ACRONYM Reports

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Now or Never

Assessment

If 1994 could be characterised as the 'year of the questionnaire'9, 1995 was a year for tidying up. 1996 is designated the year for concluding the CTBT, an achievable date, but only with commitment and political determination. It is not clear from the style and negotiating tactics of the 37 states that all possess the genuine desire and political will for a CTBT. As the window of opportunity for a CTBT again begins to close, ensuring that it is not achieved in 1996 may be the chosen strategy of those who do not want the treaty at all. The next eight months may be decisive.

Given the state of the chaotically bracketed rolling text from 1994, it is unsurprising that time was devoted to cleaning up and clarifying the text, but this need not have taken the whole year. The overall mood was of preparing rather than proceeding. The NPT extension decision overshadowed the work of the Conference on Disarmament, causing a kind of suspended anticipation in the preceding months, followed by a letting go (with negative and positive effects) after the Conference. France and China had seemed to be working to instructions to keep the pace slow. For France, it was particularly important not to have made any commitments which might tie the hands of the incoming President, to be elected in May. China, still testing and developing, wanted to prevent an early treaty. The US policy of keeping the P-5 together enabled France and China to dictate the early pace, to the chagrin and anxiety of other negotiators, who pressed for acceleration of the talks.

The major gains were on scope and verification. The concept of safety tests was dropped first, followed eventually by three of the nuclear-weapon states foregoing hydronuclear and low yield 'reliability' testing, making a zero yield scope most probable. The central seismic network of the international monitoring system was practically finalised, with considerable agreement reached on three complementary technologies: hydroacoustic, infrasound and radiation monitoring. The US started the session positively, bowing to international pressure by withdrawing the 10 year 'easy exit' proposal. On the eve of the NPT Conference, the UK and France likewise renounced their demand for explosions to be allowed for safety tests 'in exceptional circumstances'. Given France's reluctance to commit itself politically until President Mitterrand's successor could be installed, the timing of this decision came as a surprise. Viewed by some as an indication of goodwill before the NPT Conference and by others as a sign of nervousness, withdrawal of the exceptions language was widely welcomed as clearing a major impediment to agreement on scope.

After May, with new leadership in place in France and an unequivocal commitment in the NPT Principles and Objectives to conclusion of a CTBT no later than 1996, there was a hope that clearer decisions and better progress would follow. However, some non-aligned representatives worried that the opposite might happen: that achievement of indefinite extension might remove the pressure on the nuclear-weapon states to work for a genuine CTBT. When China carried on testing and France announced the end of its moratorium, the pessimistic forecast looked as if it would be fulfilled. However, France's subsequent initiative to adopt the Australian text on scope, followed by the US decision to ensure that a CTBT would be truly comprehensive, without tests of either several tons or several pounds fission yield, forces a re-evaluation of this view.

When the UK and France dropped the exceptions for safety tests in April, the assumption was that they would require that hydronuclear experiments be exempt from the treaty. On yield, the essential question among the P-5 was: how big? In the context of renewed pressure by the Pentagon (supported by the UK Ministry of Defence) for a threshold of up to 500 tons, France's 10 August announcement was primarily welcomed as undercutting this debate. Viewed as an important decision not to continue pushing for a threshold at some 200-300 tons, it was not at the time taken to mean that France was renouncing hydronuclear experiments. However, the US decision announced by President Clinton the next day clearly distinguished between 'true zero' and the previous US position, where explosions up to 4 lbs would be defined as zero for the purposes of a CTBT. With nuclear testing once more a public issue, and in an atmosphere of heightened tension following President Chirac's decision to resume French testing in the South Pacific, France, the UK, the US and - just as we go to print - Russia became caught in the zero net. This may well prove to have been the decisive moment for achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Although China has not yet moved forward, the nature of the CTBT scope is now clear. This is an immense relief to the majority of negotiators, as evinced by the number of countries which threw their backing behind the Australian text in the weeks following the zero yield breakthrough.

While opinion differs over whether France's decision to resume testing was necessary or wise, it is agreed that the French government signalled strongly that its intention was not to upset the negotiations. Thus the resumption was characterised as a 'final series', the number of tests was specified (up to eight) and the date by which they would be finished (31 May, 1996). Under pressure from worldwide protests, the French government further indicated that fewer than eight tests may be conducted, finishing rather earlier than May, perhaps even by January 1996. Similarly, since June 1995 it has been clear that the French negotiating strategy has shifted from 'delay' to 'facilitate'. During the summer France put forward pragmatic initiatives to promote compromise on issues ranging from scope to verification and on-site inspections.

The opposite may be said of China. China conducted its first test of 1995 within 48 hours of the closure of the NPT Conference. It seems to have accepted consensus in Main Committee III on PNEs and Article V only because the Chinese delegation had realised that a final declaration was highly unlikely. There are not yet any indications of when China will begin negotiating the same treaty as the rest of the CD. With the exception of Pakistan, an ally on political rather than substantive grounds, China is isolated in wanting PNEs, text on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a stated relationship with other treaties, and on many aspects of verification, including satellites. While China's reservations on the use of national technical means are shared by several non-aligned countries, it is thought that most of them would be prepared to consider some incorporation of NTM, with appropriate safeguards against discriminatory application or undue reliance. China and Pakistan, however, have so far refused to entertain any possibility of supplementing the international verification regime with NTMs, while arguing that without additional technologies the monitoring system will be inadequate.

Given how few countries have any capacity for manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons, the verification for a CTBT must be put in perspective. Its coverage must be effective enough to present a significant risk of detection, thereby providing deterrence and confidence, but if it is too elaborate and costly, it will never function at all. Close agreement on the seismic and hydroacoustic networks has been achieved, but there remain fundamental differences over how best to monitor for radioactive traces and whether a CTBT requires international satellite and EMP networks. These questions are political rather than technical, and cannot be resolved separately from consideration of cost and control. In the end a decision will have to be taken, judging the optimum practical requirements and the overall role and context of a CTBT.

As Chirac's decision to resume French testing (and the international response) has forced France into a much more assertive and constructive role in negotiations, China appears still to be following a strategy of delay. Notwithstanding its own public statements, and endorsement as an NPT party to the target date of 1996 for conclusion of a CTBT, China does not seem to be in any particular hurry to remove its numerous logs from the logjam. The worry now uppermost is that China may never have been genuinely committed to the 1996 target date, which was originally identified by the US Congress when it initiated the US moratorium in September 1992. From its first test in 1964, China has been struggling to keep up with the other nuclear powers. Officials in Beijing reportedly view the CTBT as on the agenda now only because the bigger nuclear powers no longer need testing, and they resent being forced to go along too. On the other hand, a CTBT is a central demand of the non-aligned states, and China does not want to alienate these countries by openly going against a test ban treaty. However, China may be calculating that if negotiating tactics can be employed to ensure that the CD is unable to conclude a CTBT during its 1996 session, which will end in September, the US elections in November could return a Republican President and Congress far less committed to a CTBT than the Clinton Administration. In that case, it might be the US that pulls the plug, absolving China of blame. Such a scenario may be neat, but is by no means assured. Although the forecasts are not looking hopeful for President Clinton, he could still win a second term. Nor would it be certain that an incoming Republican President would want to rock the boat on this issue. Although for many years testing has not been a salient issue in US politics, the response of public opinion to the French and Chinese tests has shown the domestic as well as international support for a comprehensive test ban. If the Republicans do take power, it is not likely that they would seek to overturn CTBT policy immediately. The greater danger is that under a Republican Administration, hawks in the Defense Department and Department of State could try to renegotiate the zero ban or impose impossible verification requirements, thereby stymieing the negotiations until they fall apart. If this is China's hope, the consequences - when it is too late - may prove to be against China's best security interests. Loss of a CTBT could have far-reaching and negative implications for international arms control and non-proliferation objectives.

The deterioration in relations between NATO and Russia are also causing concern for the CTB negotiations. Russia's initial reaction to the US 'zero ban' decision was hostile. While the UK and France attempted to make the best of a decision neither had expected so quickly, Russia was furious that it had not been 'properly consulted'. Part of Russia's anger no doubt comes from a sense of powerlessness. In many issues relevant to the NPT and CTBT, Russia has taken positions close to that of the US, and in an increasing number of cases, officials have referred to 'the P-4', broadly sketching the US, UK, France and Russia in the same camp. As a former superpower, still with a formidable nuclear arsenal, but with increasing worries about neighbouring states, including China, Russia had become convinced of the utility of a CTBT. However, its domestic politics is riven with nationalism, and even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has come under attack for leaning too close to the West. Russia may lack the capacity (and, indeed, the will) to press ahead with nuclear testing and further nuclear arms production. It would have difficulty finding the money to maintain the facilities for the 10 ton tests it reportedly favours, but at the same time, Moscow argues that it would cost even more to build the sophisticated equipment associated with the US stockpile stewardship programme. It is probable that some kind of financial arrangement could win Russia over, but it would be short-sighted to dismiss Russia from the equation. The very possibility of deploying nuclear weapons in former Warsaw Pact countries as part of NATO expansion is fuelling Russian anxiety about maintaining its own nuclear arsenal. Careless signals from the US that Russia is not so important now that it is not such a problem are counterproductive. The capacity for making trouble is still large, particularly on nuclear issues. Instead of bypassing Russia, the US and other major players should rather encourage and enhance the Yeltsin-Kozyrev administration's positive attitude on arms control. The Russian elections in 1996 will not necessarily result in a change of administration or CTBT policy. Either way, however, Russia's generally constructive role in negotiations so far should not be taken for granted. Although loss of a CTBT would probably hurt Russian security most in the long run, there may be those in Moscow prepared to use it as a football in disputes with the US and NATO.

In addition to scope and China's particular demands, the most difficult issues to resolve are likely to be entry into force, the composition of the implementing organisation and on-site inspections. Many states want the treaty to enter into force two years after signature, but with at least the five declared nuclear-weapon states and India, Israel and Pakistan on board. It is likely that accession by about 60 states will be agreed, but the key question is whether particular signatures are required as a condition or it is left to international diplomacy to bring the nuclear-weapon-capable states into the treaty in reasonable time. It is generally assumed that CD members, having negotiated the treaty, would join it. However, China has caused consternation by declaring an end to its nuclear testing programme only when a CTBT enters into force, raising questions about when it intends to sign, and the effect of this on ratification by other states, especially the US and Russia. Although it is regarded as positive that Israel, designated for membership if the expansion of the CD goes through, has been participating in the negotiations and has submitted a range of working papers, there is no indication of whether or when it would accede to a CTBT. Membership of the Executive Council likewise touches on national sensitivities: should the countries which the CTBT is primarily aiming to restrain have permanent or otherwise assured seats? How should regional and developing interests be balanced with technological capacity? The Council has to be small enough to work efficiently, but have the expertise, authority and conscience to do its job on behalf of all the world's people. Potentially the most highly charged decisions that the Executive Council will face are those concerning on-site inspections. While there is general agreement on the technical evidence to be sought, there are wide differences over the competing requirements of national security and international confidence, particularly with respect to the triggering of inspections and timing. These issues are resolvable, but need now to be extracted from the stated requirements of particular delegations and the rather circular discussions that have pertained so far. The worth of a clean draft text will be proved in how it proposes to solve these politically charged and very important articles.

© 1995 The Acronym Institute.