Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

BWC Protocol Bulletin, October 15, 2001

By Jenni Rissanen

United States' Position on Protocol Unmoved

The September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and subsequent biological terrorism scares across the globe have led to speculation about whether the US might change its stance on the verification Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC). The United States rejected the Chair's draft as well as further efforts to elaborate a Protocol on July 25 at the final session of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) negotiating the Protocol in Geneva. The Group was due to conclude the Protocol before the Fifth BWC Review Conference, scheduled for November 19-December 7 this year. However, the US statement at the annual UN First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) on October 10 indicates that the United States does not intend to revisit its position.

Avis Bolen, US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, spoke on a range of issues at the First Committee, including biological weapons and the Protocol. Avis told the Committee that the US position on the Protocol had not changed and that September 11 had only reinforced the US view that the focus should be on BW use. The attacks "must give new urgency to our efforts to combat the threat of biological weapons - and by weapons I mean here biological agents used with lethal intent. A first step must be to strengthen the norms against use of biological weapons, to make clear and doubly clear that this form of terrorism, like all others, is unacceptable. We believe that the international community, which has in Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 so clearly stated its resolve to combat terrorism by all means at its disposal, must equally clearly state that any use of biological weapons - whether by state, an organization or an individual - would be a crime against humanity to which the international community will respond. We must also make clear that transfer of BW and other toxins to those who would use them is similarly unacceptable." Avis added: "Over the past six years, the United States and many other countries sought to negotiate in Geneva a protocol that would strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention - that is to give force to its prohibitions against the possession, development, stockpiling and acquisition. Last July, we made clear that we could not support the protocol, because the measures that were proposed to enforce the ban against the possession and development are neither effective or equitable - and given the inherent properties of biological products it seems all but certain that they can never be made so. This continues to be our view. But in addition, the events of September 11 have reinforced our view that the priority focus must be on use. The international community must here and now state our abhorrence of use, as suggested above; we must strengthen our national laws criminalizing use and transfer, and we must all agree that use and transfer are crimes to which our mutual treaties of extradition would apply. We must give ourselves the means to question and challenge in the event of suspected use. And we must [be] able to distinguish an outbreak of illness caused by BW from naturally occurring illness. And in the unthinkable event that a major BW incident occurs somewhere, we need to pool as much as we can our knowledge and expertise to minimize effects. That is why the United States is working closely with many nations to improve our common preparedness to mitigate and respond to BW attacks, and why we intend to expand this cooperation, especially in the area of medical consequence management."

The First Committee begins its third week of deliberations on Monday, October 15. The deadline for submitting resolutions is Friday, October 19. As usual, Hungary is preparing a draft resolution on the BWC. However, it is expected that negotiations on the text will be more difficult this year given the AHG's failure to conclude the Protocol before the Review Conference. The Acronym Institute of Disarmament Diplomacy will follow the First Committee discussions in New York from October 22 to November 9. To find reports on further developments on the BWC resolution, please check http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc. First Committee statements and related material can be viewed at the website of the Women's International League for Peace and freedom (WILPF) at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's analyst monitoring the BWC AHG Protocol negotiations in Geneva.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.