ACRONYM Reports

Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparing for the Future

Some Questions and Proposals for Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime

Ensuring accountability and progress in implementing Article VI

Concern that the nuclear-weapon States had not made sufficient progress on nuclear disarmament was the driving factor behind the 1995 agreements to strengthen the review process of the NPT. The deal was struck in order to get the backing of key non-aligned States for the Treaty's indefinite extension and prevent a divisive vote. Among those who favoured a limited extension option, the principal argument was to retain some form of leverage on the NWS for full implementation of Article VI. Although the NWS and some of their allies insisted that the three elements of the NPT-nuclear disarmament, safeguards and "peaceful uses" of nuclear energy-be considered equally, it was clear that the negotiations on the package of decisions linking the treaty's extension with strengthened review and accountability were directly the result of concerns about nuclear disarmament. For many NPT States, therefore, the enhanced review process will stand or fall according to how effectively it is able to address the demands and political complexities of achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Before the next PrepCom takes place in Geneva in April 1998, the States parties need to consider what relationship between procedure and substance would deliver the most constructive outcome. In particular, some fundamental questions need to be addressed:

• What should the review process aim to achieve?
• What level of recommendation should be established under the enhanced review process?
• What should be the role of the Principles and Objectives in the future?
• How can the review process be used to set an agenda and create pressure for nuclear disarmament?

What should the review process aim to achieve?

In reviewing the treaty, if States parties identify areas of inadequacy, what should their powers of amelioration or leverage be to strengthen the treaty's provisions?

Recommendations that led to the IAEA's '93 + 2' Programme provide a positive example and precedent, which was able to be successfully launched because the need for wider safeguarding and inspection powers was endorsed by the NWS as well as the vast majority of NNWS party to the treaty. Regrettably, it is apparent that some of the NWS are reluctant to accept multilateral involvement in nuclear disarmament issues except in the case of specific treaties, such as the CTBT and fissban, as listed in the programme of action on nuclear disarmament in the 1995 P&O. Multilateral treaties are only one component of what needs to be done to reduce nuclear dangers and marginalise nuclear weapons in the military doctrines of the NWS and their allies. It is generally accepted that more needs to be done by the nuclear powers to bring down the size of their nuclear arsenals and reduce reliance on potential nuclear use in their military doctrines, but the international community also has a role to play in encouraging and facilitating further progress, in keeping with their obligations under Article VI.

The principal goal of the PrepComs leading towards the 2000 Review Conference should be to develop the most appropriate mechanisms for identifying and advising on areas for future work and instituting and evaluating progress reports to facilitate accountability.

What level of recommendation should be established?

A corollary of this question is what would be feasible and practical. One set of options includes procedures for allocating time or setting up subsidiary bodies to address particular issues at future meetings or intersessionally. Additionally, NPT Parties could develop mechanisms to enable them to recommend specific action to be undertaken by the IAEA, as the verification agency, or by States parties, especially the NWS.

Representatives of some of the NWS have sought to restrict consideration of these options by claiming that the review process is not empowered to set up subsidiary bodies or make recommendations for action to be undertaken except by the review conferences. This is nonsense. The language of the 1995 package of decisions is sufficiently vague (or broad) to support several different interpretations. Furthermore, most international lawyers would agree that, consistent with the terms of the treaty, States parties can empower the review process to do whatever they collectively agree it should do, including establishing negotiating mechanisms or further monitoring bodies, if they so desire.

What should be the role of the P&O?

Should the Principles and Objectives that were agreed in 1995 be abandoned, consolidated or updated by amendment; or would it be better to develop a new set of P&O at each review conference? In 1997, there was no clear agreement on how to use the P&O. Several general statements and proposals focused on aspects of the P&O, and the PrepCom Chair ensured that the P&O themes were incorporated into the cluster debates.

Measuring progress against the P&O 'yardstick', however, was only relevant to the recently concluded CTBT, and although some proposals for updating certain paragraphs were received, there was little discussion of how they could be incorporated. Before the second and third PrepComs set too firm a seal on the process, decisions will have to be taken about whether to task the NPT Review Conference in 2000 with evolving a new set of P&O. This question will entail some hard thinking about the process for deciding on and adopting updated P&O and the relationship between the P&O and the traditional final declaration which the review conferences attempt to adopt by consensus (most recently without success).

The P&O emerged from a very particular set of circumstances in 1995. Choices must now be made whether to establish the P&O as an enduring component of the enhanced review process. Such questions will have to be addressed soon, as States parties will need to develop strategies for having their proposals agreed to. It will also be necessary to distinguish between proposals intended to form the basis of an updated set of P&O, recommendations for 2000 or a rolling text for a final declaration.

Using the review process to facilitate progress on nuclear disarmament

In the first PrepCom, issues of substance and national positions were raised in the general debate and discussed in more detail in debates on the three "clusters", based on the main committees established by the review conferences: 1) nuclear disarmament, 2) safeguards, and 3) nuclear energy. Clustering the issues in this way provided continuity with the review conference structure and a way of dividing the issues, which was intended to give coherence to the discussions. Though they were held in closed session, meant to encourage free and open argument, the cluster debates tended to be ritualistic, with little real analysis of possible options and action.

It is unlikely as things stand that the present structure of cluster debates could offer an effective mechanism for negotiating on recommendations for action. Mexico, in holding up agreement on the Chair's report at the end of the 1997 PrepCom, expressed a widely held view among NNWS that nuclear disarmament was not adequately addressed in the context of the cluster debate. Although Mexico's tactic may have been inappropriate at the time, many would agree that more needed to be done under the auspices of the NPT review process to maintain pressure on the NWS for the full implementation of their obligations under the treaty. The response to Mexico's attempt to recommend that nuclear disarmament should be allocated special time was that 'nuclear disarmament' already had a whole cluster debate. This is true, but debating the generalities of all aspects of a subject can be no substitute for developing a mechanism for promoting its speedier achievement. The key is to find a specific and concrete way that the NPT Parties can legitimately exercise leverage on nuclear disarmament issues.

Article VI is not only directed at the NWS, but holds all NPT States parties accountable for its implementation. It is therefore appropriate for NPT parties to consider ways in which they can influence and accelerate progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Their involvement should not interfere with, nor be regarded as a threat or attempt to supplant, the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. Further reductions from the two largest NWS, including ratification and implementation of START II, need to be encouraged, but do not go far enough.

General Lee Butler, who formerly commanded the US strategic nuclear forces in the early 1990s, argues that the START III targets set at the Helsinki Summit, of bringing deployed strategic warheads down to around 2,000 to 2,500 by the year 2007, are woefully inadequate. The Canberra Commission, the Stimson Center, the US National Academy of Sciences and other recent studies have identified areas relating to nuclear-use doctrines and deployment postures that should be worked on in parallel with bilateral nuclear reductions.

These 'qualitative' rather than 'quantitative' nuclear disarmament agreements could include:

• taking nuclear weapons off alert;
• transparency measures leading to the setting up of a register of nuclear weapons and military fissile material holdings
• commitments not to modernise or increase nuclear arsenals;
• no stationing of land-based nuclear weapons outside the territory of NWS;
• multilateralising the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty;
• no first use.

Measures such as these should involve all of the NWS and may be accomplished by reciprocally agreed 'unilateral' actions or five-power negotiations. That does not mean that the NNWS have no right to a say in what should be done and by when. On the contrary, the NNWS, having renounced nuclear acquisition for themselves, have a major stake in the achievement of nuclear disarmament and therefore in interim agreements and confidence-building measures to increase nuclear safety and marginalise nuclear weapons in the military doctrines and use postures of the NWS. Furthermore, such measures will contribute to creating the conditions for eliminating nuclear weapons and must be regarded as components which are as valuable and necessary as continued progress on reducing the size of existing nuclear arsenals.

It is legitimate and necessary for the NPT review process to assist in setting the agenda for further action on both qualitative and quantitative nuclear disarmament, to monitor and facilitate progress, and to hold the NWS accountable as part of the ongoing review and implementation of the Treaty. If it were possible to convene an ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the CD, that could play a similar role, in addition to negotiating interim multilateral agreements such as a FMCT. But the rejection by some of the NWS, most adamantly the United States, of a CD nuclear disarmament committee have added to the current problems of that body and do not augur well for its future. It is not contradictory for both the NPT and the CD to have a role in identifying practical measures for further work by the NWS. Indeed, it would be desirable for both the CD members and NPT Parties to have an acknowledged involvement and for the NWS to keep both fora informed.

Precedents for this were created during the SALT talks and, more recently, in the P-5 sidebar negotiations during the CTBT. At that time, the CD members were engaging in multilateral negotiations in the Nuclear Test Ban Committee, but some of the most difficult issues of scope and verification were being thrashed out in special meetings of the five NWS. It was recognised that unless the NWS could come to mutually satisfactory agreements, there would be no Treaty. At the same time, the NWS knew that whatever they agreed among themselves would ultimately have to be acceptable to the other negotiators in the CD, who were kept informed of the main issues, if not the detailed talks. Coming to the CTBT negotiations with different interests and objectives, the NWS found that some issues were more likely to be won as part of a bargaining process or trade-off, such as on-site inspections, while others required strong political initiative and action, as was the case with the zero yield scope. Five power talks on qualitative nuclear disarmament could work productively in a similar manner, with the international community helping to maintain the objectives, leverage and pace, while the NWS work out the details.

Where the pace of reducing the number of nuclear warheads in United States and Russian arsenals depends to some extent on financial and technical capabilities for the safe dismantlement and disposal of the fissile materials, many qualitative nuclear disarmament measures could be undertaken first as changes to declaratory policy or with mutual monitoring overseen by the IAEA (which could, in effect, act on behalf of the NNWS). The Canberra Commission identified many of these measures in 1996 as steps which could and should be undertaken immediately.

At the 1998 PrepCom, the NNWS might draw up a menu for action covering all or some of these measures for the NWS to undertake. While the NNWS would identify the targets for action, it would be left to the NWS to determine how best to achieve positive and practical steps and agreements. In keeping with the purpose of accountability, the NNWS could require information exchange, perhaps in the form of an annual report from the NWS, individually or collectively, on their progress and/or problems. Such a concept is not new, and a further precedent for five-power statements to the NPT parties was set in 1997, coordinated by France. However, the statements need to be regular and made more substantive and responsive to the questions and concerns of the international community.

An approach by NNWS for a role in setting the nuclear disarmament action agenda would undoubtedly be resisted by those NWS who hoped for an easy and undemanding ride in the review process. Similarly, some NNWS may fear that contributing to a pragmatic agenda for immediate steps could detract from their political demands for time-bound nuclear disarmament. It may not be possible to obtain consensus on an agenda or steps in 1998, but a concerted attempt to discuss the elements of such a programme could set the tone for a more meaningful review process and establish the legitimate interests of NNWS in assisting and monitoring the progress of NWS in implementing Article VI and the NPT's other provisions.

The programme of action agreed in the 1995 P&O, which set, inter alia, 1996 as the target date for completion of a CTBT, complemented other approaches for nuclear disarmament, including the bilateral START process and NAM calls for a timetable for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Similarly a menu of political measures reducing reliance on nuclear use and establishing better information and procedures for the safety, command and control of nuclear weapons and materials held by the NWS would enhance international confidence and non-proliferation objectives, complement bilateral nuclear arms reductions and help to lay the foundations for practical consideration of a future convention for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, a goal of the international community which is rapidly gathering adherents.

Conclusion

It is too early to decide if the enhanced review process for the NPT will be effective in strengthening the treaty, but the consequences of failure could seriously weaken the non-proliferation regime as a whole. Since the primary motivation for setting up the enhanced review process was to retain pressure for full implementation of Article VI and to make the NWS more accountable, it is appropriate for the NPT parties to prioritise nuclear disarmament.

Political lines are already being drawn between those who seek to prevent a meaningful process from being developed and those who want to accelerate the achievement of substantive progress. Though legalistic arguments are likely to be marshalled to back a restrictive approach, the founding decisions for the enhanced review process were rather broadly sketched. With regard to subsidiary bodies or recommendations on substance and action, for example, States parties can empower the review process to do whatever they collectively agree it should do, consistent with the terms of the treaty itself. The NPT review process offers a way of encouraging further progress on nuclear disarmament, by building on the 1995 decisions, particularly the programme of action contained in the P&O.

One appropriate and legitimate role for the NNWS would be in setting an agenda or at least a menu of expectations for the NWS to fulfil, unilaterally, bilaterally or by means of five-power negotiations. The NPT can then also establish an agreed mechanism by which the NWS periodically report back to PrepComs and the review conferences. Any declarations or agreements could be endorsed and given political authority through the NPT process. Any problems and deadlocks could likewise be discussed, with assistance from the international community in working out solutions or compromises, while maintaining momentum and pressure for steady and irreversible progress. If the NWS take their obligations seriously they should accept such a role for the NPT review process. It would serve to strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

Goalposts and Gameplans: Exports, Energy and Power-Politics in Article IV of the NPT

All States have an obligation to ensure that their nuclear trade does not contribute, wittingly or unwittingly, to nuclear weapons proliferation by either States or sub-State groups. Meeting this obligation is assisted by a common understanding of what items are sensitive in the nuclear proliferation process and has resulted in development of internationally agreed standards for nuclear exports. ... It is essential that export control regimes are transparent in their operation and do not impede legitimate trade and technology transfer.

The Canberra Commission

[A]n undeniable flaw in the current regime is that the charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency requires that it both promote and safeguard the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The tension in this relationship is evident in the battle over the IAEA budget, in which some member States insist that any increase in the safeguards budget should be matched by a comparable increase in the technical assistance budget. Steve Fetter, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament

Introduction

Article IV of the NPT states that nothing in the Treaty "shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties" to "develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II." However, the history of the NPT has demonstrated vividly how open to interpretation the key concepts of the Article are. How can you be sure purposes are "peaceful"? What constitutes "discrimination" and "conformity"? How "common" is the understanding on the issue referred to above by the Canberra Commission? As many non-aligned States point out, nuclear export control regimes, dominated by powerful, wealthy, developed States - the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG - also known as the London Club) - have, since the early 1970s, had it in their power to arrive at their own interpretative conclusions and act upon them. Export control regimes are not explicitly mandated by the Treaty. While most States accept that such regimes are a natural corollary to the Treaty, and in particular the safeguards regime established under Article III, there is less agreement on whether they should be brought into the Treaty's purview and made more transparent and accountable. Although advocates of the existing system suggest that this would be a recipe for politicising the process and miring it in disputes likely to - and maybe designed to - greatly reduce its effectiveness, constructive critics argue that it is hard to deny that the process as it stands is highly political, and that greater trust could be established in it by increasing the transparency of its operation, even outside of a formal incorporation into NPT mechanisms.

Even deeper questions, however, about the relevance and cohesiveness of the Treaty as a whole underlie these arguments about export control regimes: should the Treaty's adamant advocacy of nuclear power - proclaimed, in the late 1960s, at perhaps the high-water mark of enthusiasm and optimism about nuclear power's potential to solve global energy and pollution problems and thus help rectify developmental inequities - remain set in stone, given the difficult, and sometimes disastrous, development of nuclear energy in the quarter-century since? Perhaps most fundamentally, does Article IV have the perverse potential to thwart the most ambitious objective of the Treaty? If radical nuclear disarmament becomes a reality, and the prospect of a nuclear-weapon-free world seems potentially within grasp, might not the existence of a widespread civil nuclear sector act as a nuclear-weapon-world in waiting, a threshold-nuclear-weapons world? This touchs on the "flaw" and "tension" in the NPT identified by Steve Fetter above. Safeguarding existing nuclear facilities while promoting the construction and operation of new facilities is at the very least an awkward, and resource- and time-consuming, balancing act for the IAEA. Promoting the spread of nuclear power while championing the cause of nuclear non-proliferation perhaps represents an equally problematic and draining agenda for the regime as a whole.

Such claims and concerns are, of course, widely dismissed and refuted: on the grounds that nuclear power is today so widespread (by the end of 1996, nearly 450 nuclear reactors in over 30 States accounted for a fifth of global electricity output) that it is impractical to seek to reverse the process; on the grounds that safeguards can be strengthened, and are being strengthened, to avoid any abuse; and on the grounds that such a process is beneficial economically (for countries not possessing ready alternatives) and environmentally (especially given the calamitous impact on the global climate of fossil-fuel emissions).

How does the debate between NPT States Parties on these issues stand, and how is it likely to develop?

The Debate at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

There was considerable concern before the 1995 Review and Extension Conference that the issue of export controls could prove one of the most divisive on the agenda. In the PrepComs leading up to the Conference, Iran had emerged as the most outspoken critic of the existing arrangements. In the final PrepCom (New York, 23-27 January 1995), Iran urged an entirely new, inclusive approach involving all NPT States, replacing "private, secretive and nonrepresentative groupings of limited membership." At the Conference, Iran repeated its criticism, contrasting support by unnamed nuclear-weapon States for the alleged nuclear-weapons programme of a non-NPT State (Israel) with the extreme difficulty many developing countries had experienced in "exercising their prerogatives as stipulated" in Article IV. Iran submitted an eight-point plan designed to affect a general overhaul of the Treaty: one point was the "phase out" of the Zangger Committee and London Club. However, Iran did not go on, as some had feared, to make NPT extension conditional on a commitment to reform in this area. Iran was far from alone in expressing frustration: Bangladesh, Botswana and Panama were among many NAM States stressing the importance of a new approach, if not an entirely new system.

On the issue of nuclear energy, a few States expressed concern that the potential pitfalls of nuclear cooperation were not being adequately addressed. The Czech Republic, for example, said that under the spur of Article IV "such cooperation had developed too liberally," while the Netherlands urged recognition of the "limitations of the use of the atom".

China has traditionally cultivated the image of a champion of the right of developing States to pursue peaceful nuclear programmes. At the Conference, China argued again that the best of both worlds - nuclear-weapon free and nuclear-power prevalent - was both desirable and possible: "the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation should facilitate rather than impede the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."

The 'Principles and Objectives' adopted by the Conference insisted that "[p]articular importance" be attached "to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right" set out in Article IV. Furthermore, "[u]ndertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented", "preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account", and "[t]ransparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty."

What was not spelled out was whether striving to abide by these principles and meet these objectives would require new mechanisms and institutions, reform of existing mechanisms and institutions, or merely a good-faith approach by those charged with operating the extant system.

The Debate at the 1997 PrepCom

A NAM Statement at the 1997 PrepCom called for an end to the "unilaterally enforced restrictive measures" of the Zangger Committee and London Club. In their place, the statement argued, developing States who were members of the NPT should be given "preferential treatment" regarding the "free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology." As at the 1995 Conference, there were two broad groupings within the NAM - a minority grouping hostile to the whole current system, with Iran as its most prominent member; and a majority grouping anxious to improve the political credibility and accountability of export control regimes. South Africa is a prominent member of this latter grouping. At the 1997 PrepCom, South Africa eloquently drew the link between increased transparency within the system and increased confidence in it. China argued that an important confidence-building measure would be to lift restrictions on "the transfer of technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are beyond safeguards required under the Treaty." The major statements made in support of the existing system -notably those of Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU) and the UK - contained no suggestions for refinements or improvements.

Much of the debate concerning nuclear energy was concerned with specific measures, such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, designed to prevent accidents, improve the handling and transport of materials and radioactive waste, etc. Notwithstanding this recognition of the potential downside of nuclear energy, many States expressed great hopes for its increasing use. For example, speaking on behalf of the EU, the Netherlands - despite the cautionary note its national statement had struck in 1995 - noted with apparent satisfaction that the EU spent "comfortably" more - $48 million - than the IAEA in 1996 on promoting nuclear power. South Africa again spoke in tempered terms, pointing out that for many developing States pursuing a civil nuclear programme places great "infrastructural burdens...on recipients." One of the wariest notes was struck by Australia, which urged States Parties to recall the "potential for harm inherent in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology."

Unilateral Pressure and Multilateral Regimes: The Case of the Bushehr Reactor

The period since the indefinite extension of the NPT in May 1995 has seen almost continual controversy over Iran's civil nuclear programme, which the US, Israel and others claim is part of a drive to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran provides an instructive case study in different approaches to responding to proliferation threats, and different approaches to arriving at threat assessments. In particular, it serves to illustrate tensions between unilateral and multilateral attitude and action.

The controversy centres around Russia's commitment to Iran to complete the construction of a 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor in Bushehr. Under Article IV, Iran is quite entitled to seek the completion of the plant and Russia is quite entitled to assist in that completion. The type of reactor is comparable to that which the US wants to provide to North Korea, to replace heavy-water reactors capable of producing weapons-grade fissile materials. Once completed, Bushehr will be fully supervised by the IAEA. As IAEA spokesperson Hans-Friedrich Meyer told the Reuters news agency on 6 March 1998: "Iran is party to the [NPT]...and has a full-scope safeguards agreement and there is no sign whatsoever that the IAEA will not inspect the exclusively peaceful use of the Bushehr nuclear power plant when it comes into operation."

Also on 6 March, Ukraine announced it was withdrawing from its part in the Bushehr project - the supply of turbines for the plant. Again, the sale of the turbines would not have contravened Article IV or the regulations of either the Zangger Committee or Nuclear Suppliers Group. Ukraine was clearly persuaded by the United States that the prospects of peaceful nuclear cooperation between Kiev and Washington would be drastically diminished if the turbines were exported. It was also made clear that general economic relations between the two States were at stake.

In a related development, it was revealed in mid-March that China had agreed not to sell Iran a large amount of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (hydrofluoric acid). On 13 March, President Clinton and White House spokesperson Mike McCurry told reporters that US officials had made plain to China their view that the chemical could be useful in the development of a nuclear weapons programme, despite the fact that it is not included on the trigger lists of restricted goods, technologies and substances drawn up by either the Zangger Committee or London Club. However, China's decision was almost certainly not motivated by a change of heart; rather, it was made in the afterglow of the October 1997 Sino-US Summit in Washington at which President Clinton announced the activation of the 1985 Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (PNC) agreement between the two nations. Clinton's decision was partly made possible by China's adoption, on 10 September 1997, of a new regulation on national export controls incorporating a 'control list' modelled on the list drawn up by the Zangger Committee. This is expected to be followed, before the end of July 1998, by a new regulation on exports of nuclear-related 'dual-use' items. These moves are being greeted in Washington as proof-positive of the wisdom of America's policy of principled engagement with Beijing. It will be interesting to see whether any change is noticeable in China's declaratory stance on the export controls issue at future PrepComs and Review Conferences.

The Bushehr case has been introduced not to suggest that the US is wrong to be concerned about the possible proliferation implications of the project, but to illustrate that the existing multilateral export control regime - sometimes criticised for being too powerful and arbitrary - can sometimes be far less effective and influential than determined unilateral action, albeit action taken by the most powerful State on earth. Current US strategy seems deeply wedded to the use of both the 'carrot' of peaceful nuclear cooperation - a policy obviously urged on the Administration by interested US companies - and the 'stick' of nuclear, and more general, economic and political, non-cooperation. Doubtless the US sees itself as exercising much-needed leadership through such a strategy, but the international objective of enhancing the effectiveness and fairness of export control regimes may be hard to square with American emphasis on the superiority and primacy of its own criteria - often far more stringent than anything agreed internationally - and methods.

There is a danger that the whole debate over export controls may be seen as increasingly irrelevant to actual political pressure and practice. This is an outcome which the US itself would wish to avoid. The US wants to see the strongest possible multilateral export control regime in place and operating effectively - that is evidently its gameplan, as it is the gameplan of the overwhelming majority of States. At issue here are the goalposts of cooperation and coercion: if these are moved too often or too far by the United States, in its impatience with existing arrangements, then broader US and international objectives could themselves run the risk of being moved out of range. This could further increase US dissatisfaction and make it more prone to unilateralism, thus making an already vicious circle even harder to break out of.

Directions for the Debate: Perspectives and Proposals

The Bushehr case is just one example of the profound difference in analysis and approach, rather than objectives, between the US and Russia on the issue of export controls and proliferation threats. US policy is openly confrontational, based on the identification and comprehensive ostracising of "rogue States" - States on whom, it considers, a cooperative approach would be wasted, if not counterproductive. Certainly for the foreseeable future, Russia is unlikely to become a convert to this approach: "Given her security concerns, and the potential for much-needed sales of defence-related G & T [goods and technology] for peaceful purposes, it is hardly surprising that Russia sees consultation rather than confrontation as the key in dealing even with what the US and others consider as 'rogue' States."

Perhaps because of its more vulnerable geopolitical and economic situation, Russia also regards the practice of identifying "rogue States" as dangerously simplistic. In the present example of Bushehr, regardless of the political nature of the Iranian regime, in Russia's view it is not a non-proliferation policy, but a punitive non-cooperation policy to seek to prevent construction of a reactor that cannot produce weapons-grade fissile materials. As then-Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov succinctly declared on 18 February 1998: "Iran's technological potential doesn't allow it to produce nuclear weapons."

This is not to say that Russia is taking a lax attitude with regard to exports, or is unresponsive to US concerns. On 22 January, Russia announced revised national controls - 'Norms of Comprehensive Control' - covering a range of nuclear-, chemical-, biological-, and missile-related G & T. Rather, Russia sees itself as preferring to rely on detailed technical assessments rather than what it sees as the US penchant for sweeping political denunciations. After all, once a State is identified as a "rogue," what other than a worst-case scenario is politically advisable when assessing intentions and designs? It is worth mentioning that many analysts are also worried by the analytical oversimplicity - and potentially damaging political and military repercussions - of the "rogue" State approach.

Such a split between the two nuclear Superpowers is worrying, not least because it reflects more widespread international differences of perception and perspective. An obvious requirement for enhancing the political and practical effectiveness of export control regimes is to elaborate a 'mission statement' to which States with different perceptions and priorities can lend their support. This will necessarily involve a delicate blend of elements: rigorous and comprehensive criteria to avoid the calamity of proliferation being assisted by the export of uncontrolled items; open discussion and collective decision-making within the export control group regarding both the adoption and emendation of general rules, and individual cases and controversies; and some degree of transparency and openness of discussion between control group members and other States (and, preferably, NGOs). The very process of elaborating these difficult relationships and balances could act as an important confidence-building measure. The alternative of countenancing no changes to the existing system, while at the same time that system is seen as becoming of secondary importance to US unilateral policy, certainly will do nothing to diminish the potential divisiveness of the issue at future PrepComs and Review Conferences.

Conclusion

A new conceptual approach to the export control issue is required. Quoting US analyst and former arms control official, Michael Moodie, Russian analyst Rustam Safaraliev argues that policymakers on all sides of the argument are becoming increasingly unable to see the wood from the trees:

"[A] fresh approach to proliferation is needed which takes into consideration technological developments against the background of the new post-Cold War agenda: the inherently discriminatory nature of traditional nonproliferation mechanisms and approaches is fundamentally incompatible with this trend of a globally spreading technological and industrial capability. Yet policymakers seem fixated on refining those mechanisms - such as export control regimes - rather than devising a whole new approach appropriate to the evolving situation."

According to Moodie, "what is needed is not a coordinated, but essentially unilateral, strategy of technology denial, but a multilateral strategy of technology management."

A new approach to the nuclear energy question is equally worth exploring. Particularly with vast profits to be made by building reactors in China, Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the potentially diverse benefits of nuclear technology - for instance, in the areas of medicine and agriculture - can be easily obscured. Nevertheless, the key appeal of Article IV for some States is the promise it affords of a cheap and reliable energy supply: that is, it is the energy that matters, not necessarily the nuclear nature of its generation. With so many alternative means of generating power now being taken seriously, particularly with regard to renewable sources of energy - witness the growing governmental commitment to the research and development of solar energy in the United States - there may be a strong case for at least beginning to explore the possibilities of converting Article IV into a mechanism for promoting energy-development in general. This prospect opens up another: that of moving to resolve the "tension" and "flaw" in the NPT regime represented by the dual promotion of nuclear energy and non-proliferation by the IAEA, as identified at the beginning of my paper.

Just as a 'new multilateralism' may be required to make the NPT's export control regime both fairer and more thorough, so a new, non-contradictory mandate for the IAEA may be needed to help synchronise the aspirations of the Treaty as a whole.

© 1998 The Acronym Institute.