ACRONYM Reports

Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Risks and Reckonings

ACRONYM Report No.7, September 1995

Part III: Review

Article VIII (3) of the NPT provides for five-yearly Review Conferences 'with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised.'

Although, after 25 years in force, the Treaty faced its extension decision in 1995, it was also time for the Fifth Review, which states parties decided to hold simultaneously, at the same Review and Extension Conference.

As in previous review conferences, three Main Committees were established to consider implementation. As agreed by the Preparatory Committee, focus was to be on the five years since the previous Review in 1990. Agenda item 16 allocated the work of the Review as follows:

Main Committee I (MC.I): implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament, and international peace and security: Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3; Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; Article VII; Security Assurances.

Main Committee II (MC.II): implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear weapon free zones: Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7; Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to Articles III and IV; Article VII.

Main Committee III (MC.III): implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II: Article III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to Article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5; Article V.

Some cross-over between issues was inevitable, compounded perhaps by slight modifications to the terms of reference, made at the insistence of Iran, partly to ensure that it could raise export controls in several contexts. Main Committees II and III therefore covered some of the same ground on non-military uses of nuclear energy, safety and export controls, and Main Committees I and II were both tasked with consideration of Article VII on nuclear weapon free zones. Main Committees II and III were also required to consider the role of the Treaty in 'the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at promoting wider acceptance of the Treaty.'

The early meetings of the Committees were open to the public, with summary records accordingly kept. However, at the very beginning of Main Committee I, the UK expressed its reservations about this, saying that it 'would not necessarily be conducive to the full and frank exchange that was desirable...'. A senior British official commented that, with all the NGOs in attendance, he feared some states' representatives would 'play to the public gallery'. As a consequence, meetings tended to be closed after an initial 'exchange of views', with the rest of their deliberations proceeding outside public scrutiny and the purview of the summary record takers.

Main Committee I: Nuclear Disarmament

Discussion in MC.I was dominated by a small proportion of the 175 states parties: the P-5, Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, New Zealand, Nigeria, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and Tanzania, with contributions by a few others.

For the first time, all five nuclear-weapon states were represented as states parties. In addition to providing conference documents, each of the nuclear-weapon states set out its record in support of its claim to have complied with its NPT obligations. Much of this had been covered in the speeches to the plenary, but was reiterated for the purposes of the Review.

United Kingdom

The UK said it had complied fully with Article I, and that it had supported international actions to ensure compliance with Article II, 'including action in respect of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.'

United States

Russia

Berdennikov said Russia had 'complied strictly' with its Article I obligations, and referred positively to the accession of former Soviet states Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT. Making no mention of Belarus's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe, Berdennikov pledged support for NWFZs, and emphasized Russia's adherence to the relevant protocols of the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga.

France

China

Articles I and II: Transfer of Nuclear Weapons or Technology

Most of the Northern representatives referred to two violations of Article II: Iraq and the DPRK. As expressed by Finland, 'The obligations under Article II had been challenged twice since the Fourth Review Conference. In the case of Iraq, non-compliance had been established beyond the shadow of a doubt. In the case of the DPRK, doubts still remained, and needed to be removed.' Nigeria broadened the assessment, arguing that 'some parties, and also non-parties, to the Treaty had acquired weapons-grade materials from nuclear-weapon States.' Without accusing the nuclear-weapon states or others per se of any violation, Jordan 'wondered how those States which had contravened the provisions of the Treaty had managed to do so', since any transaction involved a provider and recipient. Egypt, Sudan and others backed Jordan's concern, with Syria singling out Israel as enjoying 'an unfair advantage'. Tanzania demanded a sanctions regime on suppliers as well as recipients, since '[t]he nuclear-weapon States had assisted, encouraged and induced some countries to acquire nuclear weapons for one reason or another.' Italy responded by saying that nuclear materials exports made in good faith for peaceful purposes could be diverted. South Africa pointed out that 'a State with significant fuel cycle activities and an advanced technological infrastructure could equip itself with a nuclear capability through domestic enrichment processes and very simple equipment'. Sudan raised doubts about China's compliance with Article I, saying that, with regard to transfer of nuclear material 'China was following the same procedure as during the Cold War'.

NATO Deployment and US/UK Cooperation

The US and the UK both stressed that their mutual defence agreements, and that the relevant NATO provisions predated and were 'fully in accord with Article I of the Treaty.' Germany, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands all argued that their NATO agreements were compatible with the NPT and that they had never received military nuclear technology or sought to control nuclear weapons.

Over the next two weeks Ambassador Ayewah brought out a series of 'Chairman's Papers' in an attempt to get agreed text on Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3. He tried to base the papers on MC.I's discussions and proposals submitted by several states, including the EU, the US, NAM, Belarus and Ukraine, and Egypt, but drew criticism for misrepresenting some of the discussions. The NAM had welcomed positive international developments, noting that the INF and START agreements would reduce the nuclear weapons of US and Russia. They urged China, France and the UK 'to join the process.' However, the NAM language was only willing to 'take note' of the nuclear-weapon states' and non-nuclear-weapon states declarations of compliance and raised 'concerns about the ability of certain states non-parties to the NPT to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons.' The final paragraph expressed 'great and serious concerns' about Israel's nuclear weapon capability, calling for a complete halt to nuclear cooperation with Israel and for Israel's accession to the NPT, a point emphasised separately by Egypt. The US refused to allow explicit condemnation of Israel, but wanted direct mention of two violations of Article II (Iraq and the DPRK), and expressed the view that 'there had been a high level of compliance with the obligations of Article I and II of the Treaty.' The EU text 'acknowledges' the nuclear-weapon states' declarations of compliance and also that the non-nuclear-weapon states 'have fulfilled their obligations under Article II' with the two exceptions noted. The EU language underlined 'the vital need for all parties to the Treaty to comply scrupulously and unreservedly with their obligations and to avoid any actions which could raise questions about their compliance...'.

From 27 April through 4 May, the Chair ran through at least six revisions on Articles I and II, with divisions and alternative bracketed paragraphs seeming to multiply. The Draft Report of Main Committee I contained eight alternatives for paragraph 9 on nuclear cooperation within alliances. At one extreme, a few NAM states wanted Main Committee I's report to express 'grave concern' that nuclear collaboration between certain nuclear-weapon states and as part of regional security alliances 'run counter to the spirit and letter of the Treaty...and give rise to proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their aspects' - which was wholly unacceptable to the NATO states; at the other, the US and UK wanted it reaffirmed that 'the existing security arrangements are implemented in full compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT...', which many other countries regarded as too sweeping and complacent. However, the majority of options were very similar, noting difference of interpretation and emphasising the need to ensure that security arrangements were fully compatible with the Treaty.

The raising of Articles I and II compliance by NATO states clearly took many delegations by surprise. Commenting that there had never been any complaints at previous review conferences, some dismissed the issue as Mexican mischievousness. Others took it more seriously, recognising that in the post-Cold War era with former Soviet bloc countries applying to join NATO, deployment beyond the territory of the nuclear-weapon states themselves indeed carried the threats of proliferation and destabilisation. Most states accepted that NATO countries should not be criticised for the past, since the interpretation of Articles I and II had been understood to exempt deployment within alliances, providing control was not directly transferred. The future, however, was different. One senior official speculated on the reaction if China were now to form regional alliances and begin deploying its nuclear missiles in, for example, Pakistan, the DPRK, Viet Nam etc. The interpretation accepted in the 1970s needed to be re-examined in light of international changes and in the interests of non-proliferation, and NATO should reconsider the deployment of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon states. A number of Western delegates privately acknowledged that this should perhaps be re-examined now, and if Main Committee I had not become so polarised, it should have been possible to find a satisfactory compromise.

Article VI: Nuclear Disarmament

To the mounting irritation of some delegations, the Chair returned several times to ask whether 'the nuclear arms race had really ended, or merely abated.' His compatriot from Nigeria responded that the arms race had only abated. The NAM working document agreed by stressing 'the need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date'. Mexico identified some of the criteria by which the assessment could be made: if international tension had eased, why had the manufacture of nuclear weapons not ceased? Were there plans to modernise the existing arsenals? What would be done with fissionable materials in terms of production, prevention of diversion to military use, and disposition of materials from dismantled warheads? What would be the scope of a CTBT and would a moratorium on testing continue until a CTBT entered into force? Would negotiations begin on a convention to eliminate nuclear weapons? Venezuela said that 'at an early date' could not possibly be construed to mean 25 years later. The Philippines added that 'the call for a time-bound framework could not be considered impatience, since 25 years had passed...'. Algeria said that while its delegation was interested in the promises for the future, an assessment based on the past 25 years was negative, raising doubts about the sincerity of the nuclear-weapon states' commitments. In an illustration assumed to mean the UK, Algeria referred to 'one nuclear state, a depositary of the Treaty, [which] had stated that [it] was not willing to discuss nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future.' Algeria then advanced the novel suggestion that the declared nuclear-weapon states (and others, if they wished) 'could provide information on the number and type of nuclear weapons they intended to have under their future military programmes and what countries they intended to use such weapons against. The Conference could then judge from their answers whether or not the nuclear-arms race had ceased.'

EU Split

In their own statements, Ireland and Sweden went considerably further. Sweden said that the goal should be a 'nuclear-weapon-free world' and that the Conference should 'reaffirm that all nuclear weapons must be eliminated from the face of the earth.' In four key departures from the main EU bloc, Sweden argued for: a specific time schedule for implementation of nuclear disarmament measures; a negotiated multilateral treaty on negative security assurances, advocating also declarations of no-first-use; a Fissban treaty covering 'not only future production but also existing stockpiles'; and conclusion of a CTBT in 1995. Ireland reiterated the six objectives outlined in its plenary speech, and emphasised the need for concrete steps to achieve 'the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.' In a further important departure from its EU partners, Ireland also advocated a Fissban that would prohibit 'the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons'. When questioned afterwards, a British official said the countries concerned were 'wholly irrelevant', while a French official said 'the little countries outside are not important; what matters is that 12 countries support our statement.' Nevertheless, the EU, and France in particular, were clearly embarrassed by the public split and seemed to blame Sweden, a very recent member of the EU, most of all. From then until the end of the Conference, Sweden appeared to become increasingly isolated from the Western group.

Further Measures on Disarmament

Nigeria proposed the immediate adoption of a no-first-use policy, an agreement on security assurances by December 1996, CTBT by September 1996, establishment of a nuclear weapons register at the UN by the end of 1997, a ban on production of 'weapon grade fissile material' by 2000, and negotiations on a 'ban on the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons to start by the year 2005.' Linking this with its proposal for a limited extension of the NPT, Nigeria argued that 'the end of the duration of the extension should coincide with the entry into force of a treaty banning the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.'

The nuclear-weapon states opposed any kind of time-bound framework. 'Given...the complexity of... negotiations,' the US was 'concerned when unrealistic proposals were made, especially regarding time-bound disarmament.' Sweden pointed out that there were already precedents for such a schedule: the START Treaties encompassed a time-frame for removal of the specified weapons.

The fact that a CTBT was under negotiation in Geneva was welcomed by all, but several states, including Australia, Sweden, Nigeria, Norway and New Zealand, underlined the importance of concluding in 1995. By contrast, the NAM document gave no date, while a number of NAM countries, including Mexico, shifted the deadline for CTBT conclusion to 1996. Their reasons, they said, were pragmatic: they no longer saw any chance of getting a treaty this year, but pinning down the P-5 to 1996 was still achievable and would be taken more seriously. Although some took the opportunity to emphasise their opposition to thresholds or so-called 'peaceful nuclear explosions' (PNEs), comments on the CTB negotiations were generally low key, without serious divisions.

While many states welcomed the establishment of a Fissban committee at the CD, disagreements over its scope arose again and again. The nuclear-weapon states backed the language in the 1993 UNGA resolution 48/75L, which formed the basis of the CD mandate. This would ban all future production and left open the possibility of discussing related issues, including scope. The NAM, supported by Ireland and Sweden, called for a ban on the stockpiling as well as production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. Mexico referred to fissionable material for military purposes, which would prohibit its use in submarine propulsion as well as nuclear bombs. Egypt, to the surprise of some, backed away from the demands it had been making in the CD for a ban on weapon-usable fissile material, calling only for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Concerns about terrorism and security of nuclear installations and materials were also raised by some delegates.

New Zealand identified a step beyond the CTBT and Fissban, calling for 'an effectively verifiable ban on the production of nuclear weapons.' This could arguably relieve some of the pressure on the CTBT and Fissban negotiations, so that the scope of those treaties are not overloaded. It could provide a way out of the difficulties in CTBT scope negotiations regarding inertial confinement fusion, other laboratory experiments (with and without release of nuclear energy) and computer simulations, as well as the central question of whether the Fissban should cover only future production or deal with stockpiles as well. The pressure on both negotiations comes from the desire of non-nuclear-weapon states to ensure that the treaties perform effectively in promoting nuclear disarmament, and not just preventing horizontal proliferation. However, some argue for first steps first, such as a Fissban to bring the facilities of the de facto and declared nuclear-weapon states under safeguards. If a nuclear warhead production ban were identified as the next step after a CTBT and Fissban, it would be easier for non-nuclear-weapon states to agree CTBT scope that deals only with nuclear explosions and a Fissban covering only future production. Then as the next step, it would be appropriate for a warhead production ban to prohibit nuclear weapon development and manufacturing activities and to monitor that no fissile materials were taken from the stockpiles to build additional or new nuclear weapons.

After two and a half weeks of negotiations, the section of MC.I's report on Article VI was almost entirely enclosed in brackets, what one observer later dubbed 'the instrument of vengeance'. There was no compromise on how to characterise recent progress, on what to say about the nuclear arms race, on nuclear disarmament or any other measures. The only agreed paragraph acknowledged the important contribution to implementation of Article VI of fulfilment by Russia and the US of their obligations under the START I and INF Treaties.

Security Assurances

Although the UN Security Council had unanimously endorsed UNSC 984 (1995), it was clear from the statements in the NPT General Debate that many states parties did not consider that it went far enough. In discussions in MC.I and WG.1, many elaborated on the ways they felt the security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states could be improved and strengthened.

While there were disagreements over what the assurances should cover, the principal argument was over form. The NAM argued for 'an effective, unconditional, comprehensive, internationally negotiated and legally binding instrument.' They welcomed UNSC 984 (1995) only as a first step. The NAM further called for a conference to work out a protocol to the NPT 'on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties.' China made its familiar proposals for a Convention on no-first-use of nuclear weapons, as well as an international legal instrument on negative security assurances. The Ukraine backed some kind of legally binding agreement and Sweden argued for a 'negotiated multilateral treaty on negative security assurances... [which] could be further developed into declarations on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons.'

With regard to content, the NAM argued that UNSC 984 (1995) 'should have included language committing the nuclear-weapon states to take action in the event of a threat of use of nuclear weapon[s], to suppress that threat.' The NAM statement advocated NWFZs and called for 'appropriate measures' to provide protection from threats 'that emanate from the ambiguous policy of certain states non-parties to the Treaty, which possess significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and might have acquired nuclear weapon capability.' Additionally, 11 non-aligned states - Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Peru, Sri Lanka and Venezuela - all members of the CD, submitted their CD statement of 6 September 1994, which had advocated a draft protocol on security assurances attached to the NPT.

Egypt wanted better security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT who were also parties to NWFZs. Egypt, which as a member of the UN Security Council had endorsed UNSC 984 (1995) was very critical of its short-comings and the conditional terms hedging any Security Council action. Egypt therefore submitted language advocating 'an immediate response' from the UN Security Council in the event of attack or threat of attack by nuclear weapons.

Nigeria resubmitted the proposal it had presented to the 1990 Review Conference, containing a four-article protocol on security assurances to be attached to the NPT. The operative paragraphs are as follows:

"Article I

Each nuclear-weapon state party to this Agreement undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty which does not belong to a military alliance and does not have other security arrangements providing for mutual defence with a nuclear-weapon state.

Article II

Each nuclear-weapon state party to this Agreement undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty which belongs to a military alliance, or has other security arrangements providing for mutual defence, with a nuclear-weapon state but has no nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. The non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty referred to in this article undertakes not to partake in, or contribute to, any military attack on any nuclear-weapon state party to this Agreement, or its allies, parties to the Treaty, except in self defence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

By 26 April, WG.1 had collected proposals on language from Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, China, Italy, Ukraine, Malaysia, Nigeria, France, Syria, New Zealand, Russia and the US. These were compiled into a draft text, reported to MC.I on 4 May. Seven proposals, boiling down to three distinct options, were reflected:

• a protocol to be attached to the NPT - advocated with slight variations by Mexico, by Nigeria, and by 11 non-aligned states at the CD, and taken up by the NAM in a common position paper;
• international convention on no-first-use - China;
• multilateral treaty on negative security assurances (based on the P-5 unilateral declarations) - Sweden.

Although the CD was promoted as one forum for negotiations, several NAM states supported Nigeria's proposal for a special conference to be held. Since both India and Pakistan (non-NPT de facto nuclear-weapon states) are members of the CD, it is argued that a conference open only to NPT parties would be more appropriate. In brackets still is text asserting that the best security guarantee is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; disagreement over whether security assurances are a legitimate 'right' or only an 'interest' of non-nuclear-weapon states; whether the Conference should welcome, acknowledge or only note the unilateral assurances from the P-5, and whether this should be done 'with appreciation' or not; and also references to 'ambiguous nuclear programmes'. Complementing or strengthening UNSC 984 (1995) and the central question of what form a legally binding instrument should take remained in several brackets.

Ambassador Starr was reappointed by the Drafting Committee to continue his negotiations, and by the eve of the final day, he had consensus agreement on security assurances, which fell with the aborted Final Declaration.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

The Treaty of Rarotonga, establishing the South Pacific NWFZ, followed in 1985. China and Russia have signed and ratified protocols 2 and 3, undertaking not to test or use nuclear weapons in the territory (protocol 1 does not apply to them). As mentioned by several South Pacific Countries during the General Debate, the US, the UK and France have so far not ratified the three protocols, which apply to them.

In MC.II, many states, including the US, China, Indonesia, Sweden, Mexico, Jordan, Netherlands, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Egypt and Kyrgyzstan, said they supported a NWFZ or zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Many countries also welcomed the near conclusion of an African NWFZ. Sri Lanka, the US and Jordan advocated a NWFZ for South Asia. Indonesia, the US, Sweden and Nigeria gave support to a NWFZ in South-East Asia. Nigeria spoke of moves to make the South Atlantic nuclear free and Kyrgyzstan advocated NWFZs for the Korean Peninsula and Central Asia. Belarus advocated a Central European NWFZ, while Switzerland said it 'hoped that other continents, including Europe, would also become denuclearised zones one day.'

Working papers on Article VII were submitted by: Egypt, calling for the Middle East to be made a zone free of nuclear weapons; Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, advocating a NWFZ in South East Asia; various Pacific and South Atlantic states, supporting NWFZs in a number of regions and calling on those nuclear-weapon states which had not yet done so to adhere to the Protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga; and Kyrgyzstan (later backed by Uzbekistan), which sought to make Central Asia a NWFZ.

In discussions on Article VII, the main area of debate concerned the desire of many Arab states, supported by others, for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in the Middle East. While the Arab states wanted an explicit demand on Israel to dismantle its nuclear weapon programme and accede to the NPT, others (notably the US) were insisting that Israel should not be singled out by name.

Pressure came from Pacific nations for the US, the UK and France to ratify the relevant protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga, and for France to refrain from any further nuclear testing in the region. There was some discussion over the nearly-concluded African NWFZ, which was temporarily stuck over the precise boundaries of the zone of application. In particular, Mauritius was using the opportunity to assert its claims to Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, a former British colonial territory which the US uses as an important strategic base. This was backed by Uganda in MC.II, alluding to: 'some small islands which should fall within the African region and which were known to contain nuclear arsenals. When African states claimed that those islands belonged to the African region, they were told that the islands did not belong to that region.'

MC.II's draft on Article VII, dated 5 May, bracketed two paragraphs relating to establishment of a Middle East NWFZ, while retaining a general paragraph recognising that a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as proposed by Egypt, would contribute towards regional and international peace and security. There were also brackets around the proposal by Belarus and Ukraine for a NWFZ in Central Europe. Although modified, language is retained which calls on the nuclear-weapon states to respect NWFZ treaties and requiring France, the UK and the US (unnamed) to give 'early consideration to signing the relevant protocols' of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Progress on an African NWFZ treaty is commended, as are efforts by ASEAN states to establish a South East Asia NWFZ, noting Mongolia's declaration regarding its own territory, and the 'interest' of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in creating a NWFZ in Central Asia.

Main Committee II: Safeguards

About 40 states parties contributed actively to the debates in MC.II, including Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, UK and the US.

A series of eight working papers were submitted by what was historically called the G-10 (Group of 10), now comprising 11 developed, non-nuclear-weapon states: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. These papers contained text proposals on: safeguards; state systems of accounting and control; financing of safeguards; safeguards in nuclear-weapon states; IAEA inspectors; export licensing; physical protection of nuclear materials; and plutonium. In addition to these now-called 'G-11' working papers, the NAM, China and Romania also submitted papers on Article III.

As expected, what the G-11 called 'export licensing' and the NAM called 'export controls' was a major issue, requiring a separate working group, chaired by Philip McKinnon of Canada. Most states backed the IAEA's attempts to extend safeguards to undeclared nuclear facilities, although NAM speakers stressed the importance of this not hampering development. There were warnings about fissile material stockpiles, reprocessing, dual purpose technologies and nuclear smuggling, with some concerns about IAEA resourcing and a time-frame for implementing 'Programme 93+2'. On a number of these issues, the alliances were across-group allegiances. Only a few NAM countries backed Iran's attempts to have the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Groups proscribed. Similarly, G-11 attempts to insert prescriptive language about the stockpiling of weapon-usable fissile materials and the use of plutonium and HEU in commercial programmes were supported by many non-aligned states, but drew defensive reactions from France, the UK, Germany and Japan.

Undeclared Nuclear Facilities

Few NAM speakers addressed Programme 93+2 directly, but a number of them raised questions about safeguards. Mexico strongly supported Programme 93+2 and said it should apply to all nuclear material and activities by NPT states parties. Tanzania agreed that Programme 93+2 should apply equally to the nuclear-weapon states 'since they had helped to arm the undeclared nuclear-weapon states' and said that Article III 'remained contentious since it required only non-nuclear-weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards'. China also seemed to concur, referring to the 'imbalance in the rights and obligations of different states parties'. Tanzania called for a 'comprehensive safeguards system...universally applicable and based on the principles of transparency and accountability.' Several NAM and Northern States argued for full-scope safeguards, covering the facilities of the nuclear-weapon states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states. Sweden backed preferential treatment for states which signed full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA and Germany recommended that full-scope safeguards should be a condition for all new nuclear supply contracts. Sri Lanka reinforced the NAM demand for 'comprehensive and strengthened safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities.'

The report of MC.II backed IAEA full-scope safeguards on all 'peaceful' nuclear activities and expressed concern over the 'unsafeguarded ambiguous nuclear activities in some states' not party to the NPT. It commended the IAEA for Programme 93+2 but emphasised that the process should be 'objective and non-discriminatory.' It advocated verification by the IAEA 'of the correctness and completeness of the state's declaration', providing credible assurance that nuclear material is not being diverted and that there are no undeclared nuclear activities.

Export Controls

Iran, backed at times by Indonesia, Syria, Nigeria and Algeria, used two principal arguments to convey its message against export controls. In an attempt to present the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group as rivals of the IAEA or usurpers of its prerogatives, it argued for the Agency to be recognised as the 'sole body' responsible for verifying compliance with the Treaty, demanding that nothing should undermine the IAEA's authority. Secondly, opposing what it called closed, secretive groupings, Iran proposed an export/licensing regime comprising all states parties.

A Conference document by the 29 members of the Zangger Committee described and explained the evolution and working of export controls, presenting them as complementary to IAEA safeguards, and as neither secretive nor closed, since 'any party that is an actual or potential nuclear supplier and is prepared to implement the Committee's understandings is eligible for membership'.

The NAM working paper partially supported Iran's position. It urged that nuclear exports should not assist states not party to the Treaty to acquire nuclear weapons, noted the importance of 'non-discriminatory guidelines' on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and advocated establishing an ad hoc committee to formulate criteria and procedures, agree on an export control trigger list, and ensure supply for non-nuclear-weapon states parties for peaceful purposes.

After considerable debate, MC.II's report accepted language on the IAEA as the 'sole body responsible for verifying...compliance', and did not contain any specific reference to export licensing or export control regimes.

Plutonium and HEU

Several states also aired their concerns about terrorism, nuclear smuggling and illicit trafficking. Australia called for strengthened international cooperation and physical protection. South Korea called on all states to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. However, Tanzania blamed the nuclear-weapon states, saying that the Treaty had enabled them to accumulate stockpiles of fissile materials 'which had recently been the target of thieves and smugglers.' Malaysia argued that illicit trafficking was not a question of safeguards, but that 'nations that had the ability to stockpile large amounts of nuclear material should be in a position to prevent such things from happening.' If they could not, 'they should place such material under international supervision or have it destroyed.' While no names were mentioned, much of this criticism was aimed at Russia and other former Soviet states. Russia responded, supporting a broadening of international cooperation to prevent trafficking and saying that 'states that possessed nuclear materials had the obligation to guarantee their non-proliferation, physical protection, security and safekeeping, and they would also be held responsible in the event that such materials disappeared, were stolen or illegally moved.'

The report of MC.II recognised the need for safeguards of 'unirradiated direct-use nuclear fuel' but stopped short of any strictures on commercial reprocessing or uranium enrichment. Instead, it endorsed the IAEA's 'improving safeguards arrangements' in this area. It called for greater transparency relating to plutonium and HEU, 'including stock levels and their relations to national nuclear fuel cycles', and recommended that states planning new civilian reactors 'avoid or minimise use' of HEU, with the further qualification 'to the extent that this is feasible, taking into account technical, scientific and economic factors.' Expressing 'grave concern' over illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, the report noted that it is 'the responsibility of all states to protect and ensure the security of such material' and that only 53 countries have acceded to the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

The report that went from MC.II to the Drafting Committee was substantially agreed, with brackets around paragraphs relating to Iraq and DPRK, brackets on two paragraphs relating to the Middle East in the section on Article VII, and a couple of very minor drafting brackets.

Main Committee III: 'Peaceful' Uses

As with the other committees, active participation was by fewer than one quarter of the states parties, including: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Croatia, Egypt, France (individually and on behalf of the EU), Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Syria, the UK, and the US. The AOSIS - the Association of Small Island States - played a significant (and to many, unanticipated) role. IAEA representatives also participated in discussions.

Inevitably there was some duplication between MC.III's discussions and those of MC.II. The G-11 submitted three working papers on Article IV, covering sustainable development, cooperation, nuclear safety, nuclear waste and liability; China and the NAM each put in papers; and 31 countries, spearheaded by Australia, put in text underlining the de facto redundancy of Article V on PNEs. In addition, around 45 states parties in the AOSIS, backed by some of the larger Pacific and South American states, made a strong stand on the transshipment of nuclear materials.

Although export controls came up, as expected, the issues most hard-fought turned out to be nuclear transport (at sea) and PNEs. Other important issues included cooperation, waste management, nuclear safety and liability. The IAEA gave details of its Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, although adding that it 'did not take into account whether the [IAEA] member state was a party or not to the Treaty.' Tacitly recognising that nuclear power is not as desirable a bargain as it may have appeared in the 1960s and '70s, the IAEA was at pains to stress its involvement in food and agriculture, human health, industry, science, radiation protection and nuclear safety.

Nuclear Cooperation

The G-11 proposed that the IAEA should 'to the extent possible, redirect its programme in keeping with the promotion of sustainable development and the improvement of the environment' and urged more attention on radiation protection, nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. Some Northern states were themselves defensive about their own choices. Japan, for example, conscious of criticisms in MC.II and MC.III over its enthusiasm for plutonium, asserted its view that each country's decisions 'should be respected without jeopardising its respective fuel-cycle policies, and any programme in that sphere should be carried out in accordance with the principle of not holding surplus plutonium and observing as much transparency as possible.'

Export Controls

Iran said that Article IV had been understood to mean 'not only unrestricted but even preferential access'. Sharing with Syria its criticisms of the restrictions on dual-use items, Iran argued that 'Ways must be found to remove all existing export control regimes and to create transparent international mechanisms with full participation of all states parties to the Treaty in the decision-making process, so as to ensure compliance with the Treaty.' China called for 'the unreasonable restrictions on the transfer of nuclear energy technology' to be removed, but without explaining whether export controls were judged unreasonable. A number of NAM states were clearly unhappy about pushing so hard on this issue, with Indonesia, for example, expressing satisfaction with nuclear cooperation so far, and Malaysia saying that it had no experience of discrimination 'but it was imperative that the Conference should institute a forum to address...complaints.' Iran reiterated the same arguments as in MC.II, calling for a special committee within the context of the NPT. Where the NAM paper to MC.II had backed Iran to some extent by advocating an ad hoc Committee on transfers and exports, the NAM paper to MC.III did not mention this, although it referred to the 'need for setting up United Nations mechanisms to provide a forum for parties to the Treaty to discuss regularly the implementation of Article IV...'.

Nuclear Safety, Waste and Transport

MC.III's report noted that states were aware of the transboundary impact of nuclear accidents, and that the safety of nuclear installations is 'the primary responsibility of individual states.' However, the transboundary implications of nuclear activities as well as accidents had been stressed by a number of delegations, including Ireland, the AOSIS and New Zealand. Ireland had in mind UK discharges into the Irish Sea. The AOSIS was primarily thinking of the shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel and uranium which regularly plied between Japan and two European Countries, France and the UK. The AOSIS and New Zealand both put in text proposals raising concerns and calling for effective liability mechanisms. The AOSIS went further, wanting it noted that 'a number of small island developing states parties have called for an end to [nuclear] shipments through their archipelagic and territorial waters... [and] economic zones'. They pointed to shortcomings in the 1993 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Nuclear Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships, by emphasising the need for 'additional measures...'. The AOSIS said they wanted a 'comprehensive/strict liability regime.' France and Japan were against anything more than a passing reference to transshipments.

At the last minute, the issue threatened to impede the finalisation of MC.III's report, but bearing in mind the number of potential extension votes involved, France and Japan were persuaded to compromise. Four paragraphs under a subheading 'Safe transport by sea' noted that all states had an interest in nuclear transshipments being conducted 'in a safe and secure manner and in accordance with international law', noting especially the concerns of small island developing states and other coastal states. It welcomed the adoption of the 1993 IMO Code and the 'ongoing IAEA review of safety standards', and then called on states parties to work with the IMO and IAEA to develop 'additional measures which would complement the Code.' On liability the final report noted 'that effective international liability mechanisms are essential to provide compensation for nuclear-related damage which may occur during transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level nuclear waste'.

Article V: 'Peaceful' Nuclear Explosions

Clean Text Thwarted

Failure of Review

Given the chaos of MC.I's report, Ambassador Strulak of Poland decided to draft his own text on Articles I, II and VI, steering through the brackets towards what he hoped would be an acceptable compromise. His first draft was rejected by NAM states for leaning too far to the nuclear-weapon states' view that sufficient progress had been made and future commitments should be kept general and at a distance. The second draft was rejected by the nuclear-weapon states for leaning too far the other way.

Meanwhile Ambassador Starr of Australia had been retained by Ambassador Strulak to continue working for agreement on security assurances. By Thursday 11 May, Starr had won agreement on a text that was entirely clear of brackets. The parties concerned had agreed to deletion of the disputed paragraph 9, dealing mainly with Israel (unnamed). This had referred to the need for additional measures to provide protection from states non-parties to the Treaty with ambiguous nuclear programmes, and was opposed by the nuclear-weapon states. It then listed the seven proposals made by China, Egypt (2), Nigeria, 11 members of the G21, Mexico and Sweden without any comment, and urged states parties to 'pursue ways and means of considering these proposals and views on their elaboration'. Instead of welcoming UNSC 984 (1995), the parties agreed to 'acknowledge the significance of' that resolution on security assurances. Given the tricky nature of this issue, the achievement of consensus was very highly regarded.

Negotiations continued to remove the remaining few brackets and synthesize text from MC.II and MC.III's reports. Philip McKinnon of Canada continued to coordinate talks on export controls, eventually bringing about a compromise. During 11 and 12 May, several different drafts of a final declaration seemed to be circulated, with updating every few hours. The 12 May (6 pm) version had eleven bracketed paragraphs for Articles I and II, including on innocuous aspects such as listings of accessions since 1990 and welcoming South Africa, Belarus and Kazakhstan as non-nuclear-weapon state parties. The section on Article III consisted of 45 paragraphs, of which seven were still the subject of dispute. These concerned Iraq, the DPRK, transfers in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV, and export control regimes. Since the DPRK had informed the Secretariat on 9 May that its delegation was withdrawing from decision-making, in protest at the 'outdated prejudices', its objections to the paragraph which looked forward to it 'fulfilling its stated intentions to come into full compliance' with its safeguards agreements with the IAEA, would no longer have carried weight. With regard to Article III, there was also some question of reopening debate on the reference to the IAEA as the sole responsible body to verify compliance with safeguards agreements, as the US wanted to replace this paragraph with the relevant sentences from the Principles and Objectives, where they had been successful in removing the 'sole body' designation. Article IV was covered by eight agreed general paragraphs, followed by 17 agreed paragraphs on nuclear safety, transport by sea, nuclear waste and liability. The section on technical cooperation was held up until the last day, when Iran dropped its insistence on the paragraph on unilaterally enforced measures which it had inserted into MC.III's report at the last minute. Eleven paragraphs were then agreed on nuclear cooperation, and a further four on conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses.

Despite China's position and the reservation that Russia had belatedly expressed in MC.III, the three paragraphs on Article V covering the lack of benefits from 'peaceful' nuclear explosions went through by consensus. Text on Article VI contained 19 paragraphs, all in brackets. Article VII on nuclear weapon free zones was covered in 15 paragraphs. Two, on the Middle East and Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear programme, were still bracketed. The eleven paragraphs on security assurances contained one in brackets, which (as mentioned above) was subsequently removed by agreement. Article IX was covered in three undisputed paragraphs.

After the extension decision had been agreed without a vote, attempts to win consensus on the review of the Treaty seemed to deteriorate. With a late and acrimonious session on Thursday night, the divisions between certain NAM states, particularly those in the 'like-minded group', and the nuclear-weapon states seemed to have widened into a chasm. Each side blamed the other. Western states said that the 'like-minded states' wanted to wreck the review to get their own back for having been defeated on the extension decision. The NAM accused certain nuclear-weapon states (the names of the US, France and the UK came up most frequently) of an arrogant attitude to the review, as if they had achieved what they wanted (indefinite extension) and could not care less about the rest. Both sides denied the accusations, but a persistent rumour circulated that a few of the NAM had informed Ambassador Dhanapala that they would not give way any more, so it was unlikely that a Final Declaration could be agreed, no matter how much time was given to it. A number of Western states seemed to back up the NAM's concerns that the nuclear-weapon states had hardened their positions and were 'celebrating' their extension victory by refusing to make compromises on the review. In particular, they were accused of vetoing any criticism of past progress or specific reference to future action on nuclear disarmament, and that, not content with neutralising most of Iran's language on export controls, were bent on further emphasis of the utility of the existing export control regime. Certainly the NAM - and the non-nuclear-weapon states as a whole - had little to gain from loss of the Final Declaration, for it contained much stronger language on several important issues than in the Principles and Objectives.

Following what was described by a senior Western official as 'rancorous and negative' discussions in the Drafting Committee on Thursday, Ambassador Dhanapala reportedly confronted the nuclear-weapon states on the final morning about their intransigence, appealing for a spirit of compromise and constructiveness. He gave both sides a deadline of 6.00 pm to come to agreement, but to no avail. NAM representatives said that they were prepared to go the extra mile, but only if there was prospect of solution. The US and the UK expressed a readiness to work all night and through the weekend, but did not compromise on their positions. Faced with no real prospect of solution, Ambassador Dhanapala decided not to prolong discussions unnecessarily further.

He opened the final plenary of the NPT Conference at 10.30 pm. It adopted the Drafting Committee's report and a final document. There was no agreed Final Declaration. The Drafting Committee's text had not been given the stamp of approval, even though three quarters had been agreed by consensus. It could not therefore be anything more than 'a historical curiosity.' In order that the endeavours of the Committees should not be entirely lost, the Conference agreed that the reports of the three Main Committees, as accepted by states parties on 5 and 8 May, should constitute part of the Final Document. This gives some standing to sections that had already been agreed, but not the authority of a Final Declaration. The sterling work which had cleaned up the text on security assurances, NWFZs and nuclear cooperation for the Drafting Committee fell by the wayside. Because the sections on nuclear disarmament and transfers were so heavily bracketed, neither of them carries any weight.

After adoption of the NPT Review and Extension Conference Final Document, which reported on the proceedings and decisions, 16 representatives (Australia, Belarus, China, Egypt, France on behalf of the EU and associated states, Indonesia, Norway, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Ukraine, the UK and the US) gave short speeches, the main purpose of which was to pay tribute to Ambassador Dhanapala, the Secretariat and participants for their hard work.

In his final speech to the Conference, Ambassador Dhanapala emphasised that there were no winners or losers: "It was the Treaty that won." He highlighted the 'unmistakable message' of the Conference, that 'non-proliferation and disarmament can only be pursued jointly', and said there was 'no reason for smug complacency about the past performance of states party to the Treaty... [and] still less room for any relaxation in our pursuit of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the achievement of the complete elimination of these weapons through their prohibition, and the promotion of cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.' Dismissing arguments about what was legally or politically binding, the President emphasised that the states parties should make 'maximum use' of the strengthened review process and its mechanisms of accountability, so as to fulfil their undertakings and 'forge ahead in [their] tasks towards a nuclear weapons free world.' Dhanapala thanked all the Conference participants, Secretariat and Conference Services staff and interpreters, and paid particular tribute to the non-governmental organisations (NGOs). He called for communication between NGOs and the NPT parties to be improved, and suggested that a 'one to two day presentation' by NGOs should be considered during the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings and at Review Conferences.

© 1995 The Acronym Institute.