ACRONYM Reports

Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Problems and Processes

Executive Summary

The second session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) closed in disarray in the early hours of 9 May, 1998. Within days, India shocked the world with a series of underground nuclear tests. A few weeks later, Pakistan responded with its own nuclear explosions. These events threw long shadows around the world and have caused governments and activists to reassess what they want from the non-proliferation regime.

ACRONYM 12 is a report of the second PrepCom, held in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May. Part I analyses what happened and the reasons for the PrepCom's failure. It considers the future of the NPT review process and identifies some of the questions that will need to be addressed before the third PrepCom in April 1999 and the sixth Review Conference in April 2000. Part II provides a summary overview of the main issues raised during the general debate and informal plenaries or 'cluster' debates. Additional documentation and key statements are reproduced in Part III.

The second PrepCom, involving some 96 of the NPT's 185 States parties, considered a range of issues relating to nuclear disarmament, the non-military uses of nuclear energy and safeguards. Within these three broad 'clusters', they gave special attention to security assurances, banning the production of plutonium and enriched uranium for weapons, universality and regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, with particular focus on the Middle East. In the end, the participants were unable to take decisions on any substance or recommendations for the 1999 PrepCom or the 2000 Review Conference, and failed even to agree on the rules of procedure or background documentation. Agreement was only possible on the bare procedural minimum, such as dates and office-holders for the next meeting, including the designated Chair, Ambassador Andelfo Garcia of Colombia.

The failure may be ascribed to a combination of political, substantive and procedural factors. The PrepCom formally broke down over pressure to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, amid disagreements about the status and implications of all the decisions adopted along with indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. Even without this issue, which was largely dictated by external political calculations in Washington and Cairo, it is unlikely that the second PrepCom would have been able to agree on nuclear disarmament and procedural proposals for developing the review process set up in 1995. A broad gulf of perception and approach is developing between the nuclear weapon states (NWS), acting more and more as a bloc, and a few leading non-nuclear weapon countries, including South Africa, Canada, Indonesia, Egypt and Mexico, with varying degrees of support from other States.

Underlying the debates over procedures and text was a more fundamental division of interests over the purpose and objectives of the review process. The NWS seemed to regret having agreed to so much in 1995. They appeared to be trying to roll back the process and resisted any further mechanisms which might be used as levers for making more effective progress on nuclear disarmament.

If 1999 and 2000 are not to be repetitions of the political stand-off seen at the second PrepCom, it will be necessary to:

• clarify and bridge the competing perceptions of the purpose and objectives of the review process, including the status and implications of the decisions taken in 1995;
• develop structures and reporting products to reflect a balance and facilitate agreement on the different functions of the review process, including looking back and reviewing past implementation, looking forward and recommending future action, increasing accountability and promoting universality; and
• explore foreseeable areas of political difficulty, such as the Middle East and the status of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, with a view to bringing the key States together in advance of the full meeting to discuss their policy approaches and expectations.

A number of mainly procedural issues will have to be decided in 1999, including:

• adopting rules of procedure, which may need to be amended to reflect the intentions of the 1995 decisions;
• nominating the President of the 2000 Review Conference;
• agreeing on background documentation; the provisional agenda for the Review Conferences; and
• finalisation of the PrepCom report and recommendations on substantive and procedural issues.

The Chair of the 1999 PrepCom will need to coordinate consultations on these matters and consider what other preparation could assist the meeting, including the early provision of draft working papers. It may be necessary to hold a short fourth PrepCom if any of these questions are still outstanding in 1999.

ACRONYM 12 details other ways in which the effectiveness of the PrepComs and review process could be enhanced, including the following recommendations.

• The group structure, which was based on Cold War alliances, is no longer representative. The emerging dynamic, in which the nuclear weapon States (with a few of their allies) are more or less united against two or three broad coalitions of non-nuclear-weapon States, would be difficult to formalise, but is increasingly relevant. Some more neutral (perhaps regionally based) mechanism should be developed for managing decision-making and nominating post-holders, perhaps through enlarging the Bureau to around ten representatives.
• To avoid duplication and redundancies, the PrepComs should not take time to develop rolling text for a final document for the next review conferences, a task better suited to the review conference itself. It would be more in keeping with the intent of States parties in 1995 if the PrepComs focused on facilitating actions aimed at implementing decisions and objectives agreed at the previous review conference.
• If it is agreed that a major task of the review process is to facilitate the implementation of principles and objectives adopted at the preceding Review Conference, then proposals at PrepComs could go into three categories: i) actions for the PrepCom itself, including statements on contemporary issues, if appropriate; ii) recommendations to the next PrepCom, such as special consideration of certain issues; and iii) recommendations to the next Review Conference, such as deciding that future Review Conferences should formulate their own set of P&O or establish a subsidiary body on a particular issue.
• Ways should be found to structure the issue debates so that time is allocated more appropriately to priority issues or those which are more strongly contested.
• Although NPT Parties cannot impose their recommendations directly on other fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament or bilateral or regional bodies, a further very important function of the review process should be to provide a sounding board for constructive ideas aimed at resolving obstacles or conflicts that stand in the way of negotiations or activities relevant to the NPT's full implementation.

It was to be expected that the second PrepCom would be difficult. After seeing how the 1997 PrepCom developed, governments on all sides had time and motivation to be better prepared to push for precedents they wanted or against developments they disliked. The 1998 PrepCom should therefore be assessed as a product of its political context. It was not a complete failure, but lessons need to be learned. In addition to the necessity to take certain procedural decisions, the 1999 PrepCom will face many of the same outstanding questions, particularly the Middle East Resolution and nuclear disarmament, as well as the role and status of the report from 1997, especially the Chair's working paper. At stake is the validity of the decisions taken in 1995 and possibly the ability of the non-proliferation regime to withstand the challenges of the South Indian nuclear tests and re-emerging nuclear weapon doctrines and justifications.

© 1998 The Acronym Institute.