Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)BWC Protocol Bulletin, April 23, 2001By Jenni Rissanen Chair's "Composite Text" Receives Mixed ReactionThe Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) convened on April 23 for its penultimate session, concluding on May 11. This session, the 23rd in total since the AHG's creation, will be dominated by an important development: the release on March 30 by Ambassador Tibor Tóth (Hungary) of the Chair's proposal for a verification instrument to the BWC - his "composite text". The Group is attempting to agree a draft Protocol in time for the Fifth Review Conference of the Treaty, scheduled for November 19-December 7 this year. The statements during the first day of the session, however, showed that states continue to differ on the necessity and desirability of introducing a composite text. Fifteen delegations took the floor on the topic on Monday, revealing a broad divide between the European Union (EU) and some other western delegations, plus "moderate" Non Aligned Movement (NAM) countries such as Brazil, Chile and South Africa, all of which welcomed the Chair's move as the basis for further work (albeit noting that it did not meet all their concerns), and more resistant states, notably China, Iran and Pakistan, keen to downplay the Chair's text, by calling it good "reference" or "background" material, while insisting that the Rolling Text, currently incorporating around 1,400 brackets, remain the basis of the negotiations. The Chair shared with the AHG his impressions of the situation as he saw it: he had presented his "composite text", offering "a helping hand" in order to break the impasse in the negotiations. It was now up to the delegations to "pick it up and continue from there". He acknowledged that the Rolling Text was the basis of the negotiations and that this could only be changed if all delegations agreed. Referring to the content of his proposals, Tóth emphasized that the text was intended to make not just a few but "all delegations unhappy", as a sign of a balanced package upon which everyone needed to compromise. He appealed to delegations to take "a holistic view", and not focus on single national gains or losses. He reminded the AHG of its mandate and urged it to consider what collective gains the Protocol could bring - or, conversely, what all would lose in the absence of a Protocol. Sweden took the floor on behalf of the EU, which has been a strong supporter of introducing the composite text, and thirteen associated countries. The EU believed that through the introduction of the text, the AHG would "be able to find solutions to the remaining open questions", in order to conclude the negotiations before the Review Conference. Without commenting on the substance of the text, it cautioned that it did not "meet all EU expectations", setting the tone for many of the other interventions which supported the move. Like the Chair, the EU urged delegations to consider the text as a whole. It "should be the platform for the political decisions that are needed now". Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Switzerland agreed, believing that further work should be based on the Chair's text. Russia felt the Rolling Text was reflected in the Chair's text to a great extent. However, there was still a need to look carefully at all the proposals put forward in the Rolling Text. At first glance, while the text contained "many positive points", there were also "a number of unacceptable positions" which Russia was ready to work on. The views in the NAM were split: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa welcomed the introduction of the text whereas China, Iran, Pakistan and Libya were more critical, with Cuba somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. China, Cuba, Pakistan reiterated that they still considered the Rolling Text as the only basis of the negotiations, characterising the Chair's text as good "reference", "supplementary" or "resource" material. China and Pakistan believed that it held the same status as Part II of the Rolling Text (a compilation of proposals by the Chair and the Friends of the Chair). In what was perhaps the most critical view, China expressed its unhappiness about the Chair's proposals on clarification visits, decision-making mechanism for investigations, declaration triggers and transfers, believing that the composite's treatment of these issues was "one-sided" and left delegates "still far from final agreement". Given the diversity of views, "nobody [could] be sure about the fate" of the text. Pakistan called for "a good, fair Protocol" which included "unambiguous" provisions on cooperation and which would establish a multilateral transfer regime as well as a mechanism to deal with transfer denials. Cuba had studied the Chair's text with a "constructive mind". Although it was not "completely satisfied", it felt the Chair had made a good attempt to satisfy different interests. It agreed with Pakistan on the need to establish a dispute settlement mechanism where countries could take up the issue of denied transfers. Iran underscored its commitment to multilateral arms control and disarmament instruments and sought to rectify the impression that some were giving in the AHG, "perhaps intentionally": that the developed countries were "the guardians of the Convention and the Protocol", which needed to be "protected against the threats and plots planned by developing countries". It warned against a "shift of blame" game, in a clear reference to the United States. Iran believed the composite text did indicate that that AHG was moving negotiations onto a more crucial stage, but "not necessarily the endgame". It wanted "a red-line version" of the text in order to help compare it to the Rolling Text. Commenting on substance, Iran had not found the text balanced and expressed disappointment, in particular, with the treatment of the entry-into-force question, as did Libya, and the technology transfer provisions. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa all welcomed the Chair's move. Expressing itself as "very pleased" with a "balanced text", Brazil argued that it could serve as the basis of further work. Brazil, which is Friend of the Chair on cooperation issues, was satisfied with the solutions the Chair had found on the few outstanding cooperation issues and believed the text contained "politically viable" solutions for the problem of technology transfer disputes. Chile thanked the Chair for his courage and called for "intelligent and forward-looking movement" among delegates. Chile saw in the composite text not only the intention but also the materialization of compromise, and agreed with the Chair that a wide sense of dissatisfaction would mean that a workable balance had been struck. Regardless of whether the text was going to be a or the basis of negotiations, it "fills a political need". Given the short time remaining, and while continuing to reserve its national positions, South Africa supported the Chair's decision and agreed with many others that the text should constitute the basis for future work. With the first reactions to the introduction of the text now out in the open, many of which came as no big surprise to anyone in the AHG, attention is turning to the composite text itself. In the next few days, the AHG is expected to engage in a deeper examination of the text, with explanations from the Chair. Whether this will then translate into actual bargaining based on this text is still unclear with some important countries maybe opposing such a move or possibly not engaging. Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's analyst monitoring the BWC AHG Protocol negotiations in Geneva. © 2001 The Acronym Institute. |