British Policy and Parliament

Return to the British Policy page

Policy Options

In this section I will list some measures which the British government should consider implementing. Most relate to the near-term (next five years). Some may be regarded as longer term options, but may become relevant before the year 2015. In some cases Britain already complies with the suggested policy in terms of our own weapons, but they are included here on grounds that Britain can have significant influence on NATO policy, if it chooses to exercise it, or in initiating discussion among the P-5. In view of the impasse at the CD and ratification problems in both the Senate and the Duma, analysts are looking at measures that could contribute to nuclear arms control without requiring treaty negotiations. Former national security advisers and ambassadors in the US, such as Frank von Hippel, George Bunn and Jonathan Dean, have expressed interest in measures such as de-alerting, no first use and no-increase commitments as a way to move beyond the deadlocks in the multilateral and bilateral arenas and create conditions for practical involvement by all the nuclear weapon states in nuclear arms control and confidence-building.

Humanitarian missions

Consideration should be given to reconfiguring some regiments so that the British forces can respond more effectively to humanitarian and joint missions. This would require specialised training and equipment, logistics, coordination and techniques for working with civilians in crisis. In the future it is likely that the military forces will be called on more and more to participate in cooperative missions with the armed forces of other countries for peace-keeping, conflict management and resolution, large scale rescues, feeding and management of refugees or victims of natural disasters such as earthquakes and flooding.

Anti-personnel landmines

It is to be hoped that the Ottawa process will deliver by December 1997 a credible treaty prohibiting the production, stockpiling, export, transfer and use of anti-personnel landmines. The Labour government's decision to participate in this process is a welcome policy change. Despite its limitations the Ottawa Process seems to be the only international mechanism capable at this time of instituting a ban on landmines production and use. It is likely to attract at least a hundred signatures, but without China and Russia (US support is not yet clear). With the issue hopelessly bogged down at the CD, the government made the right decision to back the Ottawa process, and see how far it can go in crafting a viable landmines ban.

A total ban on landmines use is a necessary step. However, as often pointed out by countries (like China) which are reluctant to see mines prohibited, the real problem is already on the ground, randomly killing and maiming. There are more than hundred million mines infesting former war zones like Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan and now Bosnia. If mines are cheap to buy and scatter (less than £1.50 each) they are expensive to remove (around £1,000 per mine). At present, most of the dangerous, laborious work of mine clearance is done by ex-army personnel for charities like the Halo Trust or Mines Advisory Group. Their work is of vital importance, but they can't do it all. At the current pace of clearance, mines will continue to kill rural workers, especially women and children, for many more decades. Development and agriculture are severely hampered in countries inflicted with landmines.

British military forces could be deployed in an international effort to clear mines from the worst-affected regions. Humanitarian de-mining is different from the usual military approach to mine breaching, which leaves the land devastated, so special training and equipment will be necessary. Such an international endeavour to restore mine-infested land could be proposed by the Labour government, to be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations, with trained soldiers (and perhaps medical personnel) provided from each participating country on a rotational basis.

If the UN is not prepared to coordinate or undertake such mine clearance, Britain should consider taking the initiative. Given recent statements in the CD it would be difficult for the larger countries, including some of those opposed to an immediate ban, to refuse to take part. This would of course have to be by invitation and cooperation with the countries concerned. It would be in keeping with the new thinking on foreign policy in the Queen's speech and Robin Cook's mission statement, which emphasised international security, development and protection of the environment. The military has an image problem in the post Cold War world, as illustrated by the relative ease with which the Tory government decimated the regiments and cut resources. As the MOD seeks a more appropriate role, it has increasingly emphasised Britain's participation in peace-keeping. Involving the armed forces in removing landmines so that people can build their shattered lives and feed themselves again would reinforce this positive role.

Britain should not rule out a further role for the CD on landmines. Appointing a special coordinator keeps the option open for future years without risking the derailment of the Ottawa Process. The Ottawa Treaty is intended as a comprehensive political instrument, but at least initially its adherents will tend to be the 'club of the virtuous'. There may be a useful task for the CD in considering verification approaches and supplementary work on banning exports and production more widely.

Fissile materials ban

A ban on the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes is strongly supported by the US and backed by most Western and Eastern European allies. A mandate to negotiate this measure was agreed by the CD in March 1995 (the 'Shannon Report') but no committee has been convened and so no negotiations have been started. The problems fall into two main categories, compounded by lack of interest in a simple cut-off treaty, which seems the maximum the P-5 are presently willing to do:

i) whether to count existing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (past production);

ii) and the relation of the fissban to a wider agenda of nuclear disarmament, i.e. the fissban as non-proliferation measure or step towards nuclear disarmament.

Countries like Egypt, Algeria, Iran and especially Pakistan want the negotiations to cover existing stocks. The NWS, Israel and India are determined not to address stocks. In particular, China, Israel and India may be afraid that greater transparency will reveal to the world how little they actually possess, thereby puncturing their 'deterrence' policies of nuclear ambiguity. During the 1997 NPT PrepCom, Norway proposed voluntary transparency measures on fissile materials holdings.

Britain could initiate P-5 discussions on transparency measures covering existing stocks, perhaps in conjunction with the IAEA. By showing a willingness to meet some of the concerns over stockpiles, albeit outside the direct purview of multilateral negotiations, greater P-5 transparency over stocks could help shift the logjam over the fissban mandate in the CD. There is no guarantee of this, but it would shift the balance of the present stalemate, which would be in Britain's interests. Russia, and especially China, may insist on equal transparency by the threshold (T-3) states. Pakistan, Egypt et al are concerned about Israel and India, not just the P-5. It is difficult to see how to include the T-3 in such arrangements without transgressing political boundaries (or appearing to accept the de facto nuclear status of the T-3). In many ways it would be most sensible for the P-5 to go ahead and negotiate a cut-off themselves, leaving the CD to work out the wider next steps. However, that looks presently infeasible due to opposition by China and Russia (and lack of enthusiasm by Britain and France).

A major problem of approach (from Britain and other P-5 countries) is that they enter into multilateral arms control with a view of proliferation that sees the three smallest (undeclared) nuclear weapon states as the major threat and the target of the negotiations. This short-sighted approach harmed the CTBT and could also throw away the chance to make the fissile material production halt by the five largest nuclear weapon states legally binding. Of course the nuclear ambitions and capabilities of India, Israel and Pakistan are of concern, but on a global scale the P-5 stockpiles and arsenals are of far graver threat to the majority of people in the world. Putting a permanent, legally binding cap on the further production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium by China and Russia is surely a more central security objective for Britain than India's meagre stocks. Rather than surrendering to the deadlock in the CD, Britain should take a more constructive approach and work with the P-5 and the international community to find ways around the obstacles, whether by offering more transparency on stocks or by persuading the P-5 to go it alone.

With regard to the role of the proposed fissban to nuclear disarmament, this presents a more intractable political problem. In the view of many, India is insisting on this linkage to block progress on a fissban. For others, the linkage provides leverage to get an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD, a position endorsed for many years by the 113 member Movement of Non-Aligned States (NAM). A growing number of Western countries now support establishment of a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD, or at least a Special Coordinator as a step towards convening a committee. Britain's past position has been opposition, together with the United States and France, although France has at times indicated a little more flexibility. Multilateral involvement in nuclear disarmament should be assessed both in terms of intrinsic usefulness and in terms of facilitating progress on the fissban.

Assuming that Britain would not at present be prepared to enter into nuclear disarmament talks, and that policy would be constrained by US and French considerations, the government could initiate discussion with the Western NWS and other Western countries with a view to offering the NAM states some constructive multilateral mechanism for discussing nuclear disarmament issues. Most NAM have indicated that they would be willing to discuss the scope and parameters of such a committee, i.e. they want to begin preliminary talks and would not insist on negotiations at this stage, although they would want discussions to have the concrete objective of identifying further multilateral steps. The CD convened a nuclear test ban committee for many years before agreeing to a negotiating mandate. This is not an ideal precedent, but could be reassuring to those who fear that a nuclear disarmament committee will immediately commit the UK to negotiating on eliminating the arsenals.

While discussing future steps for multilateral negotiations, the CD nuclear disarmament committee could usefully appoint an expert group to investigate the very complex verification questions that would have to be addressed by any multilateral treaty that brought nuclear weapons down to small numbers or to zero. This was done by the nuclear test ban committee during the negotiating wasteland before a CTBT was regarded as ripe by the United States.

Article VI of the NPT is a commitment to negotiate in good faith. Britain is vulnerable to criticism because it does not participate in bilateral arms control and has so far rejected P-5 negotiations or a role for the CD. Agreeing to a nuclear disarmament committee (even without a negotiating mandate) would undercut India and the NAM linkage and accelerate progress on the fissban. If Britain and France showed more flexibility towards discussions on nuclear disarmament in the CD, this could contribute to a more constructive attitude from others on other issues. It would be a mistake to cut the CD out of any role or contribution in nuclear disarmament.

Even if Britain's attitude were to shift, it could take some careful bridge building with the United States and other key countries. The current US position is strongly against any nuclear disarmament discussions in the CD, let alone a committee. India and some of the NAM want a mandate to negotiate a timetable for nuclear disarmament, which is impractical at this point, although not impossible.

No replacement of Trident

The decision on replacing Trident could come up as early as 2005 if research and development of a new system are envisaged. After joining the CTBT it would be inappropriate for Britain to seek to develop a new or advanced system to replace Trident, even if that were deemed practical without nuclear testing. If Britain envisaged a modification of an already tested system, the decision could perhaps be postponed. To avoid prolonging Trident beyond its service specifications, the decision on its replacement would have to be taken by the year 2012 at the latest. Even if the British government decided to deploy Trident for its design life, the only justification for replacing it with another nuclear weapon system would be if the non-proliferation regime had disintegrated into a nuclear free for all; in that case, we are in more trouble than Trident can solve. With 187 members to the NPT and indefinite extension of the treaty, the major threats to its stability and credibility come from the declared and undeclared NWS: eight countries. Britain has no excuse to continue flaunting its nuclear weapons in the face of Article VI and the commitment by 182 of the world's nations not to acquire them (even if two or three of these may not have acted in the best of good faith).

The Strategic Defence Review should state that Britain would not replace Trident unless there was clear evidence that the NPT regime had failed and that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was on the rise. With the greater likelihood that the NPT regime will maintain its robustness, Britain should prepare to become a non-nuclear weapon state when Trident expires, or before that if multilateral negotiations and security progress make it possible to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons sooner. Aldermaston and Burghfield will have a job for the foreseeable future in dismantling nuclear warheads and finding safe and secure ways to store and eventually dispose of the radioactive materials. Verification of nuclear and other arms control treaties is likely to become a growth industry from which Aldermaston scientists and technicians, as well as British intelligence and security, could benefit.

Nuclear weapon convention

This will no doubt be regarded as hopelessly romantic and premature. But if the review is to extend to 2015, such an option must at least be considered and scoped out. Pressure to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons in a convention, (as the BWC and CWC have done for other weapons of mass destruction) is going to intensify. In 1996 the UN General Assembly voted to commence 'multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination." The vote was 115 in favour, 22 against, with 32 abstentions.

A nuclear weapon convention could only come about if the NWS decide that the threat of proliferation and accident is greater than the risks of attack by WMD or if they assess the utility of nuclear weapons in greatly reduced terms. Both shifts of perception are taking place among military planners in the United States. Russia on the other hand may be coming to opposite conclusions, seeing nuclear weapons as a means to punch above its current political weight and offset its conventional weaknesses. The Labour government has already decreed that Britain will retain Trident for the time being. Given our international obligations and a long term view of British security interests, it is not enough for Britain to say we are willing to negotiate once we are satisfied with US-Russian reductions. We must actively work to encourage further bilateral progress and consider appropriate measures that all the NWS could undertake to create more positive conditions for nuclear disarmament.

Below are some suggestions for immediate, interim steps that could be undertaken voluntarily or by P-5 agreement.

no increase of nuclear weapons

While the US and Russia are attempting to consolidate nuclear weapons reductions under the START process, the three lesser NWS are not engaged in any binding reductions. Britain and France argue that they are complying with NPT Article VI obligations because in the past few years they have withdrawn or cancelled various tactical weapons systems and battlefield bombs. These withdrawals were partly treasury-driven and partly a response to post-Cold War acceptance by the politicians of what their armed forces had been telling them for many years -- that nuclear weapons were not militarily usable. However, as unilateral initiatives the withdrawals are not binding, and there is no guarantee that they could not be reversed. A no-increase commitment could be approached in several ways, but perhaps the most viable would be as an agreement among the five nuclear powers, codified in a declaration or P-5 statement to the NPT Parties at a Review PrepCom or Conference. Alternatively, the three lesser NWS, Britain France and China, could make this commitment pending their entry into five-power reductions or the commencement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

According to Beijing's original policy, China would enter into negotiations when the US and Russian arsenals had halved. Now that the two largest NWS are reaching towards this target, China has shifted ground, requiring US and Russian arsenals to come down to below a thousand. This is very similar to the position adopted by the Conservative administration in 1995: that when Russian and US weapons were counted in the hundreds, Britain would consider negotiating. This was a ludicrous position for such a small power to adopt. The Labour Party preferred the ambiguous position of arguing that "When satisfied with verified progress towards our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure British nuclear weapons are included in such negotiations." What does this mean in practice (especially when coupled with the pledge to retain Trident)?

A credible interim step for Britain, France and China to undertake is a binding pledge not to increase the number of their nuclear weapons as long as the US and Russia continue to reduce their arsenals, pending full negotiations. China would be likely to have most difficulty with such a commitment, although it has ceased production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would limit the growth of its arsenal as well. The no-increase concept could perhaps be sold as a commitment to end the nuclear arms race. This would justify the claims made by the NWS during the 1995 NPT Conference and would be more difficult for China to refuse to declare. Some details would have to be worked out: which date to choose for the baseline; definitions (would it apply to total numbers of warheads, numbers of warheads of certain types, total megatonnage, and so on); associated transparency and verification (if any); also disposal or sequestration of the excess fissile material from past dismantlements which according to the declaration could no longer be used to build new systems.

De-alerting or de-mating nuclear warheads from missiles

Yeltsin surprised many at the NATO summit with his pledge on de-alerting. Some thought he meant de-targeting, which is already agreed bilaterally between Russia, Britain and the United States. Whether or not he meant de-alerting, this is a subject that deserves serious consideration by all the nuclear weapon states, not least Britain. Thousands of nuclear weapons are still on a launch-on-warning alert. This leaves us vulnerable to mistaken or unauthorised launch, the risk of which may have increased with the loss of authority and security that bedevils the Russian nuclear and military establishments. Launch-on-warning and hair-trigger alert postures make no sense in the present political climate. They persist because militaries in the Cold War worried about a pre-emptive strike knocking out their major weapons and military installations.

De-alerting can be accomplished in different ways for different weapons systems, and can reversed in hours or days, depending on the chosen method. For Trident, two alternatives should be considered: de-mating the warheads from the missiles and storing apart; or removing the nosecones or guidance systems, which would be stored separately on the submarines. The options have different strengths and weaknesses. De-mating the warheads and storing the warheads separately on land would provide a long-term de-alerting stability, but might be difficult for the MOD and Royal Navy to accept at first. They may be more comfortable with the temporary de-alerting provided by removing the nose-cones or guidance systems, which could be stored elsewhere on the submarines.

The precise forms of de-alerting, and mutual arrangements for transparency and verification (probably national technical means) could be worked out during the P-5 talks. This would be an important confidence-building measure, acknowledging the post-Cold war reduction in hostilities among NWS, and reducing the risk of accidental launch. It should be one of the issues discussed in resumed P-5 meetings.

nuclear weapons kept to NWS' own territory

As mentioned above, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov argued for nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from foreign territories in a recent statement to the CD. Britain used to maintain tactical nuclear weapons in Germany. These have now been withdrawn: if Labour follows through the previous government's announcement of withdrawal of WE-177 free fall bombs, by 1998 Britain will possess no tactical nuclear weapons.

Following the political debacle of the 1980s' deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, the United States now has only one operational nuclear base in Britain, at Lakenheath in Suffolk. A few token tactical weapons are maintained on the territory of six other NATO members: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. This is primarily for political purposes, to emphasise commitment to the defence of Europe. They have little if any militarily convincing mission. Russia has withdrawn its nuclear weapons from neighbouring states, and neither China nor France have ever sought land deployments outside their territories.

A bilateral (US-Russian) or P-5 agreement not to store or deploy nuclear weapons outside the NWS' own territory would help to build confidence and would reinforce Moscow's hand with its nationalist and hawkish fringes. It would codify the NATO declaration that it did not plan to deploy nuclear weapons in former Soviet states, without setting up a two-tier distinction between NATO members. It could even pave the way for a Central European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone or a NWFZ from the Baltic to the Black Sea, as supported by Belarus and Ukraine, as well as public opinion in Sweden and Finland. The NWFZ possibility would fit well with NPT objectives (Article VII) but has many sceptics in Europe. Since it would take time to negotiate, where an agreement of withdrawal to own territory could be crafted among the P-5 or bilaterally with relative speed and simplicity, Britain should prioritise getting debate on withdrawal and leave any NWFZ initiative to the states directly involved. However, Britain should no longer join sides with the detractors seeking to undermine NWFZ initiatives such as this.

Now that most of the tactical nuclear systems and the intermediate forces have been withdrawn from Europe, agreeing not to deploy out of territory would be a financially and politically low-cost gesture. The United States is reluctant (as are some European countries) because they fear it could lead to a denuclearisation of NATO or to reduced commitment by the US to the defence of Europe. In view of the irrelevance of US tactical weapons in Europe to any concept of deterrence and the necessity to forge closer links with Russia's democratic elements, Britain could play an important role in encouraging agreement on this.

Security Assurances and No First Use

Labour's pre-election policy statement promises: "a negotiated, multilateral no first use agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states and strengthened security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states in the form of an international legally binding treaty." By contrast, Rifkind was sceptical of suggestions that NATO or Britain should make a declaration of no-first-use of nuclear weapon: "The clear implication of any such declaration would be that conventional aggression could be undertaken without fear of crossing the nuclear threshold. Put crudely, it implies...that conventional war is a safe option. For all its superficial moral attraction, therefore, a no-first-use declaration would take us out of the realm of war prevention and into the realm of war limitation."

China has a declared policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. NATO has consistently refused to make a no-first use commitment. The Soviet Union adopted a no-first-use policy in the 1980s, which was reversed in line with NATO's position when Boris Yeltsin came to power in 1992. There has always been a grey area between the 'negative security assurances', according to which the nuclear weapon states guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, and no first use, which at first glance applies only to other NWS. However, because of the exemptions to their negative security assurances insisted on by four of the NWS, a no-first-use agreement would also extend to threshold NWS and NNWS in alliance with NWS, which many consider to be an important confidence-building step. Some non-aligned countries object to the concept of 'no first use' because they say it implies legitimacy for retaliatory 'second strike'. These states argue for a 'no use' agreement rather than 'merely' no first use.

At present, security assurances are offered by the individual NWS and given additional authority by means of a UN Security Council resolution. For many years the NNWS and China have demanded that security assurances be codified in a legally binding multilaterally negotiated instrument or treaty. This is an issue on which India and Pakistan have been particularly vocal, as the current assurances are limited by the western nuclear powers and Russia to countries which are parties to the NPT or regional non-proliferation (nuclear weapon free zone) arrangement (which covers non-NPT parties like Brazil). In security assurances harmonised among four of the NWS, Britain, France, Russia and the United States, in April 1995, exception was also made for "the case of invasion or any other attack...or on a state towards which [we] have a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state." The right of individual and collective self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter was also reaffirmed. China's security assurance is unconditional: "China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances."

During the Cold War, the exemption for states in alliance with a NWS was deemed necessary to cover the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Legally the exemption is ill-defined and undermines the assurances in a large number of potential conflict scenarios. There is a growing body of opinion that the exemption should now be dropped. This would undoubtedly be a provision that NNWS would refuse to endorse in the event of multilateral negotiations.

If security guarantees were limited to NPT parties but removed the 'alliance' provision, the major objection to a P-5 agreement on no-first-use would be removed. Rifkind's argument against no-first-use relies on two premises: that NATO would use nuclear weapons to repel a non-nuclear-armed attack; and that a potential aggressor believes that NATO might use nuclear weapons. In view of the Falklands War between Britain and Argentina (1981) and the Gulf War against Iraq (1991), Rifkind's argument lacks credibility unless CBW are added to the equation.

Since 1991 a potential role for nuclear weapons in deterring CBW attack has gained ground among some military planners and analysts in the NWS. While rejecting this position in general, if security assurances are to be made conditional on membership of the NPT, there is a complementary argument that accession to the BWC and CWC should be required too. This would no doubt offend the purists, who may not want to see any relation drawn between nuclear weapons and CBW attack. In my view, the whole debate around security assurances is somewhat theological. Given the importance of strengthening the non-proliferation and treaty regimes for all the WMD, using security assurances as a means of exerting pressure for accession to the BWC and CWC as well as the NPT could at least be considered.

no new or qualitatively advanced nuclear weapons

The non-aligned states negotiating the CTBT pushed very hard for the Treaty to enshrine its original objective, to halt the qualitative nuclear arms race, including modernisation. The NWS saw the CTBT as an instrument only to curb horizontal proliferation. They accepted that the test ban would constrain the modernisation and development of their nuclear arsenals, but refused any language relating to objectives, purpose or intention of the Treaty. Subject to their levels of technology, the NWS considered that any testing or development that they could perform without violating the 'nuclear explosion' prohibition was ipso facto permitted. As the NWS stressed the importance of maintaining the 'safety and reliability' of their weapons, a senior Russian official noted that "Arguments about ensuring warhead reliability through testing are often used to conceal an aggressive counterforce strategy and the 'third generation' weapon concept. The twice-postponed programme of subcritical testing which the United States intends to carry out underground at the (LYNER) facility on the Nevada Test Site have given rise to strong criticism from NNWS, including India and Pakistan. Such activities undermine the credibility of the CTBT and may give rise to compliance ambiguities and challenges, which could lead to the Treaty being discredited before it has a chance to enter into force.

The Cold War is over. The nuclear arms race should be unequivocally ended. Even by its own doctrines, neither the United States nor any other NWS requires more sophisticated weaponry than they already have. It is perverse to risk unravelling the CTBT or undermining the non-proliferation regime to keep the scientists and nuclear addicts happy. A P-5 commitment not to develop or manufacture new, improved or advanced nuclear warheads or weapons systems would put a stop to such destabilising tests. It would be welcomed by the NNWS and is likely to be a necessary (though possibly not sufficient) measure to secure India's accession to the CTBT.

Transparency/Nuclear arms register

In 1995, Robin Cook wrote that: "Confidence-building requires transparency and verification. As a starting point, the nuclear weapon states should declare their existing inventories of plutonium and highly enriched uranium to the IAEA, and open to inspection their nuclear production facilities." He also expressed support for the concept of a nuclear weapons register under the auspices of the United Nations, as originally proposed by Germany's Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in December 1993. Furthermore, Cook advocated regular reports from the nuclear weapon states outlining what steps they had taken in fulfilment of their obligations under article VI of the NPT.

The lack of a nuclear arms register has long been used as an excuse by some NNWS for resisting progress on the UN's conventional arms register and transparency in armaments. If Britain were prepared to take the initiative on this, it could help to re-invigorate attempts to register holdings and trade in conventional armaments. Among the NWS, China is likely to be the more strongly opposed. As discussed above, initiatives towards greater transparency and control of fissile material stocks, could shift the logjam and enable negotiations on a fissile material production ban to get underway in the CD.

There have already been calls for the NWS to make regular reports to the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committee meetings, under the enhanced review process established in May 1995. It might be more appropriate for Britain to undertake this initiative at the next PrepCom than to set up an additional mechanism of reporting to the UN Secretary General, as Cook had originally proposed. If this is not possible, confidence could be initiated with an exchange of information among the P-5, which might be less daunting to China than full transparency.

Sequestration/immobilisation of nuclear forces

According to the originator of the concept, Arjun Makhijani, sequestration could be accomplished by a phased multilateral (or at least P-5 plus T-3) agreement to withdraw from deployment and store nuclear warheads and weapon-usable fissile material. Since this would be under national control it could have the potential to bring all eight declared and undeclared NWS into the process, while not requiring an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament: "Theoretically...sequestration would leave nuclear deterrence intact, although it would be politically difficult to make a decision to withdraw nuclear weapons for possible use." Sequestration or immobilisation of the weapons would greatly diminish the dangers from nuclear weapons, providing the storage facilities were safe, secure and well monitored.

Makhijani identifies five phases:

1. Negotiation among the NWS to accept the principle of sequestration.
2. US and Russia make complete declarations of all nuclear weapons and weapon-usable materials.
3. Further progress on large scale withdrawal of US and Russian nuclear weapons, monitored by the P-5 and T-3. Gradual transfer to storage in special facilities, as needed to facilitate verification and accounting. Britain, France and China declare their nuclear weapon and fissile material holdings.
4. Britain, France and China commence proportional withdrawal, as deployed US and Russian weapons continue to be reduced. India, Israel and Pakistan declare their nuclear weapon and fissile material holdings and begin sequestration.
5. Full-scope safeguards established for the fissile materials of P-5 and T-3 states.

Sequestering the nuclear weapons under national control and international monitoring may be a step more readily considered than nuclear disarmament, but it would still require a significant shift of political perception in the declared and undeclared NWS capitals before it could begin to be negotiated.

A variation on this proposal calls for direct immobilisation of the entire operational nuclear forces of all five nuclear weapon states, and if possible the T-3. The NWS would have to negotiate an agreement whereby they would separate warheads from the delivery systems and place both in secure storage on their own territory, but under international monitoring. Jonathan Dean, formerly the ambassador heading U.S. Delegation to NATO Warsaw Pact Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, argued that "The owner states could still withdraw their weapons from storage if threatened by unexpected emergency, but not without giving warning."

Banning tactical nuclear weapons

The Canberra Commission proposed ending the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons altogether. Tactical and intermediate nuclear weapons are more vulnerable to theft than large ballistic missiles. There is likely to be most resistance from Russia and China to such a measure, particularly as Russia is re-evaluating the utility of its tactical weapon deployments to counterbalance its conventional weakness and potentially take on a warfighting role. Some US planners have envisaged mini-nukes and micro-nukes for deep penetrating and warfighting roles. It would be to the distinct advantage of all Europeans to support a prohibition on tactical nuclear weapons before they become fully re-instated in the doctrines of Russia and the United States. They serve no deterrent function and lower the threshold between conventional and nuclear war.

Restricting or prohibiting missile deployment

Several versions of this idea have been floated, from Jonathan Dean, Frank von Hippel, from the Deep Cuts Study Group. They range from negotiating a treaty to codify the missile technology control regime (MTCR), or extending the INF Treaty provisions beyond Europe, to banning all short and intermediate range missiles. One important purpose of seeking to reduce proliferation by restricting or prohibiting the missiles as well as the warheads is to reduce the opportunities for missile delivery of chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons. The proposal is still at an embryonic stage, but deserves deeper consideration.

Return to top of page

© 1998 The Acronym Institute.