NPT à la Carte?
NATO and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

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By Nicola Butler

NATO has made little or no progress in implementing the commitments made at the 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Despite the "unequivocal undertaking" made by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish elimination of their nuclear arsenals, far from moving forward, NATO appears to be gradually slipping backwards under its US leadership despite the concerns of some allies.

NATO's Foreign Ministers meeting in December 2004 have, for the first time since the early 1990s, not included language supporting "arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation" in their Ministerial communiqué, the last before this year's NPT Review Conference.[1] NATO's 2004 Istanbul summit was also silent on the subject of nuclear weapons policy and non-proliferation.

In June 2004, shortly before the summit NATO issued two fact sheets on nuclear policy, attempting to portray developments within NATO in a favourable light in the run up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.[2] However, the number of US nuclear weapons based in Europe remains unchanged at 480 since the 1994 US Nuclear Posture Review, anachronistic nuclear sharing arrangements dating back to the 1960s remain in force despite the concerns of some NPT states parties, and no changes have been made to Alliance nuclear policy since the 1999 Strategic Concept.

NATO continues to maintain it's Cold War policy, set out in the Strategic Concept, that nuclear weapons provide the "supreme guarantee" of Alliance security, despite attempts to re-brand itself as the "indispensable instrument"[3] for defending freedom and security in a new era.

Whilst the Strategic Concept states that US nuclear weapons based in Europe provide an "essential political and military link" between the European and the North American members of the Alliance, this view is now highly dated. As German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder recently observed, "The American military presence, which at that time both provided protection and represented a token of close solidarity, is no longer the security policy priority that it used to be... In fact, the strategic challenges lie today beyond the North Atlantic Alliance's former zone of mutual assistance. And they do not primarily require military responses." Schröder concludes that NATO is "no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies." [4]

Whilst NATO appears to be taking the business as usual approach to nuclear policy, the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change warns, "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."[5] Similarly International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei notes, "We need to do better in terms of protecting ourselves, and we cannot just continue to say, well, we have 25 countries, say, the NATO countries, who are relying on the nuclear umbrella, and everyone else should sit quietly in the cold, you know. That, as I said, in the long run, is not sustainable ..."[6]

New Security Environment, same old Nuclear Forces

Nuclear weapons have played a key role within NATO since its inception in 1949. NATO's first strategy document, "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area", drafted in October 1949, called for the Alliance to, "insure the ability to deliver the atomic bomb promptly." The document continues, "This is primarily a US responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations."[7]

Similarly NATO's current Strategic Concept, issued by the Alliance's 1999 Washington summit states, "The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies."[8]

The Strategic Concept describes nuclear weapons as playing an "essential role" in security policy - a statement that appears to be fundamentally at odds with the nuclear-weapon states' obligations to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

In addition to the nuclear forces provided by the nuclear-weapon states, five non-nuclear-weapon states in NATO participate nuclear sharing arrangements: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. These countries host US B61 bombs that, in the event of nuclear war, could be delivered by aircraft and pilots belonging to the host nation. Previously Greece also participated in nuclear sharing, but the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reports that Greece no longer hosts US nuclear weapons at its Araxos airbase.[9]

Although the number of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe has fallen dramatically since the peak of the Cold War, NATO's Strategic Concept makes a clear commitment to retain these weapons: "A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements."[10]

NATO's NPT Commitments

All NATO members are also states parties to the NPT. Although NATO itself is not a member of the NPT and no NPT agreements refer to NATO specifically by name, it is clear that many of the provisions of the NPT and the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences have major implications for Alliance nuclear posture.

Prior to 2004, NATO communiqués regularly described the NPT as "the cornerstone of non-proliferation and disarmament" and call for "full compliance" by all states parties.[11] This remains the policy of many of NATO's member states. However, over the past ten years a number of questions have been raised by non-nuclear weapon states concerning whether NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements are in compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT. There are also question marks over whether NATO's nuclear stance is consistent with the commitment of the nuclear-weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapons under Article VI of the Treaty.

The 2000 NPT Final Document contains a number of commitments relevant to NATO nuclear policy such as the need for further unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals; increased transparency; further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. NATO could also play an important role by supporting ratification of the CTBT, efforts to negotiate a fissban treaty, and the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament.

Similarly, the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament contain a number of commitments relevant to the Alliance, such as the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the need for further steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Sharing and Articles I and II

NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements were at the centre of negotiations between the US and Russia on Articles I and II of the NPT in the mid-1960s. Article I of the NPT states that, "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly." Article II imposes a complementary obligation on non-nuclear-weapon states not to "receive the transfer" of nuclear weapons.

At first glance, nuclear sharing appears to breach these obligations as it is intended to allow the US to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Allies to deliver in time of war. The US and NATO allies argue that nuclear sharing is, in fact, compatible with the NPT, based on a US interpretation that nuclear sharing does "not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling."[12]

In the past ten years, this permissive interpretation has become increasingly controversial. Some states have questioned whether nuclear sharing is in compliance with Articles I and II. Others have asked whether it is desirable for the Treaty to be interpreted as "no longer controlling" during time of war and have put forward their own interpretations that the Treaty should be binding at all times and in all circumstances. In addition, Non-Governmental Organisations have questioned the validity of the US interpretation, querying which states were made aware of the existence of this interpretation prior to signing and ratifying the NPT.

At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, Mexico asked in Main Committee 1 for clarification from NATO members on whether nuclear sharing breached Articles I and II. Mexico's concerns were then taken up by the Non-Aligned Movement and as a result several proposals for language questioning the US interpretation were put forward for inclusion in the Committee's final report, including:

"The Conference notes that among States parties there are various interpretations of the implementation of certain aspects of articles I and II which need clarification, especially regarding the obligations of nuclear weapon States parties... when acting in cooperation with groups of nuclear-weapon States parties under regional arrangements..."[13]

In response, the NATO states argued that, "existing security arrangements are implemented in full compliance with articles I and II of the Treaty".[14] No agreement was reached on the text of a report from Main Committee I at the Review Conference.

During the PrepComs for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, some NPT members began to question whether it is desirable to have an interpretation that the NPT is no longer controlling in time of war and to put forward language attempting to close this apparent loophole in the Treaty.

In 1998, Egypt proposed that "the PrepCom recommend that the 2000 Review Conference state in clear and unambiguous terms that Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allow for no exceptions and that the NPT is binding on States Parties at all times."[15]

At the 1999 PrepCom, in addition to a Non-Aligned Movement Working Paper, a statement on behalf of the New Agenda countries stressed that, "all the articles of the NPT are binding on all States Parties and at all times and in all circumstances."[16]

NATO's Non-Proliferation Fact Sheet argues that nuclear sharing is in compliance with the NPT on the grounds that nuclear sharing pre-dates the NPT. The Fact Sheet states, "When the Treaty was negotiated, these arrangements were already in place."[17] The Fact Sheet argues that nuclear sharing was "not challenged" at the time. However, it also appears to confirm the claims made by NGOs that not all parties to the NPT negotiations were made aware of the arrangements - only "key delegations" - and that the US interpretation was only made public "subsequently".[18]

It seems likely that the "key delegations" that were made aware of nuclear sharing arrangements at the time were those least likely to object. Documents dating from the period show that the United States was keen to avoid a public debate whilst the NPT was under negotiation. During the final stages of negotiations US Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach wrote, "We do not believe it would be in our interest or that of our allies to have a public discussion of the US interpretations prior to the time when the NPT is submitted to the Senate for advice and consent."[19]

To those states that were informed, the consequences of challenging the nuclear sharing arrangements was also made clear. As Katzenbach writes, "it would not be desirable to request comments from the USSR on these interpretations, since the USSR could not be expected to be bound by unilateral interpretations or a treaty made by others. However, the Soviets were informed that if they took an official position in opposition to these interpretations, a very serious problem would arise."[20]

Although NATO argues that nuclear sharing was not challenged in the 1960s, it is being questioned in the twenty first century. An interpretation that the NPT is not binding during wartime might have been an acceptable compromise to make in order to achieve agreement on the NPT text in 1968, but it creates a loophole in the NPT that can and should be closed as soon as possible.

Systematic and progressive efforts?

NATO's fact sheets attempt to highlight the "radical" and "far reaching" steps the Alliance has taken to adapt its nuclear policy and force posture since the end of the Cold War. "The fact that NATO has reduced the number of weapons available for its sub-strategic forces in Europe by over 85 percent since 1991 and almost 95 percent since the height of the Cold War, is evidence of the Allies' commitment to disarmament," the fact sheet on Non-Proliferation states.

The Nuclear Forces fact sheet features a number of charts, illustrating the "dramatic reduction" in nuclear forces. A closer look reveals little progress in reductions since the early 1990s. A chart listing Nuclear Systems deployed in Europe includes systems such as the Honest John, Sergeant and Walleye missiles that have not been deployed since the 1970s and 1980s, along with nuclear landmines (which were regarded as so risky and unpopular even within NATO that few allies actually wanted to deploy them at the time).

Similarly, a chart on the Reduction of NATO's Nuclear Stockpile includes weapons such as Lance missiles, nuclear artillery and the UK's WE-177 free fall bombs, which were withdrawn because they were becoming obsolete following the end of the Cold War. Notably this chart does not include strategic weapons such as the US and British Trident submarine launched ballistic missiles that are available to NATO, which far outweigh the non-strategic weapons highlighted in both quantity and capability.

What all these illustrations indicate is no change in numbers or types of NATO nuclear weapons deployed since 1999 - essentially no progress on disarmament since the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

What the illustrations also have in common, is that in contrast with the 2000 Final Document's call for "increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities", they do not give an indication of the numbers of weapons currently deployed. The number of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe remains classified and the subject of debate within the NGO community. A BASIC-BITS Research Report in 1997 cited a reduction to around 200 free fall bombs in Europe,[21] but in 2004 the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, referring to "new documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act" suggests that these reductions were not made and that around 480 bombs have remained in Europe since the Clinton administration's Nuclear Posture Review of 1994.[22]

NATO slides backwards

In recent years, a number of US allies - most notably Canada - have fought a rearguard action within NATO, attempting to retain as strong a commitment as possible to non-proliferation and disarmament agreements, in particular the NPT. It is clear, however, that the Bush administration was unlikely to support a continued public commitment of this nature and NATO's "consensus" decision-making process enables the United States, if it chooses, to prevent language it does not support appearing in Alliance communiqués. The nuclear-weapon states within NATO have never been keen to enter into public discussion of either their nuclear weapons policies or their implementation of the NPT.

Immediately following the 2000 NPT Conference, NATO's Foreign Ministers meeting in Florence welcomed the "positive outcome" of the Review Conference and pledged that, "Allies confirm their commitments made at the NPT Review Conference and will contribute to carrying forward the conclusions reached there." The communiqué also called for "the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty", an early entry into force for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and "the rapid conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable and universal Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty."[23] However, even under the Clinton administration, NATO clearly could not bring itself to reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals in a communiqué.

Following George W. Bush's inauguration as President, the references to START, the ABM Treaty, a Fissban and the CTBT quickly faded out of NATO communiqués. In a minor victory for more progressive allies such as Canada, which continued to advocate within NATO for more progress on nuclear disarmament, the 2001 NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Budapest rebuffed attempts by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to drop the commitment to the 2000 NPT Final Document from the ministerial communiqué.[24]

NATO's Prague summit of 2002 did retain language reaffirming "that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the spread and use of WMD and their means of delivery." The summit communiqué stressed "the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords."[25]

The December 2003 NATO Foreign Ministers' communiqué repeated the language adopted by the Prague summit and also stated, "In particular, we underline our commitment to reinforcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the pre-eminent non-proliferation and disarmament mechanism, and ensuring the full compliance with it by all states party to the Treaty."[26]

Whilst the earlier references to the 2000 NPT Review Conference had been removed from NATO communiqués to be replaced by language preferred by the Bush administration referring to "reinforcing" the NPT and "ensuring full compliance",[27] at least NATO retained some language supporting an in principle commitment to the NPT and existing non-proliferation and disarmament agreements.

At NATO's 2004 Istanbul summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, however, all mention of nuclear policy and non-proliferation and disarmament has been dropped from the official communiqués. Instead, in June 2004 NATO published two Fact Sheets on nuclear policy, with the objective of setting out the Alliance's policies in the most positive light for the forthcoming NPT Review Conference.

The lack of any statement concerning Alliance nuclear policy makes it even more difficult than previously to provide any independent scrutiny of NATO's nuclear policies. Key NATO strategy documents - such as the Alliance's current military strategy - remain classified, making it difficult to determine the true nature of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements or the role played by nuclear weapons in military strategy. Despite the commitment to increase transparency made by the allies in the 2000 NPT Final Document, NATO has made little or no progress in this area since 2000.

The 2004 fact sheets are not formally agreed NATO documents and do not have the status of Alliance communiqués. The fact sheets specify that they do not necessarily represent the views of all NATO members, meaning that allies are not necessarily committed to support their contents. They do, however, give a flavour of what we can expect to hear from NATO members in defence of nuclear policy during next year's NPT Review Conference.

The 2004 Fact Sheets emphasise that "all Allies but one have ratified and continue to support the ratification" of the CTBT and that the allies remain "committed to the immediate commencement, in the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty."[28] The Fact Sheets draw on earlier NATO agreements, which remain in force such as the 1999 Strategic Concept. Unfortunately, the 1999 Strategic Concept now looks increasingly dated and the one ally that has not committed to these positions is the most powerful Alliance member, meaning that these texts are not likely to reinstated in official NATO communiqués while the Bush administration remains in power.

In addition to NATO's failure to reduce its nuclear arsenals since 2000, other aspects of Alliance nuclear policy continue to conflict with the agreements reached in 2000. The 2000 NPT Final Document specifically called for "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies". The inclusion of this point followed concerns about NATO's Strategic Concept, which continues to put great emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons.

As long as NATO continues to describe nuclear weapons as the "supreme guarantee" of allied security, other countries will be encouraged to follow suit. As a recent International Herald Tribune op-ed by New Agenda Coalition Foreign Ministers states, "If the nuclear-weapon states continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, there is a real danger that other states will start pondering they should do the same. Recent developments show that this has already happened."[29]

NATO's nuclear posture has also proved a major obstacle to progress on negative security assurances and any possibility of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. NATO's Fact Sheets claim that the allies have "expressed their support for the creation of NWFZs", but makes this conditional on all countries in proposed zones participating "of their own free choosing".[30] Although a proposal for a Central European nuclear weapon free zone was advocated by many NGOs in the late 1990s as an attempt to ameliorate the effect of NATO enlargement in extending the NATO's nuclear umbrella, it was vigorously opposed by the prospective NATO members in Central Europe, as the United States had made clear its opposition to such an initiative.

NATO's Fact Sheets insist that Alliance nuclear strategy "fully conforms with international law". The Fact Sheets take a selective approach to the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion, noting that the opinion is not legally binding and that the Court concluded that, "neither in customary nor conventional international law is there any specific authorization nor any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons."[31]

NATO also emphasises that it is in "full compliance" with the Negative Security Assurances issued by the US, the UK and France on the eve of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. NATO's refusal to rule out first use of nuclear weapons is, however, a major obstacle to further steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons or to achieve any internationally legally binding instrument on security assurances, as proposed by the 1995 NPT Conference. As long as NATO continues to rule out a no first use policy, it is effectively giving the green light to its military planners to prepare for the option of using nuclear weapons first.

Far from reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, the US is now pursuing development of weapons such as bunker busters and mini-nukes that move nuclear weapons from a deterrence role to a potential war-fighting role. In recent years, the US has placed greater emphasis on development of counterproliferation strategies and pre-emptive war, which may include a role for US nuclear weapons. As US policy-making progresses in this area, NATO will come under increasing pressure to adopt a similar posture.

Non-Proliferation or Disarmament?

In the past NATO members have always tended to give higher precedence to Alliance policy positions than NPT commitments. NATO communiqués appeared to pick and choose those NPT commitments, which can be fitted around Alliance nuclear posture. However, as a New Agenda Coalition op-ed stated in September 2004, "The nonproliferation treaty cannot be complied with à la carte. It is a legally binding agreement..."[32] The absence of any commitment on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in NATO's recent communiqués, indicates that non-proliferation, disarmament and the NPT are now off the menu altogether as far as the Alliance is concerned.

The main losers from this state of affairs are NATO members themselves. It should be very much in the security interests of the allies to maintain a strong non-proliferation regime, as this is the most effective route to preventing other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons and to reduce the risk that nuclear weapons and technology may be acquired by terrorists. Instead, NATO appears wedded to retaining the nuclear sharing arrangements of a bygone era.

Why the US and its NATO allies continue to maintain aging and increasingly obsolete "sub-strategic" nuclear weapons in Europe seems unclear. The weapons are no longer described as having a "military" function, rather their role is defined as "political" and as "reinforcing the transatlantic link" in NATO's Strategic Concept. Nuclear weapons in Europe might have been symbolic of the transatlantic link during the Cold War, but in the twenty first century, the ability of the allies to work together to address contemporary security issues such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, and climate change is more pertinent.

Whilst many within NATO seem to think that they can continue with business as usual behind closed doors, such an approach is not sustainable in the long term. If NATO members are really committed to tackling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, then they must reassert their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, not just to the counter-proliferation policies favoured by the Bush administration. In particular, non-nuclear-weapon states in NATO must make concerted efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance policy and to remove the remaining US nuclear weapons from Europe.

IAEA Director-General Dr ElBaradei warns of the risks of "inaction" and of the need to "make significant improvements in international security" at the forthcoming NPT Review Conference.[33] However, many analysts believe that far from making progress, the forthcoming NPT Review Conference now appears to be heading for a "train wreck", in part because of the failure of the NATO nuclear-weapon states, along with their colleagues in Russia and China to implement the NPT agreements of 1995 and 2000.

NATO correctly identifies proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as posing one of the "key threats and challenges to Alliance and international security."[34] However, as New Agenda Coalition members write, "Nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin and both must be energetically pursued. Otherwise we might soon enter a new nuclear arms race with new types, uses and rationales for such weapons and eventually also more warheads. And the primary tool for controlling nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, risks falling apart, with further proliferation as a consequence."[35]

Notes

[1] See 'Final Communiqué Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 9 December 2004', NATO Press Release (2004)170.

[2] See 'NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment' and 'NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues', June 3, 2004, http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/index.html.

[3] 'The Istanbul Declaration: Our security in a new era', Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on June 28, 2004, NATO Press Release (2004)097.

[4] Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 12, 2005, http://www.securityconference.de/

[5] 'A more secure world: our shared responsibility', Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, December 1, 2004, http://www.un.org/secureworld.

[6] Transcript of a meeting at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, May 14, 2004.

[7] 'The Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Area', MC3, October 19, 2004, http://www.nato.int.

[8] 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept', NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999.

[9] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, 'U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, 1954-2004', NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004.

[10] Op Cit, 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept'.

[11] 'Istanbul Summit Communiqué', Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Release (2004)096, June 28, 2004.

[12] 'Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together with Answers Given by the United States', cited in: NPT Hearings, US Senate, 90-2, pp. 262-263, July 1968.

[13] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part II, Documents issued at the Conference, NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part II), New York, 1995, para 9.

[14] Ibid, para 9 qua.

[15] Rebecca Johnson, 'Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Problems and Processes', ACRONYM Report No.12, September 1998.

[16] Ambassador Luiz Tupy Caldas de Moura of Brazil on behalf of the New Agenda countries, May 12, 1999.

[17] 'NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues', June 3, 2004.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964 - 1968, Volume XI, page 574.

[20] Ibid, page 573.

[21] BASIC-BITS Research Note, 'U.S. Nuclear NATO Arsenals 1996-97', February 1997.

[22] Op Cit, 'U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, 1954-2004'.

[23] 'Final Communiqué Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Florence on 24 May 2000', NATO Press Release M-NAC-1(2000)52, May 24, 2000.

[24] 'Final Communiqué Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Budapest', NATO Press Release M-NAC-1(2001)77, May 29, 2001.

[25] 'Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002'.

[26] 'Final communiqué Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, On 4 December 2003'.

[27] 'Final Communiqué Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Madrid on 3 June 2003', NATO Press Release (2003)059, June 3, 2003.

[28] Op Cit, 'NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues'.

[29] Op Cit, 'NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues'.'Nonproliferation and Disarmament Go Hand in Hand', article signed by Foreign Ministers Celso Amorim of Brazil; Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit of Egypt; Brian Cowen of Ireland; Luis Ernesto Derbez Bautista of Mexico; Phil Goff of New Zealand; Nkosazana Dlimini-Zuma of South Africa; and Laila Freivalds of Sweden, International Herald Tribune, September 22, 2004.

[30] Op Cit, 'NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues', June 3, 2004.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Op Cit, 'Nonproliferation and Disarmament Go Hand in Hand'.

[33] IAEA Director-General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, 'Seven Steps to Raise World Security', Financial Times, February 2, 2005.

[34] Op Cit, 'Istanbul Summit Communiqué'.

[35] Op Cit, 'Nonproliferation and Disarmament Go Hand in Hand'.

Nicola Butler is an independent consultant on nuclear issues and Deputy Director of the Acronym Institute, responsible for the website.

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