ACRONYM Reports

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Now or Never

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CTBT negotiations opened in January 1994, stimulated by the end of the Cold War and the forthcoming NPT Review and Extension Conference. Non-aligned statements repeatedly called for a CTBT to be concluded by April 1995, while the nuclear-weapon states adamantly resisted any time-table. The G-21 concerns were two-fold: they feared that once the NPT Conference was over, pressure for a CTBT within the P-5 governments would abate; and they worried that changes of administration due in France in May 1995 and in the US and Russia in 1996 could scupper the negotiations. Change of government in the US and the UK had previously caused collapse of the tripartite test-ban negotiations in 1977-80. Despite attempts by the 1994 Chair of the NTB Committee, Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico, to drive the CD towards early conclusion, some of the nuclear-weapon states wanted to ensure that there would be no possibility of finalising before 1996 at the earliest. Although almost all the technical and political parameters for a CTBT were well known, the first year of negotiations nevertheless took some time looking at the issue from first principles, before gradually building up to a draft text.

The 1994 NTB Committee Report, published in September, took the form of an 18-page summary of proceedings, followed by a 95-page appendix of text with alternative proposals and techniques in square brackets.2 In addition to covering considerable technical ground, the first year of negotiations had seen states put forward their wish lists for what they would like to see in the treaty. Although the report took the form of a draft text for a CTBT, divided roughly into the articles that would be expected, it was laden with over a thousand pairs of brackets, indicating disputed language or ideas. While much of the language in brackets reflected minor differences of emphasis, drafting alternatives and punctuation, the political differences were far fewer, but with serious implications.

Each of the nuclear-weapon states had a strategy for protecting its nuclear arsenal from the effects of a CTBT, reflected as bracketed language in the rolling text. France and the UK wanted to be able to conduct safety tests 'in exceptional circumstances'. China demanded that nuclear explosions should be permitted for non-military purposes - the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) which had been tried for a while in the 1950s and '60s by the US and the Soviet Union for large scale mining or construction, but with little success. The US favoured a general scope for the treaty, without the exceptions for safety tests, but with a special agreement among the P-5 nuclear-weapon states that very small tests - up to 4 lbs (1.8kg) - could be conducted. However, the US was pushing for an 'easy exit' clause in the treaty, whereby a state party could 'elect to withdraw from the treaty' at a review conference held ten years after entry into force. Fearing that it lacked the technology to conduct the low yield 'hydronuclear tests' favoured by the US and the UK, China had insisted that the CTBT scope should prohibit any nuclear weapon test 'which releases nuclear energy'. Russia proposed a text that listed the prohibited environments, while at the same time it joined the US, the UK and France in wanting to be able to conduct low yield explosions, and had early on expressed reservations about completely banning PNEs. China seemed to want the treaty to do more than ban tests, requiring insertion of paragraphs and articles covering security assurances, no-first-use and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Many of the brackets also reflected the interests of non-nuclear-weapon states. Germany and Sweden wanted to ban preparations for testing, while Indonesia bracketed the word 'explosion', wanting all nuclear weapon testing to be prohibited, whether explosive or not. There were a dozen different formulations for entry into force, ranging from a simple number to a strict requirement that all states with nuclear facilities should be on board before the CTBT is fully enforced. The technical discussions had piled detailed alternatives for monitoring techniques and inspections into the rolling text. The different requirements of an independent implementing organisation or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also left a trail of text alternatives.

When the NTB Committee was convened on 3 February 1995, with Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski as its new Chair, it was with the aim of converting this heavily bracketed 'rolling text' into a coherent comprehensive test ban treaty.

under Agenda Item 1 (CD/1238)

"Nuclear Test Ban"

(Adopted at the 666th Plenary meeting on 25 January 1994)

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban", and to give priority to its work.

The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee to establish the necessary working groups in order to carry forward effectively this negotiating mandate; these should include at least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and institutional issues, which should be established in the initial stage of the negotiation, and any others which the Committee may subsequently decide upon.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1994 session.

Structure of Negotiations

In accordance with the mandate, the NTB Committee had convened two working groups, Working Group (WG) 1 on Verification and Working Group 2 on Legal and Institutional Issues. In 1994 the NTB Committee had been chaired by Ambassador Marin Bosch of Mexico. Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany had chaired WG 1 and Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland had chaired WG 2.

For 1995, as it was the turn of the Group of Eastern European States, Ambassador Dembinski took the Chair of the NTB Committee. As before, two working groups were established. Following a dispute within the Western Group, during which France vetoed Australia's candidacy, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands was made Chair of WG 2 on Legal and Institutional Issues. With some of its key ambassadors due to leave the CD during the year, the G-21 had great difficulty proposing someone to chair WG 2. To avoid delaying the start of the CTBT negotiations, they therefore agreed to support Sweden, which had been a G-21 member until 1993 and had not joined the Western Group, despite being a recent member of the European Union. During the year, WG 1, chaired by Ambassador Lars Norberg of Sweden, appointed seven 'Friends of the Chair' to focus negotiations on specific aspects of the verification regime. WG 2 appointed two Friends of the Chair, to consider questions relating to the implementing organisation and entry into force (EIF).

NUCLEAR TEST BAN COMMITTEE
Chair: Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski (Poland)

Working Group 1 on Verification
Chair: Ambassador Lars Norberg (Sweden)

Technical Verification: Peter Marshall (UK)
International Monitoring System: Patrick Cole (Australia)
International Data Centre: Ralph Alewine (USA)
OSI: consultation, clarification and trigger: Klaus Arnhold (Germany)
OSI: access provisions, time-lines: Victor Slipchenko (Russia)
OSI: reports, follow-up, sanctions: Hamid Baidi-Nejad (Iran)
Transparency and Confidence-Building: Richard Ekwall (Sweden)

Working Group 2 on Legal and Institutional Issues
Chair: Ambassador Jaap Ramaker (The Netherlands)

Entry into Force (EIF): Stephan Keller (Germany)
The Organization: Ajit Kumar (India)
Organization team: Magda Bauta Solés (Cuba), Donald Sinclair (Canada)
and Navtej Singh Sarna (India)

The Rolling Text in 1995

Much of the work of 1995 consisted of clearing up the duplications, redundancies and inconsistencies in the rolling text, so that the political alternatives could be clearly seen. Work also proceeded throughout the year to determine the technologies and number of monitoring stations that would provide the most cost-effective coverage for detecting and identifying a clandestine nuclear test, wherever it might occur.

After several revisions, the rolling text contained in the September 1995 NTB Committee report consisted of 97 pages in two parts. Part I comprises the articles which are complete or nearly complete:

• signature (open to all states);
• ratification (according to states' respective constitutional processes);
• accession (permitted after entry into force);
• depositary (Secretary-General of the United Nations);
• status of the protocol(s) and annex(es) (integral to the Treaty);
• authentic texts (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish equally authentic);
• national implementation measures (responsibilities of states to have a 'national authority' to oversee implementation of the Treaty by its citizens and in its territories);
• measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions (procedures for dealing with non-compliance, including bringing any particularly serious case to the UN General Assembly and Security Council);
• settlement of disputes (consultations between parties, or with the CTB Executive Council, with arbitration by the International Court of Justice if necessary);
• privileges and immunities (for the Organisation and its staff);
• amendments (to be adopted only at an Amendment Conference, by a positive vote of a majority of parties, with no vote against).

Part 2 comprises those articles which are still heavily bracketed, indicating disagreements over the concept and language of the articles or, in some cases, opposition to the articles altogether. These include: preamble, scope, peaceful use of nuclear energy, peaceful nuclear explosions, the organisation, reservations, entry into force, duration and withdrawal, review of the treaty, security assurances for states parties, relation with other international agreements, and verification.

Preamble

The preamble is intended to set the political context for the Treaty. In 1994, the preamble consisted of 18 hastily cobbled-together paragraphs, which had been reduced to 15 by 1995. Following China's decision on 5 September to accept language on the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from the Principles and Objectives decision agreed at the NPT Conference in May 1995, it dropped its insistence on commitment to 'thorough nuclear disarmament' or the 'complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear arms at an early date' in two other paragraphs. This resulted in the dropping of paragraphs referring to the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon states and to the need for further reductions of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. However, India opposes any reference to the NPT, of which it is not a party, requiring the retention of other paragraphs on nuclear disarmament. China continues to want a paragraph urging conclusion of international agreements pledging not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, nor to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance (no-first-use). This is opposed by the other four nuclear-weapon states. In addition to several paragraphs relating a test ban to further nuclear disarmament, the draft preamble refers to the 1963 PTBT, the preamble of the NPT, recent international agreements and cuts in nuclear arsenals and non-proliferation, as well as the need to make verification data publicly available. With India unlikely to accept direct references to the NPT, and most of the nuclear-weapon states refusing language that commits them 'too closely' to nuclear disarmament, it is likely that agreement will have to be based on some formulation developed from the 1995 Principles and Objectives,4 but without direct dependence on the NPT.

Scope

The scope is the backbone of the treaty, determining what shall be prohibited or permitted. While the working group debates exercised language options, during much of 1994 and 1995 the real arguments centred on two issues: so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) and 'activities not prohibited'. China advocated a ban on any nuclear weapon test explosion 'which releases nuclear energy' but wanted to be allowed to conduct nuclear explosions ostensibly for civil, construction or commercial purposes. While Russia had flirted with the idea of PNEs, although its official position would support a ban, the other nuclear-weapon states and the vast majority (if not all) non-nuclear-weapon states want PNEs to be included in the CTB prohibition.

However, while arguing for 'comprehensive' scope language, most of the nuclear-weapon states were discussing ways of not prohibiting very low yield tests - called hydronuclear experiments (HNE). They argued that these tests would be useful in ensuring safety and reliability of the stockpiles, but critics were concerned that they could also assist in nuclear weapon development. Though all wanted some form of testing to continue, the P-5 were divided over how high a level to permit. The US, which in 1993 had fought an internal battle over a 1 kt threshold, defined 'zero' as up to 4 lbs (1.8 kg): ie. a nuclear test which released nuclear energy up to the equivalent of 1.8 kg of TNT explosive power would not be regarded as a violation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. This was the yield defined for a 'one-point safety test'. Lacking the US's sophisticated equipment and techniques, the others argued for higher: the UK, which uses US facilities at the Nevada Test Site, reportedly favoured a level of 40-50 kg; Russia wanted at least 10 tons; while France reportedly wanted 100-300 tons. China was also understood to be interested in permitting testing up to several hundred tons, although its representatives in the P-5 meetings were cagey about identifying numbers. China's official position, which opposed any fission yield, was primarily intended to obstruct agreement on a low threshold of a few kilograms, which it believed would solely benefit the US.

Going to Zero

During a debate on scope in WG 2 in March, Australia put down a draft text on basic obligations:

"1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."

With the NPT Conference drawing close, the UK persuaded France, and on 6 April both countries dropped their much-opposed requirement for 'exceptions in exceptional circumstances' to conduct safety tests. The UK went on to endorse the Australian scope language, which already had the support of the US and others. However, once the NPT had been indefinitely extended, the US Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, backed by sections of the British Ministry of Defence, began pushing hard for testing up to 500 tons, causing a furious inter-agency debate in the US and paralysis in the Geneva negotiations. Such a threshold was strongly opposed by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Department of Energy (DOE) and sections of the State Department. Rumours of the renewed debate over nuclear test thresholds in the US fuelled public concerns, already inflamed by the 13 June announcement by the newly installed French President Jacques Chirac, that France would resume testing in the South Pacific for one last series of up to eight tests, between September 1995 and 31 May 1996.

Under mounting pressure from international opposition to its breaking the moratorium, France announced on 10 August that it envisaged a 'truly comprehensive prohibition' and endorsed the Australian scope language prohibiting 'any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.' This was followed a day later by a speech from President Clinton, committing to a 'true zero yield ban' on all nuclear explosions. Following the NPT Conference and Chirac's decision to break France's moratorium, the US public and Congress had begun taking a greater interest in support of a CTBT. This, together with the findings of the JASON report, influenced the Clinton decision. The JASON report, which was commissioned by the DOE from 14 nuclear and security experts, had concluded that sub-kiloton tests would be of marginal utility in ensuring stockpile safety. Its other recommendations were incorporated into six 'safeguards' attached to the US zero yield decision, covering: stockpile stewardship; maintenance of the nuclear weapon laboratories; a 'basic capability' to resume testing if required; continuation of treaty-monitoring research and development; enhanced intelligence gathering; and the interpretation that 'supreme national interests' could permit withdrawal if the President, in consultation with Congress, deemed that nuclear weapons 'critical to [our] nuclear deterrent' could no longer be certified without testing. In a speech to the 17 August plenary, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar reassured the CD that 'while clearly important internal considerations to the United States, these safeguards require no action by the Conference', promising that the US would not require any additions or changes to the rolling text as a consequence.

The UK followed on 14 September, adopting both the 'zero yield' concept, and the US and French interpretation of supreme national interests. The Australian text, which in March had been considered broad enough to encompass low yield tests, has now been reinterpreted by all states parties to mean a 'true zero' comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions. Since the breakthrough decisions in August, which were widely welcomed, this general scope text has been gathering support from Western, Eastern European and G-21 states alike, but with no movement yet from China. On 23 October, President Yeltsin announced that Russia too would support a fully comprehensive zero yield test ban treaty.

Defining and Extending the Ban

Although the Australian text is now considered to be the front runner on scope, it is not the only language being considered. During the scope debate in WG 2 on 27 June, India and Indonesia both proposed draft text. Indonesia's language, formalising concerns raised last year, would prohibit all nuclear testing, whether explosive or not. Intended to cover laboratory activities such as computer simulation and inertial confinement fusion, this has little support, since most states consider that widening the scope to cover non-explosive testing of nuclear devices is not the purpose of a CTBT, however desirable it might be in terms of disarmament. There is additional concern that verification would be prohibitively intrusive and expensive. India's draft text sought, for the first time, to define a nuclear explosion, using language developed by nuclear scientists in the US-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).

"1. Each State Party undertakes to prohibit and to prevent, and not to carry out, any nuclear weapon explosion, or any other nuclear test explosion, or any release of nuclear energy caused by the assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical explosive or other means, at any place under or beyond its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."

Tabled at the height of frustration over the threshold debate in the US and France's decision to resume testing, the Indian text aimed explicitly to prohibit HNEs, but left some grey areas over whether laser ignition experiments, including inertial confinement fusion, would be banned. By underlining 'nuclear weapon' and 'nuclear test' explosions, the text was also thought by some to leave a loophole for PNEs. However, PNEs would be prohibited under the definition that followed, covering any release of nuclear energy caused by compression of fissile material. The France-US-UK decisions to go to zero have undermined support for the Indian proposal. Some negotiators worry that this attempt to define a nuclear explosion could be counter productive, while others are concerned that the language of the Indonesian and Indian texts are both too ambiguous and too encompassing.

In addition to China's language prohibiting any nuclear weapon test 'which releases nuclear energy' (in effect, a zero yield), two other scope proposals remain to be resolved. The Russian text is based on the scope of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, extending the list of prohibited environments to include tests underground. Opponents fear this could conceal a loophole for contained explosions. Germany and Sweden still prefer the general prohibition to include 'preparing to test'. As the France-US-UK decisions dissipate the anxious speculation about thresholds, pressure will now grow on those countries with alternative proposals to drop them in favour of the Australian text, with the understanding that it means a zero yield treaty with no exceptions or threshold.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

Two disputed texts in Part 2 relate to China's desire to retain the right to conduct nuclear explosions 'purely for scientific research or civilian applications'. One deals specifically with PNEs, setting out the conditions for preparing and conducting the explosions, and the other underlines the 'inalienable right' of states parties to nuclear energy for non-military purposes. Although Russia very early on expressed a desire to keep open an option for PNEs, the Russian delegation made clear that they would not hold up consensus on the issue. Russia and the US conducted PNEs in the past, but found that the problems of safety, contamination and cost outweighed any utility for mining or large scale construction. Technical specialists have long argued that a PNE programme could provide data useful for military development, and that it would be extremely difficult - if not impossible - to verify and ensure no military benefit.

During a debate in WG 2 on 9 March, China invoked the right to PNEs in Article V of the NPT, arguing also that PNEs are a type of peaceful use of nuclear energy, the benefits of which should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon states by the nuclear-weapon states. Moving to counter this, 41 NPT states parties, led by Australia, proposed that the review assessment at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference should reflect that the potential benefits of PNEs envisaged in Article V had neither materialised nor been demonstrated, and that no state had any kind of active programme for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. Although China argued hard against this assessment, Main Committee III of the NPT Conference forwarded the text by unanimous consent, with the recommendation that the CD take the situation into account in its negotiations on a CTBT. Despite this consensus that Article V was essentially redundant, lack of agreement on a final declaration of the fifth review of the NPT has meant that this statement lacks full authority. Although Finland and Australia have quoted in the CD the relevant paragraphs from Main Committee III's report, in attempts to pressure China to drop its insistence on PNEs, Ambassador Sha Zukang has responded by quoting from the final declaration agreed at a previous review conference in 1985, which contained a ritualistic endorsement of Article V.

The vast majority of states want a CTBT to ban all nuclear explosions, and would not accept a treaty with any provision for PNEs. Once considered a bargaining tool, China's demand for PNEs has neither shifted nor abated. This is worrying many negotiators who fear that China's real strategy may be to hold up negotiations until it is too late to conclude in 1996, in the hope that the US elections will deliver a Republican administration opposed to a CTBT. In that case the US, not China, would be blamed for loss of the treaty.

Closure of the Test Sites

Closure and clean up of the test sites, including restoration to original inhabitants, where appropriate, have long been demanded by CTBT campaigners, on human rights and environmental principles, as well as to prevent further nuclear testing. The Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk is now under the control of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan; the remaining Russian test sites are on the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya, formerly the home of the indigenous Nenets people. The Maohi people of Tahiti-Polynesia have long demanded restoration of the coral atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa used by France for nuclear testing in the South Pacific. Native Americans of the Western Shoshone nation have been at the forefront of campaigns to halt US and UK testing at the Nevada site, part of their ancestral lands validated by the Ruby Valley Treaty of 1863. At different times during the past two years Algeria, Iran, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan have called for the test sites to be closed, although this has not been discussed under scope. The nuclear-weapon states argue that the test sites are also research laboratories and that they have to maintain a 'preparedness to test' as insurance and deterrence against break-out. Given their determined opposition, closure would not seem feasible at this time. However, if hydronuclear experiments have now been ruled out, there could be some intermediate stage of mothballing or dismantling facilities specifically associated with nuclear testing, combined with confidence-building measures - for example, notification of non-prohibited activities such as drilling or mining at, or near, the former test sites.

The Implementing Organisation

The 1994 rolling text on the implementing organisation was a mass of conflicting brackets. No final decision has been taken over whether the implementation and verification of the CTBT should be entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as proposed by Sweden, but supported only by Brazil and Egypt, or to a separate organisation. The 1995 rolling text clearly leans towards an independent CTB-specific organisation, based in Vienna, with some sharing or leasing of IAEA facilities and expertise. Some delegations have raised questions about the high cost of telecommunications in Austria, given the importance of on-line data transmission, and others want more information on what Austria is prepared to provide to the CTBT Organisation, before deciding. Vienna is so far the sole candidate for hosting the Organisation.

After long debate, negotiators decided on the name 'Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation'. It is likely to comprise a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council of either 41 or 65 members, and a Technical Secretariat which will carry out the verification measures and coordinate the international monitoring system (IMS). Although much is still in brackets, the text has been considerably tidied up so that the alternatives are more clearly defined. This has been accomplished by the Friend of the Chair on Organisation, Ajit Kumar of India, and his team from Canada, Cuba and India.

If the CTBT Organisation is distinct from the IAEA, as expected, the central political decisions concern the structure, composition and function of its bodies, particularly the Executive Council. The Conference of States Parties would comprise all states parties, each with one vote. As the principle decision-making body, it would elect (or designate) the members of the Executive Council, appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, decide on funding and rules of procedure, oversee the verification regime, and ensure compliance with the treaty.

Executive Council

Since a meeting of the Conference of States Parties would be a major (and expensive) undertaking, the more immediate decision-making would be entrusted to an Executive Council. The P-5 nuclear-weapon states want to ensure that they have seats on the Executive Council, but many others reject the concept of permanent seats. At one point, to avoid conflict over membership, Japan had proposed that there should be no Executive Council at all. That was viewed as impractical, and subsequently dropped. In addition to objecting to permanent seats for the P-5, countries such as Japan and Germany want to be certain that they have seats.

One proposal which would satisfy many Western countries is to base Executive Council membership on states parties which are also on the IAEA Board of Governors. By this mechanism, states with the largest nuclear infrastructure would qualify, the remaining seats being rotated regionally. However, a number of non-nuclear countries are unhappy with this, arguing that it discriminates against developing countries, provides a counter-incentive to states wishing to reduce their nuclear involvement, and upholds the dubious principle of putting the foxes in charge of the henhouse. While recognising that their lack of nuclear facilities may set them at a disadvantage in terms of technical expertise and qualified personnel, some argue that their rejection of the nuclear options, power as well as weapons, should be seen as an advantage to the verification regime and not as a reason to restrict their membership of the Executive Council.

Another proposal provides membership to the 10 members most advanced in the technology of nuclear energy, with the rest of the members designated from eight regions of the world, with rotation to ensure that all have a turn and no country is prevented. A third proposal in the rolling text divides the world into five regions and calls for a 65-member Executive Council provided from those regions on a rotational basis with no state excluded.

The primary function of the Executive Council would be to supervise the Technical Secretariat and oversee any agreements between the CTBT Organisation and other bodies, including the IAEA. It would be charged with facilitating cooperation among states parties, and would almost certainly oversee any consultation and clarification process in the event of an ambiguous event. Depending on the procedures decided for on-site inspections (OSI), the Executive Council would likely be responsible for decisions and evaluations concerning inspections. China wants it to decide on requests for PNEs. The Executive Council would provide the first assessment of non-compliance and make recommendations to the Conference, being also charged with making any arrangements necessary for holding meetings of the Conference of States Parties.

Because of the political importance of the Executive Council, the matter of its composition is hotly contested. At present there is no proposal capable of assuring seats for the major nuclear players without marginalising or to some extent under-representing the non-nuclear and developing states.

Technical Secretariat

The Technical Secretariat, headed by a full-time Director-General, would comprise scientific, technical and administrative staff charged with overseeing the day-to-day operations of the IMS, data collection and transmission, and the international data centre (IDC). It would probably also be responsible for administering funds and establishing, operating and maintaining IMS facilities, unless that is taken on by states parties. There is still disagreement over what degree of analysis and interpretation of IMS data should be performed by the Technical Secretariat or by the IDC. The US argues that the IDC should only process, compact and disseminate data, leaving interpretation and identification of ambiguous events to states parties, while others want 'user friendly' information, with some preliminary identification of suspect or ambiguous events. The G-21 countries have proposed that the Technical Secretariat should analyse the information, while the Organisation should be responsible for judging any suspected cases of non-compliance.

Verification

The purpose of the verification regime is to provide sufficient confidence in the Organisation's ability to detect a clandestine test, that any state or sub-national group would decide that the costs of cheating and the risks of detection would be too high.

The CTBT verification regime is envisaged as comprising: an international monitoring system, the core of which would be a global seismic network; consultations and information exchange; and on-site inspections. Most states consider that transparency and confidence-building measures could play an important part. Others want the international verification regime to be supplemented, where appropriate, by information derived from national technical means (NTM). Russia, in particular, has long advocated using NTM to supplement the international monitoring system (IMS) in order to keep costs down while maintaining a highly deterrent verification capability. Any incorporation of NTM is strongly opposed by China and Pakistan. Though many G-21 countries have reservations, fearing that NTM could be employed in a discriminatory manner, others have expressed interest in suggestions made by France and others for allowing NTM data but according it a lesser weight than information gained through the international system.

International Monitoring System (IMS)

Following on from the substantial agreement reached towards the end of 1994 on an international monitoring system consisting of networks of four technologies, Dr Peter Marshall of the UK has continued to try to win agreement on numbers and locations of stations for the system. At the same time, Patrick Cole of Australia has been translating the technical considerations into coherent language for the treaty text.

After considering all the available technologies for detecting nuclear explosions in all possible environments, the clear preference of a majority of negotiators was for an IMS comprising:

• a seismic network of 50 primary stations and up to 150 auxiliary stations;
• a hydroacoustic network incorporating two MILS (missile impact locating systems) and nine additional arrays, although the details of location and type have yet to be finalised;
• a network of radionuclide sensors to detect particles and radioactive gases;
• a network of around 70 infrasound detectors.

There is now agreement on the primary seismic network of 50 stations to detect underground explosions. These will feed data continuously to the IDC. Incorporation of a further 100-150 stations in an auxiliary network, feeding into national data centres but able to be accessed by the IDC when necessary, will provide additional data to assist in location and identification of any ambiguous seismic events. On their own, this network would be expected to detect and identify explosions down to 1 kt with a very high degree of confidence. With the likelihood of detection well below - particularly when combined with other technologies - the primary aim would be to provide a sufficiently high risk calculation to deter clandestine testing.

There are still differences of opinion over whether to have 75 or 100 fixed sensors to detect radioactivity, as advocated by the US, France, the UK and others, or Russia's preference of only 20 fixed sensors, but supplemented by 3 specially equipped aircraft, which could be deployed if a suspicious event were detected. If a nuclear test vented, it would release radioactive gases such as argon and krypton which could be carried much further distances than radioactive particulates, which would be more likely to deposit out near the site of the test. For this reason, the majority consider that the radionuclide network should comprise sensors for both particles and noble gases, although a few countries, including Belgium, have expressed doubts.

China, backed by Pakistan, has additionally proposed an international network of satellites and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) sensors to ensure coverage of atmospheric explosions. While China's position is believed to stem primarily from its refusal to allow incorporation of satellite and other intelligence information from national technical means (NTM), in the view of most of the other delegations, synergy between the infrasound network and other IMS technologies should enhance the overall coverage to provide effective detection of upper atmosphere events as well.

Analysis and Interpretation

The seismic network and probably the complementary networks of the IMS will feed data to an international data centre, which is expected to be incorporated as part of the Technical Secretariat. During most of last year there was a wide divergence of opinion over who should be responsible for analysing and interpreting the data. The US represented one extreme, arguing that the IDC should only process, compact and disseminate data. At the other extreme were a few states which wanted the IDC to inform them only of suspect events. Most states took a middle position, concerned that some less developed countries lack the facilities and expertise to interpret the data, and therefore that the US position would inhibit their participation in decision-making. With the focus of debate shifting from the IDC to the Technical Secretariat, there now seems to be gradual convergence of opinion, with a recognition that it is the responsibility of states parties to pronounce whether a detected event was a nuclear explosion, but that they would need 'user friendly' analysis, with some preliminary identification of an event, in order to do so appropriately or to participate in decisions on inspections and compliance. In its 30 June statement, the G-21 argued that 'the Organization should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing all data'. Since the Organisation represents the political as well as collective technical capacity of the states parties, this does not necessarily conflict with the US position, which was mainly intended to free the IDC from the risks and responsibilities of 'judging' an event.

GSETT-3

During 1995, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE), chaired by Dr Ola Dahlman of Sweden, has been testing a two tier seismic network feeding data into an IDC in Virginia, USA. The experience and data are intended to inform the future CTB verification regime. The test, called GSETT-3 (GSE Technical Test 3), was set up to test: a single international data centre (IDC), using the US IDC in Virginia; a primary (Alpha) network of about 50 seismic stations and 100-150 auxiliary (Beta) stations; a modern communications system to support data exchange; and the involvement of national data centres (NDC). The GSE met in Geneva from 20 February to 3 March and again in August 7-18, with 23 of the 37 CD members plus 11 non-members participating.

As of 18 August, 37 primary and 75 auxiliary stations were participating in GSETT-3, with 5 more primaries expected by the end of September and a further 5 before the end of 1995, bringing the primary network to 47. Although global coverage was uneven, especially lacking for the southern oceans, Dr Dahlman affirmed that the GSE viewed the overall concept of a system based on a single IDC, a two-tiered network of primary and auxiliary stations, augmented by NDCs in participating states as 'an efficient concept' for an international seismic system. The report of the 41st session of the GSE listed 12 technical results so far.7 Dr Dahlman highlighted the following: the IDC can do its job of analysing and informing participating states but 'additional work is...needed to further develop methods to provide parameters to characterise observed events and to provide user-friendly products.' With a combination of the primary and auxiliary networks, a location accuracy of 1,000 sq km was possible, down to 15-25 km in 'well covered regions'.

Of the 50 stations of the primary network now agreed by the CD for the CTBT monitoring system, 27 stations are currently in GSETT-3, and 4 are among those expected to join GSETT-3 in the next few weeks. This could reduce some of the investment costs of the future verification regime. The training and experience gained by GSETT-3 could also improve the speed and quality of setting up the seismic network for the IMS. Noting the future usefulness of the operational manuals developed for GSETT-3, Dahlman said that the GSE would also make plans for the transition from GSETT-3 to the CTB IMS, giving a schedule of future development and evaluation.

Costs

Now that there is some flesh on the proposed verification regime, the question of costs is assuming greater importance. Those who support the IAEA as the verification agency do so partly on grounds of cost and convenience, though recognising that the IAEA would have to be additionally resourced to fulfil such a function. Until August, the US had been arguing that states should be financially responsible for the running costs of stations on their own territory. This was opposed by the majority of states, who feared that this could either lead to an unequal burden on some countries or cause delays in providing some stations identified as necessary to the IMS. In August, the US signalled a compromise, accepting that the Organisation would finance capital, operation and maintenance of IMS sensors incurred after the CTBT is signed, and that costs should be shared among states parties according to the UN scale of assessment, adjusted to take account of CTBT membership. This brings the US closer to the views of the majority of negotiators, who also advocate that the annual budget of the Organisation be shared according to the UN formula. Bearing in mind that states will have different burdens in terms of stations on their territories, the US also proposed that parties should have the option to meet their annual assessment either by direct payment; or by a 'contribution credit', offsetting the monetary value by services in kind, for example operation and maintenance of IMS facilities on their territory, establishment of new or upgrading of existing facilities etc; or by a combination of direct payment and contribution credit. Though this is not yet agreed, negotiators are welcoming the spirit of compromise with which the US has modified its hard line position on costs.

Russia, which must prove the ability to pay for implementation before the Russian Parliament will ratify any treaty, is particularly concerned to keep costs as low as possible, consistent with an effective regime. Where France and the US want the verification system to be fully defined in advance, Russia supports a less defined system, which can evolve if required, in response to political necessity and technological advance. For this reason Russia is a prime mover in wanting the IMS to be supplemented by information from national technical means. China wants a very elaborate international system, with no incorporation whatsoever of national technical or intelligence information. The UK tends to seek solutions along the lines of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The G-21 argue that NTM should not be applied on a 'case-by-case and selective basis', but with the exception of Pakistan, have not ruled them out completely.

With the likely seat of the CTBT Organisation in Vienna, several delegations have now raised concerns about the high telecommunications tariffs in Austria, a major consideration given the importance of on-line data transmission. The IDC is expected to be located with the Organisation, although this is not absolutely necessary.

On-Site Inspections (OSI)

Negotiations on on-site inspections are emerging as a battleground for fundamentally different political approaches to verification, confidence and security. Anxious to protect military and commercial secrets, governments want to prevent unnecessary intrusion. At the same time, they acknowledge that a physical inspection is sometimes the only way to resolve suspicions if the monitoring system detects an anomalous event. It will be necessary to balance the requirements of inspections, national security and international confidence. Some states, particularly those with regional tensions and sensitivities, such as India, Israel, Pakistan and China, want to ensure that OSI are only undertaken in rare and restricted circumstances. The major areas of contention concern the timing and decision-making process, particularly the 'trigger mechanism' of how an OSI is initiated. Most states agree that the request for an inspection should come from a state party, backed up with relevant evidence, but that the determination and conduct of the OSI should be the responsibility of the Organisation. However, they differ over the level and origin of evidence to be submitted to the Technical Secretariat or Executive Council.

Outstanding issues include: the procedures for consultation and clarification; the origins, basis and timing of an OSI request; evaluation of information related to an inspection request; the decision-making process for undertaking an inspection; and whether OSI should be a single or multi-phased operation. Details about composition of inspection teams, managed access, rights and responsibilities have yet to be determined, but would be expected to fall into place if the major political differences can be resolved.

Following consultations, the Friend of the Chair on trigger mechanisms, Dr Klaus Arnhold of Germany, reported the view that OSI should be a rare event, carried out in the most timely, least intrusive and most cost-effective manner possible. The OSI regime should deter from abusive or frivolous inspections. Classically, inspections could include routine inspections, challenge inspections (where little notice is given), and observation of notified activities such as large chemical explosions. Most states argue against routine inspections in this treaty. Some states object to the concept of challenge inspections, fearing that they could be used to convey distrust or suspicion, even when not undertaken in response to a suspicious event. Many states advocate transparency and procedures for consultation and clarification, arguing that this should relieve the necessity for OSIs in most cases. Key factors for consideration are timeliness and security. Mechanisms for deciding whether to conduct an OSI must be fast enough to ensure that essential evidence is not lost or erased, while providing an adequate screen to prevent abusive or improper inspections. China, Israel, India and Pakistan have argued for OSI to be regarded as a tool of last resort, only undertaken if a mandatory and stringent process of consultation has failed to resolve doubts. Russia too argues that a request for inspection should only be made after all other possibilities for clarifying the situation have been exhausted. The US, France, the UK and most Western states put greater emphasis on quick access and the prompt gathering of vital evidence.

In December, the Group of Experts on On-Site Inspection reported on the phenomena associated with nuclear explosions in particular environments8 . Focusing on underground explosions, they argued that venting of radioactive gases, particularly xenon, and aftershocks in the vicinity of the explosion were tell-tale signs that would vanish if not observed within one month, and preferably during the first weeks. They also identified roads, debris or tailings, the traces of which may be erased or concealed, arguing that evidence on these too should be sought as soon as possible.

The report identified other manifestations which were less time-critical, some of which could only be verified by drilling and with sophisticated instruments for detection and measurement. These include: surface cratering, evidence of an underground cavity or rubble zone, surface changes from ground spallation, residual underground radioactivity, the presence of radioactive argon-37 gas, changes in ground water level, and anomalies of heat, pressure and gas flow indicating a fractured geology.

In response to this report, the US in February proposed that OSI should be conducted in two phases. The first would be of relatively short duration and low intrusiveness - but would have to be conducted soon after detection of a suspicious event. It could include aerial overflights and visual inspection, measurement of radioactivity, and seismological measurements. The second phase would be more intrusive and of longer duration, involving expensive drilling. The US argued that as well as ensuring early collection of evidence, this would keep costs down, since the first phase could well satisfy the concerns of the requesting party and Technical Secretariat. To initiate the first phase quickly, the US had argued for a simpler process for deciding to proceed, with a 'red-light' agreement, meaning that the inspection would go ahead on the basis of a request from a state party unless the Executive Council decides against. By contrast, the second phase should go ahead only if the Executive Council agrees by positive vote (a 'green light' decision). China also backs the two-phase approach, and proposes a time-line that could make this possible within the first three weeks. Though France would accept a two-phase OSI concept, the other nuclear-weapon states are reportedly unconvinced. In September, Pakistan suggested that the 'time-critical' evidence from aftershocks and noble gas releases was exaggerated, and would be 'extremely low' for a well camouflaged test. Pakistan's Ambassador Munir Akram counselled against conducting OSI in a 'hasty manner'.

For the purposes 'of ensuring the fairness, objectivity and effectiveness of CTBT verification', China and Pakistan argue for requests and decisions to be based solely on IMS data. The other nuclear-weapon states, Western and Eastern European countries envisage some incorporation of information derived from national technical means. In a statement on June 30, the G-21 stated the view that 'the judgement by the Organization [regarding OSI] should be based on data received from the IMS' and that 'it should be the exclusive responsibility of the Organization to carry out on-site inspection in areas both within and beyond the jurisdiction or control of States Parties.'

In August, France put forward a proposal that OSI could be requested on the basis of IMS or national information, but with different decision-making procedures and weight accorded to each. In effect, the French proposal was for a 'red light' decision for an OSI based on IMS data, and the more stringent 'green light' process if the request depended on NTM data. That means that an OSI would automatically proceed if the Technical Secretariat deemed IMS data to be sufficient, unless a two-thirds majority of the Executive Council specifically voted to prevent the inspection. A request based on national data would require a positive decision from the Executive Council to proceed. As several, including some non-aligned states, expressed cautious interest, China on 5 September flatly rejected any incorporation of NTM data, a position reinforced by Pakistan the following week.

Some states have expressed concern that China's positions on verification, NTM and on-site inspections are contradictory. If China is worried about frivolous, unfounded or abusive inspections, supplementing IMS data with information from other sources, including national means, would help clarify an ambiguous event, thereby reducing the likelihood of an OSI. Similarly, the reasons China provides for wanting a satellite network and EMP sensors to monitor for signs of atmospheric or upper-atmospheric testing would be met for a fraction of the cost if evidence from intelligence and commercial satellites were admitted. Rather than rejecting NTM out of hand, it might be better to construct modalities that would allow the verification regime to benefit from national data, while minimising the opportunities for biased or selective utilisation. The modalities could provide for equal access and impartial evaluation of such data when it is included as evidence in a request for OSI. Whether used officially in the verification regime or not, national intelligence and NTM - especially of the more technologically advanced states - will continue to monitor the world. Arguing against NTM and for a fully defined international regime for a treaty such as the CTBT will not succeed in making this level of intelligence available to all states, but could fatally delay the treaty's conclusion or make it too expensive for many states to ratify. In the interests of the developing and less affluent states, it could be more constructive to define the terms under which such additional monitoring data may be used or rejected.

Entry into Force

The text on entry into force has been substantially cleaned of redundancies, but there has been little further progress on agreeing the conditions under which the treaty will come into effect. Most states want to ensure that the P-5 and nuclear threshold states will be on board when the CTBT enters into force, but want to avoid imposing terms so strict that the treaty can be held hostage by one or a few states. Depending on whether negotiators favour a simple numerical option or a specific group of states, the choice comes down to a number, a list and/or a mechanism.

A simple number, such as 60, is favoured by those who want to ensure early entry into force. For the US and several other states, ratification by all five declared nuclear weapon states is a minimal condition. Russia proposed the IAEA list of states with nuclear research programmes or power reactors - about 60, including all threshold states. For the same reason France and the UK had favoured entry into force following ratification by all members of the expanded CD. Although prepared to support the IAEA list if CD expansion is not accomplished, they point out that threshold states which have been involved in CTBT negotiations would be less likely to obstruct EIF than if they are specified only because of their technological capabilities. China has now dropped this requirement in favour of the IAEA list. The principal drawback of a list is that entry into force could be delayed by any particular state withholding its ratification, thereby in effect exercising a veto.

To avoid the treaty being held hostage and enable the verification regime to be implemented, some states have proposed combining a list with a formula for exercising a waiver. Two waiver proposals have been considered this year, and appear in brackets in the rolling text. One, advocated by Australia, is based on the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty, which specified entry into force conditions, but gave the right to each of the parties to waive the requirements, thereby allowing the treaty to enter into force individually. Combined with a specific list, this would have to include some mechanism for a sufficient number of states to decide to inaugurate the verification system, or implementation would have to be based on national monitoring, thereby undermining some of the rationale for a multilateral CTBT.

The 'US waiver proposal' calls for a conference of states which have ratified, two years after signature, providing all the P-5 have ratified. The conference participants could then decide whether to waive the specific EIF requirements, to let the treaty enter into force for them, including inaugurating the verification regime. While acknowledging the importance of accession by all the nuclear weapon states, several states from all groupings are unhappy with the US waiver proposal, as it provides too big an opportunity for veto. In particular they cite uncertainty about China's intentions, now that China promises only to cease testing 'once a CTBT has entered into force', and not upon signature, as is the usual expectation, according to common practice and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. While finding the waiver conference idea interesting in principle, they suggest that only a timing condition be placed: ie a conference could be convened by decision of a majority of those which have ratified two years after signature. They could impose the condition that while all could attend as observers, only those which had ratified could participate in taking the decisions. This could exert pressure on the recalcitrant states in a variety of ways, the most important of which might be loss of influence and appointments in the CTBT Organisation at an early stage.

Review of the Treaty

Following the retraction in January of the US proposal for a special right of withdrawal after ten years, dubbed the 'easy exit' clause, general agreement has been reached on providing for a review conference after ten years, with further ten year reviews if a majority of states so desire. Some states, however, question whether any formal review process is necessary in this treaty. They consider that the issue could be addressed more appropriately in the section on the Conference of States Parties in the Organisation, with review of the treaty an ongoing function of the Conference.

Duration and Withdrawal

The treaty is intended to be of unlimited duration, with the standard article permitting withdrawal if a state decides that 'extraordinary events...have jeopardised its supreme national interests'. Pakistan has suggested that a nuclear test conducted by another country, whether party to the treaty or not, could be sufficient reason for withdrawal. The rolling text also carries a bracketed clarification relating 'extraordinary events' to the violation of the spirit, object and/or purpose of the treaty.

France, which maintained that the ending of testing was linked to the 'international strategic situation', including the NPT, START process, ABM Treaty and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, had at one stage argued that 'one of the events which might jeopardise supreme national interests would be a fundamental change in the international circumstances which were the basis for the conclusion of a CTBT.' This, like the US 'easy exit' proposal, was opposed on grounds that it could be invoked too easily, thereby making the treaty hostage to fortune. At the end of June, France dropped its proposal on withdrawal, saying that it would rely instead on the standard wording relating to 'supreme national interests', with the understanding that this would encompass France's security interests.

The US adopted this approach on 11 August. On announcing US commitment to a true zero ban, President Clinton explicitly reserved the right to exercise 'our supreme national interest rights under a comprehensive test ban to conduct necessary testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified.' This was part of the 'stockpile stewardship' plan proposed by the JASON report and adopted as part of the 'zero yield' decision. The UK followed on 14 September, attaching the same conditions as the US to its decision to accept a zero yield scope.

Most states consider that Pakistan's requirement, like the earlier French proposal, could jeopardise the treaty regime too lightly. However, others have expressed concerns regarding the effect of linking the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons with supreme national interests, as expressed by France, the US and the UK. They see this as inconsistent with the over-riding commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament enshrined in the NPT. However, recognising the need to appease the military factions in the nuclear-weapon states and ensure ratification, the general view is that such an interpretation of supreme national interests acts as an insurance net, but in practice would be difficult to invoke once the treaty has entered into force, for fear of unravelling the treaty regime altogether.

Relation to Other International Agreements

China wants an article which would place the CTBT in the context of other international agreements, including the 1963 PTBT, the 1968 NPT, the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties, the 1967 Space treaty, and a 1971 treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and ocean floor. While few if any would argue that the CTBT would not bear relation to other international agreements, there is anxiety that China will want to use this relation to defend PNEs and other nuclear activities that were permitted in an earlier age. The article, which has little support, would determine that the CTBT could not 'be interpreted in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed and rights enjoyed by any state under the [named] international agreements'.

© 1995 The Acronym Institute.