Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

BWC Protocol Bulletin, August 20, 2001

By Jenni Rissanen

AHG Stumbles on Its Report - More Struggles Predicted

The 24th and final scheduled session of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) ended at 3:25 a.m. on Saturday morning with a failure to agree on the Group's report on its negotiations on a Protocol for the Convention. After arduous negotiations, and having in principle agreed on all other parts of the report, the AHG stumbled on the issue of describing the 24th session, notably the US rejection of both the Protocol under consideration and the Protocol-negotiating process as a whole. Failure to surmount this hurdle means the loss of valuable language on the Group's mandate and on strengthening the BWC through multilateral negotiations. Although it is still too early to judge the full consequences of this latest setback, discussions in other fora, such as the UN First Committee and the upcoming BWC Review Conference (November 19-December 7), are likely to prove stormy.

On Friday morning (August 17), evaluations of whether the AHG would be able to conclude its work varied, ranging from hopeful to sceptical. China made its first comment on the US double-rejection, announced on July 25, only on this final day of the 24th session. In a statement that asked "how to proceed next?", China said that "the position of one country...makes substantive negotiations impossible". China noted the US claim "that it has not abandoned its commitment to strengthening the Convention in the multilateral framework." China would "wait and see" whether "such rhetoric [would] soon be translated into concrete actions".

Turning to the question of how to proceed, as far as China was concerned the AHG's mandate "has not been fulfilled". China stressed that the mandate "has neither come to an end, nor changed in its scope or substance, letter or spirit". Instead, it remained as agreed in 1994 and "all its elements, whether now or in future, should be interpreted and understood as what they really are". The mandate should "serve as the basis and operational directions for our work". Like Iran, which had addressed the Group earlier, China also seemed sceptical about the US commitment to the mandate. Although no one had challenged the mandate openly, China believed that this commitment would need "to be tested by time". There was a sense of irony, therefore, when the mandate suffered its first blow just hours later, when the AHG failed to agree on a report that would have stressed its continuing validity. This failure, in the opinion of some, was due to counterproductive 'blame-game' tactics from a small number of delegations bent on singling out Washington's stance.

In the early evening of the final day, there were three main areas of contention: the special conference proposed by South Africa; references in the report to multilateral negotiations; and, most controversially, the description of the 24th session.

On Thursday afternoon, South Africa had reintroduced the question of a special conference, proposing that the report include an invitation to the states parties to consider convening such a meeting sometime after the Review Conference. Earlier, a group of eight like-minded countries, including South Africa, had called for a special conference to be held prior to the Review Conference. However, with some countries adamantly opposed, and not enough in support, it was thought that the idea had faded away. South Africa's revised proposal caused difficulties for some western delegations, although seemingly less than the initial idea had provoked. The main argument against South Africa's proposal was that any reference to a special conference after the Review Conference appeared to prejudge the outcome of the Review Conference as a failure. In the end, on grounds that any reference to a special conference by the AHG would only be advisory, since only the states parties could in practice take such a decision, the AHG agreed to incorporate a separate paragraph stating the following: "The Ad Hoc Group invites the states parties to the Convention to consider the possibility of convening a Special Conference, if appropriate, after the Fifth Review Conference".

The reference to multilateral negotiations was more difficult to agree. Iran and Cuba, in particular, wanted language on this, probably in anticipation that the 'alternatives ideas' promised by the US would not encompass true multilateral or negotiated measures. Some western delegations were suspicious of the position put forward by Iran and Cuba, perhaps fearing that the underlying motive was to achieve a reference implicitly undermining the Australia Group (a suppliers' regime controlling exports), which a number of non-western states regard as exclusive and discriminatory. Nevertheless, the value of such a reference for western delegations was plain, as many of them, including the EU, had expressed their expectation that efforts to find a Protocol would continue in a setting of multilateral negotiations. The NAM and the Western Group engaged in a drafting exchange on a paragraph suggested by the Chair, Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary. The NAM strengthened the Chair's text, and after some proposed modifications by the Western Group, the two groups agreed on the following: "The Ad Hoc Group stated that an effective legally-binding instrument agreed through multilateral negotiations undertaken in the framework of the Convention will strengthen the Convention".

But after agreeing and adopting these formulations ad referendum, things got complicated. The NAM and the Western Group apparently had different perceptions as to how the AHG should proceed next. This became evident when the Chair took up a paragraph describing the events at the 24th session. At the heart of the difficulties concerning this description lay a dispute between countries - chiefly Cuba and Iran - which insisted on naming the United States, and the United States itself, which adamantly opposed any such reference, even at the expense of not finalising the whole report.

Iran took the floor to say that something was 'missing' from the Chair's proposal, and asking that the US statement of July 25 be reflected in it. This reportedly took the Western Group - ready to accept the text as it was - by surprise. South Africa, the co-ordinator of the NAM, on the other hand, complained that it had been promised a break for informal consultations before proceeding to this paragraph. Chile, Mexico and Brazil made a 'middle-ground' suggestion: that instead of naming countries, the report should talk about "one delegation". Cuba and Iran had seemed willing to accept this. A number of western delegations emphasised they were only prepared to accept the text as it stood. They urged the NAM to accept the text. South Africa insisted that the NAM had not been asked to treat the issues together. The meeting was suspended for further consultations.

Following the break, the Western Group reportedly asked that the text be put for a decision - without the paragraph on the 24th session. The NAM requested a break to reflect on the proposal. After resuming, the NAM said it could not accept this. As an alternative, it suggested that in exchange for keeping the Chair's proposal intact, the statements of the 24th session could be attached to the report. This was not accepted by the Western Group which was understood to dislike the precedent such action would create.

As a last resort, when it was clear the other avenues had been exhausted, Tóth proposed that the AHG adopt a single-paragraph report, consisting only of the earlier agreed paragraph on the Group's mandate. This would have read: "The Ad Hoc Group has not been able fulfil its mandate, since by the end of the twenty-fourth session it was not able to complete its work and submit its report, to be adopted by consensus, including a draft of a legally-binding instrument to the States Parties to the Convention. This mandate, as agreed by the Special Conference in 1994 remains in force and determines future work of the Ad Hoc Group". The Western Group was ready to accept this stand-alone proposal. However, it was not to the whole AHG's liking, with a number of NAM countries rejecting it as being insufficient. With all realistic hope of agreement now lost, accusations began to fly. Although South Africa reportedly appealed for yet another attempt to be made, Germany argued that no such effort could now bring results. Expressions of regret started to pour in and the Chair closed the session, compelled to declare that there was no report.

This dismal outcome has been met with differing degrees of disappointment. On one hand, there is a realisation that the report would not have been binding with regard to the AHG's future. On other hand, it would have 'put on record' some important agreements, most notably, that the AHG considered that its mandate was still in force and yet to be fulfilled. In addition, the report would have emphasised the principle of multilateral negotiations and recognised the two texts - the rolling text and the Chair's composite text - as the products of the six and a half years of negotiations.

With the question of blame taking over, these potential gains were lost. Most damaging, perhaps, is the revelation that the process is extremely vulnerable to being held hostage by a small number of countries. The real 'losers' are the large number of states in the 'middle-ground', ready for compromise and constructively committed to the Protocol and to finding collective mechanisms for strengthening the Convention. The United States may have gained most diplomatically from the absence of a report. With no common ground to build on, discussions in other fora, such as the First Committee and the upcoming BWC Review Conference, on the efforts to strengthen the Convention will be burdened with major obstacles from the outset.

Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's analyst monitoring the BWC AHG Protocol negotiations in Geneva.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.