ACRONYM Reports

Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Problems and Processes

An Intervention by Mr. Norman A. Wulf, Representative of the United States Of America, 30 April 1998

Cluster 1 Discussion

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to begin our contribution to the debate on "cluster one" with a few remarks about the U.S. approach to disarmament and then move to outline specific actions the United States has taken in support of its Article VI obligations as foreshadowed in our plenary statement.

U.S. Approach To Disarmament

The United States is committed to the goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Much progress has seen made toward this goal in recent years. The United States believes some countries are too quick to dismiss the historic, far-reaching, and irreversible arms control and disarmament progress that has been made to date and to ignore the important progress that is ongoing.

Our progress toward nuclear disarmament thus far has used a tried and true formula: taking a series of discrete steps, each step building on its predecessors. Nuclear disarmament cannot be imposed from the top down, but will require numerous steps, each building on the last, and each subject to intensive and painstakingly-developed verification measures.

Throughout the disarmament process, decisions and actions concerning the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons will necessarily remain the domain and responsibility of the nuclear weapon states. The 1995 NPT conference decision on "principles and objectives" recognized this responsibility in calling for the nuclear weapon states to undertake "progressive and systematic reductions of nuclear arsenals globally".

This does not mean that non-nuclear-weapon States have no role in the nuclear disarmament process. On the contrary, the United States believes that all States have a responsibility to the nuclear disarmament process. This shared responsibility is recognized in Article VI of the NPT, which calls on "each of the parties to the Treaty to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

While the United States would not agree that non-nuclear-weapon States have a role in nuclear weapon reduction negotiations, the United States does believe that the critical role of the non-nuclear weapon States is to help create the conditions under which the process toward nuclear disarmament can progress and ultimately result in a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, here are a few of the practical, pragmatic steps that we believe NPT parties should take pursuant to their Article VI obligations to help create the conditions which promote further progress toward nuclear disarmament and which will take us closer to this shared goal. Such steps include:

• Support for the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system, including adoption of new protocols to safeguards agreements by all NPT parties;
• Unequivocal support for and compliance with other global arms control efforts (e.g., CTBT, CWC, BWC);
• Further efforts to identify, to reduce, and eliminate destabilizing concentrations of conventional forces;
• Implementation of measures including military transparency initiatives and confidence- and security-building measures to promote enhanced confidence and stability, particularly in regions of tension. This will in turn make progress toward nuclear disarmament more possible.

We all must recognize that the process of nuclear disarmament is not limited to actual nuclear arms reduction and elimination, but involves many other steps to which all countries can and must contribute. Moreover, we all must be willing to do our part to create the security conditions under which the shared goal of a world free from nuclear weapons can be achieved.

U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Efforts

Mr. Chairman, the United States remains deeply engaged in the process of bilateral nuclear arms control. This process began in the late 1960's with the negotiations for the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement and has continued ever since.

The current "generation" of bilateral nuclear arms reductions efforts underway between the United States and Russia are represented by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreements.

The START I Treaty, signed in July 1991 by the U.S. former Soviet Union, entered into force on December 5, 1994, when the five parties to START - the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine - exchanged the instruments of ratification. START I will result in reductions by December 2001 of approximately one-third of the deployed delivery systems and warheads of the U.S. and former Soviet Union strategic arsenals.

START I is the first treaty that actually reduces strategic offensive arms, with overall reductions of 30-40 percent, and reductions of 50 percent in the most threatening systems.

The United States and Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have already made great progress in achieving the START I reductions.

By the beginning of 1998, the United States had already reduced almost to the second-phase reduction limit of the Treaty for the number of warheads attributed to deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan together have already met this limit, one which the parties are not required to achieve (7,950 warheads) until December 5, 1999.

The parties have also already met the final-phase reduction requirement of the treaty for the number of deployed ICBM's and their launchers; deployed SLBM's and their launchers; and deployed heavy bombers. The parties are not required to reduce to this level (1,600 SNDV's) until December 5, 2001.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are already free of all nuclear weapons. Belarus and Kazakhstan no longer have strategic offensive arms on their territories.

The parties continue to work together to ensure that the START I Treaty is implemented smoothly and that all Treaty obligations are fulfilled. All parties are participating in inspections and in the exchange of notifications and information required by the Treaty.

The parties meet regularly in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) in Geneva - START's implementing body - to oversee implementation and resolve any problems. To date, the parties have concluded some 85 JCIC documents clarifying Treaty provisions and codifying agreement on procedures as mandated by the Treaty.

The United States is also cooperating with Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to facilitate the elimination of strategic offensive arms and to enhance the security, safety, control, accounting, and centralization of nuclear weapons and fissile material

U.S. Efforts: START II And Beyond

START II, signed on January 3, 1993, is a bilateral follow-on treaty to START I and is designed to bring about further deep reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces and to enhance strategic stability by banning MIRVED and heavy ICBMs. START II requires reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons down to no more than 3500.

On January 26, 1996, the U.S. Senate voted by an overwhelming margin (87 to 4) to give its advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty. We are now awaiting positive consideration by the Russian legislature (Duma and Federation Council). President Yeltsin has underscored the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty, and has assured President Clinton that he is seeking the legislature's prompt approval of the Treaty. While we cannot predict when the Russian legislature will act, we hope that the clear benefits START II provides will encourage the Russian legislature to act quickly and favorably

START II provides an orderly mechanism for the United States and Russia to dramatically decrease the resources they devote to strategic offensive arms. At the same time, it provides enhanced stability and security. Thus, its prompt approval is in the best interests of both countries.

The United States and the Russian Federation signed a protocol to the START II Treaty on September 26, 1997. This protocol extended the time period for implementation of START II from January 1, 2003 until December 31, 2007. However, the parties are also legally committed to deactivate, by removing their re-entry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps, by December 31, 2003, the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that will be eliminated under START II. These documents are designed to facilitate ratification of START II by spreading the costs of dismantling nuclear weapons systems over a longer period, while still ensuring that START II's security benefits will be realized in approximately the original timeframe.

At the March 21, 1997, summit in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century

The Presidents agreed that, once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

• Reductions in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000 -2,500 by December 31, 2007;
• Measures relating to transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads;
• Seeking to ensure that the current START Treaties are made unlimited in duration, making clear that their arms control benefits are irreversible;
• Finally, at Helsinki the Presidents also agreed that their experts will explore possible arms control measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, and will consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials. These discussions will take place separate from, but in the context of, the START III negotiations.

START III will provide a 30-45 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons below START II and about an 80 percent reduction below Cold War levels, as well as containing new measures to further enhance security, strategic stability, and irreversibility.

Implementation of START II and III thus will make a major contribution toward the ultimate goal shared by the United States and all NPT parties to a world free of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war. As I emphasized earlier, this process will not - cannot - occur overnight. The United States continues to hold that progress on disarmament can best be accomplished on a step-by-step, incremental basis.

The United States will begin START III negotiations when Russia ratifies START II. U.S. and Russian experts have exchanged preliminary ideas on what START III could entail and how the negotiations could be organized. President Clinton has stated publicly that he and President Yeltsin wish to discuss START III at their next summit after Russia ratifies START II.

Mr. Chairman, the first goal of Article VI - cessation of nuclear arms race - has been achieved. Moreover, the decades-long bilateral nuclear arms control process, which I've just outlined and which has produced concrete, substantial, and far-reaching results, stands as a clear illustration that the second goal of Article VI - good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament - is being realized.

U.S. "Non-Classic" Arms Control Efforts

The United States is not waiting for the START process to become fully operational before it begins to reduce dramatically the facilities and materials available for nuclear weapons production. The United States has underway now a range of other measures, which I will refer to as "non-classic" arms control measures, that are taking us steadily away from the Cold War's nuclear status.

These include measures to terminate the production of nuclear material for use in nuclear weapons; to improve the transparency of fissile material stockpiles and apply verification measures to them; and to ensure that their disposition takes place in a safe and effective fashion. In all these ways, we seek to make the process of disarmament safe, transparent, and irreversible. Such measures confirm and help to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions. Taken as a whole, these "non-classic" measures provide a bridge between Article III (safeguards) and Article VI (disarmament).

The theme I would emphasize is that activities such as cessation of production of nuclear material for use in nuclear weapons, the application of transparency measures and disposition of nuclear material that has been rendered excess to defense needs - whether initiated unilaterally or together with others - are an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process.

The multiple "non-classic" arms control activities we have undertaken include bilateral commitments made by the United States and the Russian Federation as well as the transformation of these commitments into "acts on the ground". Let me provide examples of areas where we are continuing to make significant strides.

1. 1995 declarations on "transparency and irreversibility"

As cited in the 1995 Summit declaration of Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, the United States and Russia have made a number of declarations related to transparency and irreversibility of fissile materials. They include commitments that:

• Fissile materials removed from nuclear weapons being eliminated and no longer needed for national security requirements will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons
• No newly produced fissile materials will be used in nuclear weapons; and
• Fissile materials from or within civil nuclear programs will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The U.S. - Russian plutonium production reactor agreement and a corresponding implementing agreement providing for U.S. - Russian cooperation were signed and entered into force on September 23, 1997. This agreement provides that all fourteen U.S. plutonium production reactors must remain permanently out of operation, as will Russia's ten plutonium production reactors that are now shut down. The three Russian reactors that are operating will be converted by the year 2000 to a new fuel type so that they no longer produce weapon-grade plutonium.

The agreement also provides that plutonium produced between January 1995 and 2000 will not be used for nuclear weapons. Thus, this agreement caps U.S. and Russian stockpiles of weapon-grade plutonium and ensures that plutonium produced between 1995 and 2000 is not available for weapon use. It marks the first time that the U.S. and Russia have formally imposed such limits on the materials for nuclear warheads themselves rather than simply on their delivery vehicles.

All these measures are subject to bilateral monitoring arrangements which, in addition to monitoring of plutonium, permit U.S. and Russian inspectors to visit each other's nuclear material production facilities to ensure that closed reactors remain permanently shut down and that the three reactors in Russia still in operation are converted by the new millennium so as to operate exclusively in a non-production mode

The agreement marks a new stage of U.S. - Russian cooperation to regulate and safeguard nuclear materials, to limit their use in weapons, and to build mutual confidence through increased transparency. It is an important step forward on the path leading to eventual negotiations of limits on warheads themselves.

This agreement complements steps that the U.S. and Russia have already taken to cease the production of high-enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

3. Mayak storage facility and Trilateral Initiative

Under the Department of Defense's "Co-operative Threat Reduction" program, the U.S. is also working with Russia to build a secure storage facility at Mayak to house 50,000 containers holding up to hundreds of tons of fissile material from over ten thousand dismantled nuclear weapons. We are currently negotiating a bilateral transparency regime to provide confidence in three areas: that the material to be stored in this facility came from nuclear weapons; that the storage of these materials is safe and secure; and that nuclear materials stored there are never again used in nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the United States, Russia and the IAEA are developing further the Trilateral Initiative on excess fissile material. Under this initiative, we are addressing technical, financial, and legal aspects to support the objective of providing international verification that such materials are permanently removed from nuclear weapon programs. Considerable technical progress has been made, and such measures and inspections are planned to begin in a timeframe consistent with the loading of weapon origin fissile material into the storage agility at Mayak in Russia and at relevant facilities in the United States.

4. Placing U.S. fissile materials under IAEA safeguards

The U.S. continues to take significant steps in support of our policy to place excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable. President Clinton announced on March 1, 1995, the permanent withdrawal from weapon programs of over 200 metric tons of plutonium and high enriched uranium from the U.S. stockpile.

The U.S., in fact, has now identified 227 metric tons of such material as surplus to defense needs - and has withdrawn this material permanently from its defense stockpile with the intention of building international confidence that the dismantling of nuclear weapons is truly irreversible. Of that material, 12 metric tons (10 mt of HEU and 2 mt of Pu) have been under IAEA safeguards at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats for several years.

In September 1996, the United States committed to placing 26 additional tons of HEU under safeguards in the year 2000. And in September 1997, the United States committed to making another 52 metric tons of excess material available for safeguards, consistent with plans for treatment, storage, and disposition, over the next seven years.

5. Plutonium disposition

Let me now say a few words about how the United States plans to dispose of this excess plutonium. Of the total 227 metric tons of surplus U.S. plutonium and HEU, 52.5 metric tons is surplus plutonium that is slated for disposition, of which 38.2 metric tons is weapon-grade material.

This plutonium represents approximately half of the total U.S. plutonium inventory. In 1996 the U.S. declassified its plutonium inventory and announced it to be 99.5 metric tons. Correspondingly, in late 1997, President Yeltsin decided to remove gradually from military nuclear programs up to 50 mt of plutonium and up to 500 mt of HEU which has become available through the nuclear disarmament process.

Building on the 1996 Moscow Nuclear Summit commitment that "fissile material designated as no longer required for defense purposes will never again be used for nuclear explosive purposes", the U.S. and Russia, together with others, have now made real progress on developing technologies to help manage the plutonium from dismantled strategic weapons. This cooperation has also been endorsed by statements by our Presidents at all subsequent P-8 summits. Bilaterally, the U.S. and Russia are close to signing a technical cooperation agreement that will expand joint activities on research and demonstrations of plutonium disposition technologies, and that will permit, under suitable monitoring and non-proliferation conditions, the construction in Russia of pilot-scale facilities for plutonium disposition activities.

Multilaterally, at a meeting in October 1996, in Paris, the P-8, the IAEA, and several other countries concluded that both disposition of excess plutonium by burning it as mixed oxide fuel (MOX) in existing power reactors and immobilizing it together with high-level radioactive waste in glass or ceramic logs so that it is ready for disposal were viable approaches.

These approaches were also endorsed by the record of decision issued in January 1997 by the U.S. Department of Energy because they both meet the "spent fuel standard"; i.e., that both methods will make the plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as the plutonium in commercial spent fuel.

U.S. efforts in committing and placing additional amounts of fissile material not needed for defense purposes under IAEA safeguards; issuing a formal record of decision on plutonium-disposition technologies last January; proceeding to select the sites where plutonium disposition would take place in the U.S.; and working closely with the P-5 and Russia on feasible, multilateral approaches, represent significant steps toward irreversibly reducing stockpiles of excess weapon plutonium.

6. Plutonium guidelines

Another area that increases transparency in fissile materials is the "Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium", which were formally adopted in Vienna last year by nine plutonium-using countries. These Guidelines will apply to the management of all plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities - and to other plutonium after it has seen designated by the government concerned as no longer required for defense purposes.

Among the provisions of the Guidelines is the commitment of the governments to manage plutonium in ways that will ensure, safely and under sound non-proliferation conditions, the peaceful use or the permanent disposal of plutonium subject to the guidelines, taking into account, inter alia, the critical concept of the importance of balancing plutonium supply with plutonium demand.

7. HEU purchase agreement, Project Sapphire, and IAEA verification of down-blending in the U.S.

The U.S. agreement with Russia to purchase uranium blended down from 500 tons of weapons HEU is another important part of our effort to dispose safely and irreversibly of fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons.

This accord represents a commitment to purchase some $12 billion worth of nuclear material over a span of 20 years. The nuclear material will come from nuclear weapons and be used subsequently in peaceful nuclear activities as fuel for reactors.

Extensive reciprocal transparency measures have also been developed and implemented. These are aimed at the twin objectives of providing assurance that the material comes from Russian nuclear weapons and that, once blended down and imported into the U.S. in the form of LEU, the material is used only for peaceful purposes as commercial reactor fuel, and not re-enriched.

Transparency arrangements for material subject to the agreement are currently in force at a total of approximately 13 individual facilities in the U.S. and in Russia. Monitoring activities involve observing facility operations, making non-destructive assay measurements, and applying tags and seals on containers. We are also working toward the installation of special equipment to continuously monitor the enrichment and flow of uranium in Russian blending facilities.

Related HEU activities include Operation Sapphire, which airlifted 600 kg of HEU out of Kazakhstan in 1996 for safe disposition in the United States. The U.S. has subsequently made available portions of the Babcock and Wilcox Plant to IAEA safeguards, where this material is being down-blended into low-enriched uranium (LEU) , which cannot be used for nuclear weapons. The IAEA is also currently verifying down blending operations for former U.S. weapons HEU taking place at the Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plant.

8. Prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials

In April 1996, the P-8 Moscow nuclear summit adopted a "programme for combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material". The programme called for a stronger collective response, including: prompt dissemination of information on nuclear smuggling incidents; enhanced cooperation among intelligence, customs, and law-enforcement agencies; vigilant enforcement of material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) responsibilities; exchange of relevant scientific information to permit identification of sources of smuggled material; and support for efforts to place nuclear material no longer required for defense purposes under IAEA safeguards.

Since the Moscow Summit, the P-8 countries and others have worked to implement many elements of this programme, including:

• Establishment of a national points-of-contact (POC) system and procedures to share information on smuggling incidents, if necessary very rapidly;
• Development of a framework for enhanced cooperation among law enforcement, customs, and intelligence agencies on nuclear smuggling matters; and
• Maintenance of contact with the IAEA regarding its efforts to combat smuggling, including its database on smuggling incidents, and welcoming its ongoing efforts to ensure the safe and secure utilization of nuclear material.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the traditional forms of arms control have not been superseded. There remains a need to continue with the arduous process of negotiating arms control agreements that promote bilateral and international peace and stability. On the other hand, conditions have been created where we can take other steps that provide an important complement to these essential efforts and which will reduce the nuclear danger for all. These steps, which have begun recently, will not be completed soon. Plutonium disposition programs, for example, will take several decades to complete. I am reminded of one who, wishing for new shade trees to provide protection from the sun, asked how long would take. When told that it would take thirty years, the response was, well then, we must begin immediately.

Mr. Chairman, we have begun, and we intend to continue. However, as I hope I have made clear, this is a task that is not just for the United States or even for the nuclear weapon states. It is a task for us all. For example, all States parties to the NPT need to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the resources that it needs for its part of the job; that effective physical protection measures are applied wherever necessary; and that all states in a position to do so contribute to these efforts.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

© 1998 The Acronym Institute.