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Iran's Nuclear ProgrammeDisarmament and Sustainable Non-ProliferationBy Dr Rebecca Johnson Back to the main page on Iran's Nuclear Programme Presentation to the International Conference on Iran's nuclear energy programme: Politics and Prospects Centre for Strategic Research, Tehran, April 25, 2006. My very grateful thanks to Pugwash and the Centre for Strategic Research for inviting me to participate in this very timely and interesting conference, and to the Iranian people for the wonderful hospitality I have received on my visit here. As some of you may know, I have followed the vicissitudes of the nuclear non-proliferation regime very closely for more than a decade. I therefore want to recall the very strong and unequivocal statement made by Mr G. Ali Khoshroo, then Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, in May 2003 at the NPT PrepCom in Geneva. Responding to US accusations that Iran was "conducting an alarming, clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons programme", Ambassador Khoshroo said: "unlike some others, we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran's defence doctrine. They do not add to our security, nor do they help us to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, which is in our supreme interests." At the time, this statement provoked considerable debate. Some observers cynically noted that such high sounding rhetoric was often heard from India before it conducted its nuclear explosions in 1998 and declared itself a member of the nuclear club. Others, including me, granted that India used to try to deflect criticism by taking the moral high ground on nuclear disarmament, which we see Iran increasingly doing in the UN First Committee and Conference on Disarmament; but I could not recall India ever declaring nuclear weapons per se to be immoral, inhuman and illegal - certainly not in such fundamental terms. Moreover, since Ambassador Khoshroo's statement, Iran's highest leaders have declared nuclear weapons 'unIslamic'. This is very compelling and would haunt any Iranian government that sought to get nuclear weapons in the future, exposing Iran to accusations of deepest hypocrisy and dishonesty. So as a starting point, I think we should believe that this moral condemnation of nuclear weapons is sincere, and try to find a way for Iran to allay the world's suspicions. The problem for Iran - and indeed the rest of the world - is that it concealed some of the more sensitive parts of its nuclear programme from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). For nuclear specialists, there are also many ways in which Iran's nuclear programme, activities and ambitions appear much more geared towards providing a nuclear weapon option in the future than simply for supplying an energy demand which does not appear obvious, given Iran's substantial oil and gas industry. To paraphrase an English saying: if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck you're going to have difficulty persuading people that it's a robin. Especially if you're also cooking pancakes and spring onions (though it's not quite appropriate to liken a missile programme to pancakes or nuclear energy to the pleasures of Peking Duck!). There are a number of other countries that developed full fuel cycle capabilities under the guise of nuclear power programmes. Some, like Britain, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa, went on to get nuclear weapons. Of these, only South Africa has had the wisdom to give them up. Others, like Brazil and Argentina, developed significant capabilities during their period of intensive regional rivalry but had the sense to step back from the brink and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Tlatelolco Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty for Latin America and the Caribbean. Japan, often cited by Iran as an example, decided more than 30 years ago to develop its own full fuel cycle, thereby providing itself with a nuclear weapon option. Japan had the excuse of the 1974 oil shock, having few energy resources of its own, and there is no suggestion that Japan has indicated overt interest in actually acquiring nuclear weapons or that it has violated the NPT. Yet, its alliance with the US notwithstanding, most analysts consider that Japan would not have been allowed to carry out such a comprehensive fuel cycle programme nowadays. Much has been learned in 30 years, which is why there is so much concern about Iran's ambitious programme. The nuclear non-proliferation regime is sliding towards a precipice. If the treaty is further eroded it could shatter, giving rise to a proliferation surge, with the risk of falling into a insecurity abyss from which no-one would emerge safely. Yet it is surely unfair to require of Iran an abstinence not applied to others. And I think it would be very difficult for NPT states to accept another level of division between nuclear haves and have-nots in which the burden of safeguards and renunciation is placed most heavily on the shoulders of the non-nuclear weapon states. For sustainable nonproliferation, what is needed is an integrated approach that would:
In dealing with Iran's nuclear crisis, I believe it is important to address three levels: of course we need to deal with the specifics of Iran's case, about which we have already heard many papers, so that is not my subject here; we also must address the regional and international security concerns, which others more knowledgable than me have discussed; and, last but by no means least, we need to bring the core regime up to date. I will here focus on just three practical ways relevant to Iran in which the regime could be strengthened:
1) Renunciation of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear power generation. As Mark Fitzpatrick pointed out yesterday, there are some 30 countries with nuclear energy programmes, of which ten have uranium enrichment capabilities of their own. Even fewer have reprocessing programmes, because the fast breeder reactors which were designed for plutonium fuel turned out to be uneconomic and have too many technological problems to be practical. Likewise, mixed-oxide - MOX - fuel is seen mainly as a way to burn excess plutonium from dismantled weapons. Without that disarmament-related purpose, MOX would be neither necessary nor attractive for nuclear power generation. Dr Mohamed ElBaradei and Dr Hans Blix have noted that neither plutonium nor HEU are required for nuclear power generation. Reflecting how much more is known about the nuclear fuel cycle since the NPT was negotiated and opened for signature in 1968, and as a step towards a non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime, Article IV needs to be interpreted with an agreement to this effect. I do not underestimate the difficulty of getting such an understanding through, but the small minority of states that insist on maintaining programmes to separate plutonium and enrich uranium above the levels appropriate for operating LEU reactors are contributing to the threats and problems of proliferation. This initiative would be compatible with other kinds of proposals, such as multinational or regional fuel production and supply consortia. Moreoever, such an understanding in relation to Article VI would reinforce and accompany the ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (fissban) that is required under Article VI and has been on the negotiating agenda for more than ten years. 2) Bringing the CTBT into force, provisionally if necessary Iran is one of only 11 countries impeding entry into force of the CTBT, an important treaty which 176 countries have signed. Iran signed in 1996, but has still not ratified. I heard from Mr Larijani this morning that the reason is that the treaty is complicated, but this is an odd excuse when Iran has such a technologically and diplomatically capable culture and society. Over 130 other states have ratified, including Britain. Ratification was more complicated for France and Russia, as they had test sites that had to be closed and closely monitored. But Iran, we are assured, has no test site and no intention to construct a test site for the future. Moreover, living in such an earthquake-prone region, Iran has a very great deal to gain from the civilian benefits that come with the verification system for the CTBT, espcially in seismic monitoring, which includes training programmes for the next generation of seismologists. It is true that the Bush administration does not like this treaty and the United States has not ratified because the Republicans want to hold open the option to resume nuclear testing, even as they proclaim their adherence to a moratorium. Similarly, India opposed the treaty when it was adopted in 1996, and India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed, though India and Pakistan abide by moratoria. And it is not missed that these are three countries that have pursued nuclear weapons. So if Iran wants to build confidence that it genuinely regards nuclear weapons as immoral, illegal and inhumane, then ratifying the CTBT would be a relatively low cost, high value step to take, which would greatly please the vast majority of the international community. In keeping with Iran's game of diplomatic chess, the fact that such a move might annoy and wrong-foot the Bush administration also deserves consideration! On a more general note, after ten years in limbo it might be time to think about provisional application of the CTBT. The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) will shortly be publishing my paper on this in their quarterly journal Disarmament Forum, so I won't go into more detail here. [When it is published, this article will be available on http://www.unidir.org.] By ratifying now, Iran could put itself among the states taking potentially far-reaching decisions about the future of the test ban and non-proliferation regimes. This is a challenge and an opportunity for Iran, with very little danger for any state not seeking nuclear weapons! 3) Removing the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons from military and security policies To make any real progress towards sustainable nonproliferation and integrated disarmament, it is necessary for nuclear weapons to be devalued, thereby reducing their role and attractiveness. Cuts in arsenals may reduce some nuclear dangers, but unless and until they are accompanied by a disavowal of use (and therefore value), reductions will fail to have the desired political impact, both for the non-nuclear weapon states and on the decision-making of potential proliferators. The time has now come to promote the worldwide adoption of the principles and commitments of the non-use of nuclear weapons. This would provide a qualitative complement to quantitative reductions in arsenals, and reduce the value accorded to nuclear weapons in conformity with the disarmament principles and measures adopted by NPT parties in 2000 and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (1996). This is not the same as the no first use pledge called for by the Canberra Commission and others. Though such a pledge could help to counter the rise of destabilising doctrines of nuclear use for prevention, pre-emption or retaliation for attacks that have not involved nuclear weapons, advocacy of 'no first use' in the post cold war era is less helpful now than it once appeared. Importantly, the doctrine of no first use implies a legitimate second strike or retaliatory use in the event of a nuclear attack, and so undercuts efforts to stigmatise nuclear weapons as immoral, illegal and inappropriate for deterrence or defence. The logic underlying first use nuclear deterrence is that an adversary should be uncertain of whether any kind of attack or threat would be met with a nuclear response. As long as nuclear weapons exist, regardless of any declaratory policy, such uncertainty will in actuality be part of any calculation. No use doctrine is unlikely to change this fact for military decisionmakers in the short term, but the deterrence role of uncertainty should not be overestimated. In today's security environment, extreme ideologues, whether leaders of states or armed groups, may well not be deterred by nuclear or other mass destructive capabilities held by their target countries or anyone else. On the contrary, provoking a nuclear or similarly disproportionate retaliation could well fit with certain political or terrorist agendas. Leaving aside the question of who and where could reasonably be targeted in retaliation for a terrorist attack that won't necessarily carry the perpetrator's return address, any use of nuclear weapons in response to an act of terrorism - however devastating - would be morally wrong and counterproductive. Whatever the actual size and yield of the warhead, crossing the nuclear threshold in retaliation or pre-emption would destroy moral authority and fragment anti-terrorist coalitions. Even more innocent people would die. Retaliation with nuclear weapons would deflect international condemnation and collective action away from the original perpetrators and towards the nuclear weapon user. Instead of there being one centre of destruction, caused by the terrorists, a nuclear retaliation would create many more victims, thereby fragmenting and dispersing international responses and practical assistance. One objection to the no-use concept is that it is at best 'unenforceable' declaratory policy, and at worst, political rhetoric for propaganda purposes, with no genuine operational constraint. While declaratory policy is not as legally binding as treaty-mandated obligations, it is a mistake to dismiss declarations of intent or restraint as if they are not worth the paper they are written on. Many confidence-building measures (CBM) exist in the grey area between national and declaratory policy and international law, often laying the groundwork to prevent conflict and make possible more far-reaching regional or multilateral agreements. In effect, no use declarations would extend and embed unconditional negative security assurances, as many non-nuclear weapon states have long demanded, providing more confidence, relevance and restraint than the current assurances entail. Procedurally, unilateral declarations of no use could be given greater legitimacy through a Security Council resolution, as was done with the limited negative security assurances provided by the weapon states in April 1995, and referenced in UNSC Resolution 984. A no-use commitment would support the NPT and conform with the International Court's ruling. This would enable nuclear weapons to be progressively sidelined as an instrument of policy or coercion, but allow addicted states the reassurance of holding onto some physical weapons while they get used to the idea that they are better off without them. It would, of course, be practical and preferable for the retained weapons to be few in number, de-alerted and held in secure storage, much like Stansfield Turner's concept of 'strategic escrow'; and it would need to be understood that such continued possession would be for a transition period, pending their complete abolition, as required under the NPT's article VI. Though such an arrangement might have sceptics on both sides of the nuclear divide, it has the merit of addressing concerns about new nuclear weapons (most of which are associated with new and revived doctrines for use), sustainable nonproliferation and the need for more reliable security assurances. No use commitments would, of course, be required of all nuclear weapon possessors, not only the NPT states, but they can start unilaterally. There is no reason why all states should not declare, as a matter of moral and legal principle that they would not use nuclear weapons. Of course this is implied for the non-nuclear NPT states, but it would be politically advantageous to underline that this choice is a positive reflection of the state's moral and political position. It would be consistent with Iran's 2003 statement, with which I opened. Multiple unilateral declarations of no-use of nuclear weapons would remind us that non-nuclear states have already made the moral choice not to use nuclear weapons by entering into their NPT commitments. Too often, the NPT states in good standing are dismissed as being unable to use nuclear weapons, which belittles the conscious security choices they have made not to pursue this capability. ConclusionsA crisis is made up both of danger and opportunity. If Iran indeed believes that nuclear weapons are "inhuman, immoral, illegal and against [Iran's] basic principles", as Ambassador Khoshroo declared, then there is much to gain from suspending Iran's enrichment programme, in line with the 2004 Paris agreement, or capping it at the research level of 164 centrifuges, while ratifying and applying the Additional protocol and entering into further talks with the IAEA and EU about further transparency measures that might be required to allay reasonable suspicions and anxieties. But the tough choices and renunciations should not only be expected from Iran. Iran could take the lead in pushing the non-proliferation regime into the 21st century, helping to remove its inherent discriminations, take nuclear weapon use out of security doctrines and policies, participate fully in embedding an international nuclear test ban, and accelerate the processes towards disarmament. Nonproliferation without disarmament, the approach favoured by states with nuclear weapons, is unsustainable and has no future. Disarmament without nonproliferation would be impossible to implement. Both must be worked on in a progressive, integrated approach that puts human security at the heart of the endeavours. To reduce the threats and dangers from nuclear weapons, attention must be paid to the symbolic, strategic and political factors, as well as to the physical materials and components. An integrated disarmament approach is essential if we are to sustain nonproliferation and find coherent ways to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and new proliferators. Our individual security depends on our collective security. Common security is best promoted when genuine progress in disarmament is pursued alongside nonproliferation in accordance with the nondiscriminatory, shared responsibilities developed as part of the human security paradigm. Addressing both the demand and supply sides of proliferation, the integrated disarmament approach would combine the norms, rules, institutions and practices built up over the last century to constrain all types of mass destruction weapons with the policing powers and tools developed to deal with cheaters, as well as any commercial and non-state actors whose activities threaten to unleash a nuclear catastrophe.
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