ACRONYM Reports

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The Endgame

ACRONYM Report No.9, April 1996

Assessment

Following the 1995 resolution of the UN General Assembly calling for the CTBT to be ready to sign 'by the outset of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly', there is widespread agreement that this September 1996 target date effectively means finalising the treaty by the time the second part of the 1996 session closes at the end of June. Though only a handful of issues remain, they will determine what kind of treaty this will be. Some of the political differences appear to be fundamental, particularly concerning how comprehensive the scope should be and the relationship between the treaty and nuclear disarmament.

The test ban negotiations cannot take place in a vacuum. Domestic politics in key states and changing international relations and alliances are more likely to determine the fate of the CTBT than the talks in Geneva. What is clear at this stage of the negotiations, as demonstrated by the Iranian and Australian drafts, as well as the Chair's working paper, is that conclusion is possible in the next few weeks if enough states want it. All the technical and verification issues are resolvable. The political choices are now understood, with compromise required by all sides to achieve the best result. While there are inevitable endgame strategies by which states hold on to losing positions as long as they possibly can to win other concessions, the time is fast approaching when too much bluffing may be self-defeating. There are as yet few indications that those with isolated or minority positions are preparing to let go. If they do not, they could wreck the treaty, by causing it to collapse in deadlock or by forcing its transformation into a less relevant measure.

On fundamental issues such as scope and on-site inspections, the alternatives mean a different kind of treaty. Compromise is not necessarily the middle ground between positions. That may be optimal on an issue such as the composition of the Executive Council, but may not work when alternatives are more fundamental. A middle-ground attempt such as the Iranian draft on PNEs may in fact affect the role and operation of the treaty in ways that turn it into something else. If this had to be the price of getting China on board, the CD would have to consider whether the surviving treaty would be worth having.

The states participating in these negotiations must take a long hard look at what they want this treaty to do. What is their bottom line, beyond which the treaty ceases to be useful or acceptable? By its own mandate, the CTBT is intended to contribute effectively to non proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament. Its structure and provisions may only cover 'banning the bangs', but that is not the sum of its purpose and context. A treaty with thresholds or a provision for researching and possibly conducting sophisticated explosions under the guise of 'peaceful' uses may reduce the bangs, but it would not necessarily contribute effectively to the process of nuclear disarmament, and would not therefore be consistent with the concept of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Agreeing a treaty means closing off some options. Just as the US, France and the UK confronted this reality in 1995 and decided in favour of the CTBT and against safety tests and thresholds, so China must now accept that a PNE provision, however dressed up in conditions, would create a loophole for further proliferation. The non-nuclear weapon states have made it clear that they do not want a PNE provision on their behalf. If China is genuinely concerned about future needs and possibilities, then like the other nuclear weapon states it can save face by giving notice that if circumstances change, it may evoke the standard amendment or supreme national interest procedures.

The US and western nuclear weapon states must also come to terms with the relationship between a CTBT and nuclear disarmament. They may get backing to defeat India's attempt at structural linkage between the treaty text and nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework, but no-one wants a CTBT to be just a tool to reinforce the nuclear status quo. The response among CD delegations to the US announcement of its sub-critical test programme and the worldwide opposition to French testing 'for simulation purposes' showed this clearly. Though the non-nuclear weapon states wanted more, a treaty that will require five states to cease an unpopular and environmentally destructive activity and close off the testing option for everyone else is seen as an important step. It will constrain but not prevent the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. But its relevance in the 1990s must be seen in the wider political context. To avoid derailing the negotiations at a critical juncture, the US may postpone conducting the sub-critical tests planned to begin in June at the Nevada site. Though this would be welcomed, it indicates the perceptual gulf between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states that the US expects to resume once the treaty is signed.

Who Wants What and Why?

It is inevitable that the states which will be affected by the treaty's prohibitions are the ones having most difficulty with some of its provisions. Of these, the positions of China and India are now giving most cause for concern. In the first two years, public opinion and internal policy calculations caused the western nuclear weapon states to drop their pet provisions on safety tests, easy exit, and finally thresholds. Because so many of China's positions - such as PNEs, security assurances, and a satellite network - were thought to be place-holders or bargaining tools, they were not placed under the same degree of pressure until recently.

Although Beijing desires to complete its current programme of two to four tests, its public statements seem to indicate that it expects to join the treaty. It is now thought unlikely that China wants to hold up conclusion of the treaty text, but it may instead bargain for a late signing ceremony so that it can join with the rest. Concessions on scope from China and its reconsideration of verification positions gave a glimmer of hope in March, but it has to be said that China has yet to make concessions on one of its big stumbling blocks. With the rising backlash against a 'fix' to protect PNEs from outright prohibition, it is difficult to see how China can insist on a PNE provision without wrecking the treaty. It would be better to give in with good grace, perhaps with a statement like that of the US on withdrawal or, as Mexico suggested, on amendment. It would be in keeping with China's reasoning for PNEs to state for the record that if there is an overwhelming civilian need for nuclear explosions in the future, and it was accepted that they could be conducted without military benefit, the treaty could be amended.

If China drops its position on satellites and EMP sensors, it may need to take a more flexible approach to the incorporation of national technical information, on which the US, UK, France and Russia insist. Beijing's argument for satellites and EMP had been based on the legitimate view that without such information the verification regime would be inadequate. China had been opposed only on grounds of prohibitive cost, with the tacit acceptance from most states that existing national facilities could supply such supplementary data at a fraction of the cost. China's other concerns on security assurances and no first use should be negotiated outside the context of this treaty. This could be done in several ways, including the CD, NPT enhanced review process or plurilateral negotiations. Letting go of these articles at this stage of the negotiations will not be interpreted by anyone as abandoning the principles on which they were based. There is much sympathy with these principles, but a CTBT is not the place to fulfil them. It has to be presumed that China has entered into the negotiations, despite its frantic programme to upgrade its nuclear arsenal, because it has judged it more costly to remain outside. If that presumption is wrong, there is not much point in continuing.

Russia has also been causing concern, associated more with nuclear weapon issues outside the treaty than with the CTBT provisions themselves. With the main Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk off-limits in Kazakhstan, and Novaya Zemlya under ice for most of the year, Russia would have nothing to gain and much to lose by the failure of a CTBT and revived testing programmes in the US and China. Nevertheless, Moscow has seemed uninterested and at times hostile to the emerging treaty, with late proposals on test site monitoring and no clear decision yet taken on zero yield and the Australian scope text, despite fluffy statements on this in the press. Apart from its domestic turmoil and economic difficulties, Russia is deeply concerned about the US threats to the ABM Treaty and the implications of NATO expansion. Ratification of START 2 by the US on January 26 was helpful, but if it does not want to rejuvenate the arms race, the US needs to consider its long term security interests and the role of nuclear weapons much more profoundly.

In dropping its low yield testing, the US made considerable concessions, which should not be undervalued. Nevertheless there is some validity in the comments made by India, Russia and others that, as now envisaged, the CTBT will reinforce and freeze US dominance in nuclear weapon development. John Holum's opening speech went some way towards this concern. It would now be constructive if the US and other nuclear weapon states would accept preambular language referring to prevention of new and qualitative nuclear weapon development. They should also be prepared to give the CTBT a context in terms of a programme or process of nuclear disarmament. Though clearly supreme in terms of technology, the US needs to show more flexibility about the conditions it will accept on use of NTM, and on other aspects of verification, such as funding and the role and responsibilities of the IDC.

After ending its testing programme with a sixth nuclear test on January 27, France signed the protocols of the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga on March 25 (together with the UK and US), and has pledged to close its Pacific Test Site. For the past six months, France has been constructively behind the treaty, although it joins the UK and US in resisting commitments on qualitative developments and nuclear disarmament and in opposing the establishment of a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD. The UK was a reluctant convert to a CTBT, and still prefers a very cautious approach, guarding positions until the bitter end. In particular the UK seems determined not to give in 'too soon', by which it apparently means without a commitment from India that it will sign the treaty.

Though the more open US approach on the preamble is generally welcomed, there were recent signs of concern that it might have given the appearance of being too determined to get a treaty at all costs, leading others to think they could force the Clinton Administration to the wall. To restate the US bottom line on issues such as NTM and linkage with time-bound nuclear disarmament, a senior US diplomat recently warned against pushing too hard, saying that the United States 'could very well abandon the negotiations and if it wanted to get a test ban just work it out with the

P-5 ...'46

Israel's accession will affect the credibility of the treaty for many Arab states, although it is thought to have built up a basic arsenal of between one and two hundred nuclear weapons without a programme of nuclear tests so far. Although not yet a member of the CD, and therefore unable to withhold consensus, Israel has participated in negotiations - especially verification and OSI - by putting down detailed proposals and working papers. Not all Israel's positions can be accommodated, but concerns about confidentiality and managed access to sensitive sites are likely to be met sufficiently for Israel to be able to accede, providing the resurgent conflict in the Middle East and nationalist pressures do not force the government into a gesture of obstinacy.

India, which played a constructive role during the first two years of negotiations, is now causing the greatest mistrust and concern. In the run-up to its parliamentary elections, the results of which are due in May, the Indian mass media have been full of discussions on nuclear testing, nuclear weapons and India's status in the world. The debates were partly precipitated by leaked US intelligence assessments that India was preparing a nuclear test at Pokharan, where the 1974 nuclear explosion had been conducted. It is fuelled by the forthcoming elections, with results due in mid-May. While the Congress I Party of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao has taken a more pragmatic line, supporters of the nationalist Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have called for India to declare itself a nuclear power and prove itself with tests. Current forecasts are for a hung parliament. It would be wise not to place too much reliance on a positive clarification of India's position after the elections.

India faces four choices: to conclude and accede; to prevent consensus and block treaty conclusion; to allow the treaty to be finalised, refuse to sign, and then undertake a programme of testing; or to allow finalisation of the treaty, but refuse to sign (while still refraining from testing). India's international relations would be severely jeopardised if it chose either to block the treaty's conclusion or to start a nuclear test programme of its own. It has the example of the widespread international condemnation of recent French testing to weigh. A single test could only be a gesture, meaningless in terms of the technical development of its weapons. A programme of tests, which would be necessary if India were serious about developing second and third generation weapons, could carry a very high financial and political cost, which India would find very difficult to sustain over time. Options two and three are therefore unlikely to be feasible.

New Delhi's recent proposals may have been genuine attempts to strengthen the treaty and make it more relevant to India's security requirements, as a populous country bordered by nuclear and threshold states. Certainly, India is concerned that indefinite extension of the NPT freezes them into a position of inferiority. Moreover, with the CD deadlocked over its agenda and expansion, India suspects that the NPT enhanced review process will exclude it from participation in multilateral negotiations which may be set up under the auspices of the NPT. Regardless of whether India's fears about the NPT process are valid, they contribute to the strategy of pushing for linkage between the multilaterally negotiated CTBT and nuclear disarmament, and for establishment of a nuclear disarmament committee in the CD. To the extent that these concerns are genuine, more could be done to address them. But there are also indications that India has been laying the groundwork for a possible decision not to sign the treaty, since the time-bound condition in particular is unlikely to be met.

Choosing option four, to stay outside the treaty but not test, would not attract as heavy a penalty as testing, but it would not be devoid of political cost. Particularly if the treaty preamble contains language on qualitative nuclear development and disarmament, as widely expected, India's justification for such a stand would be weakened in the eyes of the world. Costs could include international prestige, its leadership position among the non-aligned, and any chance of a seat on the UN Security Council, which India is believed to be seeking. It would risk its international credibility without any technical or military gain, give justification to Pakistan's hawks, and possibly strengthen China's hand. Beyond the rhetoric of the moral high ground, the domestic debate in India has yet to subject its own policy options to a rigorous analysis. India would gain little by not signing the treaty: it is too late to start testing, but it would receive no kudos for refraining.

© 1996 The Acronym Institute.