British PolicyTrident Replacement:
|
£ million | ||
---|---|---|
Capital | Revenue | |
2000-01 | 0 | 4 |
2001-02 | 0 | 4 |
2002-03 | 1 | 4 |
2003-04 | 3 | 4 |
2004-05 | 3 | 5 |
Note:
All figures are at out-turn prices.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what recent assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the HELEN laser at Aldermaston; what its future purpose is; and if he will make a statement; [47819]
(2) what the (a) role is and (b) functions are of the proposed new laser at AWE Aldermaston. [47821]
John Reid: In 2001 a review of the capability provided by the HELEN laser identified a requirement to replace it in order to attain, under laboratory conditions, previously inaccessible temperature and pressure regimes akin to those actually obtained in a nuclear weapon. This was deemed essential to underwrite the continued safety and reliability of the Trident nuclear warhead stockpile in the nuclear test ban era.
Accordingly, we shall be replacing HELEN-which has given 25 years of useful service-with the ORION laser, whose primary role will be to enable the safety and reliability of the Trident stockpile to be underwritten through the remainder of its service life. Until its planned decommissioning in 2008, HELEN will continue to be used for worthwhile experiments both in support of Trident and as a test bed for some of the technologies and equipment to be used on the ORION laser.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether Crown immunity applies in the case of the AWE planning application for a new laser facility at Aldermaston; and if he will make a statement. [41945]
Mr. Touhig: The normal planning process cannot be used for the proposed Atomic Weapons Establishment Orion Laser Development at Aldermaston because the Ministry of Defence (MOD), as a Crown Department, 18 Jan 2006 : Column 1326W is not subject to the statutory planning process and is therefore not legally able to submit formal planning applications.
I refer the hon. Member to my answer of 7 December 2005, Official Report, column 1348W. It explained that the MOD follows a consultation process with the local planning authority under DoE Circular 18/84 which largely mirrors the statutory planning system. It is this Department's policy to support any development proposals with the same level of background information that would be required under the statutory planning system.
The MOD works closely with local authorities to address any concerns raised in connection with any development proposals. The Local Planning Authority can also stipulate conditions when responding. While the perception may be that my Department claims "Crown Immunity" from planning regulation, it does in fact follow the practice of the normal planning process and also strives to follow its principles.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will take steps to ensure that the plans for the AWE Orion Laser development at Aldermaston are tested by the normal planning process and that Crown immunity is not applied; and if he will make a statement. [34765]
Mr. Touhig: Under Crown exemption from planning legislation, the Ministry of Defence does not submit planning applications. In their place we use a consultation process under DOE Circular 18/84 which largely mirrors the statutory planning system. It is our normal policy to support any development proposals with the same level of background information that would be required under the statutory planning system.
The development at AWE Aldermaston is part of a scheduled programme of rebuilding works at the site. A range of background material has been submitted to West Berkshire council (the local planning authority) in support of these proposals mirroring the requirements placed on those which would be required of any private developer.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 3 November 2005, Official Report, column 1259W, on AWE Aldermaston, when he was first informed that the original estimate was inadequate. [27853]
John Reid: I became aware of the need for additional investment at AWE Aldermaston shortly after my appointment as Secretary of State for Defence. As far as the Ministry of Defence is concerned, when the initial AWE management and operation contract (which became effective on 1 April 2000) was awarded to AWE Management Ltd., it was recognised that a detailed analysis would be required to establish the levels of investment necessary to sustain the minimum capability required to support the policies described in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. This process, which included conducting studies, investment appraisals, capability
29 Nov 2005 : Column 335W
assessments, contract negotiations and a process of departmental and ministerial approvals, was completed in July 2005.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 3 November 2005, Official Report, column 1259W, on AWE Aldermaston, how much of the £1 billion will be spent on (a) increased costs for the continuous running project, (b) new facilities at Aldermaston, with particular reference to the proposed new laser and (c) other areas of expenditure; and if he will make a statement. [27855]
John Reid: As I made clear in my written statement to the House on 19 July 2005, Official Report, column 59WS, the purpose of this additional expenditure at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) is to maintain the effectiveness and safety of the nuclear deterrent through an additional investment in key skills and facilities. Of the total forecast expenditure at AWE between now and the end of 2007-08, around 45 per cent. is capital costs, principally on new facilities including the new Orion laser, and around 55 per cent. is operating costs.
Mr. Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost was of the Trident missile system in 2004-05. [30330]
John Reid: In 2004-05, the capital and operating costs of the Trident nuclear deterrent, including the costs for the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston, were just under 4 per cent. of the Defence budget.
Danny Alexander: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what studies his Department has undertaken on a possible replacement for the UK's Trident nuclear missile capability; whether information from the studies will be placed in the public domain; and if he will make a statement. [31629]
John Reid: Initial preparatory work is being undertaken by officials on possible options for any replacement of the UK's nuclear deterrent capability. However, while decisions are likely to be necessary in the current Parliament, they are still some way off and Ministers have not yet begun to consider the position on this issue in any detail. It is therefore premature to speculate on the range of options that might be available and when and how we might place additional information in the public domain.
Mr. Kilfoyle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the impact of (a) changed operational practices of the Vanguard type submarines and (b) changed strategic circumstances in which they are deployed. [32354]
John Reid: The operational posture of Vanguard-class submarines, including a reduced day-to-day alert state with a reduced load of warheads, detargeted missiles and a normal 'notice to fire' of several days, was set out in the 1998 strategic defence review. This posture remains appropriate to the strategic environment.
Submarines
13. Mr. Gordon Prentice: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the running costs of the Trident submarine fleet were in 2004-05. [17622]
John Reid: Since the Trident nuclear deterrent became operational in 1994, the annual expenditure for capital and running costs has ranged between 2 and 4 per cent. of the annual defence budget...
Mr. Moore: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions (a) he and (b) his officials have had with the US Administration regarding (i) an extension to the service life of US Ohio-class submarines and (ii) a replacement for US Ohio-class submarines; and if he will make a statement. [17157]
Mr. Ingram: I have been made aware of extensions to the service life of US Ohio-class submarines as part of routine discussions on matters of common interest. I cannot comment on US plans regarding a replacement for the Ohio-class submarines; that is a matter for the US Government.
Astute-class Submarines
Mr. Moore: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the adaptability of Astute-class submarines for carrying a nuclear missile system. [17213]
John Reid: [holding answer 13 October 2005]: As my predecessor made clear previously on 30 June 2004, Official Report, column 318W, work has been undertaken to keep options open in considering platforms to carry the Trident D5 missile in the longer term pending future decisions on any replacement for Trident. However, while decisions on any replacement for the Trident system are likely to be required in the current Parliament, they are still some way off and Ministers have not yet begun to consider the position on this issue in any detail. It is therefore too early to speculate on the merits of any particular option.
Nuclear Deterrent
Mr. Moore: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what steps he will take to ensure a full debate on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent; and whether these will include the publication of a White Paper; [17211]
(2) whether a final decision on the replacement of Trident will be subject to a vote of the House; and whether he expects that the decision will be made during this Parliament. [17212]
John Reid [holding answer 13 October 2005]: While decisions on the long term future of the UK nuclear deterrent are likely to be necessary in the current Parliament, they are still some way off. It is therefore too early to say what formal or informal procedures might be used to underpin future decision-making by the Government in this area.
14 Oct 2005 : Column 620W
Mr. Moore: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the viability of an aircraft delivery platform for nuclear missiles. [17214]
John Reid [holding answer 13 October 2005]: Decisions on any replacement for Trident have not yet been taken. While decisions are likely to be required in the current Parliament, they are still some way off and Ministers have not yet begun to consider the position on this issue in any detail. It is therefore too early to speculate on the merits of any particular option.
Trident
Mr. Moore: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what work has been undertaken by his Department on an extension of the service of Trident D5 missiles. [17210]
John Reid [holding answer 13 October 2005]: Work by officials is ongoing within the Ministry of Defence preparatory to consideration by Ministers of options for the future of the UK's independent nuclear deterrent. Alongside other options, these studies have looked at the possibility of extending the service of Trident D5 missiles in the UK.
Nuclear Deterrent
Mr. Salmond: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much the UK Government has paid Atomic Weapons Establishment Management Limited in each of the last 20 years. [14990]
Jeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the total expenditure on AWE Aldermaston was in each of the past five years; and what the estimated expenditure is for (a) 2006-07 and (b) 2007-08. [16212]
John Reid: The contract between the Ministry of Defence and Atomic Weapons Establishment Management Limited commenced in April 2000. Annual expenditure at the Establishment since then, and that projected for 2005-06 to 2007-08, is as follows:
(16) Forecast.
On current planning we expect expenditure at the Atomic Weapons Establishment to be a total for the next two financial years (2006–07 and 2007–08) of around £1.5 billion.
Figures previously published in the 18 March 2005, Official Report, column 478W have now been uprated to 2005–06 prices. In addition, certain elements of cost have been re-allocated between 2002–03 and 2003–04. The figure for 2004–05, previously reported as provisional, now reflects actual expenditure. I notified these changes to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on 16 August 2005. A copy of my letter is in the Library of the House.
Trident Nuclear Missile System
Jeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has held with the US Administration on purchasing a replacement for the Trident nuclear missile system. [16211]
John Reid: I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave the hon. Member for Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk (Mr. Moore) on 21 July 2005, Official Report, column 2120W.
Trident/Vanguard Replacements
Mr. Meacher: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether a decision has been taken to replace the Trident D5 missiles and 4 Vanguard class submarines. [16359]
John Reid: I have nothing to add to the answer I gave to the hon. Members for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) and for New Forest, West (Mr. Swayne) on 6 June 2005, Official Report, column 985.
Nuclear Deterrent
Alan Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what purpose the Versatile Intermediate Pulsed Energy Reactor (VIPER) at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston is used; what its running costs were in 2004-05; what energy it consumed in that year; whether he has requested AWE Management Ltd. to conduct a sustainability audit of VIPER; and whether it has been used for collaborative work with scientists from the United States Energy or Defense Department under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement on atomic energy matters. [14934]
John Reid: The Versatile Intermediate Pulsed Energy Reactor (VIPER) is used to test materials under intense transient neutron and gamma ray environments. The annual running costs of the VIPER facility are in the order of £1 million. The reactor's energy consumption is not separately identifiable but is estimated as negligible compared with that of the whole of the Aldermaston site. AWE has not been asked to conduct a sustainability audit on VIPER. The reactor has been used in some collaborative work with US personnel under the 1958 US/UK Mutual Defence Agreement.
Alan Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what purpose scientists from (a) his Department and (b) the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston are engaged in collaboration with scientists at the US Sandia National Library on the SPHINX x-ray simulator. [14936]
Mr. Ingram: Ministry of Defence scientists are not engaged in collaboration with Sandia National Laboratories on the SPHINX x-ray simulator.
The SPHINX simulator has been used by AWE scientists in collaboration with Sandia National laboratories under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement to conduct thermostructural response and imaging experiments.
Alan Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what purpose marginal initiation characterisation tests are conducted at Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston; how many have been conducted since July 2004; and what the cost is of each such test. [14937]
Mr. Ingram: The United Kingdom Marginal Initiation Characterisation Test (MICT) has been developed as a small-scale explosives test to screen energetic materials and ultimately characterise the effects that ageing, temperature, density and composition have on their sensitivity (i.e. safety) and performance. Since July 2004, 23 tests have been undertaken. The approximate cost for a single test is £250.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to his answer of 7 June 2005, Official Report, column 446W, on Trident, whether the range of options about the future of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent includes an option of not proceeding with a new generation strategic nuclear deterrent.
John Reid: The Labour Party's manifesto for the 2005 general election made clear our commitment to retain the UK's independent nuclear deterrent. Although decisions on any replacement for Trident are likely to be taken in the current Parliament, it is too early to rule out, or rule in, any particular option.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to his answer of 7 June 2005, Official Report, column 446W, on Trident, whether the decision on whether to replace Trident will be the subject of a substantive vote in Parliament.
John Reid: It is too early to say what formal procedures might be used to underpin future decision-making by the Government in this area.
Sir Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what preparatory work has begun on a replacement for Trident; what the cost of that work has been; and if he will make a statement.
John Reid: I refer the right hon. Member to the answer I gave on 14 June 2005, Official Report, columns 333-34W, to the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis).
Sir Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when a decision will be taken on the replacement of Trident; and if he will make a statement.
John Reid: I have nothing to add to the answer that I gave on 7 June 2005, Official Report, column 466W to the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis).
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether it remains his policy that the decision to replace Trident with the next generation of the strategic nuclear deterrent will be taken before the end of this Parliament.
John Reid: The December 2003 Defence White Paper (Cm 6041, paragraph 3.11) indicated that it was likely that decisions on whether to replace Trident would be needed during this Parliament. As I said on 18 May 2005 during the Foreign Affairs and Defence Debate on the Gracious Speech, Official Report, column 247, that continues to be the case.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what preliminary assessments his Department has made of the relative merits of (a) extending the life of Trident and (b) replacing Trident with an entirely new system.
John Reid: We have previously made clear that, in advance of decisions on whether to replace Trident, which are likely to be needed in this Parliament, we will continue to take appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability is kept open. We have not yet made an assessment of the relative merits of such options. We previously indicated on 30 June 2004, Official Report, column 358W, that we routinely undertake studies into the optimum operational life of key defence capabilities, including the Trident system, and that these have included concept studies on options for platforms to carry the Trident missile in the longer term.
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the relationship is between the new building programme at the AWRE Aldermaston and the next generation British nuclear weapons.
Mr. Ingram: Developments at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston are consistent with the policy set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and in the December 2003 Defence White Paper (Cm 6041-1). Such developments include the sustainment of the capabilities necessary to meet safety, environmental and operational requirements and to keep open options in respect of any decision on whether or not to replace Trident.
Adam Price: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment his Department has made of the (a) physical, (b) environmental and (c) health impacts of the detonation of a single trident nuclear warhead in an urban area.
John Reid: The impacts of the detonation of a nuclear weapon would depend on a wide range of variable factors. These include the yield and design of the weapon; the accuracy of the delivery system; the nature and construction of the target; the geographical characteristics of the surrounding terrain; geological conditions in the target area; the height of weapon burst; and the weather conditions at the target.
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