ACRONYM Reports

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed but not Sealed

The Treaty Provisions

The Preamble

During 1996, the preamble became one of the few areas where the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) still hoped to be able to influence the final text. With the P-5 making deals with each other on significant aspects of the scope and verification, the non-aligned states tried to imbue the preamble with their understanding of the meaning, spirit and context of the treaty.

In January, Arundhati Ghose tabled a working paper on the preamble, with five proposals for new or additional language. India wanted a general reference to the relationship between the cessation of testing and nuclear disarmament and made three proposals referring to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a 'time-bound framework', 'agreed time-frame', and 'time-bound process'. India also proposed an additional paragraph: 'Emphasising that the principal objective of this Treaty is to end the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems…'

Having made these proposals for the preamble, India also proposed supplementary language for the articles on review of the treaty, to ensure that the preamble is not neglected. To the paragraph referring to a conference after ten years to 'review the operation of the Treaty', India suggested adding 'and with a view to ensuring that the objectives, purpose and the provisions of the Preamble to the Treaty are being realised'. Only this last proposal, on reviewing the preamble, was adopted, in article VIII.

Pakistan put in a similar proposal on ending the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons being an objective, purpose or aim of the treaty. There was considerable support for these proposals on qualitative developments, not only from the G-21, but also several Western delegations. As negotiations neared the end, the majority of non-aligned delegations realised that to be taken seriously by the nuclear powers they would have to put their combined weight behind the proposals. Mexico attempted to coordinate a G-21 proposal on the preamble which would commit the parties to the concept of a time-table for nuclear disarmament and reflect the treaty's role in curbing vertical proliferation. Though they could not get consensus in the G-21, 13 countries (Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka and Venezuela) submitted a proposal for preambular paragraphs recognising :

'that a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should end the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, thereby constituting an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects', and

'that an end to all nuclear weapon tests explosions and all other nuclear explosions is an indispensable step towards the larger goal of a nuclear weapon free world and should be complemented by negotiations, to be conducted on a high priority basis, on a comprehensive phased programme with agreed time-frames for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at the earliest possible time'.

A further paragraph referred to the aspirations of the 1963 PTBT, including ending environmental contamination by radioactive substances. While not including Pakistan's separate section on purposes and objectives, the statement put the preamble into this context with a final paragraph committing to the 'achievement of the above mentioned purposes and objectives.' By this time, however, India was refusing to negotiate with its non-aligned colleagues on a joint proposal, saying that it would only negotiate with the P-5 on the basis of its own text proposals. India had its own game in hand, but its tactic undoubtedly weakened the bargaining power of the G-21 states. It also appeared to play into the hands of the Western nuclear powers who made it clear that they would not negotiate on strengthening the preamble unless India gave a commitment to sign the treaty.

France, Britain and the United States categorically rejected any mention of curbing nuclear weapon development as an objective or aspiration of the treaty, but were reluctantly prepared to allow the preamble to state that such constraints would be a consequence or result of the treaty. They also accepted a preambular paragraph recognising a CTBT as 'a meaningful step in the realisation of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.' Cuba fought hard to include the environmental effects. For a long time France opposed any references linking nuclear testing to environmental harm (reportedly afraid that such linkage could make it possible for the nuclear weapon states to be sued) , but in the end the French ambassador signalled Ramaker that she would permit a veiled mention. Despite the blandness of the final language, the fact that the environment survived in the preamble at all was credited to the Cuban delegation's persistence and determination. In a last ditch attempt to re-open negotiations and forestall adoption of Ramaker's June 28 text with what they regarded as an inadequate preamble, 13 of the non-aligned countries submitted a longer revised version of their proposals on July 18, during the intersessional period. It was too late, and Ramaker's unamended preamble went into the finalised treaty.

CTBT: Preamble

The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the States Parties"),
Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects
Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such agreements and measures,
Convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures,
Stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament,
Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation,
Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,
Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment,
Affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security,
Have agreed as follows:

Basic Obligations

The Basic Obligations define the scope of the treaty, encompassing the core principles on what is prohibited or permitted. As previously discussed, during 1994 and 1995 the main debate over scope was conducted among the P-5 and focused on 'activities not prohibited' (ANP), with each nuclear power having a different requirement. However, the debate shifted after the US, France and Britain adopted the zero yield concept and threw their weight behind a general scope formulation proposed by Australia in March 1995, which covered 'any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion'.

From the beginning of negotiations, Russia had wanted a scope text based on the PTBT Basic Obligations, adding the term 'underground' to the list of prohibited environments. Several Western delegations, including some of the nuclear powers, expressed suspicion that Russia preferred this formulation because it might allow for a 'grey area' of explosions in a contained (i.e. laboratory) environment. Denying any such intention, Russia insisted that the PTBT formulation was tried and tested, and that the CTBT should build on what is already there rather than reinventing the wheel. Although President Yeltsin stood beside Clinton when the US President announced on October 23, 1995, that both countries backed the concept of a fully comprehensive, zero yield ban, Russia did not endorse the Australian formulation until May 1996, after the April 21 Summit. On this occasion, Clinton reiterated that "we have all agreed to go with the so-called Australian language which is a strict zero-yield comprehensive test ban treaty. That is the only kind of treaty that can give the people of the world the certainty that they really are seeing the end of the nuclear age of the big weapons." Yeltsin was less explicit, saying that "all, to the very last one, agreed that this year we've got to sign the treaty on banning... any size of test forever..." However, the Russian delegation confirmed in May that it was dropping its own scope proposal and would support WP.222. It was clear from the remarks by both Presidents that persuading China to go along with this was viewed as the "the biggest and most important issue".

In May 1995, after the NPT had been indefinitely extended, China exploded another nuclear device, France announced a resumption of its test programme, and the US Pentagon renewed its push for a 500 ton threshold. As a response and challenge, India and Indonesia both tabled scope texts intended to prevent low yield or hydronuclear testing. Indonesia's approach was to remove the word 'explosion' from the text, thereby banning 'any nuclear weapon test or any nuclear explosion'. This would mean that the testing of nuclear weapons per se, whether explosive or not, would be prohibited, together with PNEs. In February, 1996, Indonesia withdrew its proposal and backed the Australian text, with the understanding that it would 'ban all types of nuclear tests in all environments for all time'. Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi heavily underscored the 'true zero yield' interpretation, "which forswears all nuclear explosions". Frustrated over the planned US programme of subcritical tests and the Western powers' intransigence regarding stronger preambular text on qualitative developments, Egypt (followed by Iran, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria) briefly embraced the Indonesian text a few months later. Faced with the Australian formulation in two successive Chair's texts, their challenge soon dropped by the wayside.

Following objections that its definition could place some civilian applications in a grey area, including laser ignition (or inertial confinement fusion), which New Delhi itself wanted (and still intends) to develop, in 1996 India made slight modifications to its June 1995 scope proposal, but continued to fight for it throughout the year. India's scope language was based on (but not identical with) a definition originally proposed by the US based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC):

'Each State Party undertakes to prohibit and to prevent, and not to carry out, any nuclear weapon explosion, or any other nuclear test explosion, or any release of nuclear energy caused by the (rapid) assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical explosive or other means, at any place under or beyond its jurisdiction or control.

Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.'

Many countries were concerned that this definition would greatly complicate verification and still did not fully clarify the question of civilian applications. The Western nuclear powers also objected that the definition would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, although this could equally be the case under the Australian scope.

At the same time, with the same objective of encouraging the CD to come to agreement on scope, Germany and Sweden withdrew their early proposal that imminent preparations of a nuclear test explosion should be explicitly banned as part of the treaty's scope. Instead, Germany proposed modified text in the sections on consultation and clarification and the Executive Council which would allow consideration of concerns on 'apparently imminent non-compliance' with the treaty, taken to mean activities that could be construed as preparations for a nuclear explosion. Eventually this too was dropped.

In 1994, China had proposed a ban on any nuclear weapon test explosion 'which releases nuclear energy'. This formulation was intended to prohibit thresholds or hydronuclear experiments (HNE) but exempt PNEs. In March 1996, China withdrew its bracketed language on releasing nuclear energy and agreed a "common understanding" on the meaning of the phrase 'any nuclear weapon test explosion', whereby the CTBT would "without any threshold, prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion". However, China would not at that time endorse the Australian language, which clearly banned PNEs. Beijing continued to fight for the right to conduct nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes until the very final stage of negotiations.

'Peaceful' Nuclear Explosions

The background on PNEs has been complicated. During the 1950s, the US had a 'Plowshares' programme for nuclear explosions for civilian purposes, but abandoned it in 1977, the costs and problems outweighing any benefits. The Soviet Union regarded its programme more positively and conducted more than a hundred explosions, mostly for large scale excavation and construction work. At Soviet insistence, a right for non-nuclear-weapon states to receive the 'potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions' was included in article V of the NPT in 1968. Only the P-5 declared weapon states would be authorised to conduct the PNEs. In fact, no NNWS has ever requested a nuclear explosion to be conducted on its behalf, though India, which has never signed the NPT, called its 1974 nuclear explosion in the Rajasthan desert 'peaceful'. Russia gave up its programme in the 1980s, amid growing economic and environmental concerns. Nevertheless, Russia's position on PNEs was somewhat equivocal. The Geneva delegation would neither fight for PNEs nor speak out against them, maintaining the position that Russia would not obstruct consensus on banning PNEs. Behind the scenes there was considerable cooperation between officials and scientists from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) and Chinese scientists, with MinAtom providing extensive data which purported to back China's claim that PNEs could be safe and economically viable for a developing country. Apparently in an attempt to prevent PNEs becoming a treaty-breaking issue, early in 1996 Russia had informally begun to circulate an idea based on the 1977-1980 tripartite talks, in which the treaty would institute a moratorium on PNEs until they could be conducted so as to preclude any military benefit.

The non-nuclear weapon states were unanimously opposed to PNEs. In May 1995, states parties to the NPT included in the report from Main Committee III the assessment that the potential benefits of PNEs envisaged in article V had neither materialised nor been demonstrated, and that no state had an active programme for the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. China strenuously but unsuccessfully opposed this paragraph in debate, but in the end the Main Committee III report containing it was approved by consensus. Lack of a final report from the 1995 NPT Conference diminished its authority, so China continued to evoke the NPT article V provision and ritual endorsements in the last consensus report from the 1985 Review Conference.

China's lonely campaign for PNEs was given a considerable boost in February 1996, when Iran's draft treaty included a procedure for permitting them. Although all explosions were seemingly prohibited by the Iranian scope, the draft gave the Conference of States Parties responsibility for considering 'in exceptional circumstances and in the case that the real benefit of nuclear explosion for the sole purpose of purely peaceful scientific research and civilian applications are demonstrated…..a specific request for conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion.' A PNE would only go ahead if four-fifths of the Conference of States Parties agreed, and with verification 'to ensure that it will be conducted for purely peaceful purposes.' Considering that this condition would never be met, several states expressed initial interest in the proposal, seeing it as a face-saving way to get China on board. Others, led by Japan, Canada, Australia and Germany, opposed the Russian and Iranian solutions, fearing that they would provide a right and excuse for the P-5 (and possibly the undeclared NWS) to maintain in perpetuity nuclear design teams, laboratories and research facilities for conducting nuclear explosions, thereby undermining a central objective of the treaty.

China persisted. Abandoning his country's proposal on scope in March 1996, Sha Zukang emphasised his opposition to banning PNEs: "...as an important principle, any disarmament or arms control treaty should not hinder the development and application of science and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore it would be incorrect if [the] CTBT should ban PNEs... As a populous and developing country with insufficient per capita energy and mineral resources, China cannot abandon forever any promising and potentially useful technology that may be suited to its economic needs. China fully shares the concern over the possible misuse of PNEs. However, we think that the issue can be solved by establishing a strict application and approval procedure and an effective international on-site monitoring mechanism for the whole process of PNEs." As interest in the Iranian formulation dwindled after an initial surge of enthusiasm, China tried to get the P-5 to consider a new article II of the treaty in return for Chinese acceptance of the Australian language in article I. Accordingly, China's article II proposal would 'notwithstanding the provisions of article I' offer the possibility of permitting PNEs, providing that a Review Conference of States Parties agreed to this by consensus.

This was unacceptable to the majority of delegations. However, many were afraid that China had invested so much in the demand for PNEs that it would not be able to accept the treaty without some face-saving formula. Consequently Canada put forward an alternative paragraph under article VIII on review (rather than as a separate article attached to scope), with additional safeguards. This was accepted by China, when included in the Chair's draft text: 'On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions.' The recommendation would then have to be dealt with under the amendment procedures laid out in article VII, requiring consensus among States Parties at a specially convened Amendment Conference.

This provision reassured the majority of states because the unequivocal legal position, based on the article I Basic Obligations, is that PNEs are prohibited. They can only be conducted if the treaty is amended at some time in the future. The article VIII provision is actually more stringent than for any other kind of proposed amendment, requiring two stages of consensus: at a Review Conference and again in an Amendment Conference. Nevertheless, it was important for China that 'nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes' was mentioned as an issue which could be raised in the future. The likelihood of amending the treaty to permit PNEs is now so remote that the possibility should not be regarded as a justification for any research programmes by nuclear weapon laboratories.

With the PNE difficulties finally resolved and India's alternative proposals ignored, the Chair's text reproduced the Australian formulation on scope, which became article I of the final treaty.

CTBT: Article I Basic Obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

The Implementing Organization

From the beginning there were two primary organisational options for implementing the CTBT: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or a separate CTBT Organisation (CTBTO). Sweden, Egypt and Brazil spearheaded the campaign for the IAEA to be entrusted with full responsibility for implementing the treaty. The US and China were strongly opposed, with the majority of states undecided, recognising merit and drawbacks in each option. The IAEA was invited to present its case to the NTB Committee on four occasions: in February, May and June of 1994 and in December 1995. In the end, the CD delegations decided on a separate organisation, co-located with the IAEA in Vienna, sharing some facilities and resources, but legally and financially distinct.

The CTBTO would be set up once the treaty takes effect. It would comprise a Conference of States Parties, which would normally meet annually, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. During negotiations, the major political contention concerned composition of the Executive Council. Since the Conference will only meet annually, the Executive Council will be the main decision-making body for questions of verification and compliance. The nuclear weapon possessors and others which regarded themselves as having a special interest or regional status wanted a formula that would give them assured seats, while others including Japan and the G-21 rejected the concept of permanent seats per se.

The Iranian and Australian model treaties came up with representative options for solving the problems of regional and political balance, although neither proved acceptable to the majority. Iran's draft drew on the IAEA structure, with a council of 65 members elected from the conference according to their region. Although all states would have the right to be considered for membership of the council, there was no specific structural mechanism preventing the exclusion of a particular state if its region persistently failed to elect it. Australia looked to the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) precedent, suggesting a smaller Executive Council of 41, regionally designated, but with at least two members per region per session designated by alphabetical rotation. This would guard against any permanent exclusion of any particular state party. Australia sought to balance interests and accountability by specifying that particular priority should be accorded to those states parties: a) having the highest number of IMS stations; b) having sizeable nuclear infrastructure; and c) which have ratified before the treaty enters into force.

Morocco's Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi was appointed Friend of the Chair. He crafted a compromise somewhere between the IAEA and UN regional models, with a Council of 45 members from six regions: 8 from Latin America; 6 from Eastern Europe; 9 from North America and Western Europe; 9 from Africa; 6 from the Middle East and South Asia; 7 from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. There were immediate objections from African delegations that they were under-represented and from Middle Eastern delegations that Israel was included in their region instead of the North America and Western Europe region. After much pressure from both the African and European countries, Ramaker increased the size of the Council to 51, adding one seat to each of the six regions, thus:

10 from Africa;
7 from Eastern Europe;
9 from Latin America and the Caribbean;
7 from the Middle East and South Asia;
10 from North America and Western Europe;
8 from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East.

Israel stayed as part of the Middle East and South Asian region. The countries allocated to each region were listed in Annex 1 to the Treaty. Ramaker incorporated almost all the conditions recommended by Benjelloun-Touimi for seat allocation, with one third filled by the region concerned, taking account of particular criteria. One seat per region would be filled by alphabetic rotation (to ensure that no state can be permanently excluded), and the rest designated from among the States Parties in each region by rotation or election. Following strong objections by Pakistan to reference to nuclear capabilities as determined by the IAEA, which appeared in the Chair's May 28 draft, Ramaker omitted all mention of the IAEA. According to the final text, when allocating a third of the seats, each region would take into account, in an order of priority determined by the region itself, i) the number of monitoring facilities in the IMS; ii) expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and iii) budgetary contribution to the CTBTO. This satisfied most of those who wanted assured seats, including the P-5, since they were likely to rank high in expertise, facilities and/or finances.

There was little controversy over the powers and functions of the Technical Secretariat, which will oversee the verification regime and day to day running of the IMS and IDC, budgetary matters and appointment of technical and administrative staff. The Technical Secretariat will be headed by a Director-General, appointed by the Conference of States Parties.

CTBT: Article II

THE ORGANISATION

A.GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The States Parties hereby establish the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (herein after referred to as "the Organization") to achieve the object and purpose of this Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.
3. The seat of the Organization shall be Vienna, Republic of Austria.
4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, which shall include the International Data Centre.
5. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty. States Parties shall consult, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Treaty.
6. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Treaty in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Treaty. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Treaty and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality provisions set forth in this Treaty.
7. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this Treaty. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Treaty.
8. The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative arrangements with other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such arrangements, excluding those of a minor and normal commercial and contractual nature, shall be set out in agreements to be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties for approval.
9. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization.
10. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget.
11. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceeding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

B.THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making

12. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference") shall be composed of all States Parties. Each State Party shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
13. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty.
14. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it decides otherwise.
15. A special session of the Conference shall be convened:
16. 1. When decided by the Conference;
    2. When requested by the Executive Council; or
    3. When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States Parties.

16. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in accordance with Article VII.
17. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Review Conference, in accordance with Article VIII.
18. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise.
19. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next session.
20. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum.
21. Each State Party shall have one vote.
22. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
23. When exercising its function under paragraph 26 (k), the Conference shall take a decision to add any State to the list of States contained in Annex 1 to this Treaty in accordance with the procedure for decisions on matters of substance set out in paragraph 22. Notwithstanding paragraph 22, the Conference shall take decisions on any other change to Annex 1 to this Treaty by consensus.

Powers and Functions

24. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with this Treaty. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.
25. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of, and review compliance with, this Treaty and act in order to promote its object and purpose. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions.
26. The Conference shall:
    1. Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and the annual programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports;
    2. Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 9;
    3. Elect the members of the Executive Council;
    4. Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the Director-General");
    5. Consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter;
    6. Consider and review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Treaty. In this context, the Conference may direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him or her, in the performance of his or her functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Treaty to the Conference, to the Executive Council, or to States Parties. In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts serving in their individual capacity and appointed, in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Treaty;
    7. Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with Article V;
    8. Consider and approve at its initial session any draft agreements, arrangements, provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines and any other documents developed and recommended by the Preparatory Commission;
    9. Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be concluded by the Executive Council on behalf of the Organization in accordance with paragraph 38 (h);
    10. Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty; and
    11. Update Annex I to this Treaty, as appropriate, in accordance with paragraph 23.

C.THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making

27. The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on the Executive Council.
28. Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distribution, the Executive Council shall comprise:
29. 1. Ten States Parties from Africa;
    2. Seven States Parties from Eastern Europe;
    3. Nine States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean;
    4. Seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia;
    5. Ten States Parties from North America and Western Europe; and
    6. Eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East.

All States in each of the above geographical regions are listed in Annex 1 to this Treaty. Annex 1 to this Treaty shall be updated, as appropriate, by the Conference in accordance with paragraphs 23 and 26 (k). It shall not be subject to amendments or changes under the procedures contained in Article VII.

29. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference. In this connection, each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of the Executive Council as follows:
    1. At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled, taking into account political and security interests, by States Parties in that region designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as well as all or any of the following indicative criteria in the order of priority determined by each region:
       1. Number of monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System;
       2. Expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and
       3. Contribution to the annual budget of the Organization;
    2. One of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on a rotational basis by the State Party that is first in the English alphabetical order among the States Parties in that region that have not served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of time since becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is shorter. A State Party designated on this basis may decide to forgo its seat. In that case, such a State Party shall submit a letter of renunciation to the Director-General, and the seat shall be filled by the State Party following next-in-order according to this sub-paragraph; and
    3. The remaining seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled by States Parties designated from among all the States Parties in that region by rotation or election.
30. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative on the Executive Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
31. Each member of the Executive Council shall hold office from the end of the session of the Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the Conference thereafter, except that for the first election of the Executive Council, 26 members shall be elected to hold office until the end of the third regular annual session of the Conference, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 28.
32. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.
33. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members.
34. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions.
35. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote.
36. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of all its members. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

Powers and Functions

37. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with this Treaty. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation.
38. The Executive Council shall:
    1. Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Treaty;
    2. Supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat;
    3. Make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for consideration of further proposals for promoting the object and purpose of this Treaty;
    4. Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party;
    5. Consider and submit to the Conference the draft annual programme and budget of the Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty, the report on the performance of its own activities and other such reports as it deems necessary or that the Conference may request;
    6. Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the preparation of the draft agenda;
    7. Examine proposals for changes, on matters of an administrative or technical nature, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto, pursuant to Article VII, and make recommendations to the States Parties regarding their adoption;
    8. Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization and supervise their implementation, with the exception of agreements or arrangements referred to in sub-paragraph (i);
    9. Approve and supervise the operation of agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties and other States; and
    10. Approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing operational manuals that may be proposed by the Technical Secretariat.
39. The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference.
40. The Executive Council shall:
    1. Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties and the Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Treaty through information exchanges;
    2. Facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in accordance with Article IV; and
    3. Receive, consider and take action on requests for, and reports on, on-site inspections in accordance with Article IV.
41. The Executive Council shall consider any concern raised by a State Party about possible non-compliance with this Treaty and abuse of the rights established by this Treaty. In so doing, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:
    1. Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter;
    2. Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;
    3. Make recommendations to the Conference or take action, as appropriate, regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V.

D.THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

42. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification and other functions entrusted to it by this Treaty, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or the Executive Council in accordance with this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the International Data Centre.
43. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to verification of compliance with this Treaty shall, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol, include inter alia:
    1. Being responsible for supervising and coordinating the operation of the International Monitoring System;
    2. Operating the International Data Centre;
    3. Routinely receiving, processing, analysing and reporting on International Monitoring System data;
    4. Providing technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring stations;
    5. Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties;
    6. Receiving requests for on-site inspections and processing them, facilitating Executive Council consideration of such requests, carrying out the preparations for, and providing technical support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and reporting to the Executive Council;
    7. Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations and concluding, subject to prior approval by the Executive Council, any such agreements or arrangements relating to verification activities with States Parties or other States; and
    8. Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of verification under this Treaty.
44. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the verification regime, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Treaty or the Protocol and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.
45. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall include:
    1. Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization;
    2. Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request;
    3. Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and other subsidiary organs;
    4. Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the implementation of this Treaty; and
    5. Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the Organization and other international organizations.
46. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General. Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official languages of this Treaty. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification.
47. With respect to the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the Technical Secretariat shall determine and maintain a clear accounting of all costs for each facility established as part of the International Monitoring System. Similar treatment in the draft programme and budget shall be accorded to all other activities of the Organization.
48. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Executive Council of any problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through consultations with the State Party concerned.
49. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The first Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference at its initial session upon the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission.
50. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience, efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.
51. The Director-General may, as appropriate, after consultation with the Executive Council, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues.
52. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization. The Director-General shall assume responsibility for the activities of an inspection team.
53. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

E.PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

54. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
55. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives of members elected to the Executive Council, together with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.
56. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the State Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated. Such agreements shall be considered and approved in accordance with paragraph 26 (h) and (i).
57. Notwithstanding paragraphs 54 and 55, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Protocol.

National Implementation Measures

The basic obligations of the CTBT include the prohibition and prevention of nuclear explosions at any place under a State Party's jurisdiction or control. The purpose of Article III is to ensure that each state passes its own laws or undertakes the necessary measures to ensure not only that the government, but also that sub-national groups or individuals do not violate the treaty while on its territory. These provisions are fairly standard and did not cause much controversy.

CTBT: Article III

National Implementation Measures

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. In particular, it shall take any necessary measures:
   1. To prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognised by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
   2. To prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere under its control; and
   3. To prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere.
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the measures taken pursuant to this Article.
4. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the Organization upon entry into force of the Treaty for it. The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.

Verification

The purpose of the verification regime is to provide at reasonable cost a system for the detection and location of a possible nuclear test. Since no verification regime can give complete certainty, the aim is to deter cheating by a system credible enough to raise the uncertainties and risks of discovery, and thereby the financial and political costs to any would-be violator. The major areas of contention during the three years of negotiations were:

• which technologies should be incorporated into the IMS;
• the role, if any, of national technical means or intelligence information;
• the decision-making procedure and level of intrusion for on-site inspections (OSI);
• how much analysis and interpretation should be provided from the IDC to states parties; and
• costs.

IMS

Early on, most states agreed to an IMS comprising at least four technologies. The core was a comprehensive, global, two-tier seismic system, backed by hydroacoustic, radionuclide and infrasound networks. China and Pakistan argued until the end for a dedicated network of satellites and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) sensors, and questioned the usefulness of noble gas monitoring. Some delegations also doubted the necessity of infrasound monitoring. The tricky job of coordinating negotiations among scientists and diplomats over the required coverage and details of the IMS was entrusted for the whole negotiations to Britain's Dr Peter Marshall. During 1997, Australia became Friend of the Chair to turn the emerging agreements into consolidated treaty text. After much haggling over numbers and locations of stations, the IMS was finally agreed as follows:

• 50 primary seismic stations;
• 120 auxiliary seismic stations;
• 80 radionuclide stations for measuring radioactive particles in the atmosphere, of which 40 would also be designated for monitoring for the presence of relevant noble gases (such as argon-37, xenon-133, and krypton-85);
• 11 hydroacoustic stations;
• 60 infrasound stations.

Ramaker omitted EMP sensors and satellites, but included provisions for 'improvement of the verification regime', allowing EMP, satellites or other technology to be incorporated in the IMS subject to consensus by the Executive Council. In this manner, technologies or stations could be added or deleted from the IMS without requiring the full process of an Amendment Conference. It would also be possible, under separately established 'cooperative arrangements' for any state party to make data from national stations which are not formally part of the IMS available to the IMS and IDC. It is not entirely clear from the text whether this provision applies only to 'IMS-type' technologies, or whether it could be a means by which information from national or commercial satellites could be fed into the IDC, if required. It was accepted by all that satellite information would be useful to the verification regime. The issue was whether the states parties to the CTBT would be prepared to pay for a dedicated satellite network, which the majority were not.

For China and Pakistan, the satellites question was interlinked with the issues of NTM, which they wanted excluded, and equal access to information. The US, Russia and others expected to supplement the IMS with satellite data but opposed incorporating a satellite network into the IMS, citing cost and the complexity of interpretation skills required. China, Pakistan and several non-aligned delegations opposed NTM for two principle reasons: because its information would not be equally accessible to all; and because allowing NTM of one kind could set a precedent for legitimising in international treaties the techniques and technologies of espionage, in which Western countries were more advanced. In rejecting all NTM but recognising the validity of satellite information, therefore, China had little option but to argue for satellites to be part of the IMS. Since this was rejected by the majority, China eventually accepted Ramaker's approach, with the understandings on NTM which the Chair clarified on August 14 (see below).

National Technical Means

Part of the problem has been that the term 'national technical means' has different meaning for different delegations. To some it covers only technology such as satellites, bhangmeters, and seismic, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring stations that might not be directly linked into the IMS, but could be categorised as 'IMS-type' data. These could provide a useful supplement to the IMS, and if appropriate, might be accessed directly from commercial or national sources by the Technical Secretariat. At a more controversial level, NTM can include intelligence gathering technology, specialist satellites, signals and communications intercepts. Though the means may be militarily sensitive, the information could be of relevance for the detection and identification of a suspected event. Then there are human and 'illegal' intelligence sources, including whistleblowers, leaks and spies. These might provide an alert or help to pinpoint the area for investigation, but may not be available for independent inquiry to check their veracity or accuracy. Even if such information were permitted, which Russia and others opposed, it may be necessary to get corroborative evidence from accepted IMS, national or commercial resources.

Whilst backing the IMS as a cost effective international basis for verifying the CTBT, the US, Russia and Western and Eastern European states argue that it would be too easy for a cheat to calculate the chance of detection and design its clandestine explosion accordingly. The uncertainty introduced if NTM evidence were also allowed would greatly enhance the treaty's deterrence capability. China and several non-aligned countries are more worried about NTM being available to only a few states, and used in exclusive or discriminatory ways. Together with their demand for dedicated international satellite and EMP monitoring networks as part of the IMS, China and Pakistan have repeatedly argued against any incorporation of NTM. Referring to Pakistan's "historical experience of undue harassment", Foreign Minister Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali said that the use of NTM as a trigger for OSI would "allow the use of information which could be subjective, selective and unreliable..." China contrasted the "relatively objective and just" IMS with NTM which "are controlled and used by individuals or small groups of states parties." Thus, Ambassador Sha concluded that if "NTM are incorporated into the international verification or used for triggering OSI, that would inevitably put most of the states parties...into an extremely unequal position...This is obviously unreasonable and unjustifiable..."

China and Pakistan are not the only countries sensitive to abuse of national intelligence means. In June 1995, the G-21 stated the view that "the judgement by the Organization [regarding OSI] should be based on data received from the IMS." However, most non-aligned delegations were more interested in restricting the potential for abuse than in banning NTM altogether. Several indicated that NTM data might be more acceptable if it could be verified or corroborated by IMS information. Others, who expressed opposition to NTM as a basis for an OSI request were more open to its use to supplement or reinforce IMS data in a request or evaluation. Pakistan accepted that NTM should be permissible for use by a challenged state party in responding to an OSI request against it.

According to Iran's draft text, an OSI should be based solely on IMS data, but supplementary information could be supplied to the Technical Secretariat. Australia's model treaty allowed an OSI request to be based on data from the IMS 'and/or by other elements of the treaty verification regime... [including] any relevant supplementary data or information.' To even things up, Australia also proposed associated measures promoting 'access by all states parties to other technical information and data relevant to the verification of the basic obligations of the treaty.' South Africa and France were among those attempting to bridge the gap on NTM. The French had proposed permitting both IMS and NTM data, but according them different weight in the decision-making process. South Africa built on this to provide the CTBTO with an 'objective' role in evaluating NTM. The US rejected these attempts at compromise, calling the issue a "treaty breaker". The Clinton administration was concerned to ensure the widest possible verification provision. Although this desire for robust verification was genuine, their related (and perhaps most pressing) anxiety concerned future ratification. It had been intimated in Washington that unless the Pentagon and intelligence agencies had clear permission to utilise NTM, they would refuse to certify the verifiability of the treaty when it came before the Senate for ratification.

Under considerable pressure, because of the fundamental importance of this issue to the United States, Ramaker's text permitted any relevant technical information, including NTM, providing it was obtained 'in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law', understood by the Russians to exclude espionage. However, in his August 14 report, Ramaker also emphasised that the sovereignty of states would be respected and that the text contained safeguards against abuse, according to which verification, including any OSI request, must be based on objective information relevant to the treaty's subject, namely to clarify whether a nuclear explosion had taken place.

Since IMS data will be provided under the auspices of the CTBTO, and would therefore be regarded by many states parties as more objective and accessible, it would be likely to be more immediately persuasive if a state party is making an OSI request to the Executive Council. This assessment provides China and others with some reassurance that the weight and incentive for using NTM-based information, except as a supplementary source of data, may be lessened. For the US, the clear permissibility of any relevant data was necessary to get past the military agencies and to maintain the credibility of the deterrent function of verification. In the end, the Chair's formulation on NTM was accepted by China, which then concentrated its energy on obtaining a more stringent decision-making process for inspections.

On-Site Inspections

Deciding on the provisions for inspecting the area of a suspected nuclear explosion was the last issue to be resolved. During the first two years, Friends of the Chair concentrated on technical questions and on identifying the characteristics of a clandestine nuclear explosion, so as to determine what technologies and time-lines would be needed for effective on-site inspections. Little was done to sound out the political positions until the final year of negotiations, not least because national security considerations make OSI such a politically sensitive question. Anxious to protect military and commercial secrets, governments want to prevent unnecessary intrusion. But a physical inspection may be the only way to resolve suspicions if an anomalous event is detected. In addition to the admissibility of NTM, which goes to the question of what evidence could be used to back up an OSI request, the major areas of contention concerned the decision-making procedure and rights or management of access.

The United States, backed by most Western delegations, wanted to ensure quick access and the prompt collection of time-critical evidence. They therefore advocated a relatively simple decision-making process. Ideally, the US preferred a 'red light' process, by which the Technical Secretariat could seek to clarify an anomalous event by sending in an inspection team, unless a majority of the Executive Council decided that an OSI should not take place. China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Israel and a number of G-21 countries were more concerned about abusive use of OSI procedures for political harassment or for spying on their military facilities. They wanted a much more stringent process, in which no inspection could go ahead without the specific authorisation of a two-thirds or three-quarters majority of the Executive Council, after it had considered the available evidence, as presented by a state party making a formal request for an inspection of another state party (the green-light process). The United States argued that this would result in politicking and delays, during which time vital evidence could be destroyed. Russia and Israel were especially concerned about protection of sensitive sites and managed access. With an eye on its military and intelligence agencies and future ratification hearings, the US delegation described OSI provisions as another 'treaty breaking' issue. Later China made a similar claim as it wrestled with the United States over decision-making procedures.

The Iranian and Australian model texts surprised many by coming to broadly similar conclusions about how this difficult question could be resolved, with a presumption of access and two phases for inspections. For the initial or 'short phase', Australia echoed the earlier French proposal according different decision-making procedures, depending on whether the OSI request was based on IMS data (a 'red light' go ahead unless a two thirds majority of the Executive Council votes against) or solely on NTM (requiring a 'green light' majority decision by two-thirds of the Executive Council). Iran, which proposed that an OSI request could only be based on IMS data, advocated a simple red-light procedure, requiring a majority of three-quarters of the Executive Council to prevent the initial phase of an OSI from going ahead. This early, time-critical phase would consist of visual inspection, overflights and more focused monitoring. If this failed to clarify the suspicions, a further, much more intrusive inspection would have to be considered. Both the Australian and Iranian drafts would apply the stringent 'green light' to the consecutive phase of OSI, requiring a two-thirds majority to decide to go ahead.

Ramaker attempted to find his own compromise between the polarised positions. The May 28th draft specified that before an inspection could proceed, a majority of the Executive Council must give their approval (green light, simple majority). Although the US delegation continued to argue that the provision was too stringent, they also let it be known that they could "live with it". China, however, made clear that this was unacceptable. Pointing to the distinction made elsewhere in the treaty between procedural matters (requiring a simple majority vote) and substantive matters, which could be decided only by a two-thirds majority, China's Ambassador Sha stated in June that "the launching of OSI can only be considered as a substantive issue in the EC." When Ramaker's June 28 text repeated this formula without alteration, Sha warned that, in light of its security interests, China would be putting forward amendments to the text. He was understood to be referring in particular to the OSI provision.

Despite US assertions that Ramaker's June 28 text must not be re-opened, the United States found itself having to negotiate with China over OSI. During the intensive P-5 negotiations over a package of agreements, Britain, France and Russia indicated in June their willingness to go along with a green light process requiring approval by three-fifths of the Council members, which China was also prepared to accept. The US refused to go above the simple majority in Ramaker's draft. However, after China rejected this provision in the June 28th draft, intensive bilateral US-Chinese discussions were required in the first weeks of August, during which Sha made it clear that without this concession China would be unable to sign the treaty. Subsequently, and under pressure from the other nuclear weapon states, the US finally accepted that authorising an OSI would require 'at least 30 affirmative votes' of the 51-member Executive Council. Since he had declared at the end of June that the negotiations were over and had resisted any re-opening of the text to address objections to the preamble and entry into force provisions, Ramaker attempted to pass the OSI amendment off as part of a list of 'procedural' modifications. In fact it was the only substantive amendment to the June 28 text. The treaty was subsequently finalised in the Chair's working paper WP.330/Rev.2.

The US was not the only delegation to be concerned that requiring a green light decision of the Council to permit an inspection could cause delays, enabling time-critical evidence to be dispersed or erased. Ramaker's text dealt with this by providing a practical but strict time-line for the various stages between an OSI request and arrival at the site to be inspected, so that the time taken must not exceed one week. Once an inspection is initiated, it can only be halted by a majority decision of the Council, or by recommendation of the inspection team (unless countermanded by the Council). However, if drilling is to be conducted, a further green light decision of the Council must be sought. Concerns about intrusion and effectiveness have been balanced with overflight provisions and managed access, although these did not cover all of the Russian and Israeli concerns. The envisaged time-frame for an inspection is 60 days, with the possibility of an extension of up to 70 days, subject to a majority decision of the Executive Council. Provisions covering the conduct of inspections were intended to diminish the opportunity for abuse while ensuring that the inspection team is not prevented from carrying out its mandate by undue delays and impediments thrown up by an inspected state. States are allowed to protect sensitive facilities and information unrelated to compliance with the treaty. The inspection should move from less intrusive to more intrusive procedures. Inspectors and access points have to be identified to the CTBTO within 30 days of the treaty's entry into force for a particular country (and updated as appropriate). Consideration has been given to inspections where the site under one state's jurisdiction or control is on the territory of another state (as with US bases in Europe or Japan). During an inspection, personnel are granted privileges and immunities consistent with diplomatic status, and up to three observers from the requesting part(ies) may accompany the team, subject to the inspected party's agreement of the personnel.

The draft treaty also includes penalties if the Executive Council deems a request to have been 'frivolous or abusive'. This may be financial (requiring the requesting state party to bear the costs incurred) or any of the measures in article V, which covers the redressing of a situation, compliance and sanctions. Accordingly, failure to comply with treaty obligations or abuse of the treaty's provisions can result in penalties ranging from suspension of membership rights, collective measures in conformity with international law, and the taking of cases of 'particular gravity' to the United Nations. The earlier specific mention of the UN General Assembly and Security Council have been left out, as several states had raised concerns about the potential for bias and possible use of veto because of the permanent representation of the declared nuclear weapon states in the UN Security Council.

CTBT: Article IV

Verification

A.GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements:
2. 1. An International Monitoring System;
   2. Consultation and clarification;
   3. On-site inspections; and
   4. Confidence-building measures.

2. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited to the subject matter of this Treaty, and shall be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification.
3. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Treaty to cooperate, through its National Authority established pursuant to Article III, paragraph 4, with the Organization and with other States Parties to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Treaty by, inter alia:
   1. Establishing the necessary facilities to participate in these verification measures and establishing the necessary communication;
   2. Providing data obtained from national stations that are part of the International Monitoring System;
   3. Participating, as appropriate, in a consultation and clarification process;
   4. Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections; and
   5. Participating, as appropriate, in confidence-building measures.
4. All States Parties, irrespective of their technical and financial capabilities, shall enjoy the equal right of verification and assume the equal obligation to accept verification.
5. For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States.
6. Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect sensitive installations, activities or locations not related to this Treaty, States Parties shall not interfere with elements of the verification regime of this Treaty or with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with paragraph 5.
7. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty.
8. Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities.
9. Subject to paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organization through the verification regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol.
10. The provisions of this Treaty shall not be interpreted as restricting the international exchange of data for scientific purposes.
11. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime, and in the examination of the verification potential of additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring, with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost-effective verification of this Treaty. Such measures shall, when agreed, be incorporated in existing provisions in this Treaty, the Protocol or as additional sections of the Protocol, in accordance with Article VII, or, if appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals in accordance with Article II, paragraph 44.
12. The States Parties undertake to promote cooperation among themselves to facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to technologies used in the verification of this Treaty in order to enable all States Parties to strengthen their national implementation of verification measures and to benefit from the application of such technologies for peaceful purposes.
13. The provisions of this Treaty shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties for further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

    Verification Responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat

14. In discharging its responsibilities in the area of verification specified in this Treaty and the Protocol, in cooperation with the States Parties the Technical Secretariat shall, for the purpose of this Treaty:
    1. Make arrangements to receive and distribute data and reporting products relevant to the verification of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, and to maintain a global communications infrastructure appropriate to this task;
    2. Routinely through its International Data Centre, which shall in principle be the focal point within the Technical Secretariat for data storage and data processing:
       1. Receive and initiate requests for data from the International Monitoring System;
       2. Receive data, as appropriate, resulting from the process of consultation and clarification, from on-site inspections, and from confidence-building measures; and
       3. Receive other relevant data from States Parties and international organizations in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol;
    3. Supervise, coordinate and ensure the operation of the International Monitoring System and its component elements, and of the International Data Centre, in accordance with the relevant operational manuals;
    4. Routinely process, analyse and report on International Monitoring System data according to agreed procedures so as to permit the effective international verification of this Treaty and to contribute to the early resolution of compliance concerns;
    5. Make available all data, both raw and processed, and any reporting products, to all States Parties, each State Party taking responsibility for the use of International Monitoring System data in accordance with Article II, paragraph 7, and with paragraphs 8 and 13 of this Article;
    6. Provide to all States Parties equal, open, convenient and timely access to all stored data;
    7. Store all data, both raw and processed, and reporting products;
    8. Coordinate and facilitate requests for additional data from the International Monitoring System;
    9. Coordinate requests for additional data from one State Party to another State Party;
    10. Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring facilities and respective communication means, where such assistance and support are required by the State concerned;
    11. Make available to any State Party, upon its request, techniques utilized by the Technical Secretariat and its International Data Centre in compiling, storing, processing, analysing and reporting on data from the verification regime; and
    12. Monitor, assess and report on the overall performance of the International Monitoring System and of the International Data Centre.
15. The agreed procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat in discharging the verification responsibilities referred to in paragraph 14 and detailed in the Protocol shall be elaborated in the relevant operational manuals.

B.THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM

16. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities for seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and respective means of communication, and shall be supported by the International Data Centre of the Technical Secretariat.
17. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them in accordance with the Protocol.
18. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre. Each State Party shall cooperate with the International Data Centre through its National Authority.

    Funding the International Monitoring System

19. For facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System and specified in Tables 1-A, 2-A, 3 and 4 of Annex 1 to the Protocol, and for their functioning, to the extent that such facilities are agreed by the relevant State and the Organization to provide data to the International Data Centre in accordance with the technical requirements of the Protocol and relevant operational manuals, the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs of:
    1. Establishing any new facilities and upgrading existing facilities, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself;
    2. Operating and maintaining International Monitoring System facilities, including facility physical security if appropriate, and application of agreed data authentication procedures;
    3. Transmitting International Monitoring System data (raw or processed) to the International Data Centre by the most direct and cost-effective means available, including, if necessary, via appropriate communications nodes, from monitoring stations, laboratories, analytical facilities or from national data centres; or such data (including samples where appropriate) to laboratory and analytical facilities from monitoring stations; and
    4. Analysing samples on behalf of the Organization.
20. For auxiliary network seismic stations specified in Table 1-B of Annex 1 to the Protocol the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part 1, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs only of:
    1. Transmitting data to the International Data centre;
    2. Authenticating data from such stations;
    3. Upgrading stations to the required technical standard, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself;
    4. If necessary, establishing new stations for the purposes of this Treaty where no appropriate facilities currently exist, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; and
    5. Any other costs related to the provision of data required by the Organization as specified in the relevant operational manuals.
21. The Organization shall also meet the cost of provision to each State Party of its requested selection from the standard range of International Data Centre reporting products and services, as specified in Part I, Section F of the Protocol. The cost of preparation and transmission of any additional data or products shall be met by the requesting State Party.
22. The agreements or, if appropriate, arrangements concluded with States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall contain provisions for meeting these costs. Such provisions may include modalities whereby a State Party meets any of the costs referred to in paragraphs 19 (a) and 20 (c) and (d) for facilities which it hosts or for which it is responsible, and is compensated by an appropriate reduction in its assessed financial contribution to the Organization. Such a reduction shall not exceed 50 per cent of the annual assessed financial contribution of a State Party, but may be spread over successive years. A State Party may share such a reduction with another State Party by agreement or arrangement between themselves and with the concurrence of the Executive Council. The agreements or arrangements referred to in this paragraph shall be approved in accordance with Article II, paragraphs 26 (h) and 38 (i).

    Changes to the International Monitoring System

23. Any measures referred to in paragraph 11 affecting the International Monitoring System by means of addition or deletion of a monitoring technology shall, when agreed, be incorporated into this Treaty and the Protocol pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 1 to 6.
24. The following changes to the International Monitoring System, subject to the agreement of those States directly affected, shall be regarded as matters of an administrative or technical nature pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 7 and 8:
    1. Changes to the number of facilities specified in the Protocol for a given monitoring technology; and
    2. Changes to other details for particular facilities as reflected in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol (including, inter alia, State responsible for the facility; location; name of facility; type of facility; and attribution of a facility between the primary and auxiliary seismic networks).

If the Executive Council recommends, pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (d), that such changes be adopted, it shall as a rule also recommend pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (g), that such changes enter into force upon notification by the Director-General of their approval.

25. The Director-General, in submitting to the Executive Council and States Parties information and evaluation in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 8 (b), shall include in the case of any proposal made pursuant to paragraph 24:
    1. A technical evaluation of the proposal;
    2. A statement on the administrative and financial impact of the proposal; and
    3. A report on consultations with States directly affected by the proposal, including indication of their agreement.

    Temporary Arrangements

26. In cases of significant or irretrievable breakdown of a monitoring facility specified in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol, or in order to cover other temporary reductions of monitoring coverage, the Director-General shall, in consultation and agreement with those States directly affected, and with the approval of the Executive Council, initiate temporary arrangements of no more than one year's duration, renewable if necessary by agreement of the Executive Council and of the States directly affected for another year. Such arrangements shall not cause the number of operational facilities of the International Monitoring System to exceed the number specified for the relevant network; shall meet as far as possible the technical and operational requirements specified in the operational manual for the relevant network; and shall be conducted within the budget of the Organization. The Director-General shall furthermore take steps to rectify the situation and make proposals for its permanent resolution. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties of any decision taken pursuant to this paragraph.

    Cooperating National Facilities

27. States Parties may also separately establish cooperative arrangements with the Organization, in order to make available to the International Data Centre supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of the International Monitoring System.
28. Such cooperative arrangements may be established as follows:
    1. Upon request by a State Party, and at the expense of that State, the Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to certify that a given monitoring facility meets the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals for an International Monitoring System facility, and make arrangements for the authentication of its data. Subject to the agreement of the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat shall then formally designate such a facility as a cooperating national facility. The Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to revalidate its certification as appropriate;
    2. The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a current list of cooperating national facilities and shall distribute it to all States Parties; and
    3. The International Data Centre shall call upon data from cooperating national facilities, if so requested by a State Party, for the purposes of facilitating consultation and clarification and the consideration of on-site inspection requests, data transmission costs being borne by that State Party.

C. CONSULTATION AND CLARIFICATION

29. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among themselves or with or through the Organization, any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty.
30. A State Party that receives a request pursuant to paragraph 29 directly from another State Party shall provide the clarification to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after the request. The requesting and requested States Parties may keep the Executive Council and the Director-General informed of the request and the response.
31. A State Party shall have the right to request the Director-General to assist in clarifying any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. The Director-General shall provide appropriate information in the possession of the Technical Secretariat relevant to such a concern. The Director-General shall inform the Executive Council of the request and of the information provided in response, if so requested by the requesting State Party.
32. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. In such a case, the following shall apply:
    1. The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the requested State Party through the Director-General no later than 24 hours after its receipt;
    2. The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after receipt of the request;
    3. The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party no later than 24 hours after its receipt;
    4. If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain further clarification from the requested State Party.

33. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under paragraph 32 (d) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. At such a meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure in accordance with Article V.

    D. ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

    Request for an On-Site Inspection

34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Part II of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State.
35. The sole purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator.
36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with paragraph 37. The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests.
37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.
38. The requesting State Party shall present the on-site inspection request to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for the latter to begin immediate processing.

    Follow-up After Submission of an On-Site Inspection Request

39. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immediately upon receipt of the on-site inspection request.
40. The Director-General, after receiving the on-site inspection request, shall acknowledge receipt of the request to the requesting State Party within two hours and communicate the request to the State Party sought to be inspected within six hours. The Director-General shall ascertain that the request meets the requirements specified in Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol, and, if necessary, shall assist the requesting State Party in filing the request accordingly, and shall communicate the request to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties within 24 hours.
41. When the on-site inspection request fulfils the requirements, the Technical Secretariat shall begin preparations for the on-site inspection without delay.
42. The Director-General, upon receipt of an on-site inspection request referring to an inspection area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, shall immediately seek clarification from the State Party sought to be inspected in order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request.
43. A State Party that receives a request for clarification pursuant to paragraph 42 shall provide the Director-General with explanations and with other relevant information available as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request for clarification.
44. The Director-General, before the Executive Council takes a decision on the on-site inspection request, shall transmit immediately to the Executive Council any additional information available from the International Monitoring System or provided by any State Party on the event specified in the request, including any clarification provided pursuant to paragraphs 42 and 43, as well as any other information from within the Technical Secretariat that the Director-General deems relevant or that is requested by the Executive Council.
45. Unless the requesting State Party considers the concern raised in the on-site inspection request to be resolved and withdraws the request, the Executive Council shall take a decision on the request in accordance with paragraph 46.

    Executive Council Decisions

46. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the on-site inspection request no later than 96 hours after receipt of the request from the requesting State Party. The decision to approve the on-site inspection shall be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Executive Council. If the Executive Council does not approve the inspection, preparations shall be stopped and no further action on the request shall be taken.
47. No later than 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 46, the inspection team shall transmit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a progress inspection report. The continuation of the inspection shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the progress inspection report, decides by a majority of all its members not to continue the inspection. If the Executive Council decides not to continue the inspection, the inspection shall be terminated, and the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.
48. In the course of the on-site inspection, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a proposal to conduct drilling. The Executive Council shall take a decision on such a proposal no later than 72 hours after receipt of the proposal. The decision to approve drilling shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council.
49. The inspection team may request the Executive Council, through the Director-General, to extend the inspection duration by a maximum of 70 days beyond the 60-day time-frame specified in Part II, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, if the inspection team considers such an extension essential to enable it to fulfil its mandate. The inspection team shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in Part II, paragraph 69 of the Protocol it intends to carry out during the extension period. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the extension request no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request. The decision to approve an extension of the inspection duration shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council.
50. Any time following the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 47, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a recommendation to terminate the inspection. Such a recommendation shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the recommendation, decides by a two-thirds majority of all its members not to approve the termination of the inspection. In case of termination of the inspection, the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.
51. The requesting State Party and the State Party sought to be inspected may participate in the deliberations of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request without voting. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party may also participate without voting in any subsequent deliberations of the Executive Council related to the inspection.
52. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties within 24 hours about any decision by and reports, proposals, requests and recommendations to the Executive Council pursuant to paragraphs 46 to 50.

    Follow-up After Executive Council Approval of an On-Site Inspection

53. An on-site inspection approved by the Executive Council shall be conducted without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry no later than six days following the receipt by the Executive Council of the on-site inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry no later than six days following the receipt by the Executive Council of the on-site inspection request from the requesting State Party.
54. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the on-site inspection. The inspection mandate shall contain the information specified in Part II, paragraph 42 of the Protocol.
55. The Director-General shall notify the inspected State Party of the inspection no less than 24 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 43 of the Protocol

    The Conduct of an On-Site Inspection

56. Each State Party shall permit the Organization to conduct an on-site inspection on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. However, no State Party shall have to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control.
57. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol, the inspected State Party shall have:
    1. The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Treaty and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate;
    2. The right to take measures it deems necessary to protect national security interests and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection;
    3. The obligation to provide access within the inspection area for the sole purpose of determining facts relevant to the purpose of the inspection, taking into account sub-paragraph (b) and any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures;
    4. The obligation not to invoke this paragraph or Part II, paragraph 88 of the Protocol to conceal any violation of its obligations under Article I; and
    5. The obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to move within the inspection area and to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol.

58. The on-site inspection shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the efficient and timely accomplishment of the inspection mandate, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol. Wherever possible, the inspection team shall begin with the least intrusive procedures and then proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary to collect sufficient information to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with this Treaty. The inspectors shall seek only the information and data necessary for the purpose of the inspection and shall seek to minimize interference with normal operations of the inspected State Party.
59. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the on-site inspection and facilitate its task.
60. If the inspected State Party, acting in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 86 to 96 of the Protocol, restricts access within the inspection area, it shall make every reasonable effort in consultations with the inspection team to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Treaty.

    Observer

61. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:
    1. The requesting State Party, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, may send a representative, who shall be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the on-site inspection;
    2. The inspected State Party shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance of the proposed observer to the Director General within 12 hours after approval of the on-site inspection by the Executive Council;
    3. In case of acceptance, the inspected State Party shall grant access to the observer in accordance with the Protocol;
    4. The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the inspection report.

Reports of an On-Site Inspection

62. Inspection reports shall contain:
    1. A description of the activities conducted by the inspection team;
    2. The factual findings of the inspection team relevant to the purpose of the inspection;
    3. An account of the cooperation granted during the on-site inspection;
    4. A factual description of the extent of the access granted, including the alternative means provided to the team, during the on-site inspection; and
    5. Any other details relevant to the purpose of the inspection.

63. The Director-General shall make draft inspection reports available to the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide the Director-General within 48 hours with its comments and explanations, and to identify any information and data which, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection and should not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat. The Director-General shall consider the proposals for changes to the draft inspection report made by the inspected State Party and shall wherever possible incorporate them. The Director-General shall also annex the comments and explanations provided by the inspected State Party to the inspection report.
64. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the inspection report to the requesting State Party, the inspected State Party, the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties any results of sample analysis in designated laboratories in accordance with Part II, paragraph 104 of the Protocol, relevant data from the International Monitoring System, the assessments of the requesting and inspected States Parties, as well as any other information that the Director-General deems relevant. In the case of the progress inspection report referred to in paragraph 47, the Director-General shall transmit the report to the Executive Council within the time-frame specified in that paragraph.
65. The Executive Council, in accordance with its powers and functions, shall review the inspection report and any material provided pursuant to paragraph 64, and shall address any concerns as to:
    1. Whether any non-compliance with this Treaty has occurred; and
    2. Whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused
66. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 65, it shall take the appropriate measures in accordance with Article V.

    Frivolous or Abusive On-Site Inspection Requests

67. If the Executive Council does not approve the on-site inspection on the basis that the on-site inspection request is frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is terminated for the same reasons, the Executive Council shall consider and decide on whether to implement appropriate measures to redress the situation, including the following:
    1. Requiring the requesting State Party to pay for the cost of any preparations made by the Technical Secretariat;
    2. Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to request an on-site inspection for a period of time, as determined by the Executive Council; and
    3. Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the Executive Council for a period of time.

E. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

68. In order to:
    1. Contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of verification data relating to chemical explosions; and
    2. Assist in the calibration of the stations that are part of the component networks of the International Monitoring System,

Redress and Disputes

Articles V and VI are fairly standard and need no comment or explanation.

CTBT: Article V

Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure compliance, including sanctions

1. The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the recommendations of the Executive Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3, to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Treaty.
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the exercise of its rights and privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise.
3. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with international law.
4. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations.

CTBT: Article VI

Settlement of Disputes

1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Treaty shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Party and the Organization, relating to the application or interpretation of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this treaty and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The parties involved shall keep the executive Council informed of actions being taken.
3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Treaty by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to seek a settlement through a process of their own choice, bringing the matter to the attention of the Conference and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article II, paragraph 26 (j).
5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered, subject to authorisation from the general Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article II, paragraph 38 (h).
6. This Article is without prejudice to Articles IV and V.

Amendments

Substantive amendments to the treaty (including an amendment to permit PNEs, if referred by a Review Conference) would require consensus among all States Parties attending an Amendment Conference. There is a simplified procedure for administrative or technical amendments and a fast-track means for adding or removing stations from the IMS, or otherwise updating verification provisions.

CTBT: Article VII

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 to 6. Proposals for changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 8.
2. The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by an Amendment Conference.
3. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the views of the States Parties on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Director-General no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Director-General shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
4. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless all States Parties that support the convening of an Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.
5. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.
6. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
7. In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Parts I and III of the Protocol and Annexes 1 and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All other provisions of the Protocol and the Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures:
   1. The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depository;
   2. No later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;
   3. The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7. No later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;
   4. If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;
   5. If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session;
   6. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph;
   7. )Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.

Review of the Treaty

Normally a rather standard article, the review of the CTBT was turned into a contentious provision on three counts: the early proposal by the United States for an easy procedure for withdrawal from the treaty at the first review conference, dubbed the 'ten year opt-out' or 'easy exit' proposal; whether or not the preamble should be explicitly referred to; and explicit mention of reviewing a request to conduct nuclear explosions for 'peaceful' purposes.

Faced with heavy criticism for undermining the durability of the CTBT with its ten year opt-out proposal, the Clinton administration dropped it in January 1995. Appointed by the Chair as 'moderator' for the final stage of discussions on the Review, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt managed to get Western acceptance for a non-aligned proposal for the envisaged ten year conference to review 'the objectives and purposes in the Preamble' as well as the treaty provisions. This was the only one of India's January 1996 proposals to be met.

The Review Conference was also charged with taking into account any new and relevant scientific developments and reviewing the possibility of conducting PNEs in response to a specific request. However, although a State Party can request that PNEs be addressed, this is not automatically on the agenda, as China had originally wanted. Even if the Review Conference decides by consensus that PNEs (or a particular PNE) could be permitted, the question has to go to an Amendment Conference, where the States Parties would have to adopt an amendment allowing PNEs, also by consensus.

CTBT: Article VIII

Review of the Treaty

1. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a Conference of States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article VII.
2. At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Conferences may be convened with the same objective, if the Conference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year. Such Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of substance.
3. annual session of the Conference provided for in Article II.

Duration and Withdrawal

Many states feared that the early US proposal for a ten year opt-out possibility at the first Review Conference would have severely undermined the credibility and durability of the CTBT. With that gone, the way was clear for the CTBT to be of unlimited duration. The rest of the provision was in standard language, with provision for withdrawal only if a state decides that 'extraordinary events' related to the treaty's subject, 'have jeopardised its supreme interests'.

Pakistan had long maintained that a nuclear test conducted by another country, whether party to the treaty or not, could be sufficient reason for withdrawal. France's original position had been that one of the events which might jeopardise supreme national interests would be a fundamental change in the international circumstances which were the basis for the conclusion of the CTBT. These interpretations were rejected by the majority, on grounds that they could jeopardise the treaty regime too lightly. However, in 1995 and 1996, first France, then the United States, Britain and Russia linked their supreme interests with security interests (France) and with the right, as expressed by the United States, "to conduct necessary testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified". Britain and Russia also adopted similar understandings when they endorsed the true zero yield scope concept. These four nuclear powers clearly intend that their interpretations of supreme interest be part of the negotiating record, able to be invoked if a future government deems it necessary. While expressing considerable concern that the four-power 'understandings' could undermine the long term credibility of the treaty, the general view in Geneva was that such an interpretation of supreme interests acts as an insurance net (and appeases military factions or reassures hawks during ratification debates). In practice it would be difficult to withdraw on that basis after the treaty had entered into force, for fear of unravelling not only the CTBT, but the wider credibility of international non-proliferation and arms control treaties.

CTBT: Article IX

Duration and Withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.

Annexes and The Protocol

The treaty has two annexes, a Protocol on verification, and two annexes to the Protocol. Annex 1 of the head treaty lists the states allocated to each of the six regions for the purposes of electing the members of the Executive Council; Annex 2 lists the 44 states defined in article XIV of the treaty, for the purposes of entry into force. The Protocol has three parts and provides details of conduct, requirements, rights and responsibilities for establishing the verification regime. Part I covers the IMS and IDC functions, Part II deals with on-site inspections, and Part III covers confidence building measures. Due to constraints of space, only annex 2 is here reproduced, because of its importance to the entry-into-force provision.

Annex 1 to the Protocol lists by country and location coordinates all the stations designated for the IMS: Table 1-A lists the primary seismic network of 50 stations; Table 1-B lists the auxiliary seismic network of 120 stations; Table 2-A lists the 80 radionuclide stations, but does not identify the 40 which will monitor for noble gases as well as measure radioactive particles; Table 2-B lists 16 radionuclide laboratories for analysing the products of the radionuclide stations; Table 3 lists 11 hydroacoustic stations; and Table 4 lists 60 infrasound stations.

India had originally offered a primary seismic array at Gauribidanur, a 3-c auxiliary station at New Delhi, a radionuclide monitoring station at Allahabad, a radionuclide laboratory at Mumbai (Bombay), and an infrasound station at Gauribidanur. Although India announced its withdrawal of its facilities from the IMS in June 1996, the designated IMS stations have not been reassigned, with the exception of the radionuclide laboratory, which has been allocated to another country. The other four stations appear in the Annexes to the Protocol as 'to be determined', in the hope that India will join the treaty in the future.

Annex 2 to the Protocol lists the characterisation parameters for the IDC standard event screening.

CTBT: Article X

Status of the Protocol and the Annexes

The Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol form an integral part of the Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexes to the Protocol.

CTBT: Article XI

Signature

This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature before its entry into force.

CTBT: Article XII

Ratification

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective constitutional processes.

CTBT: Article XIII

Accession

Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

Entry into Force

During 1994-5, little attention was paid to the provisions for the treaty to enter into force. Most diplomats regarded this as an endgame issue. They were right. Most also assumed the entry into force provisions would fall in place once the treaty was substantially agreed. They could not have been more wrong.

During the first two years, various proposals on entry into force were put forward, which clustered into the following categories:

• a list of specific states, such as the IAEA identification of 68 countries which have or have had nuclear research or power reactors (backed by Russia and China) or the 61 countries in the expanded CD (France and Britain);
• a simple number, as in the CWC entry-into-force provision of 65 states (favoured by many negotiators, including India and Australia);
• a list plus a waiver mechanism, such as a percentage of a list or a conference which could be convened to waive certain conditions if the treaty had not entered into force by a certain date.

Some delegations preferred a flexible combination of the above. For example, the United States favoured a simple number of 40 plus all five declared nuclear weapon states. However, the US also considered some possibilities of a waiver combined with an inclusive list, such as the IAEA or expanded CD proposals from Russia, China, Britain and France. The political challenge on entry into force was to balance universality (or at least accession by the relevant states) with early implementation. In particular, Russia, Britain, China, Pakistan and Egypt made clear their requirement that all nuclear test capable states (assumed to be the P-5, India, Israel and Pakistan) should accede to the treaty before it enters into full legal force. Although the camouflage was pretty thin, the list proposals were ways of binding the 'five plus three' nuclear test capable states without specifically singling them out.

The Australian model text proposed combining the list of CD members plus observers (some 75 states) with a waiver conference two years after signature, at which the states which have ratified could decide whether to permit the treaty to enter into force for them. Iran suggested basing entry into force on the IAEA list of 68 states, but specified that the treaty can enter into force if 65 out of the 68 join. Some delegates immediately pointed out that the remaining three could well be nuclear weapon or threshold states. Austria had made a proposal on provisional application in June 1995, which Ambassador Harald Kreid put forward again at the end of March. This would allow a simple majority of states parties to apply the treaty provisionally, allowing them to decide among themselves about verification and financial arrangements in the event of incomplete accession. Although any state could join thereafter, the position of those states which ratify but vote against provisional application seemed unclear.

Seeking to cut through the euphemistic role of the IAEA or CD lists, the UK floated a proposal aimed at only the eight nuclear capable states, according to which the essential requirement for entry into force was accession by states on the IAEA list 'not under a legally binding treaty obligation not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons'. This formula covers all countries with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, namely the P-5 and India, Israel and Pakistan, which are neither parties to the NPT nor to a regional nuclear weapon free zone treaty, as Brazil and Cuba are. Though this language was never formally proposed by the UK, it was adopted into the rolling text by Pakistan. India, China and Israel objected on grounds that such a provision singled them out, while South Africa disliked the way in which it appeared to offer special status to the threshold states.

At the end of May, the UK delegation came up with another suggestion, listing 37 countries which provided either primary seismic stations or radionuclide laboratories to the IMS. With negotiations deadlocked in the NTB Committee, Ramaker included the British formula in his May 28 draft treaty text. It appears that he intended it to be just a 'holding article' and hoped that it would galvanise the delegates into fresh endeavours to find a good compromise. Instead, it seemed to harden the positions even further. Russia, China, Britain and Pakistan pledged their support to this article, if not Ramaker''s whole text. India denounced the coercion implied in the provision and withdrew all its facilities from the IMS.

On June 20, Ghose underlined that India "would not accept any language in the treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to decide, in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede to such a treaty". That same day, Ramaker tabled a Chair's working paper on entry into force which aimed to meet the demands of the hard-liners, such as Britain, Russia and China, while providing a delayed mechanism with more flexible conditions if the treaty had not taken effect within reasonable time. The proposal was essentially a series of staggered provisions. The first and main condition was accession by all states with a primary seismic station or radionuclide laboratory, as in article XIV in the May 28 draft. If this stringent requirement were not met within five years, then states which had ratified would have a second chance to bring the treaty into effect by a combination of a simple number, waiver conference and 'deferment' option. If at least 75 states had signed and ratified, then the treaty would enter into force automatically five years plus 180 days from the date of its opening for signature, unless one or more of them requested a special conference to be convened. If a conference were requested, then this would be open to all states which had fully ratified, who would have the power to agree to implement the treaty by a two-thirds majority. In recognition of the particular concerns put forward by Pakistan and Egypt, WP.334 proposed that any state which had ratified but did not support the decision to implement the treaty could, at the time of the conference, defer its own accession to the treaty until all the original conditions had been met or it revoked its decision to defer.

By this time, France, the United States and the majority of other delegations wanted a more flexible provision that would not allow India or any other listed country to take the treaty hostage and delay implementation indefinitely. However, WP.334 had three big problems: it was too late; too complicated; and repeated the discredited IMS-based list. Despite its complexity, the formula was ingenious and potentially quite workable. It could possibly have won through if it had used the IAEA list or newly-expanded CD as its base-line and if Ramaker had been able to put it in as the 'holding article' in the May 28 draft instead of the unequivocal IMS-based list proposed by Britain. As it was, Russia and Britain rejected it out of hand, even though five years was a reasonable period of time for them to demonstrate the effectiveness of their list proposal.

With time running out, many states returned to the view that listing the members of the newly expanded CD, combined with a waiver provision, could facilitate wide adherence and early implementation and also exert pressure on the nuclear test capable states. But the US regarded 60 as too large a number and Russia, China and the UK continued to oppose any kind of waiver. Ramaker resurrected an idea originally floated some months previously by Canada for a 'political conference'. The NTB Committee made one last attempt to find a compromise, meeting until midnight. The acrimonious discussion that ensued was characterised by intemperate exchanges between Britain and India. At one point, Britain's ambassador reportedly caused great consternation by arguing that the point of a strict entry into force provision was that the CTBT only concerned the eight, the others being there merely to share the financial burden of its verification. Japan then warned that it would not pay to maintain the Preparatory Commission if implementation of the treaty were unreasonably delayed. In such a polarised atmosphere, Ramaker gave in to the demands of the three nuclear powers. In his June 28 final treaty text, Ramaker replaced the discredited IMS-based list in article XIV with a version of the IAEA list, from which India could not simply withdraw. He combined this with the Austrian/Canadian ideas on a political conference and provisional application.

Article XIV of the revised Chair's text set a primary condition of ratification by a list of 44 states which were participating members of the CD on June 18 (after expansion) and appeared in the 1995 and 1996 IAEA lists of countries with nuclear research or nuclear power reactors respectively. If the condition is not met within three years, then states which have already ratified can convene a conference to decide on measures to 'accelerate the ratification process' and facilitate early entry into force. The list was intentionally convened to prevent ambiguity by clearly omitting Yugoslavia (formally a CD member but barred from participation) and Iraq. Following concerns raised by India and others that the term 'measures' might imply sanctions and that the provision as a whole was a threat to its sovereignty, Ramaker clarified that "the current article on entry into force did not impinge on the sovereign right of any state to take its own decision about whether or not to sign and ratify the treaty." The NTB Committee report also states that article XIV did not impose any legally binding obligations on a state not party to the treaty, regardless of whether or not ratification by that state was a condition of entry into force. Addressing India's concerns about sanctions, Ramaker emphasised that paragraph 2 relating to the conference "did not refer to United Nations Security Council measures in accordance with chapter VII of the United Nations Charter."

Since proponents of this article XIV have made clear that the conference is not a waiver conference, its powers appear to be limited, leading several delegates to dismiss it as a 'handwringing conference'. A waiver conference would have had the power to waive the original conditions so that the treaty can enter into force for those countries which have ratified by an agreed date. The political conference in article XIV may only have the power to decide provisional application, which would enable the CTBTO and IMS to be set up and paid for by mutual consent, but which may lack the authority for carrying out on-site inspections in the event of any suspicious circumstance. A further ambiguity in the text caused a flurry of disagreement in early 1997 over whether paragraph 2, referring to three years 'after the date of the anniversary' of the treaty's opening for signature meant three years, as intended by Ramaker and Canada, who originated the idea, or four, which British lawyers contended was contained in the actual words. Leaning heavily on the framers' intentions and the understandings when the treaty was adopted, the matter seems to have been resolved in favour of three years.

Although this provision provided India with the cause (or excuse) for vetoing the CTBT, New Delhi were not the only ones to complain that the EIF provision created an unacceptable pressure. On August 15, India's near neighbour Bangladesh, which is also one of the listed 44 states, told the CD that as one of the poorest nations in the world, its decision on ratification would have to be based on "budgetary arithmetic". He added that Bangladesh was already an NPT party and had no ambitions for nuclear weapons. Bangladesh subsequently signed the CTBT. By March 7, only three of the 44 listed states have not signed: India, Pakistan and North Korea.

CTBT: Article XIV

Entry Into Force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification upon the request of a majority of those States. That Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.
3. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force.
4. All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 and any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as observers.
5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

CTBT: Annex 2 to the Treaty

List of States Pursuant to Article XIV

List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors in the World", and of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's December 1995 edition of "Nuclear Research Reactors in the World":

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.

CTBT: Article XV

Reservations

The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. The provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the Protocol shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

CTBT: Article XVI

Depositary

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession.
2. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States signatories and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices.
3. The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States.
4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

CTBT: Article XVII

Authentic Texts

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Road to Vienna

After a disastrous first meeting of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in New York, November 20-22, representatives of over 100 states signatories met again in Geneva, March 3-7. This time the meeting, chaired by Ambassador Jacob Selebi of South Africa, concluded successfully. It established the CTBTO in Vienna, agreed a nine month budget and appointed Wolfgang Hoffmann to head the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) as its first Executive Secretary.

The decisions followed weeks of intensive behind-the-scenes consultations to resolve the problems over structure, staffing and budget that had prevented agreement in November. In New York the decisions on how the CTBTO should be structured became tangled with different states' bids for their personnel to be appointed to key positions in the new hierarchy. Some countries, including Iran and France, retained serious reservations about the way in which the CTBTO was to be constituted, but in the end Selebi managed to forge agreement, enabling work to begin.

The PTS will consist of five divisions, whose directors were also appointed, as follows:

Administration: William B Davitte (USA),

Legal and External Relations: Masabumi Sato (Japan),

On-site Inspections: Vladimir Kryuchenkov (Russian Federation),

Verification - International Monitoring System: Gerardo Suarez (Mexico),

Verification - International Data Centre: Rashad M Kebeasy (Egypt).

The Administration Division will cover general services, finance, personnel, conference services and procurement. In addition to legal services and external relations, the Legal and External Relations Division will cover public information and international cooperation. The OSI Division will have to be responsible for developing the procedures and equipment for geophysical and radionuclide inspections, drilling, transport, overflights and training. The IDC Division will cover monitoring, scientific methods and data fusion, communications and infrastructure, and training in IDC-related technology and interpretation. The IMS Division will also cover training and the setting up of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and infrasound monitoring stations as specified in the treaty. In addition to the office of the Executive Secretary, monitoring of progress towards establishing the CTBTO will be overseen by teams responsible for internal auditing and evaluation of the verification regime.

Two working groups were also convened, comprising representatives from countries which have signed the treaty:

Working Group A on Budgetary and Administrative Matters, chaired by Tibor Toth of Hungary;

Working Group B on Verification, chaired by Ola Dahlman of Sweden.

Dr Dahlman was formerly the Chair of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) which studied seismic verification under the auspices of the CD's NTB Committee for nearly two decades, culminating in the third technical test of a provisional worldwide seismic network, known as GSETT-3. According to preliminary assessments, the IMS primary seismic network, some of which is based on GSETT-3, is 64 percent complete, with the auxiliary seismic network covering 32 percent of the stations identified in the CTBT verification protocol. However, there is still a long way to go on the other three technologies which comprise the IMS: the hydroacoustic network is estimated to be 27 percent in place; the radionuclide network about 15 percent complete; but only 2 percent of the proposed infrasound network is set up.

Fourteen countries earmarked to host stations in the IMS have not yet signed the treaty. In June 1996, at the height of the battle over the CTBT's entry into force, India withdrew its four facilities, which appeared as 'to be determined' in the adopted treaty text. It is understood that little discussion has taken place regarding the implications of this and other gaps in the IMS due to any country's failure to sign.

It will be the task of Working Group B during 1997 to develop technical specifications, requirements, policies, guidelines, procedures and documentation (including manuals and training) relating to inspections, as well as the IMS, IDC and communications. Working Group A intends to prioritise the development of staffing and financial regulations, rules of procedure for the CTBTO and the 1998 draft budget. Smaller expert groups may also be convened to work out details on particular issues.

After much debate, a budget of $28 million was agreed for the first nine months, to cover the initial setting up costs for the IMS and the IDC. Some of the scientists most closely involved with the verification regime expressed concern that cuts in investment earmarked for the seismic network could have an adverse effect on the ability of the verification regime to be fully operational by September 1998, as planned. In March there were still some echoes of the sentiment - strongly marked in November - that queried the urgency of setting up the verification regime, reflecting doubt that the entry into force conditions would be met any time soon.

© 1997 The Acronym Institute.