activities associated with United States economic activity,
was anathema to the powerful religious establishments under Ayatollah
Khomeini, which considered the USA to be the Great 6 Jun 2006 : Column
1205 Satan. A lot of bad blood has been shown on both sides, and now is
the time for the United States, the whole western world and the UN to
show common sense towards Iran. Now is the time for reconciliation and
a future agreement that could be lasting. That is perhaps the most immediate
reason for this crucial and urgent debate today, but many others face
us, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, pointed out.
8.04 pm
Lord St John of Bletso: My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady
Williams of Crosby, for introducing this debate today. Once again, the
international community has cause to be profoundly concerned by the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. It is also important, however, that the word "nuclear"
should not be cast in a completely negative light, because although nuclear
weapons remain a threat, nuclear energy may prove to be our salvation.
This debate on the proliferation of nuclear weapons is constantly evolving.
Three years ago, we were worried by developments in India, Libya and Iraq.
Today, we find that our attention is preoccupied by developments in Iran
and North Korea. However, although the focal points of our concern may
be changing, I believe that the most sensible course of action remains
the same. It is simply this: Her Majesty's Government should support the
worldwide adoption of a clear, unambiguous and straightforward policy,
and stick to it. Furthermore, Her Majesty's Government should use their
influence in Washington-I am pleased that the Minister has already mentioned
Condoleezza Rice-and we need to work hard to ensure that the United States
does the same.
It is my belief that many of the problems that we face today have arisen
as a direct result of uncertainties and misunderstandings caused by a
general failure to apply our stated policy equally across the board. We
have sent mixed signals, mistrust has spread, and we are now confronted
with an uncertain and potentially dangerous future. The essence of the
NPT was unequivocal. The treaty stands on three pillars: non-proliferation,
disarmament and the right to use nuclear technology peacefully. I repeat
all this to underline the view that, 40 years on, the treaty continues
to represent a sound basis for international agreement to control the
development of these deadly weapons. Sadly, as the noble Baroness, Lady
Williams, has already said, the major contributors to the NPT have failed
to keep their side of the bargain.
I was pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, recalled that South Africa
was the first and only country with nuclear capability to willingly dismantle
its nuclear programme and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As every speaker has said, particular concern is focused today on Iran
and North Korea. There is no doubt that both countries are in breach of
the NPT. The west's relationship with Iran 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1206 is
nothing if not complex. Relations have certainly deteriorated since the
recent election of President Ahmadinejad, who seems to personify a general
mistrust of western powers. His statements on Israel are clearly offensive
and inflammatory, and his Government's refusal to answer questions of
the International Atomic Energy Agency suggests that Iran is determined
to pursue a uranium enrichment programme. Now the west is faced with a
choice: either we meet force with force in Iran, as we did in Iraq, or
we seek to alleviate the mistrust and negotiate a calmer, lasting agreement.
The second option is clearly preferable.
A similar situation has developed, as has already been mentioned, in
North Korea. It has been clear for four years that North Korea has pursued
a programme to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. North Korea
is generally accepted to have produced enough plutonium for one or two
nuclear weapons, although some estimates range between five or six. Those
are obviously areas of grave concern, but it would be quite wrong for
us to fret over developments in Iran and North Korea, and turn a blind
eye to Israel and India.
It bears repeating: if the NPT is to mean anything, it must surely be
implemented clearly, unambiguously and equally across the board. The US
has always opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but United States
policy and, by extension, United Kingdom policy, seems to have been determined
by whether the countries concerned are broadly supportive of or antagonistic
to US interests. US and, for that matter, UK officials have considered
that since there are no conceivable circumstances where Israel or India
would pose a threat to us, our opposition to their nuclear weapons development
has rarely been sustained. Today, US/UK policy has evolved into tacit
acceptance. Obviously, turning a blind eye to countries which we happen
to like does not represent a clear, unambiguous implementation of the
NPT, and our selective approach undermines the treaty.
It is not enough for us to sit back and casually point to the fact that
neither India nor Israel ever signed the NPT, so they cannot be held to
be in breach of the treaty. We must deal with the reality. What is wrong
in Tehran and Pyongyang must be wrong in Tel Aviv and Delhi. If we develop
an international treaty, we cannot simply apply it to countries of which
we do not approve. As one commentator put it, the US and UK look as though
they are preaching temperance from a bar stool.
So, what now? As my noble friend Lord Hannay mentioned, the seventh NPT
review conference was held at the United Nations in May 2005, but it may
be time for a renewal and affirmation of the treaty and a new global commitment,
particularly from the US and the UK, to implement its terms equally. Such
a declaration would help to address concerns in Iran and North Korea,
and to defuse the current situation. I believe that this is the best way
forward. 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1207
8.11 pm
Lord Alderdice: My Lords, like other noble Lords, I, too, thank my noble
friend Lady Williams of Crosby for obtaining this important debate, but
I hope that it is a taster for a more full-length debate in your Lordships'
House. This is a matter of enormous complexity and importance. It would
not be right if all our consideration was confined simply to this dinner
hour. It is really only possible to deal with a very limited number of
issues. I shall focus on a strategic question, which I hope that the Minister
will be able to answer.
From the beginning 60 years or so ago, there were two approaches to nuclear
proliferation. One was associated in the minds of the public, I suppose,
particularly with the names of Einstein and Szilard, the two scientists
who spoke so much not about just the scientific aspects of the problem
but also the political problems. Their view was that the whole community
of nations had to come together to address nuclear proliferation. It was
perhaps best put politically by President Eisenhower in his 1953 "Atoms
for Peace" speech at the United Nations. He said:
"But the dread secret, and the fearful engines of atomic might, are not
ours alone . . . the knowledge now possessed . . . will eventually be
shared by others-possibly all others".
Therefore, the multilateral approach that developed from that, of which
the NPT is the most significant element, was an understanding that you
cannot stop the knowledge indefinitely: you have to concentrate on co-operation
and persuasion, and make available to all countries that wish it the civilian
developments of nuclear energy, and encourage that. The positive thing
is that while physicists such as the eminent Dick Wilson at Harvard would
say now that in 1946 they thought that by now there would be 100 nations
with the bomb, of course there is less than one-tenth of that. That shows
a success on the part of the NPT. Of course, the lack of success was more
in the hands of the "haves" than the "have nots".
It is very worrying that the other strand of opinion about nuclear proliferation
and how to deal with it, associated perhaps particularly with the name
of General Leslie Groves who headed the Manhattan project, was that the
United States had to make sure that no one could get the hold of nuclear
technology unless they were an ally of the United States. Civil use could
always progress into military use. Although that view took a back seat
for a long time, one senses that it never died away completely and in
recent years it has begun to come forward again in the American mind and
thinking.
I say that because one has noted a number of comments of this kind and
can see the different approach to Iran and in the way the 2006 US national
security strategy worryingly undermines the other element of NPT-not only
the side saying that everyone should have nuclear technology for civilian
use but also the commitment of the "haves" in the form of the nuclear
powers, that they would never use nuclear military power to blackmail
those who do not have it. But when we have a doctrine of pre-emption-if
a terrorist attack was made on the United States 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1208
using a dirty bomb, the US would feel able to pre-empt and respond to
such an attack against any country which it felt might be associated with
it. Of course, the people of the Middle East and, with all that has been
said about Iran, feel particularly vulnerable. In fact, sometimes I think
that the big message of the Iraq war for any country on the other side
of the argument from the United States is: get a bomb and there is a fair
chance you won't be attacked. Certainly that is the message I hear from
people in the Middle East. If Saddam had really had a bomb, he would not
have been attacked.
That leads me to the strategic question to put to Her Majesty's Government:
which of these strategic approaches is now being adopted? Is it the multilateral
approach which says that everyone should have the option and that those
of us who have the military technology will, along with others, negotiate
to reduce it while encouraging everyone towards the practical civilian
use of nuclear energy at a time of increasing difficulties regarding energy
supplies, or do we find ourselves pulled towards what I have described
as the Groves doctrine, that it is only our allies we can trust with the
technology because it can always be used for military purposes? The reason
for concern about this is because when considering Iraq, the argument
heard in your Lordships' House went something like this: "Well, they have
WMD". Later it became, "Well, they have WMD programmes". The next argument
was, "Well, they have the technology to develop WMD-covert programmes".
Finally the argument became, "Well, they have the people who know how
to do this".
I fear that we see the same kind of argument beginning to develop over
Iran and nuclear technology. "They have got it". "No, they haven't got
it but they do have programmes to develop it, which is urgent". Of course,
Mr Negroponte recently remarked that it may not happen for 10 years, but
they have the people who could do it if they really wanted to. That is
a very dangerous argument. Indeed, I was particularly concerned when the
Foreign Secretary, the right honourable Margaret Beckett, commented that
there are "two paths ahead" and that:
"We urge Iran to take the positive path and consider seriously our substantive
proposals".
That, I presume, is the multilateral approach of talks. But the Foreign
Secretary referred to two paths. The suggestion that Her Majesty's Government
are beginning to tinker with what I have described as the Groves understanding
which now informs some senior people in the US Administration is worrying.
I therefore seek the noble Baroness's reassurance that that is not a strategic
shift on the part of Her Majesty's Government and that we will have a
serious debate and discussion within our scientific and political communities
and in the community at large over how to address this seriously deteriorating
situation.
Baroness Crawley: My Lords, I must remind your Lordships that this is
a time-limited debate and that the Minister has already lost three minutes
of her time to reply. 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1209
8.18 pm
Lord Garden: My Lords, I, too, thank my noble friend Lady Williams of
Crosby for arranging this important debate. As other noble Lords have
said, the timing is perfect given the launch of the Hans Blix commission
report on weapons of mass destruction over the past week. The report analyses
the threats from what the commission assesses are 27,000 nuclear weapons
still around on the globe, as well as the potential threat from those
who wish to acquire such weapons. In a debate of one hour, we can scarcely
do justice to the 60 different recommendations made in the report. I hope
that the Minister will tell us that the Government are going to study
the Blix report carefully. Perhaps, for once, they might come up with
a reply to the report showing how we will take forward those 60 recommendations.
Our minds are focused on the impending crisis over Iran's nuclear enrichment
programme and the potential proliferation implications. No doubt we will
come back to that in other debates but, as my noble friend Lord Alderdice
has highlighted, nuclear proliferation by states has been a relatively
slow business. Over the past 60 years, nine states have become nuclear-the
big five, India, Pakistan, Israel and probably North Korea. A number-and
it is more than just South Africa and the three previous Soviet republics-have
abandoned their developments along the way to nuclear weapons over the
years. We need to remember that the web of arms control measures, although
they have not been 100 per cent effective, has played a significant role
in constraining proliferation by states.
There is much more that we should do to put new life into the arms control
process but it is clear that some of the major players currently lack
commitment. This is evident not only in the extraordinary increase in
nuclear weapons spending by the United States; I was in Paris last week
listening to the French proposals for new systems and a new doctrine which
run counter to the aims of the non-proliferation regime.
However, the dangers from nuclear proliferation are now as much about
the possibility of both fissile material and expertise being transferred
illegally for either financial or ideological reasons. Despite the benefits
that the noble Lord, Lord St John of Bletso, saw with nuclear power, it
does of course release yet more fissile material to be used illegally.
This raises the small but finite possibility of non-state actors gaining
access to nuclear weapons. Few experts believe that it is likely for the
foreseeable future that it will possible for such groups to manufacture
a fission bomb from scratch. The problem arises from access to ready-made
weapons-or to highly enriched uranium-that have already been produced
by states.
The source of these risks is very clear. Since 1995, the IAEA has maintained
an illicit trafficking database, which records 662 confirmed incidents
of theft, 18 of which involved highly enriched uranium or plutonium, including
a few cases involving kilogram quantities. Both the United States and
Russia still have a large number of nuclear weapons, as we have heard,
6 Jun 2006 : Column 1210 and an even larger stockpile of material that
they need to safeguard. Russia has a particular problem in safeguarding
old tactical weapons which may not have the permissive action links that
would lock the weapons. There is also a particular worry, which we have
not heard so far in the debate today, about Pakistan's weapons. We are
aware that some of the extremist terror organisations operate illegally
from within Pakistan and that the country has suffered instability in
the past.
But no nuclear weapon state can be complacent. Are we certain that United
Kingdom weapons and materials are properly defended? I do not expect the
details to be released into the public domain, but Ministers need to keep
a regular check that standards are being maintained as we go down the
route of more contractorisation and outsourcing of the public sector.
Have we taken into account the lessons we learnt from Libya-now well documented-in
terms of how the AQ Khan network operated, and have we put the appropriate
countermeasures in place?
The WMD commission report rightly states that we require,
"many parallel and reinforcing approaches in the fields of arms control,
disarmament, non-proliferation and anti-terrorism, at all levels-unilateral,
bilateral, regional, plurilateral and global".
In my view, the UK has got a good story to tell in terms of observing
its NPT and other arms control obligations. I look to the Minister to
tell us what proposals the Government have to take forward the arms control
agenda from this position. In particular, what will the Government do
to get movement on bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force
and to negotiate a fissile materials cut-off treaty? Will the Government
push for a global treaty to assure non-nuclear weapon states against threats
of attacks by nuclear weapons? These negative security assurances can
reduce the incentive for proliferation. Finally, will the Government back
the commission's call for a world summit at the UN on disarmament, non-proliferation
and terrorist use of WMD?
8.24 pm
Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady
Williams, for introducing this important debate.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was drawn up in a world order where
the great danger was of a war between two nuclear superpowers, but the
end of the Cold War and the development of a new global system have changed
this. While proliferating states are still a concern, a new threat has
emerged in the form of terrorist groups. Unlike states, terrorists do
not need access to uranium mines, complex nuclear facilities or reliable
delivery systems, as a dirty bomb alone would be sufficient to meet their
ends. Nor can terrorists be deterred by traditional means. Whereas states
seek nuclear weapons to deter potential attack, terrorists seek to use
them to inflict havoc and destruction.
Nuclear weapons technology is now easier to acquire, and the industrial
capacity of states to manipulate such technology has improved vastly.
We 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1211 have seen the development of an international
black market for nuclear material. The dismantling of the AQ Khan network
was a success, but we still do not know the full extent of the materials
and expertise that it provided to countries such as Iran, or whether elements
of the network are still intact. The efforts of countries such as Iran
and North Korea to subvert the NPT have eroded confidence in the treaty's
ability to constrain proliferators.
It is vital to British interests that Iran does not become a fully fledged
nuclear power. There would be a real possibility of an arms race in the
Middle East and serious implications for the future of the NPT regime
if a country that had signed the treaty succeeded in using it as a cover
to develop nuclear weapons.
The Iranians continue to claim that all work done in this area is for
civilian use only. They claim that their activities are legal under the
provisions of the treaty and describe Western objections as "bullying".
It is true, as is frequently pointed out by those in Iran who would try
to justify their nuclear work as research into nuclear energy rather than
weaponry, that the non-proliferation treaty aims to promote co-operation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as to work towards nuclear
disarmament. However, it was set up to operate in a climate of openness
and mutual trust between countries. To this end, the International Atomic
Energy Agency was established, with a clear warning that countries that
hoped to divert nuclear technology and material into military uses would
be identified and stopped. Iran's 18 years of concealment of its nuclear
activities from the IAEA and repeated violations of its safeguards agreement
does not inspire confidence. There are strong grounds to doubt that it
is pursuing solely peaceful research.
The IAEA concluded in April that Iran must go well beyond the terms of
its agreements with the IAEA to restore international trust in its intentions,
but instead of responding positively to this demand, Iran has accelerated
its enrichment research and reduced IAEA access by ceasing to implement
the additional protocol. Furthermore, the Iranian Government have ruled
out a proposal for the country to meet its civilian nuclear power needs
through a joint-venture enrichment programme in Russia, an opportunity
that Iran would surely grasp if its intentions were purely peaceful. The
Iranian leadership has also made blunt threats to disrupt the flow of
oil to international markets.
I hope that consistent international pressure will lead Iran to clarify
all outstanding issues with the IAEA, to demonstrate conclusively that
its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes only and to make the commitments
that could lead to an improvement in its relationship with the rest of
the world. I add my voice to those who have spoken in support of the US
Government's offer of talks with Iran if it agrees to suspend its uranium
enrichment activities. This is a very positive step towards a diplomatic
resolution of the current crisis, and I hope that Iran will respond fully.
6 Jun 2006 : Column 1212
The debate about Iran serves to highlight how much the world has changed
since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. At least three
countries now have nuclear weapons which are not governed by the treaty
and two more are attempting to join them. We must not let the treaty become
an irrelevance as more countries develop nuclear weaponry outside its
framework. Will the Minister give any indication that serious steps are
being taken to establish a worldwide protocol to cover these countries?
Can she explain what plans the Government have to monitor and regulate
future agreements between countries that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and those that have not? Finally, what steps are the Government
taking to ensure that past unauthorised exchanges of nuclear technology
such as that which passed between North Korea, Pakistan and Libya do not
happen again?
8.30 pm
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, like other noble Lords I thank
the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for securing this all-too-short debate
and for highlighting the continuing relevance and value of the non-proliferation
and disarmament regime, albeit a more fragile regime than we all would
wish. Her excellent analysis has illustrated why the non-proliferation
treaty must remain the cornerstone of the UK's counter-proliferation policy.
But clearly the non-proliferation and disarmament regime continues to
face real and pressing challenges, as outlined so recently in the excellent
report by Hans Blix. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Garden, that the
Government are carefully examining the Blix report in relation to calls
for a world summit. As the UK is certainly committed to progress in a
multi-disarmament forum, a world summit could be considered.
As noble Lords will be aware, our efforts last year were focused principally
on the review conference and on the Millennium World Summit last September.
In both, the United Kingdom worked tirelessly to achieve ambitious and
balanced outcomes with strong commitments on non-proliferation and disarmament.
The final result was disappointing. However, the lack of a formal outcome
should not detract from the real gains. There was a lot of good and detailed
discussion of ways in which the treaty could be strengthened and we intend
to take those forward in the different international forums. The EU, for
example, put forward ideas on measures to discourage withdrawal from the
treaty and those drew widespread support. The very fact that the EU reached
a common position on the NPT continues to be useful.
On the Millennium Review Summit, noble Lords will recall that the then
Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, was personally involved in an initiative
led by Norway that would have offered a substantive strengthening of international
commitments on non-proliferation and disarmament. In this instance the
UK was operating in a purely national capacity. We were prepared to work
with six other countries, including South Africa, that have wide-ranging
positions on these issues and we 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1213 were successful
in finding much common ground on which we could proceed towards the shared
aim of strengthening international non-proliferation. However, while it
was not possible at the summit to make substantive progress, more than
80 countries openly supported the initiative. We continue to be engaged
with the initiative and look forward to further opportunities to take
forward the group's agenda.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime will continue to face new challenges,
but we believe that these challenges serve to bolster support for it rather
than to undermine it. We share that commitment with an overwhelming majority
of states and we will continue to use all available international forums
to build consensus to strengthen and reinforce the regime. For example,
we are taking every opportunity to encourage all states to adopt the IAEA's
additional protocol. The UK supports the 2006 EU joint action in support
of the IAEA, as we did last year, and this provides substantial EU funds
for pursuing nuclear safety projects in target countries. I recognise,
of course, that it requires further money.
We have also been at the heart of negotiations for a new and strengthened
mandate for the committee reporting on UNSCR 1540. We are actively working
with others to formulate appropriate incentives for countries to forgo
fuel-cycle facilities. We fully recognise the right of states that comply
with their obligations under the NPT to use and benefit from nuclear technology
as set out in Article 4. As the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, said, you
cannot stop knowledge. It is clear that the nuclear fuel cycle presents
particularly acute proliferation risks. We are currently working with
the US and other international partners to develop a fuel supply mechanism
that we hope to put before the IAEA for approval before the end of this
year. We are also working with G8 partners towards more technically advanced
solutions that would allow states to reap the benefits of civil nuclear
energy without the risk of further transfer of proliferation-sensitive
technology. Connected to this is our work to strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.
These are all significant steps to counter the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
But our record also demonstrates that we have made progress in nuclear
disarmament. We take our disarmament obligations under Article VI of the
NPT very seriously. As noble Lords have said, we have an excellent record
in that area. Since the end of the Cold War we have reduced the total
explosive power of our nuclear forces by more than 70 per cent. We are
the only nuclear weapon state to have reduced its deterrent capability
to a single nuclear weapons system, Trident. I assure the noble Lord,
Lord Hannay, that full account will be taken of our commitments under
the NPT when the forthcoming decision on Trident is taken.
We continue to press for multilateral negotiations towards mutual, balanced
and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons. Of course, we remain fully
committed to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We promote
its entry into force bilaterally at every relevant opportunity. We will
6 Jun 2006 : Column 1214 continue to pursue what we see as the next step
in achieving progress on disarmament; namely, the immediate commencement
of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). We welcomed
the draft FMCT text and mandate for an ad-hoc negotiating committee, tabled
in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva by the US on 18 May. We also
welcome the fact that India has committed to work with the US on an FMCT.
Naturally, we watch with interest the discussions in the US Congress
on India. We believe that there are clear benefits to be gained from bringing
India further into the broader nuclear non-proliferation framework. This
will strengthen this broader framework, which is underpinned by the NPT.
We have strongly supported the initiative from its inception and have
been actively involved throughout.
The Government welcomed the 19 September statement of principles by the
parties to the six-party talks. We have consistently urged North Korea
to return to the talks so that these principles can be converted to real
progress. We greatly regret that progress has not yet been made. But,
although we are firm supporters of the process, the UK is not one of the
six parties, so we have limited influence on the progress of the talks.
Many noble Lords understandably referred to Iran. The Government warmly
welcomed the announcement by the US that it would be willing to participate
in negotiations with Iran provided Iran resumed its suspension of all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. This explicit statement,
and the support expressed in Vienna last week by the Foreign Ministers
of China and Russia, greatly enhances the attractiveness and weight of
the proposal presented to the Iranian authorities in Tehran this morning
by Javier Solana. I was pleased to see BBC reports that, according to
the Iranian negotiator, today's talks have been constructive. But if Iran
fails to re-engage, it must be clear that there will be consequences.
We have worked to clarify thinking among key partners on the measures
that the Security Council might take to further increase pressure. I assure
noble Lords that, following the Foreign Secretary's Statement last week,
there has been no strategic shift in our policy.
The noble Lords, Lord St John of Bletso and Lord Dykes, referred to Israel.
We have consistently urged Israel, as a non-nuclear-weapon state, to accede
to the NPT. We have also consistently supported UNGA resolutions calling
for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
That would, of course, include Israel.
Today, as the noble Lord, Lord Astor, clearly stated, we must also consider
the possibility that the threat of WMD proliferation and international
terrorism will one day converge. The G8 global partnership against the
spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction has committed to meet
this challenge through raising up to $20 billion for the threat reduction
projects the noble Baroness has described. 6 Jun 2006 : Column 1215
The UK has demonstrated our willingness to shoulder our share of responsibility
for countering this threat. In 2002, the Prime Minister pledged up to
$750 million to the global partnership. Almost four years on, the UK programme
is fully operational and delivering £43 million worth a year of measurable
progress on the ground. In the past year alone, the UK has finished dismantling
three nuclear submarines, constructed a new £20 million facility to deal
with spent nuclear fuel as well as establishing projects to create 1,000
new jobs for former weapons scientists in the closed nuclear cities.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked about progress under the G8 this year.
As noble Lords will know, Russia has chosen to focus on energy security,
and while G8 leaders are expected to agree a non-proliferation statement,
it will focus on present challenges such as Iran as well as the non-proliferation
implications of energy security. In closing, I reiterate that despite
the many and varied challenges that the non-proliferation regime faces,
the Government fully support and will continue to seek every opportunity
for forward movement to uphold and strengthen the non-proliferation and
disarmament agenda.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Article VI, May
25, 2006
Lord Archer of Sandwell asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they have any proposals to initiate the negotiations required
by Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Lord Triesman): My Lords, the United Kingdom is committed to progress
in multilateral disarmament and plays a strong role in all the relevant
international forums. The UK has an excellent record in implementing its
disarmament obligations under the NPT, and, in this 25 May 2006 : Column
922 regard, continues to press for multilateral negotiations towards mutual,
balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons. Our priority remains
the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, without
pre-conditions, at a conference on disarmament in Geneva. We therefore
welcome the draft FMCT text and the mandate for an ad hoc negotiating
committee tabled by the United States on 18 May.
Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that sympathetic
if not wholly encouraging answer. Does he recollect that, last Monday,
in reply to a question from me, he said that we-the Government-would,
as he put it, stick to our word under the treaty? Does he further recollect
that Article VI of the treaty imposes on all member states an obligation
to negotiate in good faith for a treaty on total and complete disarmament?
Does he accept that those negotiations cannot begin until someone initiates
them? Has anything been done to comply with that obligation? Does my noble
friend consider that replacing Trident would encourage those negotiations?
Lord Triesman: My Lords, we have taken no decision on Trident; I must
clear that matter up first.
I refreshed my memory on Article VI, which is as my noble and learned
friend describes. The United Kingdom takes the Article VI obligations
very seriously. We have a good record. Since the end of the Cold War,
we have reduced the explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per
cent. We are the only nuclear-weapons state to have reduced its deterrent
capacity to a single nuclear-weapons system, which is currently Trident.
Only one Trident submarine is on deterrent patrol at any one time, and
it is normally on several days' notice to fire. Its missiles are not targeted
at any country. These have been serious steps and developments.
Lord Wright of Richmond: My Lords, what representations have the British
Government made to the Government of Israel to persuade them to accede
to the non-proliferation treaty?
Lord Triesman: My Lords, there has been consistent discussion along the
lines of desiring to see a nuclear-free area in that region. The Government
of Israel are well aware that that is our aspiration. At the moment, they
believe that their defence needs are their defence needs. I believe that,
as we move towards what I hope will be a more comprehensive peace, our
discussions will be more fruitful.
Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I endorse what the Minister has said.
However, does he agree that concerns about Article VI of the treaty should
not be used as an excuse for other violations of the treaty? Does he accept
that we all want to see general and complete nuclear disarmament? In fact,
if one looks at the record fairly and objectively, the United States,
Russia and ourselves have succeeded in halting the nuclear arms race,
which used to terrify the world when we were younger, and have made a
major 25 May 2006 : Column 923 contribution to disarmament. Would efforts
not be concentrated more fruitfully on ensuring that we had a stronger
NPT, taking account of the non-signatories-about whom we have just heard-the
treaty breakers and other dangerously lawless elements? Is that not where
the best efforts of those who are well intentioned about achieving world
peace and stability should be concentrated, not on Article VI?
Lord Triesman: My Lords, the obligations under Article VI are a live
proposition, and we take them seriously. However, the priorities in the
noble Lord's question are exactly right, and I do not differ with him
on any point.
Lord Garden: My Lords, is the Minister aware that President Bush has
put in a nuclear-weapons budget request for the 2007 financial year, which,
in real terms-including inflation-represents one-third more than the average
spending on nuclear weapons each year in the United States during the
Cold War? Is that really meeting Article VI's requirement for a cessation
of the nuclear arms race? Will the Government initiate, as the noble and
learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, suggested-from their position of
high moral goodness, given what they have been doing-talks with the other
four nuclear "haves" in the NPT?
Lord Triesman: My Lords, we have been consistent with everybody in arguing
that we are committed to progress in multilateral disarmament. It would
not be helpful or likely to be fruitful if from this Dispatch Box we attempted
to judge what the Americans must judge for themselves about their defence
requirements or procurements. I just expressed the aspiration that we
should all move to the point that Article VI envisages. Our priorities
are those described by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, a moment ago: making
sure that people come into compliance with the current international law
and making sure that proliferation does not happen and destabilise the
whole world.
Lord Judd: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that part of the crisis
in world affairs underlined by the ISS report issued yesterday is that
a large and articulate section of world opinion is tired of being told
what it must do by people who do not themselves seem to be sufficiently
committed and that that underlines the importance of the multilateral
approach? Does he not agree that on Iran, for example, if we are to have
credibility in mobilising world opinion on our real concern, our commitment
to and effectiveness in seeing through undertakings given in the context
of the NPT is crucial?
Lord Triesman: My Lords, we return to the Question asked earlier this
week. I said then-I do not change that view in what I put to the House
today-that we would stand by our obligations, including those under Article
VI. We are registered as one of the 25 May 2006 : Column 924 nuclear powers
and, as I have said, we have made conspicuous efforts to reduce our nuclear
armament capability. Iran, as a signatory, must do its bit and stand by
its word. That is an obligation for all signatories to that convention.
If I may say so, there is no justification for saying that, if we did
more, it would lead anyone else in a different direction. We need to see
obligations under treaties observed.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
Lord Archer of Sandwell asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they are satisfied with progress at the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference.
6 Jun 2005 : Column 664
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Lord Triesman): My Lords, the United Kingdom's objective at the
NPT Review Conference was to strengthen the treaty. The UK delegation
worked hard to achieve this but, regrettably, extended procedural delays
meant that there was not enough time to negotiate a substantive final
document. Even so, the conference aired serious concerns, and meetings
on the ideas that emerged will be carried forward in the coming months.
The NPT remains the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the
framework for nuclear disarmament. It retains the full support of the
states party to it.
Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, while I thank my noble friend for
that glimmer of hope and fully acknowledge the hard work done by the United
Kingdom delegation to ensure some progress, can my noble friend confirm
that, in return for the non-proliferation undertakings in the treaty by
the non-nuclear states, the nuclear states undertook to negotiate in good
faith for the total elimination of nuclear weapons? Given that the nuclear
powers have been so unmindful of their obligations, does my noble friend
find it surprising that some non-nuclear states have failed to appreciate
what a dangerous game they are playing?
Lord Triesman: My Lords, I understand that the conference was attended
by almost every nation in the world, and it would therefore be unsurprising
not to encounter such differences of opinion. That led to a failure to
reach a final statement. But I can tell the House that the United Kingdom
is most certainly fulfilling all of its obligation under the NPT, including
its disarmament obligations under Article IV; I am sorry, under Article
VI. Our national statement at the Review Conference made it clear that
we have unambiguous support for nuclear disarmament. Indeed, we have a
good record in that we have reduced the total explosive power of our nuclear
forces by over 70 per cent since the end of the Cold War. That is a forward-leaning
process and we are committed to continuing it.
The Lord Bishop of Oxford: My Lords, in view of the Minister's reply
concerning the United Kingdom's obligations under the non-proliferation
treaty, is he able to give an indication of when the decision to replace
Trident, if it is to be replaced, will be made, along with an indication
of the process whereby that decision will be made?
Lord Triesman: My Lords, no decision has been taken on replacing Trident,
although decisions are likely to be required during this Parliament. That
is as close to a timetable as I can go today. Any decision to develop
a successor system would be taken in accordance with our international
legal obligations and will be consistent with the NPT.
Lord Garden: My Lords, has the Minister heard the remarks of the former
US Secretary of Defense, 6 Jun 2005 : Column 665 Robert McNamara, who
coincidentally is to speak in the Moses Room at 7 pm tonight? He has said
that the NPT conference, which he attended, accomplished nothing and that
neither the American nor the British people understand the dangers that
remain not only from the future proliferating states, but also from the
nuclear "haves" not meeting their commitments.
Lord Triesman: My Lords, I have not heard the statements of Robert McNamara,
but I shall do my best to adjust my diary for the rest of the afternoon.
I believe that the conference held in 2000 considerably raised hopes.
It is not the case that every conference held to review non-proliferation
has raised hopes to that extent. In a sense the last conference was more
like many of its predecessors than the 2000 conference. However, the work
to be undertaken over the coming five years, starting with preparatory
conferences in a year's time-so that four years of work lies ahead before
the next main conference-will address a whole range of ideas explored
in this most recent conference. We believe that some of them show considerable
potential, and certainly the United Kingdom has been at the forefront
of motoring some of those ideas.
Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I am sure that the United Kingdom
is fulfilling its obligations under the treaty and that the British delegation
did its best at the recent very disappointing conference. However, is
not the noble Lord, Lord Garden, right to raise somewhat the temperature
of the issue? The NPT is clearly being eroded on all sides. We see that
with the growth of states developing nuclear weapons and the problems
surrounding them always on the edge of being developed in Iran. Is there
not a case for more than reviews, but for urging the bringing forward
of the new proposals the Minister has just mentioned and perhaps publishing
them in a White Paper for Parliament to peruse? It could be suggested
that the withdrawal time from the NPT should be lengthened so that countries
cannot cheat and run, and perhaps the Russians should be involved more
actively. They now say that they have changed their tone and that they
want to help to curb Iran from going military nuclear. A whole range of
issues here demand a degree of urgency rather greater than anything suggested
in the noble Lord's replies so far.
Lord Triesman: My Lords, I have expressed both some optimism about the
stance taken by the United Kingdom and some real caution about the overall
lack of success in a general sense of the conference-as has the noble
Lord. He has put forward a number of important ideas. I want to reflect
on their possibilities and discuss them with ministerial colleagues. However,
part of the framework of any discussion is that of the right of nations
to use nuclear power as a source of energy and therefore have access to
it as a matter of right. However, they must do so under a highly regulated
system that is provided under the treaty in Article IV, and to make sure
that the processes are not 6 Jun 2005 : Column 666 part of a fuel cycle
that then becomes a nuclear weapons cycle. I welcome the ideas that have
been suggested, but they need to be regarded in that light.
Lord Lea of Crondall: My Lords, given the commitment indicated by my
noble and learned friend Lord Archer of Sandwell to multilateral disarmament,
and following on the question put by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop
of Oxford, is it not fair to say that our position is that we are not
going to review our Trident weapons system irrespective of what anyone
does? We want to have the right to do so for as long as others are developing
their systems. Is that balance not consistent with the NPT?
Lord Triesman: My Lords, we will always take the steps necessary to defend
this country from aggression. We will do so in a way compliant with the
treaty, and I hope that I have emphasised the point. With respect, I will
not be drawn further today on anything to do with the Trident decision.
That decision has not been taken, but it will be taken during the course
of this Parliament.
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