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Looking to the Future

With the Cold War over, the world faces new opportunities, but also new (or at least different) threats. President Bush's grand assertion of the 'New World Order' has many of the characteristics of the old. There is still institutionalised under-development and poverty in many areas of the world, especially the South, in Africa and Asia. Religious fundamentalism and ethnic intolerance which were kept below the surface in some regions exploded into open conflict. Other conflicts collapsed under their own weight once they were no longer useful as proxy combat zones for US and Soviet ideologists. But they have left a legacy of shattered economies, landmine infestation, undernourished and maimed populations, and an over-armed and under-educated layer of young males who can quickly turn into marauding gangs on hire to militaries and criminals alike. This period is characterised by the paradox of increasing nationalism and decreasing national power. Many of the most serious problems threatening our security are no longer solvable on an isolated or national basis. Nor could we be defended by the traditional tools of defence -- weapons and armed forces -- if food and water shortages and changing climate patterns overwhelmed us, a security threat that could become real over the next 20-50 years. However, the UN is only limping along, and though global solutions are required, it is not clear that the international and multilateral organisations set up 50 years ago to mediate relations among nations will continue to exist with any relevant degree of effectiveness or authority. If that is wanted, some real political and economic investment will need to be made to transform and reform the UN, its bureaucratic culture and the attitude of the member states, especially the United States.

The political dominance of the United States is even more pronounced now that the Soviet balance has gone, but it looks in danger of imploding. The Cold War arms race beggared the Soviet Union, but it also cost the United States dear. The US may dominate the world militarily, but it cannot keep its inner cities safe, employed and productive. The more high tech the toys available to the US military, the more stark the contrast with the skills and education level of the armed forces assigned to use them. This is a recipe for over ambition and instability. The US is in trouble. Britain should seek to maintain the Atlantic Alliance, but as a critical friend rather than a sycophantic poodle. What is deemed good for the United States by an increasingly parochial US government (or Congress) is not necessarily good for Britain or the rest of the world (or for the US' longer term interests either). For the past 50 years, the US has shored its bloated military up with government handouts and by peddling its weapons, hardware and surveillance systems around the world, arming regimes or propping up despots that turned into or could become future threats. Britain has done the same, on a lower scale. The US cannot sustain these levels of defence expenditure, but governments fear the Congressional and economic fallout if they pull the plug. Britain and other European countries need to construct defence relations that are not wholly reliant on NATO and the United States. NATO expansion has been badly handled so far. If it is pushed through now, it may backfire on European security over the next 5-10 years. Britain should not assume that NATO will continue to be central to our security interests. It is possible that NATO could collapse or transform into a different kind of alliance during the next two decades. Britain must make some kind of assessment of alternative security arrangements so that we are not caught unprepared if NATO changes.

This period is characterised by the emergence of a changing global equation rather than a 'new world order'. The North still has the majority of rich, industrialised nations, but with declining economies, high unemployment and crumbling social and urban infrastructures. Some areas of the South are educating and industrialising rapidly. Without the destabilising activities of the CIA given free rein, most of the countries of South and Central America are enjoying greater economic development and political stability than during the 1960s-1980s. Most Asian states are likewise putting energy into building their economies and cementing trading relationships that are much more important in guaranteeing cooperation than military forces. China's economy could well become the giant of the region over the next 15 years. Will this lead the Chinese government to seek military dominance as well, as has happened with other large countries on achieving regional economic dominance? Or will China's political system collapse under the weight of competing interests as its GNP rises? China's past history suggests that any military hegemony it seeks will be to consolidate its own borders and the spheres of influence it has established as 'belonging' to Beijing, such as Tibet. Although China's human rights record is poor, it is unlikely that Britain will change its policy of verbal chastisement and practical non-interference. China is unlikely to seek to invade neighbours beyond those borders and would have no interest in aggression or war with the West, unless it felt under direct and territorial threat from a major power, such as a nuclear armed Japan or United States. Such a scenario seems remote. Japan continues to hold to its non-nuclear policy, but its accumulation of plutonium for an impractical and expensive energy option gives rise to the plausible view that Japan prefers to keep a nuclear insurance policy, allowing it to weaponise fairly quickly if its security conditions changed dramatically. The US argument that only its nuclear umbrella keeps Japan nuclear free is unconvincing, although it may have been instrumental in obtaining Japan's signature on the NPT in 1975. Japan's nuclear insurance policy, if that is what it is, does not pose foreseeable security risks in the next two decades, unless China's growing dominance destabilises relations in the Far East.

Africa remains desperately underdeveloped, ravaged by Aids, poverty, corruption and armed testosterone. Simple analyses that blame it all on colonialism no longer convince anyone. Certainly, colonialism made inappropriate territorial and political divisions and established unusable infrastructures and unequal arrangements for exploiting the wealth of raw materials in Africa. Bureaucratic incompetence and the rapaciousness of local elites, fed and fostered by military and commercial links with corrupt or venal arms traders and aid arrangements, have further destroyed the people. While the European and American right tended to support the abusers because of the profits and influence available, the left were paralysed by a reluctance to criticise leaders who had emerged from anti-colonialist movements. Double standards were rife. It's time to start again, with a long term strategy for seeding the economies of the South, particularly Africa, so that the people themselves can reconstruct their countries along the lines of sustainable development.

The new face of Europe is still in the process of emerging. Some consider the European Union (EU) has already grown too large to play an effective political role. Others argue that the EU should have invited in the former Eastern European countries, rather than dealing with their westernising aspirations by enlarging the NATO military alliance. The countries on the inside are working to an agenda on integration and monetary union that was set before the Berlin Wall came down. A re-evaluation of the objectives and strategy for federalising Europe should have taken place in the early 1990s. Instead of which, like Kohl's simple answers to the complexities of German reunification, the EU put its blinkers up and ploughed along the track it had already decided upon, refusing to look around and beyond. As a result, opportunities have largely passed for developing a broader consensus on a post Cold War cooperative restructuring of Europe. The EU would have been a much more appropriate starting point for re-integrating and assisting in the development of former Soviet satellites than NATO. If the (badly made) decisions on expansion are carried through, it will be necessary to create mechanisms for military confidence-building, trade and development to avoid the NATO enlargement creating new lines of division and distrust in Europe.

The best means of defence is prevention. The classic approach was to prepare for war in order to secure peace. War usually followed. One way is to appear strong, hoping to deter aggression. This works up to a point. But a greater danger for Europeans is the chaos, refugees, economic disruption and spread of conflict from a regional problem that, left unmanaged, turns into a full-scale war. Our military, intelligence and political officers need to be better trained in conflict resolution, peace-keeping and war-prevention. British and other European forces should be more prepared for cooperating in peace-keeping, de-mining and conflict management and reduction than for military exercises and wargames. The skills and equipment are substantially different, although adaptation and conversion are not difficult. Though a well trained regiment that works efficiently together and trusts its officers can acquit itself well in many unexpected situations, it would be more efficient to plan the recruitment and training of Britain's forces specifically for the tasks they are likely to have to undertake in the future.

More ethnic and gender diversity in all areas and at all levels of the armed forces might be a difficult challenge to military culture in the short-term, and would have to be consciously and pro-actively worked for. However, it would contribute to the forces' ability to respond more sensitively and effectively to many different kinds of mission that fall loosely into the category of 'peace-keeping'. Informational technology is also likely to play a key part in defence, in intelligence, surveillance and smart weaponry, with enhanced use of space (and possible conflict over access, control and use of space and space-based resources). Technology advances also provide us with ever more accurate means of monitoring and verifying treaties, bringing the goal of verified disarmament closer. At the same time, the vulnerability of information technology to attack by bugs, hackers or EMP 'white-out' indicate that total reliance on smart technology may enhance the speed and totality with which a sophisticated adversary -- or we ourselves -- could be paralysed by an attacker knowing where to target. So information technology is likely to be the defence growth area in the future, but it will cut both ways: providing information and vulnerable targets to aggressors, as well as giving us the means to identify and stop them.

It is a truism that the world is shrinking. The ability of governments to provide for the defence and security of the British people will increasingly depend on the ability to cooperate with other nations and international organisations to solve or mitigate the big global challenges: water, food, resources, agricultural land, sustainable development, environmental degradation, climate change. These are all security threats in their own right. They also underlie some of the most intractable political and regional conflicts as well. It is likely that if environmental conditions and global poverty worsen in the next two decades, they may precipitate acute shortages, civil unrest and possibly war. The prognosis is pessimistic. The location(s) depend on many factors. The Defence Review will need to take this threat very seriously.

Arms control: the international context

Since the historic withdrawal of the newly deployed Cruise and Pershing under the bilateral 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, arms control has had a very productive decade: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990; the 1991 START I agreement, followed by START II in 1993 (but not yet ratified by Russia). The Geneva-based multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD) concluded the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992 and the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) in 1996. These negotiated agreements have been accompanied by major cutbacks in tactical arsenals and cancellation of tactical systems in the pipeline undertaken unilaterally by the United States, Britain, France and Russia.

Over the next decade this progress may well slow down. The United States and Russia are having enormous difficulties getting the ratification of treaties through the Senate and Duma respectively, due a combination of political and personality obstacles. The US made strong efforts to ratify START II in 1996, hoping that this would encourage Russia to do likewise and shift them from some obstructive positions in the CTBT negotiations. The Duma did not ratify. While some of the problems were to do with domestic power games, many deputies were genuinely concerned about NATO expansion, US plans for missile defence and circumvention of the ABM Treaty, and the unequal targets in START II, which would give the US an advantage. The US has sought to reassure Moscow on all three counts, through the Helsinki Agreement and the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. Russian analysts complain that the compromises are cosmetic. The Duma has still not ratified

The Conference on Disarmament

On the multilateral agenda, too, much is now deadlocked. The multilateral negotiating body on arms control and disarmament is the CD in Geneva, now with 60 members. It successfully negotiated the CWC and CTBT, but after many years of fairly fruitless deliberations. Many now fear that the CD is entering into another phase of much talk and little accomplishment. Of the many issues before the CD, only three have substantial backing:

i) a ban on the production of fissile materials (fissban, 'cut-off' or 'FMCT');

ii) negotiations on (a phased approach to) banning the export, stockpiling, production and eventually use of anti-personnel (AP) landmines;

iii) nuclear disarmament (with or without a specific negotiating mandate at this stage).

The CD works by consensus. As seen most recently at the last plenary of June, no ad hoc committees can yet be agreed on any of these issues. Nor was it possible to convene deliberative committees on transparency in armaments, security assurances or prevention of an arms race in outer space, which had all also been proposed. The CD did appoint a Special Coordinator on landmines, but that was perceived as lipstick, covering up the fact that the CD is not in a position to do anything on this issue. CD members also appointed coordinators to consider further expansion, the agenda and ways to improve the functioning of the CD. Fiddling while Rome burns (or at least smoulders damply).

NATO

NATO was originally conceived to 'keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down'. The following letter from forty-five former senators, cabinet secretaries and ambassadors, as well as arms control and foreign policy analysts puts the case against this hasty expansion of the remaining Cold War military alliance more succinctly and authoritatively than I could, so I have reproduced it in full, as received on the internet. The senior American officials call for a postponement of NATO expansion while other options for European security are explored. The group recommends making it a priority to open the doors of the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe, enhance the Partnership for Peace program, and vigorously continue the arms reduction process. This letter has now been followed by a letter from over forty Senators, including Jesse Helms, also calling for a postponement and rethink. Whether or not NATO expansion goes ahead, the British government needs to rethink its own attitude to and reliance on NATO. There are better ways to maintain US involvement in European security, the full and peaceful integration of unified Germany and the former Eastern bloc countries. In any case, NATO stability and effectiveness during and after expansion is in question, and cannot be assumed for the next two decades. British defence planning needs to take this into account.

June 26, 1997

AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON

We, the undersigned, believe that the current U.S.-led effort to expand NATO, the focus of the recent Helsinki and Paris Summits, is a policy error of historic proportions. We believe that NATO expansion will decrease allied security and unsettle European stability for the following reasons:

• In Russia, NATO expansion, which continues to be opposed across the entire political spectrum, will strengthen the non-democratic opposition, undercut those who favor reform and cooperation with the West, bring the Russians to question the entire post-Cold War settlement, and galvanize resistance in the Duma to the START II and III treaties.
• In Europe, NATO expansion will draw a new line of division between the "ins" and the "outs," foster instability, and ultimately diminish the sense of security of those countries which are not included;
• In NATO, expansion, which the Alliance has indicated is open-ended, will inevitably degrade NATO's ability to carry out its primary mission and will involve U.S. security guarantees to countries with serious border and national minority problems, and unevenly developed systems of democratic government;
• In the U.S., NATO expansion will trigger an extended debate over its indeterminate, but certainly high, cost and will call into question the U.S. commitment to the Alliance, traditionally and rightly regarded as a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy.

Because of these serious objections, and in the absence of any reason for a rapid decision, we strongly urge that the NATO expansion process be suspended while alternative actions are pursued. These include:

• opening the economic and political doors of the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe;
• developing an enhanced Partnership for Peace program;
• supporting a cooperative NATO-Russian relationship; and
• continuing the arms reduction and transparency process, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons and materials, the major threat to U.S. security, and with respect to conventional military forces in Europe.

Russia does not now pose a threat to its western neighbors and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are not in danger. For this reason, and the others cited above, we believe that NATO expansion is neither necessary nor desirable and that this ill-conceived policy can and should be put on hold.

SIGNED,

[positions included for unofficial identification purposes only]

Ambassador George Bunn (IIS Consulting Professor, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford, University)

The Honorable Robert Bowie (Former Director, Policy Planning Staff, and Counselor, Department of State; former Deputy Director for Intelligence, C.I.A.)

Professor David Calleo (Director of European Studies, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University)

Ambassador Richard T. Davies (Former Ambassador to Poland (1973-1978); Political Officer, NATO International Staff; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs)

Ambassador Jonathan Dean (Former Ambassador heading U.S. Delegation to NATO Warsaw Pact Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions; Deputy U.S. Negotiator, Four Power Agreement on Berlin; Adviser for International Security Issues, Union of Concerned Scientists)

Professor Paul Doty (Emeritus Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University)

Susan Eisenhower (Chairman, Center for Political and Strategic Studies)

David M. Evans (Former Senior Adviser to Helsinki Commission (1990-1995); President, Integrated Strategies International)

Ambassador David Fischer (President, World Affairs Council of Northern California)

Ambassador Raymond Garthoff (Former Ambassador to Bulgaria (1977-1979); Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution)

Dr. Morton H. Halperin (Former National Security Council and Department of Defense Official)

Owen Harries (Editor, The National Interest)

Senator Gary Hart (U.S. Senator (1975-1987))

Ambassador Arthur Hartman (Former Ambassador to The Soviet Union (1981- 1987))

Senator Mark Hatfield (U.S. Senator (1967-1997))

Professor John P. Holdren (Chairman, National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control; Professor, Harvard University)

The Honorable Townsend Hoopes (Former Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force)

Senator Gordon Humphrey (U.S. Senator (1979-1991))

Senator Bennett Johnston (U.S. Senator (1972-1996))

Professor Carl Kaysen (Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University)

The Honorable Spurgeon Keeny (Former Deputy Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Senior Staff Member, National Security Council; President, Arms Control Association)

Ambassador James Leonard (Former Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; former Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations)

Dr. Edward Luttwak (Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies)

Professor Michael Mandelbaum (Professor, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University)

Ambassador Jack Matlock (Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1987- 1991))

The Honorable C. William Maynes (Former Editor, Foreign Policy; Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs (1977-1980))

Ambassador Richard McCormack (Former Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (1989-1991))

The Honorable David McGiffert (Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (1977-1981))

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara (Secretary of Defense (1961-1968); President of the World Bank (1968-1991))

Jack Mendelsohn (Former Senior Foreign Service Officer; Deputy Director, Arms Control Association)

Philip Merrill (Former NATO Assistant Secretary General)

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze (Former Special Adviser to President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz for Arms Control; former Deputy Secretary of Defense; former

Secretary of the Navy)

Senator Sam Nunn (U.S. Senator (1972-1996))

Ambassador Herbert S. Okun (Ambassador to East Germany (1980-1983); Ambassador to the United Nations (1985-1989))

Professor W. K. H. Panofsky (Emeritus Professor, Stanford University)

Professor Richard Pipes (Director, East European and Soviet Affairs for National Security Council)

Lt. General Robert E. Pursley (ret.) (Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force)

Professor George Rathjens (Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

The Honorable Stanley Resor (Former Secretary of the Army; Ambassador to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Negotiation)

The Honorable John B. Rhinelander (Former Legal Adviser to U.S. SALT I Delegation; Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State)

The Honorable Marshall Shulman (Professor Emeritus, Columbia University)

Dr. John Steinbruner (Senior Fellow and former Director, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution)

Admiral Stansfield Turner (ret.) (Former Director of the C.I.A.)

Ambassador Richard Viets (Former Ambassador to Tanzania and Jordan)

The Honorable Paul Warnke (Former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs)

Admiral James D. Watkins (ret.) (Former Secretary of Energy; former Chief of Naval Operations)

end letter

Non-Proliferation Treaty

The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970 and now has 186 States Parties, which looks set to become 187 when Brazil deposits its instruments of ratification, as recently announced. In May 1995, 174 parties to the NPT adopted three decisions without a vote. This 'politically binding package', as described by the President of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Jayantha Dhanapala, comprised Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty (Decision 1), Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (Decision 2), and Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Decision 3). A fourth resolution, on the Middle East, was adopted at the same time, also without a vote.

Taken together, the first three decisions provided for the indefinite extension of the NPT, but with an enhanced review process intended to ensure greater accountability and a stronger mechanism for full implementation of the Treaty in all its aspects. The enhanced review process entails at least three (and possibly four) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings to be held between the five yearly Review Conferences. According to Decision 1, the purpose of the PrepComs would be 'to consider principles, objectives and ways' of promoting full implementation. The PrepComs are empowered to make recommendations to the next Review Conference and possibly other bodies and to establish subsidiary bodies for specific issues relevant to the Treaty. Most importantly, the review process was intended to deal with issues of substance related to the NPT and to look 'forward as well as back'. Its job was not only to evaluate implementation but to 'identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.'

After leaning on his non-aligned colleagues to achieve this package of commitments, which avoided a divisive vote on indefinite extension, Dhanapala commented: "Only history can prove the wisdom of the decision. If genuine progress on nuclear disarmament is embarked on, if we have rigorous accountability as part of a strengthened review process, we should be able to hold the nuclear-weapon-states to article VI. If the world is a safer place with only five nuclear-weapon states rather than the 20 or 25 that were President Kennedy's nightmare, then the world is safest with no nuclear weapon states." This was a very sober assessment of the responsibilities of the NWS for ensuring the stability and credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

The 1995 decisions sketched out the broad framework for the enhanced review process but did not determine how exactly it should work. In April 1997, 149 NPT Parties met in New York for the first PrepCom to the 2000 Review Conference. In many ways the meeting was inconclusive, with some useful procedural decisions taken but great resistance from the NWS to developing greater accountability. I attach three background documents on the NPT extension process and opportunities, for consideration:

• Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Risks and Reckonings, ACRONYM No 7, September 1995
• 'Addressing the Issues', NPT Briefing # 1, Disarmament Intelligence Review, April 1997
• 'Reviewing the NPT: 1997 PrepCom', Disarmament Diplomacy No 14, April 1997, pp 9-25.

Some of the P-5 measures recommended below could be codified in statements to the NPT PrepComs and review conference, which would give them political authority beyond mere voluntary declarations, while not requiring ratification as such. If the P-5 are unable to agree these measures collectively, any of the NWS could take a unilateral initiative and announce it to the NPT. Many states have called for annual reports on arms control and disarmament progress from each of the NWS as part of the enhanced review process. This would reinforce the credibility of the NPT regime.

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© 1998 The Acronym Institute.