ACRONYM Reports
ACRONYM Report No.11, April 1998
Appendix III : Decisions Adopted in 1995
Decision 1 : Strengthening the Review Process for the
Treaty
- The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of
article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen
the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to
assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of
the Treaty are being realized.
- The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference
decided, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review
Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that,
accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year
2000.
- The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory
Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days,
a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review
Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held
in the year of the Conference.
- The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to
consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the
full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and
to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These
include those identified in the Decision on principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted
on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural
preparations for the next Review Conference.
- The Conference also concluded that the present structure of
three main Committees should continue and the question of an
overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should
be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the
work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for
the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue
is undertaken in only one Committee.
- It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established
within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant
to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such
issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be
recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference
in relation to the specific objectives of the Review
Conference.
- The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should
look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of
the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of
undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify
the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress
should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also
address specifically what might be done to strengthen the
implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.
Decision 2 : Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
"The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of
international tension and the strengthening of trust between
States,
Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance
with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and
shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process
provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the
enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,
Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control,
The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with
determination towards the full realization and effective
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly
adopts the following principles and objectives:
Universality
- Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to
the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest
date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to
achieve this objective.
Non-proliferation
- The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase
the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to
implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive
devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by
States parties to the Treaty.
Nuclear disarmament
- Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing
of international tension and the strengthening of trust between
States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The
undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be
fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon
States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to
pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to
nuclear disarmament.
- The achievement of the following measures is important in the
full realization and effective implementation of article VI,
including the programme of action as reflected below:
(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the
negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively
verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than
1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban
Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost
restraint;
(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of
negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable
convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the
statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on
Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;
(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of
systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons
globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and
by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones
- The conviction that the establishment of internationally
recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements
freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,
enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.
- The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in
regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the
establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction,
should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account
the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of
additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review
Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.
- The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their
respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the
maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the
relevant protocols.
Security Assurances
- Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995),
which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the
declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative
and positive security assurances, further steps should be
considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps
could take the form of an internationally legally binding
instrument.
Safeguards
- The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent
authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the
statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguard system, compliance
with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in
fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of
the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties
that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards
agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such
concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the
Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on
necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.
- All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to
sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and
which have not yet done so should do so without delay.
- International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be
regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of
Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of
Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the
Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should
be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into
comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.
- New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special
fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require,
as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope
safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to
peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be
placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary
safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States.
Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the
exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.
- Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
should be fully implemented.
- In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the
non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of
developing countries particularly into account.
- Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be
promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all
interested States party to the Treaty.
- All States should, through rigorous national measures and
international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels
of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe
standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical
protection and transport of nuclear materials.
- Every effort should be made to ensure that the International
Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources
necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of
technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency
should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding
ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable
and assured resources.
- Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to
peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious
concerns regarding the application of international law on the use
of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.
The Conference requests that the President of the
Conference bring the present decision, the decision on
strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on
the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of
all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and
in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.
Decision 3 : Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995,
in accordance with articles VIII, paragraph 3, and X, paragraph 2,
of the Treaty, on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming
that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its
extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to
international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate
goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
Having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the
Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a
strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the decision on
strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament, also adopted by the Conference,
Having established that the Conference is quorate in
accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,
Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to
the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article
X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force
indefinitely.
Resolution on the Middle East
(Proposed by the Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.)
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty,
the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to
strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,
Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of
31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all
other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to
international peace and security,
Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by
consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71
adopted of 15 December 1994,
Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency
concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East,
the latest of which is GC (XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994,
and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas
of tension,
Bearing in mind Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)
and particularly paragraph 14 thereof,
Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and
paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference
on 11 May 1995,
Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the
Conference on 11 May 1995,
- Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East
peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well
as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone
free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass
destruction;
- Notes with satisfaction that, in its report (NPT/ CONF.
1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the conference recommended
that the Conference "call on those remaining States not Parties to
the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international
legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities";
- Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle
East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this
connection the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3,
of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
- Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of
universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the
Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede
to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear
facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards;
- Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take
practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress
towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable
Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear,
chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain
from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this
objective;
- Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the
nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert
their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early
establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of
nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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