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Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 2, February 1996A monthly digest of news and documents edited by Sean Howard. Credits Contents
Editor's introductionWelcome to the second issue of Dfax's monthly arms control review. In issue 1, we launched a series of opinion papers on the future tasks and agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The inaugural piece, by Frank Blackaby, former Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), provided an overview of a wide range of possible new measures, with special emphasis on the most ambitious, and perhaps the most necessary, measure of all: a Nuclear Weapons Convention. There are two opinion pieces in this issue. Frank Barnaby, also former Director of SIPRI, provides a richly detailed briefing on the many complex technical and political issues involved in the negotiation of a fissile materials cut-off treaty, and argues for the scope of such a treaty to be as far-reaching as possible. Professor Paul Rogers, head of the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University in the UK, instils a plausible gloom into his analysis of the prospects for far-reaching nuclear disarmament, arguing that "nuclear strategy appears in the early stages of a transformation towards small but usable nuclear forces". Also in this issue, Rebecca Johnson again provides, in Geneva Update, a uniquely insightful summation of recent developments in the negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the CD - negotiations now entering a particularly intensive and turbulent phase; Documents and Sources summarises material from the CD, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Departments of Defense, Energy and State, and the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; while News Review deals with major stories featured by news wires between mid-January and mid- February. I would like to thank all those who commented favourably on the first issue. Criticisms as well as commendations are sought. Comments can be e-mailed directly to the Editor on: sean@gn.apc.org Readers' comments"...one of the foremost, or perhaps the foremost, publication in the field." Celso Amorim, Ambassador of Brazil to the United Nations and Member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons"I wish you success in the carrying out of your important work." Hisami Kurokochi, Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament"Your project is bold, timely and innovative." Professor Ashok Kapur, University of Waterloo, CanadaThe CD Agenda: a summaryThe agenda, in place since 1978, has ten items, known collectively as The Decalogue. The DecalogueItem 1. Nuclear Test BanItem 2. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear DisarmamentItem 3. Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related MeasuresItem 4. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer SpaceItem 5. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear- Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear WeaponsItem 6. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological WeaponsItem 7. Comprehensive Programme of DisarmamentItem 8. Transparency in ArmamentsItem 9. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant MeasuresItem 10. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United NationsThe review so farFor the 1994 Session of the Conference, Sweden's Ambassador, Lars Norberg, was appointed Special Co-ordinator on Review of the Agenda. No Special Co-ordinator was appointed for the 1995 Session. Algeria's Ambassador, Hocine Meghlaoui, has now been appointed as Special Co-ordinator on the Agenda, though his deliberations are principally concerned with the agenda for the 1996 Session. The fullest account of the review so far came on 1 September 1994 with Ambassador Norberg's report to the Conference. His statement referred to "divergent views" on the issue of "the appropriate balance" between nuclear and non-nuclear issues: "...consultations have revealed conflicting views among delegations as to the appropriate balance between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons on the agenda. Divergent views have also been expressed with regard to the question of a possible widening of the CD's scope of activities to include the negotiation of politically binding agreements covering, for example, global confidence building measures or regional questions." Specifically, Ambassador Norberg said that four of the Decalogue items in particular were inspiring controversy: items 2 (Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament), 3 (Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Measures), 7 (Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament) and 8 (Transparency in Armaments). The review of the CD Agenda - OpinionThe need for an effective ban on the production of fissile materials usable in nuclear weaponsBy Frank BarnabyIntroductionCommitments made at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference require the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) by the end of 1996. After a CTBT has been negotiated, the next most important arms control measure is the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (often called a fissile material cut-off treaty). The concept of a fissile material cut-off was first suggested 50 years or so ago in the 1946 American Baruch Plan. During the 1960s, when the negotiations for an NPT were in progress, a cut- off was included in a group of measures recommended by the non- aligned countries for urgent negotiation. After 1978, cut-off resolutions have been regularly passed by the United Nations General Assembly. But there was little hope of progress on a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons while the Cold War was on. With the end of the Cold War, the concept was given a considerable emphasis by President Bill Clinton in his speech to the General Assembly in September 1993: "We will pursue new steps to control the materials for nuclear weapons. Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism in all nations. We will press for international agreement that would ban production of these materials for ever". Strong American support made a cut-off realistic and attainable. In 1993, General Assembly Resolution 48/75, adopted by consensus, recommended the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. On 25 January, 1994, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed to appoint a Special Coordinator to "seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate" a cut-off. It was soon apparent to the Special Coordinator, Canada's Ambassador Gerald Shannon, that a crucial political issue was the scope of the cut-off treaty. Would it include existing stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons - i.e., past as well as future production? It was not until 23 March, 1995, that Ambassador Shannon was able to report consensus on the negotiating mandate for the cut-off and establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee. The difficulty about defining the scope of the cut-off was not solved, but the adoption of the mandate was achieved by a compromise (some might say a fudge). In the words of Ambassador Shannon: "During the course of my consultations...some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. ... It has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues." (Bishop, 1995) At the time of writing, despite this breakthrough, the Ad Hoc Committee had still not been formed. It is unlikely that significant progress will be made on negotiating the treaty until the negotiation of a CTBT has been completed; hopefully in the Autumn of 1996. Many delegations in Geneva simply do not have enough staff to cover the negotiation of two major treaties at the same time. When negotiations begin, the scope of the treaty will probably be one of the first topics to be discussed. The scope of a cut-offThe scope of a cut-off is not only a matter of whether or not past as well as future production of fissile materials should be included. There is also the issue of whether civil fissile materials which could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons should be included as well as military ones. As defined in Resolution 48/75, a treaty banning the production of fissile materials would, at a minimum, cover the production of weapon- grade plutonium (plutonium containing more than 93 per cent of the isotope plutonium-239), weapon-grade highly-enriched uranium (uranium enriched to over 90 per cent uranium-235), and uranium- 233 for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or outside of international safeguards. Nuclear weapons can be manufactured from plutonium containing almost any combination of plutonium isotopes, although plutonium containing high percentages of the isotope plutonium-239 (weapon- grade) is more suitable than plutonium containing more than 10 per cent or so of the isotope plutonium-240. Except for plutonium containing 80 per cent or more of the isotope plutonium-238, all plutonium must be considered to be potentially weapon-usable (Mark, 1990). Similarly, although highly-enriched uranium, containing more than 90 per cent of uranium-235, is most suitable for fabricating nuclear weapons, uranium enriched to more than 20 per cent is weapon-usable. A more comprehensive and effective cut-off than the minimum one would, therefore, include: plutonium of all isotopic compositions, except plutonium containing more than 80 per cent of the isotope plutonium-238; uranium enriched to over 20 per cent in the isotope uranium-235; and uranium-233. This would include all weapon-usable fissile materials. A treaty banning the further production of just military plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons - i.e., the production of weapon-grade materials in designated military facilities - should, on first sight, be easy to negotiate. In all of the five declared nuclear-weapon States the production of weapon-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium is coming or has come to an end (Berkhout et al, 1994). This is why these powers are willing to ban the future production of military fissile material. Current stocks of fissile materials(i) Civil and military plutonium The extent of the existing stocks of weapon-grade and weapon- usable fissile materials is important when considering the need for a cut-off treaty. The world's total stock of plutonium, civilian and military, is about 1,500 tonnes (excluding the plutonium in the cores of the world's nuclear-power reactors). Of this, about 1,200 tonnes are civil plutonium. The world's nuclear- power reactors are currently producing about 65 tonnes of plutonium a year (Albright et al, 1993); by the year 2000 the total amount of plutonium in the world will be about 1,600 tonnes (Leventhal, 1995). About 200 tonnes of civil plutonium have been separated from spent nuclear-power reactor fuel elements in reprocessing plants. An additional 30 tonnes a year are being reprocessed, so that by the end of 1996 there will be as much separated civil plutonium as military plutonium. By the year 2000, there will be some 300 tonnes of separated civil plutonium; if current reprocessing plans go ahead, by the year 2010 there will be about 550 tonnes of separated civil plutonium. This means that the amount of civil plutonium as a percentage of total (civil plus military) plutonium will have increased from about 30 per cent in 1990 to about 70 per cent in 2010. By the year 2000, the amount of civil plutonium in store will be about 250 tonnes. Of this, about 80 tonnes will be stored in France, about 50 tonnes each will be stored in the UK and Japan, and about 40 tonnes each in Germany and Russia. Smaller amounts (less than 8 tonnes each) will be stored in Belgium, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the US (Leventhal, 1995). There are about 230 tonnes of military plutonium in the world's stockpile. A small amount of military plutonium is still being produced in Russia in two reactors which are also used for domestic heating purposes; they will be shut down when their heating function is replaced, probably before the end of the 1990s. No military plutonium is being produced in the US, the UK, or France. The amount of military plutonium that China plans to produce in the future is not publicly known. India and Israel are probably still producing plutonium but in relatively small amounts. The world's stock of military plutonium is, therefore, unlikely to increase significantly. The amount of military plutonium in the US is about 100 tonnes. About 40 tonnes of this plutonium are outside nuclear weapons. The US is currently dismantling about 1,800 nuclear weapons a year, probably containing about 7 tonnes of plutonium. As of mid-1995, the US has in store the fissile cores of about 8,000 dismantled nuclear weapons. These contain a total of about 32 tonnes of plutonium. The amount of military plutonium in the former Soviet Union is probably about 125 tonnes. The amount outside weapons is probably about 50 tonnes. Russia is apparently dismantling about 1,800 nuclear weapons a year, probably containing about 7 tonnes of plutonium. The UK has probably produced about 10 tonnes of military plutonium, of which about 3 tonnes are in weapons. France may have produced roughly 6 tonnes of military plutonium. China probably has about 2 tonnes in its weapons. Israel may have produced about 950 kilograms of military plutonium and India between 200 and 300 kilograms. About 90 tonnes of the world's 230 tonnes of military plutonium are currently outside nuclear weapons. About 14 tonnes of plutonium are removed each year from dismantled nuclear weapons. By the year 2000, the total amount of military plutonium outside nuclear weapons may have increased to about 160 tonnes, or about 70 per cent of the world's total military plutonium. (ii) Highly-enriched uranium The situation with highly-enriched uranium is different from that with plutonium. The bulk of the world's stock of highly-enriched uranium is military; only about 1 per cent is civil. Moreover, the highly-enriched uranium removed from dismantled weapons can be disposed of more easily by mixing it with nuclear or depleted uranium to produce low enriched uranium for nuclear-power reactor fuel. Low enriched uranium is not usable in nuclear weapons. There are about 1,900 tonnes of military highly-enriched uranium in the world - about 800 tonnes in the US; about 1,000 tonnes in the ex-Soviet Union; about 15 tonnes each in the UK, France and China. Pakistan has probably produced about 150 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium and South Africa about 360 kilograms. About 20 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium is used in civil facilities, almost all of it as fuel in civil research reactors. About 1,500 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium are outside nuclear weapons and about 400 tonnes in active nuclear weapons (160 in the US, 230 in Russia, 8 in France, 3 in the UK, and 7 in China). Highly-enriched uranium is also used to fuel the reactors in nuclear-powered warships. The reactors in, for example, American nuclear-powered warships have so far consumed about 100 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium as fuel and about the same amount will be needed for future fuel. On average, a nuclear weapon contains about 15 kilograms of highly- enriched uranium. The dismantling of nuclear weapons will produce about 30 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium in each of the US and Russia. ConclusionIf surplus military plutonium remains outside international safeguards it will, to say the least, considerably reduce the effectiveness of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Hence the arguments for including existing stockpiles in a treaty. Similarly, given that the world stock of separated civil plutonium will soon exceed the world stock of military plutonium and that this civil plutonium can be used to fabricate efficient nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of a cut-off will be much reduced if civil plutonium is excluded. A ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons will, therefore, be effective only if it puts under international safeguards the military plutonium and highly-enriched uranium already produced as well as banning all future production of these materials. Moreover, such a ban will not be effective unless it includes civil fissile materials which can be used in nuclear weapons. ReferencesFrank Barnaby was Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1971-81. Nuclear disarmament: Pressures for and againstBy Paul RogersIntroductionFrance has recently announced that it is ceasing production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and is phasing out its small force of land-based nuclear missiles. This action appears to suggest a curtailing of nuclear ambitions and contrasts with its recent nuclear test programme in the Pacific. It comes at a time when prospects for a comprehensive test ban treaty appear quite good, and the Australian Government has set up a commission to determine prospects for a nuclear-free world. Does this mean that there are prospects for further nuclear disarmament or are we at a time of transition? This article reviews progress to date and points to possible indicators of future developments. BackgroundCompared with the mid-1980s, progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament has been impressive in several respects. At the height of the final phase of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union were engaged in a substantial quantitative and qualitative enhancement of their nuclear forces, commonly referred to as the nuclear arms race. This had its major focus on two classes of nuclear system - strategic and intermediate. The former included a number of highly accurate multi-warhead missiles such as the MX and the SS-24, and raised fears of disarming first strike strategies. Intermediate forces included the US Pershing II and ground- launched cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-20, the so-called Euromissiles. The US missiles were the focus of sustained public opposition in Western Europe, but were still deployed successfully from 1983. Also during the 1980s, the middle-ranking powers - Britain, France and China - were expanding their nuclear forces, and there was concern over the prospects for proliferation, especially in South and East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Although there were a number of attempts to develop bilateral Soviet-American nuclear arms control negotiations in the early 1980s, progress was extremely limited. Prospects improved markedly after Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union in 1985, and a treaty covering intermediate nuclear forces was agreed in 1987. This was highly significant in banning a complete class of nuclear missiles, and resulted in the withdrawal and destruction of the Euromissiles by the end of the decade. Progress was also substantial in controlling strategic nuclear forces, although agreements on START 1 and START 2 were features of the immediate post-Cold War period of the early 1990s. If fully implemented, these treaties will reduce strategic nuclear forces from a Cold War peak of about 23,000 to a combined Russian- American total of perhaps 7,000, although with provision for substantial reserves. They also remove the most accurate of the multi-warhead land-based missiles. The more recent stages of East-West nuclear arms control since 1989 have proceeded in parallel with the somewhat chaotic break-up of the Soviet Union. During that process, around half of the entire Soviet nuclear forces were withdrawn from deployment, most of them comprising tactical weapons. There is continuing concern over the security of many of these weapons. Although not related to any treaty obligations, the United States has withdrawn the great majority of all its tactical nuclear forces. Though this process has attracted little attention, it represents a significant change in nuclear strategy, with increasing reliance on conventional forces in major conflicts. Over the period 1985-95, Britain substantially reduced its nuclear forces and France and China made some modest reductions. South Africa dismantled its small nuclear arsenal and Argentina and Brazil agreed to curtail their nuclear weapons development. In 1995, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was reviewed and extended indefinitely. In short, from a mid-1980s perspective of a sustained East-West nuclear arms race and concern over proliferation, we are into an era of substantial denuclearisation. What are the prospects for this process continuing towards a nuclear-free world? The attitude of the nuclear-weapon StatesAlthough the United States and Russia are the most significant States, some interesting indications can be obtained from the attitudes of the middle-ranking powers. While Britain will restrict its nuclear forces to a single system - Trident - this is seen as a multi-purpose nuclear force capable of maintaining strategic and "sub-strategic" roles. It has an intended service life of 30 years and there are no indications of a British commitment to substantial further nuclear reductions short of global nuclear disarmament. The French attitude is broadly similar. Recent announcements notwithstanding, the French nuclear tests allow France to maintain modern nuclear arsenals for at least two decades and to continue further developments without the requirement for full-scale tests. Robust and diverse nuclear forces will be maintained, with an increasing emphasis on potential threats from third world States, especially those developing ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological warheads. China, too, has been conducting nuclear tests, and is maintaining a posture involving strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is taking a relatively strong line on nuclear issues, arguing that there is little sign of any real commitment to nuclear disarmament by the major nuclear powers. A variant of this is the current Indian attitude, which includes the possibility of the first nuclear test since 1974. India regards the attitudes of the five declared nuclear powers as fundamentally hypocritical, with the indefinite extension of the NPT being nothing more than a device to maintain the status quo. Russia is the most interesting and, in some ways, most disturbing state to consider. While there have been substantial reductions and withdrawals of nuclear forces, there are three factors to take into account. Firstly, there is evidence of a firm commitment to modernise a core component of Russian nuclear forces, especially submarine and land-based missile systems. Secondly, there is ample evidence that Russian political and military circles see maintenance of strategic nuclear forces as the last possible claim to superpower status. Finally, and most worrying, nuclear weapons are seen as having an increasing utility for a State which is having great difficulty in maintaining substantial conventional forces. They are seen as being a much cheaper option - a variant of Truman's "more bangs for the buck" argument. In the United States, the position is considerably more complex and it is possible to observe three reasonably distinct stages in the development of nuclear thinking in the past five years. In the final two years of the Bush administration, there was considerable interest in maintaining nuclear forces for countering new threats in a world which was perceived as having numerous dangers and much potential instability. Targeting third world and "rogue" States and an emphasis on limited nuclear options was commonplace. The Clinton Administration, influenced by the Washington arms control lobby, tended to counter this, at least for the first two years. A flexible nuclear posture would be maintained, but there would be very little nuclear modernisation and no new nuclear weapons would be developed. There was also considerably greater openness about nuclear issues. This coincided with a vigorous debate in Washington concerning the prospects for complete nuclear disarmament. More recently, several factors have combined to signal a rather more aggressive stance. The success of the Republicans in the 1994 mid-sessional elections to Congress gave the defence lobby a new impetus, especially as counter-proliferation became a political priority for Republicans. More recently, although the Departments of Defense and Energy have maintained an apparent commitment to further denuclearisation, there is evidence of some change in attitudes. Late last year there were reports of a programme to modify a standard nuclear bomb, the B61, to enable it to destroy new kinds of targets, especially heavily protected underground facilities. Furthermore, developments at Los Alamos included the capability to re-introduce the production of nuclear warheads up to a maximum of 50 each year. ConclusionThe United States, Russia, Britain, France and China all show clears signs of a long-term commitment to nuclear forces, even at a time of apparent progress to further arms control. The overall assessment is of nuclear powers envisaging a continuing of changed utility for nuclear weapons, albeit at a much lower level than during the heightened tensions of the Cold War. A core aspect of this developing view is a concern over the proliferation of a range of weapons of mass destruction, especially biological and chemical weapons. Investigations by the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) made public late last year have established that Iraq had developed a far more substantial programme of weapons of mass destruction than previously revealed. These included chemical and biological warheads fitted to missiles and deployed with pre-delegated launch authority at the time of the 1991 Gulf War. This development is cited by nuclear strategists as an example of more general trends in weapons proliferation. They envisage a disorderly world in which, within a decade or so, a number of States in the Middle East and Asia will have acquired long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Counter-proliferation strategies will be required which must encompass military capabilities. While these may concentrate on missile defence systems, it will also be necessary to maintain nuclear forces designed for use in limited wars with potential aggressor States. This outlook is increasingly common in the United States but also features in thinking in Britain and France, and to an extent Russia. To States such as India, it represents a continuation of Northern dominance in nuclear affairs and confirms the view that there is no commitment whatsoever to genuine progress towards a nuclear-free world. In summary, there has been considerable progress towards nuclear arms control and disarmament over the past decade, certainly much greater than anyone would have dared predict in the mid-1980s. At the same time, old attitudes die hard, and nuclear strategy appears in the early stages of a transformation towards small but usable nuclear forces. The risk of global nuclear catastrophe may well have eased greatly, but the risk of limited nuclear use may, paradoxically, actually be increasing. In an uncertain world, further progress towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament will not be easy. Professor Rogers is Head of the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK. The contributors and Editor encourage readers to submit responses, to be considered for publication, to the arguments put forward above. Responding to Frank Blackaby's opinion piece - The next steps for the CD - David Atwood, of the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva, writes: "I found the Blackaby piece very useful. Just as the CD is trying to find a way to expand, there are those who wonder if it will have anything much to do once the CTBT is completed. This, of course, is a rather absurd notion, given the disarmament tasks which remain. But Blackaby is on track in noting the conventional weapons and nuclear disarmament challenges and we need to help the system to find a way to get to these issues. Things are stuck for all sorts of reasons having little to do with issues of weapons themselves." CTB negotiations - Geneva Update No. 26By Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Intelligence ReviewLatest developmentsConcerned that the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in Geneva needed a shot of adrenaline to get past the 1,200 brackets of the rolling text, Iran and Australia towards the end of February each tabled draft or 'model' treaty texts. Many delegations welcomed the sense of urgency implicit in the Iranian and Australian initiatives, intended to highlight ways of reaching compromise on the most difficult areas of scope, on-site inspections (OSI), the Executive Council and entry into force (EIF). China, India, Pakistan and Russia emphasised that the only basis for negotiations should continue to be the rolling text, on which negotiations have been proceeding at a stately pace, with more brackets being added than removed. Jaap Ramaker, Chair of the Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) Committee, has requested his various Friends of the Chair to report back by the end of March, preferably with draft text on their issues. With only three weeks to go before the first part of the 1996 session closes, there is optimism that a CTBT can be achieved, combined with nervousness about political developments outside Geneva that could cause a derailment. Positions are still polarised on certain issues, such as so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), intrusive inspections and the use of national technical means (NTM), a term for intelligence sources, including satellites, signals and agents. These are increasingly referred to as potential treaty breakers. Recent negotiations among the P-5 nuclear weapon States on scope and related issues have reportedly been less than productive, with some delegations accusing others of rigidity and brinkmanship. Nevertheless, informal discussions now focus less on whether there will be a CTBT, but rather on what kind of treaty it will be and how universal: whether one or two countries who do not see their positions reflected to their satisfaction will block consensus, or allow completion but walk away from signature - and if so, what effect this would have on the credibility of the treaty and its effectiveness as a step towards nuclear disarmament. With pressure from India to link the treaty explicitly with nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework, which the majority (whether sympathetic with the aim or not) regard as unworkable, more attention is also focusing on steps beyond a CTBT. Negotiations on a fissile materials ban in the CD presently look comatose, if not entirely expired. Despite a brief flurry of debate in the CD, the expansion question remains deadlocked. Before tabling its draft text (CD/1384) on 22 February, Iran had consulted several of its non-aligned colleagues, seeking possible co-sponsors. Presenting the text, Dr Ali Akbar Velayati, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed that the purpose was to help the CD 'to perceive a middle ground - a package...which may constitute a compromise amongst the various and, at times, contradictory positions.' Putting the Australian 'model text' (CD/1386) down on 29 February, Michael Costello, Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, concurred. He said this was not an attempt 'to establish an alternative or parallel negotiating process', but to 'demonstrate tangibly that a CTBT...is indeed within reach.' While it was known that Australia was working on a text, it had not sought co-sponsors. A large number of delegations took the floor to welcome both drafts as 'useful resources' and 'valuable contributions', underlining Australia's 'sense of urgency' rather than endorsing its provisions. Several also warned that while such vision texts can shed light on possible solutions, they were not necessarily the solutions themselves. A few countries expressed concern that the hoped-for acceleration might be faster than they were prepared for. Arundhati Ghose of India characterised the model texts as no more than 'national positions and views on what would constitute a balanced text', saying that she looked forward to continue building on the rolling text in the coming weeks. For China, Sha Zukang warned against creating an artificial climate of urgency or attempts to elevate the Iranian and Australian texts above any of the myriad proposals which have been made so far. He challenged the 30 June target mentioned by Australia and several others and reiterated that the international commitment was only to conclude a CTBT by the end of 1996. However, China is reported to be particularly satisfied with Iran's offer on PNEs. Munir Akram took the opportunity to restate Pakistan's unchanged positions on several issues including scope and NTM. While the US is clearly unhappy with a number of the compromises proposed by Australia, especially on NTM and on-site inspections, Stephen Ledogar was able to remark that 'both efforts together demonstrate the extent to which there is already widespread agreement'. Synthesising the areas already substantially agreed in the rolling text, there were many similarities of approach in the ways in which the Iranian and Australian texts sought to resolve some of the most difficult issues. The fundamental difference was on scope. Australia still holds that its general scope text, with the understanding of zero yield adopted by the US, France and the UK, has the best chance of commanding consensus. Iran's draft reintroduces the prohibition against nuclear weapon tests, despite its withdrawal by Indonesia on 8 February, and provides a loophole for PNEs, which most countries say they still oppose. On the preamble, Iran retains some linkage with nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework, which Australia drops in favour of language referring to 'a meaningful step' and 'systematic process' on nuclear disarmament. On some of the outstanding issues, like entry into force, OSI and the composition of the Executive Council, both drafts take a similar conceptual approach, while differing in the detail of their solutions. On entry into force, for example, to balance political credibility with practical implementation, they both propose a list (which includes the nuclear weapon and threshold States) combined with a mechanism to prevent a veto. On OSI, both propose a two phase process, with quick access (red light) for the first, less intrusive phase, and a more rigorous decision-making procedure (green light) for any subsequent, fuller inspection. Australia's draft would allow an OSI to be based on any kind of information, while also suggesting ways of making national intelligence data more accessible to meet non-aligned concerns about bias. Iran would base an OSI request solely on information from the international monitoring system, but leaves a small opening for NTM as supplementary information. Stressing that they need more time to study the texts fully, some Western delegates privately commented that the Iranian text was better than expected, while the Australian model contained less than they'd hoped. It is not yet clear whether the vision texts will speed up or complicate the negotiations. Despite the likelihood of 2-3 weeks of intersessional negotiations, the expectation is that the negotiations will not reach their critical stage until late May, when the prospect of running out of time begins to bite into favoured positions. 1 February PlenaryThe 723rd plenary of the CD, chaired by U Aye of Myanmar, heard from the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, who called for 'a clear map to guide us in the process aiming at a nuclear- free world' and noted that Sweden supported the proposal in the report by the Commission for Global Governance entitled 'Our Global Neighbourhood' for 'agreement within 10 to 15 years on the total elimination of nuclear weapons.' Underlining the need for all States to be prepared to compromise in order to conclude a CTBT this year, Hjelm-Wallen signalled that Sweden had relinquished its long held advocacy of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as implementing organisation of the CTBT. Presenting Egypt's position on nuclear disarmament, Mounir Zahran held that the CTBT should be viewed as a 'disarmament measure which must put an end to the qualitative and quantitative proliferation of nuclear weapons', stressing that 'to permit low yield explosions or peaceful nuclear explosions would be tantamount to incorporating a serious loophole...which would undermine [the CTBT's] overall credibility.' Zahran also announced that Cairo would host the signing ceremony of the African Nuclear- Weapon-Free-Zone-Treaty in April. Bernard Goonetilleke expressed Sri Lanka's concern about the time- table for achieving a CTBT and addressed several of the outstanding issues in the negotiations. 'Having banned nuclear- weapon test explosions and other nuclear explosions,' he asked 'should we permit sub-critical tests which would allow the nuclear- weapon States to improve their arsenals and design third generation nuclear weapons?' Goonetilleke called for work on a CTBT to be completed by June and endorsed his colleagues' calls for negotiations on nuclear disarmament to commence in the CD as soon as possible. Addressing the substantive issues, Jorge Berguno of Chile argued that the CTBT 'reduces the gap between the rights and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear States as long as it results in a total prohibition of all tests in all environments', in which context he interpreted the 'zero option' and argued that only a 'total ban', including PNEs, would be tenable. In the first plenary following France's sixth and last nuclear blast in the South Pacific, Joelle Bourgois conveyed President Chirac's announcement of the permanent cessation of French nuclear testing, saying that France had exercised 'utmost restraint and kept to a bare minimum in both number and duration of the series of tests which were essential to ensure the safety and reliability of a deterrent force which remains a factor for peace in the world and for Europe.' She closed with a call not to let the opportunity for a CTBT slip. Australia, Japan, Chile and South Africa welcomed France's announcement, but reiterated their regret that the nuclear tests 'ever took place'. Richard Starr further urged France to provide access to all relevant data and sites for a complete assessment to be made of 'all the effects of its testing'. Bourgois responded that international experts were being invited to Moruroa 'to observe the absence of any harm caused to the environment'. Stephen Ledogar announced ratification of START II by the US Senate by 87 votes to 4. This was welcomed by subsequent speakers, who urged the Russian Federation to ratify it as well. Dr Ola Dahlman spoke on behalf of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE - see below). 8 February PlenaryThe 724th plenary of the CD, chaired by U Aye of Myanmar, heard substantive statements on the CTBT and nuclear disarmament from Algeria, the United States, Nigeria and Indonesia, with comments from Thailand and China. Indonesia also proposed refining the rules of procedure of the CD in order to admit the 23 countries on the agreed O'Sullivan List to full membership of the Conference, which sparked a heated debate but got nowhere. Noting the 36th anniversary of the first French test in Algeria, Hocine Meghlaoui underlined the need for a CTBT with no exceptions or PNEs. Arguing that no room should be left for the qualitative or quantitative development of nuclear arsenals, Meghlaoui said that what could not be verified, however, 'should not be referred to for the time being, without being explicitly or implicitly set aside.' Oum Maolanon of Thailand urged all States to adhere to a moratorium on testing pending agreement on the CTBT. Indonesia, Nigeria and Algeria all considered that inspections under the CTBT should be triggered by (International Monitoring System (IMS) information. Criticising as 'hardly credible' the view that nuclear weapons provide stability and peace, Ejoh Abuah said that Nigeria supported strong disarmament language in the CTBT, including a time-bound framework. Referring to the 'linkage meisters', Stephen Ledogar said that the CD 'has been doing little else but nuclear disarmament' since completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992, citing work on a CTBT and fissile materials 'cut-off'. Castigating those 'who bring nothing but pieties and rhetoric' to the debate, Ledogar asked what a 'time-bound framework' actually meant, particularly since 'dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons are taking place according to changed political circumstance and the driving force of specific State interests in lessening the nuclear weapons threat.' Objecting to remarks made by the US about China's continuing nuclear tests, Sha Zukang responded that 'the United States is not qualified to point its finger at China's extremely limited number of nuclear tests'. He reiterated that China wanted a 'good CTBT...as soon as possible and not later than 1996.' Dropping its own preferred language on scope, Agus Tarmidzi announced Indonesia's support for the Australian text, underscoring the 'true zero yield' interpretation 'which forswears all nuclear explosions.' Expansion After addressing several issues relevant to the CTBT, Tarmidzi then proposed that the rules of procedure of the CD should be modified to enable the 23 States accepted in principle in September 1995 to take their place immediately as full CD members. His proposal was warmly endorsed by Finland, Chile, New Zealand, Ukraine, Cuba, Korea, Egypt and Mexico, some of whom are 'members in waiting' on the O'Sullivan list. However, Ledogar demurred, arguing that his proposal of September 22 should take precedence. He advocated amending either rule 3, dealing with conditions of equality under the Charter of the United Nations, or rule 18, modifying the rule of consensus. The US has long objected to the granting of full membership -- particularly the power of veto -- to Iraq, one of the 23, while it is subject to UN sanctions. Benjelloun-Touimi, the Moroccan Ambassador who had moved the issue forward when President of the CD at the end of 1995, then chastised Indonesia for raising the question prematurely, when 'we knew the response was not positive'. The expansion question was thus left in abeyance again. 15 February PlenaryU Aye, relinquishing the chair of the CD to his successor, urged delegates at the 725th plenary to exercise cooperation and flexibility to bring the CTBT negotiations 'to a prompt and successful conclusion', noting especially the key issues of scope, preamble, entry into force, on-site inspection and national technical means. He reported on his consultations on nuclear disarmament, noting that many delegations that favour the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would be willing to accept an 'open-ended working group as an interim measure, provided that this exercise will lead to the establishment of an ad hoc committee within a reasonable period of time.' However, he regretted that some delegations from one group (understood to be the US, France and the UK) oppose any mechanism on this issue in the CD 'at this stage', although many of their colleagues in the Western group were more flexible. He also regretted the failure of the CD to resolve the expansion question and encouraged the Special Coordinator, Hocine Meghlaoui of Algeria, in his difficult task on reviewing the agenda and addressing the four issues of fissile materials ban, security assurances, transparency in armaments, and prevention of an arms race in outer space. Arundhati Ghose of India responded to questions raised 'about the seriousness of delegations, including perhaps my own, in trying to relocate the CTBT in its originally envisaged context'. She pointed out that the CD's 'decalogue' (the ten points on the CD agenda) derived from the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD I) and not the NPT and said that the banning of nuclear weapons was a task 'not for an esoteric club of vested interests but for the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.' Rudiger Hartmann, German Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, urged conclusion of a CTBT by June, and gave his country's position on some of the key issues. Germany favours the zero threshold approach on scope; a numerical solution under 60 for entry into force; a CTBTO independent but co-located with the IAEA; and a presumption of speedy access in OSI, to capture time- critical evidence in the initial phase. It backed the IMS, but regards noble gas monitoring as 'indispensable'. Announcing the withdrawal of Germany's scope language on preparation in favour of new treaty language covering 'imminent nuclear explosions' elsewhere in the treaty, he reserved the right to reintroduce the original language if the new ideas were not accepted. Olexander Slipchenko said that Ukraine also supported the 'true- zero-yield standard', which should be fully comprehensive with no exceptions for PNEs. Referring to the problems on enlarging the CD, he stressed that admission to the Conference was not regarded 'as a sort of special favour, but rather as an invitation to contribute to common productive work based on the experience of this country.' Baron Alain Guillaume railed against 'purely rhetorical declarations or manoeuvring disguised as generous proposals', warning that these 'demagogical sirens...can only lure us off course in our efforts towards nuclear disarmament.' 22 February PlenaryThe 726th plenary of the CD, chaired by Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, was dominated by the tabling of Iran's draft CTBT text by its Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, as discussed above. Several delegations, including Indonesia, Myanmar, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Australia and Egypt welcomed the Iranian initiative. Antonio de Icaza of Mexico reminded delegations: 'No nuclear disarmament without non-proliferation, No non-proliferation without nuclear disarmament.' Addressing scope and, by implication, the ambiguities surrounding sub-critical tests, de Icaza suggested stating somewhere in the treaty, in a binding manner, its purpose 'to ban tests that lead to the qualitative development of existing nuclear weapons as well as the development of new nuclear weapons including technologies designed to use nuclear explosive yields in small amounts.' 29 February PlenaryThe Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, Michael Costello, presented Australia's model CTBT text to the 727th plenary of the CD, chaired by Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands (see above). The plenary was addressed by 29 speakers, principally to welcome both the Australian and Iranian draft treaties and underscore the urgent need to address the political issues and intensify the negotiations. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Eugeniusz Wyzner, welcomed the US ratification of START II and the cessation of French testing in the Pacific and strongly supported completion of the CTBT negotiations by the end of June. In a detailed and substantive speech he outlined Poland's position on the CTBT, backed the zero yield option, and encouraged the CD to undertake further measures on its agenda. Peter Naray gave Hungary's position, also endorsing the Australian formulation on scope, and urging further consideration of the French and South African proposals for incorporating NTM under conditions designed to prevent abuse or discrimination. He also announced Hungary's adoption of a moratorium on the export and re- export of all types of anti- personnel landmines. Arguing that the nuclear weapon States 'bear a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament', Wade Armstrong said that New Zealand believed a CTBT to be 'an essential step' towards nuclear disarmament, and pressed for consideration of a negotiated and verifiable agreement to ban the future production of nuclear weapons as a possible next step. Joelle Bourgois informed the CD of President Chirac's announcement of a series of measures France was undertaking: adherence to the protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga; closure of the test sites at Moruroa and Fangataufa; cessation of production of highly enriched uranium and closure of the Pierrelatte plant (France had previous halted plutonium production for military use); and withdrawal of landbased nuclear weapons, including the dismantling of 30 Hades missiles. A summary of CTB negotiationsAfter two years of intensive negotiations, Jaap Ramaker of The Netherlands and the Chairs of the two working groups, Grigori Berdennikov of Russia (Working Group 1 on Verification) and Mounir Zahran of Egypt (Working Group 2 on Legal and Institutional Issues), have taken over the task of seeing the treaty concluded this year. Friends of the Chair have been appointed to resolve some of the key outstanding issues: Mark Moher of Canada on OSI; Yukiya Amano of Japan on funding; Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco on the executive council; Marshall Brown of the US on the preamble; Peter Marshall of the UK on technical verification; Patrick Cole of Australia on the IMS; Ralph Alewine on IDC; and Richard Ekwall of Sweden on associated measures. It is understood that Ramaker has asked each of them to report back before the end of March, preferably with clean or substantially clarified treaty text on these issues. In addition to the issues addressed below, there is still lack of agreement on the IMS/Technical Secretariat role in processing and disseminating information, and whether and to what degree this should include analysis and interpretation of data, as desired by many developing countries. The US proposal for financial obligations to the CTBT Organization to be offset by 'contribution credits' for IMS stations and technology 'in kind' is far from agreed. Preliminary work on the preparatory procedures to get the CTBTO ready for implementing the treaty was put aside pending clearer decisions on the actual treaty. Further discussion is needed on Review of the Treaty in light of India's recent proposal to include consideration of the preamble. ScopeRamaker has not appointed a Friend on the most important issue of all - the scope and basic obligations of the treaty - where the main differences arise among the P-5 nuclear weapon States, India and Pakistan. Negotiations among the P-5 have reportedly foundered twice since the CD resumed in January, principally over China's demand for clarification of the exact meaning of the zero yield concept, endorsed last August-September by the US, France and the UK. Following their decisions to cease pressing for hydronuclear or other low yield nuclear explosive testing, these three countries endorsed the Australian text on scope contained in WP.222: "1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." However, the US and UK had already endorsed this scope prior to taking the zero yield decision. With some sympathy from Russia, China wants to know how this text now expresses zero yield, since it 'provides no unambiguous definition of whether or not there would be nuclear energy release'. In 1994 China had proposed that the scope prohibit 'any nuclear weapon test explosion which releases nuclear energy', but wanted permission for PNEs, which every other state opposes. Russia has not yet let go of its proposal to model the scope on the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), listing prohibited environments. Resentful that the US and France 'prematurely' bounced the P-5 debates on possible thresholds out of play last year, with the zero yield decision, and reluctant to concede that it will not be able to retain nuclear explosions up to 10 tons TNT equivalent, Russia has not yet moved on scope; it is also sending mixed messages on PNEs, which Russia officially opposes, but which are favoured by the weapons laboratories and influential members of MinAtom. As the P-5 argue their own interests with regard to scope of the treaty, India continues to press for a more defined and explicit scope. In June 1995, India proposed (WP.244): "1. Each State Party undertakes to prohibit and to prevent, and not to carry out, any nuclear weapon explosion, or any other nuclear test explosion, or any release of nuclear energy caused by the assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical explosive or other means, at any place under or beyond its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." This text seems designed to ban all use of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear explosive testing, and should leave 'no loophole for activity, either explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued development and refinement of nuclear weapons', according to Ghose. However, some delegations have pointed out that the Indian definition raises as many ambiguities as it seeks to eliminate. In deliberate moves to promote closure on this all-important article of the treaty, Indonesia, Germany and Sweden gave up their bracketed text on scope. On 8 February, Agus Tarmidzi told the CD that Indonesia, which in 1995 proposed text prohibiting 'any nuclear weapon test or any nuclear explosion', had decided to support the Australian scope, underlining that in Indonesia's view this 'will ban all types of nuclear tests in all environments for all time.' At the same time Germany and Sweden withdrew their insistence that imminent preparations of a nuclear test explosion should be explicitly banned in the scope text. Instead, Germany proposed modified text in the sections on consultation and clarification and the executive council which would allow consideration of concerns on 'apparently imminent non- compliance' with the treaty, taken to mean activities that could be construed as preparations for a nuclear explosion. While Australia, in its recent 'model' CTBT text, reiterated its scope language from WP.222, which has attracted widespread support from CD members and observers, Iran has revived the Indonesian formula: "1. Each state party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out, any nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each state party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test or any other nuclear explosion referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article." The Iranian text's prohibition on any nuclear weapon test is clearly intended to outlaw laboratory experiments on nuclear weapon components and nuclear-weapon-related activities such as the announced US programme of sub-critical tests. Opinion differs (and Iran is not clear) whether such a formula would also ban computer simulations, theoretical testing or inertial confinement fusion. Indonesia is understood to have withdrawn its own text on this because of concerns that explicit verification of such a sweeping ban would be prohibitively expensive and intrusive, and that it had no chance of success. The US made it clear last August that going to zero would have to be accompanied by 'stockpile stewardship' plans to reassure Congress and the Pentagon that the 'safety and reliability' of US nuclear weapons would not be jeopardised. France and the UK have taken similar positions, while part of Russia's dismay over losing its desired ten ton provision was also related to stockpile maintenance. All four have indicated that they regard a ban on all nuclear-weapon-related testing to be both unacceptable (in the context of this treaty) and unworkable. China has remained enigmatic, although it is clear that the level of intrusion implied in such a scope would be difficult for the Chinese to accept. Some negotiators have also raised concerns that the Iranian formulation is ambiguous concerning the conduct of nuclear explosions in environments beyond any State parties' jurisdiction and control. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE)The Australian model text seeks to ban all nuclear explosions, making no distinction between military or non-military purposes. This position has been endorsed by almost everyone, on the two- fold grounds that it is well nigh impossible to verify that a nuclear device has been manufactured and exploded without any military benefit, and that the civilian benefits of PNEs have not manifested themselves during the past four decades of intermittent US and Soviet programmes. Since negotiations commenced in 1994, however, China has argued that PNEs should not be banned, but that 'all countries are entitled to make their own judgment about whether to develop and utilize PNE technology in light of its own national conditions and economic needs'. Although insisting that it does not favour PNEs itself, Iran has, through its draft text, offered a loophole on PNEs that is threatening to undermine the solid opposition to PNEs among the non-nuclear-weapon States. While Iran's text on scope (general obligations) would seem clearly to prohibit any nuclear explosion, Iran later gives the Conference of States Parties responsibility for considering 'in exceptional circumstances and in the case that the real benefit of nuclear explosion for the sole purpose of purely peaceful scientific research and civilian applications are demonstrated...a specific request for conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion.' A PNE would only go ahead if four-fifths of the Conference of States Parties agreed, and with verification 'to ensure that it will be conducted for purely peaceful purposes.' This attempt at finding a face-saving formula for China has antecedents in the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty and tripartite testing talks of 1977- 80, and is similar to a fix which Russia, under pressure from its own nuclear laboratories, had been tossing around for several weeks. While a number of delegations have expressed interest in this way out of the PNE hole that China has dug, arguing that a four-fifths majority of parties in favour of a PNE would be such a remote possibility that the Iranian restriction is tantamount to a ban, concern about the wider implications is growing. If, as everyone agrees, a PNE could not be researched, manufactured, conducted and verified on the present level of technology to satisfy the requirement that no military benefit should be obtained, the Iranian provision would be a clear invitation to nuclear physicists and interested governments to set up design teams to overcome the challenge. Since the nuclear device used in a PNE is essentially indistinguishable from one which can be used as a bomb, the CTBT would be setting up a right to conduct further research and experimentation on nuclear warhead design. Where the permission in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article V is confined to nuclear-weapon States, which may conduct PNEs on behalf of those which have renounced nuclear weapons, the Iranian text would appear to provide a right to all to research and develop nuclear devices for PNEs. If so, it negates the NPT prohibition on acquisition of nuclear materials for nuclear explosive devices; if not, it enshrines and perpetuates research and development by the five declared nuclear-weapon States and non- NPT parties. Any attempt at further controls would then be evaded on grounds that the erstwhile nuclear weapon design teams are now researching ways of refining PNEs. Thus, what started out as a seemingly benign way of making concessions to China while ensuring that PNEs would never be conducted, may well turn out to be a life-saver for the nuclear weapon laboratories, reinforcing more strongly than ever the privileges of the nuclear-weapon States, and setting in place a barrier which would make further restrictions on nuclear weapon development and production more difficult in any future negotiations. VerificationWhile there is broad agreement that the verification regime should comprise an international monitoring system (IMS) of four technologies, transparency, consultations and clarification, and on-site inspections, negotiators are increasingly referring to OSI -- and the role of national intelligence in particular -- as a potential `treaty-breaker'. With some of the details still to be worked out, the IMS is expected to comprise (at least): 50 primary and 100-150 auxiliary seismic stations; a hydro-acoustic network of 2 MILS (US Missile Impact Location System), four fixed cable hydrophones provided by Australia, Chile, France and the UK, and five T-phase systems provided by Canada, France, Mexico, Portugal and the UK; around 75- 100 radionuclide monitors; and around 70 infrasound detectors. Russia belatedly proposed that four primary seismic stations plus radionuclide monitors be located at each of the test sites at Nevada, Lop Nor, Moruroa and Novaya Zemlya. This is still being fought over among the P-5. Iran, in its speech to the 22 February plenary, expressed support for this position, but its draft text went along with the locations identified in the updated rolling text, also supported by Australia. The outstanding areas of disagreement over the IMS remain China and Pakistan's requirement for additional networks of satellites and EMP sensors, which the majority consider to be prohibitively expensive at this stage. Some questions still hover over the incorporation of noble gas monitoring and whether specially equipped aircraft should supplement the radionuclide network, as proposed by Russia. There is a general optimism that these issues can be worked out, although it is recognised that the positions of China and Pakistan on satellite and EMP networks are intimately related to rejection of any inclusion of national technical means in the verification regime, which is proving to be one of the most obdurate issues. Group of Scientific Experts (GSE)A seismic network would be at the core of the IMS. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE), chaired by Dr Ola Dahlman of Sweden, began testing GSETT-3 (GSE Technical Test 3) in January 1995 after nearly twenty years of discussions under the auspices of the CD. The purpose of GSETT-3 is to evaluate the effectiveness of an international seismic network and data transmission. GSETT-3 was designed to try out an international seismic network and provide experience and data useful for CTB verification by testing: a single international data centre (IDC), using the United States' existing IDC in Virginia; a primary network of about 50 seismic stations and 100-150 auxiliary stations; a modern communications system to support data exchange; and the involvement of national data centres (NDC). The GSE held an intersessional meeting from 27 November to 1 December, 1995, reported in CD/1372, and a further session from 12- 23 February 1996, reported in CD/1385. By the end of 1995 the GSETT-3 network comprised 41 primary stations and 76 auxiliary stations, of which 30 primary and 33 auxiliary stations are expected to be in the IMS envisaged for the CTBT. In its evaluation of the test so far, the GSE confirmed the concept of one IDC to process the information from the seismic network as 'proven effective', although problems of software overload were identified. However, the IDC had demonstrated 'the feasibility of providing a wide range of event bulletins, raw data and derived products' to national data centres (some of which, it was observed, suffered outages and would need upgrading to a more reliable level of operational capacity). The system was evaluated as meeting expectations of detecting blasts of at least 1 kt (1,000 ton TNT equivalent), though with considerable regional variations. Location capability also varied widely, which the GSE report attributed to uneven distribution of the GSETT-3 stations and the need to improve the tuning and calibration of the system being tested. It is expected that a further meeting of the GSE will take place, 20-24 May. On-Site Inspections (OSI)Getting agreement on on-site inspections is proving particularly difficult, as this cuts to the heart of States' concerns about national security, equal access to information, and ability to deter violations by a robust and timely inspection regime. Since OSI will be the most intrusive component of the verification regime, if invoked, determining the conditions, especially the basis for OSI requests and the decision-making procedure, have become the battleground for different approaches to verification and confidence. The dominant view is that the OSI regime should consist primarily of transparency measures combined with provision for inspections to gather evidence about an ambiguous event. An OSI would be a rare event, but the provisions in the CTBT should be sufficient to deter any would-be violator. Following 1994 work on the technical aspects of OSI, including residual evidence of a nuclear test, evasion scenarios and time considerations, discussion in 1995 focused increasingly on the political questions, but with little progress towards their resolution. Resolving the requirements of timeliness and protection against abusive requests are at the heart of disagreements over what kind of evidence is required to back up an OSI request by a State party and whether there is a presumption of access in the event of suspicion. Several States, including China, Israel and Pakistan want the period of consultation and clarification to be obligatory. According to China's proposed time-line, this could delay an OSI for three weeks, which other States consider too long. Many others, including Russia, advocate a period for consultation, but argue that its duration and requirements should be flexible, not mandatory. The US, France, UK and most of the Western States want OSI to be able to be initiated speedily, to catch time-critical phenomena such as aftershocks and noble gas releases. They argue that the Technical Secretariat could evaluate evidence and decide to undertake an inspection, though the Executive Council could vote to prevent it (a 'red light') if a majority considered it unnecessary or frivolous. In general the Western and Eastern Europeans consider that an OSI request should be able to be based on any relevant information. Although most now wish to avoid the term, this means national technical means (NTM). China, Pakistan, India and others prefer the stringent 'green light' process, requiring a positive vote by a majority (simple, two thirds or even three quarters) of the Executive Council. The G- 21 and China have argued against NTM on the grounds that they are available on a selective basis and may be used in a discriminatory way. To the surprise of many (and consternation of a few), the Iranian and Australian drafts came to similar conclusions, with presumption of access and two phases for OSI. For the initial or 'short phase', Australia echoed the earlier French proposal according different decision-making procedures, depending on whether the OSI request was based on IMS data (a 'red light' go ahead unless a two thirds majority of the executive council votes against) or solely on NTM (requiring a 'green light' majority decision by two thirds of the Executive Council). Iran, which proposed that an OSI request could only be based on IMS data, advocated a simple red-light procedure, requiring a majority of three quarters of the executive council to prevent the initial phase of an OSI from going ahead. This early, time- critical phase would consist of visual inspection, overflights and more focused monitoring. If this failed to clarify the suspicions, a further, much more intrusive inspection would have to be considered. Both the Australian and Iranian drafts would apply the stringent 'green light' to the consecutive phase of OSI, requiring a two-thirds majority to decide to go ahead. The UK has expressed concern that the two phase process could make agreement on the second more substantive inspection more difficult, especially if a well camouflaged test succeeded in minimising the superficial evidence. Both Australia and Iran sought ways of bridging the gulf over national intelligence between the US position (supported by Russia, UK and France) on the one hand and China, Pakistan and India (supported by many non-aligned countries) on the other. Australia allows OSI requests to be based on data from the IMS 'and/or by other elements of the treaty verification regime...' , including 'any relevant supplementary data or information'. However, Australia proposes associated measures promoting 'access by all States parties to other technical information and data relevant to the verification of the basic obligations of the treaty'. This reaches some way to meet South Africa's proposal of 7 February, that any State party wishing to rely on non-IMS data for an OSI request would have to provide 'the unprocessed information' to the Technical Secretariat for evaluation. Iran has proposed that an OSI request must be based solely on IMS data, but does not entirely slam the door shut on NTM, allowing supplementary information to be provided to the Technical Secretariat. The whole debate over national intelligence has become even more politically charged with recent allegations by the US, based on their intelligence sources, concerning Indian nuclear test preparations, Chinese exports to Pakistan of ring magnets for enriching uranium and Cuban air traffic and military communications over the downing of two civilian aircraft. Many of the G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States argue that to endorse NTM as a component of the CTBT verification regime would institute a power imbalance, discriminating against those with less sophisticated technical resources. This itself would be unacceptable for many; but more importantly it seems, they are concerned that this treaty should not set a precedent endorsing uncorroborated national intelligence information in the wider international context. At the same time they acknowledge that NTM, particularly with respect to satellite, EMP and optical data, would enhance the IMS coverage and increase the deterrence aspect of the verification regime. As evinced by both Iran and Australia's texts, there are indications that some kind of mechanism for sharing relevant data or subjecting it to independent analysis by the verification organisation might make limited incorporation of NTM acceptable to most of the non-aligned. Such a solution would require concessions from the US which that delegation has so far ruled out in unequivocal terms. Meanwhile China and Pakistan have publicly -- and recently -- reiterated their complete opposition to any provision for NTM data in this treaty at all. France, South Africa, Iran and Australia, as well as others in less formal ways, have attempted to find a solution whereby NTM can provide the verification regime with a cost-effective but accountable supplement to the IMS. Without some compromise from the US, Russia, China and Pakistan at their opposite poles, this issue may well harden to prevent conclusion of the CTBT. CTBT Organization (CTBTO)Implementation of the treaty will be overseen by a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), likely to comprise a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council of either 41 or 65 members, depending on how it is constituted, and a Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat, headed by a full time Director General, will coordinate the verification regime, including the IMS and IDC. Sweden, which had long advocated that verification should be under the auspices of the IAEA, indicated on 1 February that it would give up this 'preferred national position', while holding to the view that 'close collaboration between the CTBT Organization and the IAEA would present many advantages'. Egypt, which had also backed the IAEA, endorsed Sweden's concession as well. As reflected in both the Iranian and Australian drafts, it is clear that the CTBTO will be in Vienna, structurally independent from but in cooperation with the IAEA. The central question on organization concerns the composition of the Executive Council. The P-5 nuclear weapon States want to ensure they have seats, as do the major economic players like Japan and Germany, but others reject the concept of permanent seats. Some proposals in the rolling text mirror the composition of the IAEA Board of Governors, whereby the States with the largest nuclear infrastructure qualify automatically, the rest being rotated regionally. However, many smaller non-nuclear countries consider this would discriminate against their full participation. Israel changed its early backing for an elected council and proposed that the seats on the executive council should be designated, not elected, by alphabetical rotation from regional lists. In different ways, both Iran and Australia sought compromises that would meet the concerns of the major players and provide some balance of regional and security considerations. Iran's draft leans on the IAEA structure, proposing a council of 65 members, elected from the Conference according to their region: Africa (15); Asia (16); Eastern Europe (8); Latin America/Caribbean (11); and Western Europe and Others (15). Although all States would have the right to be on the council, there is no specific structural mechanism preventing the exclusion of any particular state if its region persistently fails to elect it. This is a concern raised by Israel, which a senior Iranian official said would not be a problem since Israel would be included among 'Western Europe and Others', together with Australia and New Zealand. By contrast, Australia looks to the CWC precedent, suggesting a smaller executive council of 41, regionally designated, but with at least two members per region per session designated by alphabetical rotation, thereby guarding against permanent exclusion of anyone. While Iran refers to 'due regard' being given to the importance of nuclear infrastructure, Australia seeks to balance interests and accountability by specifying that 'particular priority' shall be accorded to those States parties which a) have the highest number of IMS stations; b) have sizeable nuclear infrastructure; and c) which ratify before the treaty enters into force. Neither expands on how this weighting would operate in practice. While several delegations expressed interest in these options, it also left some of the major players deeply discontented, and many stressed that it was still too early to make a final decision. Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco, as Friend of the Chair on this issue, will continue consultations with delegations through March, with a view to providing Ramaker with some kind of path through this labyrinth of competing interests, possibly drawing on elements from both proposals. Entry into force (EIF)Agreement on the conditions under which the CTBT would enter into force, with implementation of the verification regime and decision- making apparatus is also proving elusive. The core options are for a simple number (from 40 upwards) supported by a growing number of States, a list (such as the countries on the IAEA list of States with nuclear infrastructure, viewed as a way of ensuring the P-5 and threshold States), and/or a mechanism to prevent one or a few States from preventing implementation of the treaty by using their refusal to accede as a veto. It is generally agreed that adherence by the declared and de facto nuclear weapon States is of utmost importance, but at the same time many States want to prevent any renegade from holding the treaty hostage. On 26 January India added another variable into the EIF debate, with a proposal relating entry into force to nuclear disarmament: "...this Treaty shall enter into force only after all States parties have committed themselves to the attainment of the goal of total elimination of all nuclear weapons within a well-defined time framework (of ten years)." Combined with similar linkage in language on the preamble and review of the treaty, India's EIF proposal has caused grave consternation among some delegations, who argue that it is unworkable on legal, practical and political grounds. Although the particular solutions they propose are different, the conceptual approach to entry into force by Iran and Australia was remarkable similar. Both suggest combining a list with a veto- avoiding mechanism. Though Australia's national preference is still for a simple number, the Australian model proposes that the concerns expressed by others could be met by specifying ratification by all CD members plus observers (now some 75 States, including the P-5 and threshold States), but providing for a conference which could be called after two years by those who have ratified. The Conference would decide whether to waive this stringent condition, even if a few states on the list have not yet joined, and inaugurate the verification system. This is a modified version of the US waiver conference proposal from last year, but without the US condition requiring all P-5 on board before such a conference could be convened, which several negotiators regarded as counter-productive. Iran provides the IAEA list of 68 States which have or have had nuclear technology or capability, and specifies that the treaty should enter into force if 65 out of these 68 States ratify (a modified version of the percentage option). There has already been some criticism that the Australians are taking a retrogressive step by basing EIF on the concept of an expanded CD, since that proposal had been dropped from the rolling text, and that Iran's proposal could conceivably result in implementation of the treaty without three of the nuclear weapon States or main threshold countries. Nevertheless, both drafts are welcomed as genuine attempts to find creative solutions to a potentially sticky issue. Characterised by Canada as a payoff between politically effective and operationally viable, EIF conditions can become central in some governments' national ratification debates, so must be credible, if not prohibitively stringent. Framework and PreambleThe Iranian and Australian drafts focused renewed attention on the framework and purpose of the treaty, sections of the rolling text which remain almost entirely in brackets, signifying lack of agreement. Both decided to omit China's articles on security assurances, peaceful uses and relation with other treaties, although Iran includes mentions elsewhere in its text. Inevitably the preamble becomes a site for competing approaches, especially on the relation of the treaty with nuclear disarmament. At the beginning of the 1996 session, India had put down additional preambular paragraphs, mostly linking the treaty to nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework. Iran took this forward with a paragraph calling for 'the speediest possible achievement of an agreement for total elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework'. Australia omitted all reference to time-bound frameworks, on grounds that it could not gain consensus, but tried to meet non-aligned, particularly Indian, concerns with a paragraph saying that a CTBT 'will constitute a meaningful step towards the realisation of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.' However, it dismayed others by dropping the reference to protection of the environment, despite Australia's national position of support, on grounds that it was opposed by some and 'not...essential in the context of this treaty.' One phrase from the rolling text that Iran has retained and Australia deleted has attracted some interesting reactions, as States begin to analyse and assess these two draft treaty texts. A preambular reference to an objective of the CTBT being 'to end the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems', originally proposed by India, could make the Australian scope text, with its implication of an undefined zero yield concept, more acceptable to some of the non-nuclear-weapon States; although the language is presently opposed by some of the nuclear weapon States, it appears to articulate the argument made in the CD by John Holum, US Director of ACDA, on 23 January, while also representing one of China's oft-repeated positions. Several States had proposed complete closure of the nuclear test sites, of which only three will be left, if France carries out its pledge to close the Pacific test sites: Nevada, Lop Nor and Novaya Zemlya. The US and Russia had argued that this was impossible since the sites were used for other activities, including research. Iran's text instead requires that the States parties 'shall cease all activities related to nuclear testing and close those parts related to the testing in the site...[and] shall also ensure that specifically designed equipment for testing shall be destroyed.' Iran also proposed that detailed information on past tests, including dates and yields, should be provided to the CTBTO. 1996 SessionThe first part of the 1996 session runs from 22 January to 29 March; the second part from 13 May to 28 June, and the final part from 29 July to 13 September. The possibility of 2-3 weeks of intersessional negotiations in April and early May are being discussed, although some States emphasise that they need time for personal consultations with their governments as well. Editor's note: The full text of, and relevant notes accompanying, Australia's draft treaty is available on e-mail from Dfax. Documents and SourcesDRAFT CTBT TEXTS: AUSTRALIA & IRAN STATEMENTS TO THE CDAustralia: Statement, 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations', by Mr Michael Costello, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 29 February 1996. Iran: Statement by His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the 1996 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 22 February. See Geneva Update for background, context and reaction. Extracts PreambleIran: "It is generally understood that the CTBT would halt modernization of second generation of nuclear weapons and arrest the race for gaining superiority and nuclear war fighting capability through the third generation. The CTBT aims, therefore, to end the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems and should be considered as a step towards nuclear disarmament. Achievement of an agreement for total elimination of all nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date within a time-bound framework could also be declared a principal aim. This would reflect, in a moderate way, the position of the great majority of the States. These aims could appropriately be included in the Preamble of the Treaty." ScopeAustralia: "On scope - the most fundamental provision of the treaty - our proposed text will be familiar. It was first tabled in March 1995 as Working Paper 222, and since then has attracted widespread support." Editor's note: the relevant provision of Working Paper 222 reads: "1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction and control. 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging. or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." Iran: "On the scope, given the strong aspirations of the international community for a comprehensive ban, no nuclear test in any place and at whatever yield should be permitted. A provision for peaceful nuclear explosions within the Scope, therefore, could create a loop-hole in the Treaty which would lead to suspicion during its implementation and eventually undermine the Treaty. Furthermore, it is a strong view that academic and scientific studies have, so far, not recognized any real civil benefit from nuclear explosions. Science, however, is not absolute in its assertions. The CTBT is a Treaty intended to last through decades or even generations. Its duration is indeed unlimited. It would hence seem reasonable to envisage, exceptionally and under stringent conditions, the possibility of peaceful explosions if the real benefit...for the sole purpose of purely scientific research and civilian applications are demonstrated in the future. The conditions for acceptance should be set in a manner to make use of this provision possible only when...peaceful benefits have been recognized universally. Even then, an explosion of this nature would only be conducted under strict international monitoring. Without attempting to burden the scope, therefore, stipulations may be made to this effect within the powers and functions of the Conference of States Parties." VerificationAustralia: "On verification we have incorporated the text already available for describing the four International Monitoring System technologies on which consensus has been achieved (seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and infrasound), and on associated institutional arrangements. We have suggested a middle-way solution to the debates surrounding the nature of verification reports and the inclusion of noble gas monitoring capability." Iran: "Much time has been spent to develop a verification mechanism which would both deter violations and detect them if they ever take place. Extensive technical considerations, particularly by the group of scientific experts [GSE], have demonstrated that verification can reliably be achieved with coverage of stations operating under the four monitoring networks. This presents a sufficient basis for the treaty to start while it does not preclude the examination of potential additional technologies and their possible inclusion in the system in the future. Moreover, the proposal by the Russian Federation to place four of the proposed seismic and radionuclide stations at the existing nuclear test sites would further improve the system and could be incorporated following an agreement by the nuclear weapon states. Introduction of national technical means, on the other hand, entails more complications than benefits and could put into question the reliability and validity of international verification. Verification of compliance with the Treaty should be solely based on the data collected from the international monitoring system." On-Site Inspection (OSI)Australia: "For on-site inspection (OSI) we have carefully and deliberately reflected both the substance and the structure of the Rolling Text. We have selected from the various options available there to produce an overall package which we consider contains the internal political and technical balances which are required for the OSI mechanism to be technically credible and politically acceptable. Bearing in mind the need to strike a balance between timeliness, the need to enable the detection of time-critical phenomena, and the need to protect against frivolous or abusive requests for an inspection, the approach we settled on is centred around a 'red- light' decision-making process if a request is based on IMS data and a 'green-light' process if the request is based solely on non- IMS data. It incorporates a two-phase approach to OSI - a short, less intrusive phase and, if deemed necessary, an extended phase when more intrusive activities would be undertaken." Iran: "The verification system needs to be completed with provisions for on-site inspection... An on-site inspection will principally be a rare event which needs to be conducted effectively. The State parties, as a rule, shall first resort to consultation and clarification. But this should not affect the timely conduct of OSI where and when necessary. In order to register and record the time-critical features of the testing the inspection team should be able to visit the site quickly. This visit would be limited only to visual observations. If needed, a consecutive inspection may be conducted in an intrusive manner provided that the Executive Council, after thorough review and assessment of the initial inspection report, decides on the inspection by a two-third majority of all members present and voting. The Executive Council shall supervise the conduct of OSI and have a right to halt the inspection if it considers [it] frivolous or abusive. In other words, a red light applies to the initial phase of inspection whereas a green light is required for the consecutive phase." TransparencyIran: "It is evident that with coming into effect of the CTBT nuclear test sites will no longer have any relevance. It would be useful therefore that, as an associated and transparency measure, States Parties would decide to close the test sites and destroy equipment specifically designed for nuclear testing. Transparency would also be served through submission of declarations on nuclear tests carried out in the past as well as notifications of chemical explosions of over 300 tons of TNT-equivalent as has been suggested." Entry into ForceAustralia: "...we have tried to take into account the major concerns of negotiating parties. These include the requirement for all 'key' States to ratify the Treaty before it enters into force and a need to prevent entry into force being blocked by a delay in ratification by any individual State. We have tried to find a formula that will ensure that the number of States parties at entry into force is adequate to enable effective financing of the CTBTO [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization] and that the number and composition of States Parties at entry into force is adequate to enable the effective implementation of the International Monitoring System. In order to accomodate these concerns, we have proposed a slight variation to the current waiver proposal. I would note that this is one area in which our proposed text differs considerably from our national preference, which remains for a simple numerical formula." Iran: "The Treaty would be most successful if all nuclear weapon States in addition to some other advanced nuclear States accede to it at the time of entry into force. It has, at the same time, been rightly argued that the Treaty should not become hostage to the decision, or indecision, of one or two States. We should bear in mind...that 68 States are listed by IAEA as those to have, [to have] ever had, or [to] have under construction nuclear power or nuclear research reactors. We could, therefore, stipulate that accession by 65 States out of the 68 would trigger the Entry Into Force, leaving a rather safe margin of three to avoid undue delay. ..." Organization and FundingAustralia: "Resolving the matter of Executive Council composition will clearly require flexibility on all our parts. Between us, we already have reached a consensus on the requirement that the Executive Council be an inclusive body, with a structure which allows a reasonable amount of discretion to regional groups in determining designation of seats, at the same time setting relatively objective criteria for appointment to continuous and other seats. The mechanism we propose attempts to give form to the consensus we already have on these principles." Iran: "We have always considered Vienna as the most suitable place to serve as the seat of the Organization for CTBT and believe that this enjoys consensus. There is also an overwhelming view that the CTBT needs an independent organization which may benefit from existing international expertise and facilities such as the IAEA. ... The CTBTO would include an Executive Council with elaborate and important powers and functions. It should fully represent the anticipated high number of parties to this Treaty. The number of 65 for its membership seems reasonable. Regional groups would elect their representatives... Notions of permanency or special status have been broadly objected to and should be avoided as any form of pre-arranged designation runs counter to the basic norms of democratic procedures. Regional groups, of course, have the right to re-elect a certain State or States..." The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: First MeetingSee also News Review. BackgroundOn 26 November 1995, Australia's Prime Minister, Paul Keating, announced the establishment of a Commission to report on prospects for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World (NWFZ). The Commission - 'The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons' - has been asked to report to the Prime Minister by 31 August 1996. The report will then be submitted to the UN and the CD. [Editor's note: the impact on the Commission following the defeat of Prime Minister Keating's Labour Party in the 2 March General Election is not yet clear.] The Commission's 17 members are: First meeting of the CommissionThe Commission held its first meeting in Canberra, 23-25 January. The Press Release from the meeting follows, plus extracts from an address by Australia's Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, and a press conference given by Minister Evans together with Commission Chair Sir Richard Butler. Press ReleaseCanberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: First Meeting, 25 January 1996Full text: "At its first meeting, held in Canberra 23-25 January, 1996, the Commission emphasised that there was, at present, an unprecedented opportunity and necessity to act to eliminate nuclear weapons from human life and the earth's environment. This unique moment in contemporary history must be seized. The Commission agreed to pursue its further work on the basis of addressing the key question of why a nuclear weapon free world must be achieved. The Commission would also carry out a critical analysis and rebuttal of the arguments employed for the retention or acquisition of nuclear arsenals. The Commission would develop a series of realistic measures through which the achievement of the elimination of nuclear weapons can be successfully and safely pursued. The Commission would continue its work at its second meeting, to be held in New York in April. The Commission's final report and recommendations would be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1996, and to the Conference on Disarmament." Speech by Australia's Foreign Minister, Gareth EvansAddress by Senator Gareth Evans, Foreign Minister of Australia, to the opening session of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, 23 January 1996Extracts: "The task confronting this Commission is as ambitious and important as any task could possibly be. It is now to make the case, if it can be made, as to why the world should now strive for the absolute elimination of nuclear weapons. It is to make the case, if it can be made, as to how such elimination might be achieved in practice. And it is to articulate these cases, assuming they can be made, in such clear and compelling terms that governments around the world will be persuaded to make the necessary commitment and take the necessary action. ... The first big issue that has to be tackled is obviously the question of 'why'. Why, given the global peace we have enjoyed since the nuclear age began, does it make sense now to seek the elimination of nuclear weapons? Why should the present nuclear weapons States give up their deterrent nuclear capability? And why should the present nuclear have-nots renounce their right to acquire it? The short answers, in Australia's view, are these. No-one's security will be helped by the continued existence of nuclear weapons. And everyone's security will be enhanced by their destruction. ... In the post-Cold War world, and in a globe where the forces of economics and technology are working more and more to unite States in common, cooperative strategies rather than to divide them, the prospect of any of the present nuclear weapons powers launching a nuclear attack on any other is presently negligible, and will remain so. One would not expect any of the nuclear powers to move to disarmament unilaterally, or other than on a step-by-step basis maintaining stable deterrence on the way down - but there is no reason why the threat of nuclear aggression from other nuclear powers should stop any of them from making the commitment to zero. No credible case can be made for any State maintaining a nuclear deterrent against the possibility of non-nuclear aggression from another country. One of the most difficult issues for the Commission to tackle will undoubtedly be the stated strategic concerns of countries like France - invaded twice this century - and Israel, vastly outnumbered by its Arab neighbours. But the truth of the matter is that internal and external constraints have made in the past, and will make in the future, nuclear weapons effectively unusable in any contingency short of a response to direct attack with nuclear weapons against one's own territory or armed forces. ... So long as anyone retains nuclear weapons there is always a risk, however small, of their accidental or inadvertent use. ...a genuine commitment to elimination is crucial to stop nuclear weapons proliferation - not only to the threshold and undeclared States, but to many other countries as well with the technological and economic capacity to acquire them. ... Without concrete moves towards the destruction of existing weapons by the declared nuclear powers, it will simply not be possible to embrace the threshold and undeclared States, or anyone else, in the bargain: no-one is going to play until they see the field as level, or at least becoming so. Without a serious commitment to elimination by the present nuclear haves, it is not going to be possible to put in place the kind of highly intrusive verification measures that will inhibit potential rogue States and sub-State groups from acquiring nuclear capability. ... ...it is impossible to understate the burden of responsibility that lies upon the shoulders of the present nuclear haves... Resistance is growing, accelerated by reaction to the French and Chinese tests, to what are perceived, for better or worse, as hypocritical double standards by the nuclear weapon States. If a nuclear deterrent capability is necessary for France and Britain, why shouldn't it be necessary for Germany and Japan, or India or Israel or Indonesia, or for that matter Australia? If the distinguishing characteristic of permanent Security Council status has been nuclear weapons possession, why should other States aspiring to that status forego their acquisition? These are the questions to which policy makers in many countries are increasingly going to have answers. And it is crucial that this Commission clearly articulate the answers: that nuclear weapons are not a security solution for anyone, but a problem for everyone. ... The nuclear weapon States While the whole global community has a direct and fundamental interest in the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the regime which manages that process and its outcome, the key responsibility...lies with the nuclear weapon States themselves. It must be recognised that the elimination of nuclear weapons will depend on decisions which they alone can make. And it must be accepted as an elemental truth that so long as any State possesses nuclear weapons, in any number, some other States will have a ready made excuse for aspiring to that status themselves. We should be under no illusions about the size of the task of nuclear disarmament which confronts the international community. More than 40,000 nuclear weapons exist in the world today, with a total destructive power around a million times greater than that of the bomb that flattened Hiroshima. ... Under START II, which has yet to be ratified, both Parties [US and Russia] have agreed to...deep cuts. But even if the disarmament schedules can be maintained, the five nuclear weapon States by 2003 would still have around 12,000 warheads between them. ... The world needs, if we are to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable time-frame, a practical program of nuclear reductions to which all five nuclear weapon States are committed. The nuclear weapon States will need to pursue that program in good faith and with renewed vigour. ... Specifically, we believe that further nuclear arms reductions treaties will need to be progressively negotiated by the United States and Russia, with movement made as early as possible towards the conclusion of START III. Further down the track, the UK, China and France will need to join the United States and Russia in five-power negotiations to achieve even deeper reductions. ... The United States and Russia can prepare the ground for five-power negotiations by developing a series of interim confidence building measures. For example, the United States and Russia might share information and expertise with the other three nuclear weapon States on how complex START provisions are verified. And the task does not end with the dismantlement of weapons. There are further processes that will also have to be pursued to make the reductions permanent and irreversible. * The weapons components need to be destroyed. * The weapons grade nuclear material needs to be burnt in reactors, or diluted for peaceful nuclear use. * At the stage of dismantlement, the nuclear weapon States have a special responsibility for accounting for and protecting the components and weapons grade material. The threshold and undeclared nuclear weapon States A central threat to the objective of non-proliferation is posed by the position of the threshold and undeclared nuclear weapon States... their continued refusal to join the NPT regime is of grave intrinsic concern not only in terms of proliferation, but also in terms of other key aspects of progress towards nuclear disarmament, not least reductions by nuclear weapon States and the conclusion of major multilateral instruments such as a CTBT. Accordingly, a major challenge is to close the gap which exists between those States - both nuclear and non-nuclear - which have supported and continue to support the NPT regime, and those few States who do not only remain outside it but whose policies directly challenge it. Action to address this situation - to achieve the universalisation of NPT obligations - must include consideration of the NPT opponents' security concerns, and an associated demonstration that possession by them of a nuclear weapon capability diminishes, rather than enhances, their security. ... It must be recognised that the universal acceptance of non- proliferation obligations through membership of the NPT will be essential to all three stockpile reduction processes to which I have referred - i.e. by US-Russia, by all five declared nuclear powers, and by the threshold/undeclared States. ..." Press Conference by Foreign Minister Evans and Commission Chair Sir Richard ButlerTranscript of press conference by Senator Gareth Evans and Ambassador Richard Butler at the conclusion of the first meeting of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, 25 January 1996Extracts from remarks by Gareth Evans "[I want to comment on] the recurring suggestion...that this enterprise really is a bit naive, romantic, quixotic in nature, and that really we'd be rather better off focusing just on the non- proliferation objective: in fact, as someone kindly suggested earlier in the week, we ought to re-name the Commission the 'Canberra Commission to do a Bit More to Curb Proliferation', and abandon this romantic aspiration to actually achieve elimination. Can I just say...that that sort of comment fundamentally and comprehensively misses the central point of the whole enterprise. And that is that if we are going to get somewhere with the proliferation problem...then the present nuclear weapon States simply have to get serious, and be seen to be getting serious, on the subject of actual elimination. It's just not going to happen otherwise." "The timing of it I think is something that has been in the back of my mind for a while, but it was really only in the context of the French tests and the international reaction to it, that it seemed to us that the international environment was right for a major exercise of this kind, with consciousness roused in the way that it is. I don't undervalue or underestimate the task of maintaining that level of consciousness. Bob McNamara expressed himself very disappointed, I think understandably, at the way in which the Stimson Report*, just two or three weeks ago in the United States, signed by four Four-Star Generals and arguing the case for elimination, disappeared without trace in the context of current American politics. You have got to keep working away." Extracts from remarks by Sir Richard Butler "Question: 'You've said the Commission had agreed that it would set out the practical steps that would need to be taken but how much agreement is there on what those practical steps should be?' Sir Richard: 'Substantial agreement. We've got a list that we call an 'action plan' which begins at the beginning, which is to encourage and facilitate the further development by those who hold nuclear weapons of measures through which they will eliminate them. And then moves on to an end to testing, a cut-off in the manufacture of fissile material for weapons purposes. In other words the things you do to prevent those who might want to from making new nuclear weapons and then move on to the agreements that we will need to ensure that clandestine and criminal activity doesn't take place. They're the three legs of the stool, the logical ones. Get rid of what already exists, prevent from coming into existence what people might plan, and to stop extra-systemic or criminal activity. Now these steps together with the means of creating them, verifying them and then putting them into a global compact...has been agreed to. I have a piece of paper that's called 'Steps in Action Plan'. We will need to articulate the detail of it. We'll do that in April. But there is complete agreement about those and I emphasise again, under the guiding principle that the goal of this is zero, I can't emphasise to you strongly enough how important that is; not reductions, not down to a chosen few to hold an evil few weapons, but zero.'" The Editor would like to thank the Australian High Commission in London for provision of the documentation featured above. US State Department START II Fact SheetState Department Fact Sheet, Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), 1 February 1996Full text "What is START II? The START II treaty is a bilateral treaty negotiated by the United States and Russia during 1991 and 1992. It was signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on January 3, 1993. START II builds on the foundation of START I to create an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement that reduces the number of strategic delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) and the number of warheads deployed on them. Overall strategic forces will be reduced by 5,000 warheads in addition to the 9,000 warheads being reduced under START I. Key Provisions of START II Because START II builds upon the START I treaty, START I remains in effect. START II will remain in force throughout the duration of START I, which has a 15-year duration and can be extended for successive 5-year periods by agreement among the Parties to the treaty. START II sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons that each Party may deploy. The final ceilings will be reached in two phases. Phase One is to be completed seven years after entry into force of the START I treaty (which was December 5, 1994). Phase Two is to be completed by 2003. However, Phase Two may be completed by the end of 2000 if the United States is able to provide financial assistance for the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia. By the end of the first phase, each Party must have reduced the total number of its deployed strategic warheads to 3,800-4,250. This includes warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the warheads carried on heavy bombers with nuclear missions. No more than 1,200 warheads may be on deployed ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs); no more than 2,160 on deployed SLBMs; and no more than 650 may be on deployed heavy ICBMs. By the end of the second and final phase, each Party must have reduced the total number of its deployed strategic warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs. No MIRVed ICBMs will be deployed by the end of the second phase. No more than 1,700-1,750 warheads may be on deployed SLBMs. There will be no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs. Downloading START II allows for a reduction in the number of warheads on certain existing MIRVed ballistic missiles. This is called "downloading." Such downloading will be permitted in a carefully structured fashion, which is a slight variation from the rules agreed in START I. * Each side will be able to download two existing types of ballistic missiles by up to four warheads each. * No more than 105 ICBMs of one of those types may be downloaded by up to five warheads each. Such an ICBM may only be deployed in silos in which it was deployed at the time the two START treaties were signed. Thus, the three-warhead US Minuteman III ICBM, the four-warhead Russian SS-17 ICBM, and 105 of the six-warhead Russian SS-19 ICBMs may be downloaded to a single warhead, to comply with the requirement to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs. The Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM and launchers for the SS-24 ICBM would be destroyed. SS-24 ICBMs would be eliminated in accordance with START procedures. Missile-System Elimination In START I, deployed SLBMs and most deployed ICBMs may be removed from accountability either by destroying their launchers or, with the exception of SS-18 silos, by converting the launcher so that it is only capable of launching another type of missile. Moreover, 154 SS-18 silos must be eliminated through destruction under START I. Under START II, those rules will continue to apply, but with the major exception of the SS-18. Ninety SS-18 silos may be converted to launch a single-warhead ICBM, which Russia has said will be a variant of the SS-25. The START II treaty provisions specify conversion procedures which are subject to inspection and which are virtually irreversible without destroying the silo. In addition to the elimination or conversion of SS-18 silo launchers, all SS-18 ICBMs, whether deployed or non-deployed, must be eliminated no later than January 1, 2003. This is a major improvement on START I, which did not require the destruction of silo-based missiles. Moreover, this provision achieves the long- standing US goal of totally eliminating heavy ICBMs. Heavy Bombers Under START II, heavy bombers will be attributed as carrying the actual number of weapons - whether long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), short-range missiles, or gravity bomb - for which they are equipped. This number is specified in the treaty's Memorandum of Attribution and is subject to confirmation by a one- time exhibition of the bombers and by on-site inspections. This attribution formula is another improvement over START I. Under START I, the first 150 US heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range ALCMs are attributed with 10 warheads; each bomber in excess of the 150 would be attributed with the actual number of long-range ALCMs it is equipped to carry. For the former Soviet Union, the first 150 heavy bombers are attributed with eight warheads; each heavy bomber in excess of 150 would be attributed with the number of long-range ALCMs it is equipped to carry. For both Parties, all heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons other than long-range ALCMs are attributed with one warhead each. Up to 100 heavy bombers that were equipped for nuclear arms other than long-range ALCMs may be reoriented to a conventional role and exempted from accountability under START II. Such bombers will be based separately from heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons, they will be used only for non-nuclear missions, and they must have observable features that differentiate them from nuclear- equipped heavy bombers of the same type. If these heavy bombers are returned to a nuclear role, which is permitted, they will become accountable under START II and may not be returned to their exempted status. Verification The comprehensive, intrusive START I verification regime also will apply to START II. Additionally, START II has new verification measures. These include the following: * Observation of the conversion of SS-18 silos; * Observation of SS-18 eliminations; * Exhibitions of heavy bombers to allow confirmation of capacity; and * Exhibition of reoriented bombers to confirm their observable differences. Moreover, reentry vehicle inspections (RVOSI) will allow inspectors visual access to the front ends of ICBMs and SLBMs to verify that the numbers of warheads attributed to those systems match the number deployed on them." US disclosures on plutonium exports, imports and stocksSee also News Review. The disclosures were made at a Department of Energy (DoE) press conference on 6 February. Press ReleaseDepartment of Energy Press Release, 'Openness', 6 February 1996Extracts Policy of openness "Openness: An Administration Policy President Clinton has said that 'an informed citizenry is essential to the democratic process and...the more the American people know about their government the better they will be governed. Openness in Government is essential to accountability...' Acting on this belief, on 17 April, 1995, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information. This Order emphasizes the Administration's commitment to open Government while recognizing that the national interest requires that certain information must be maintained in confidence... In recent years dramatic changes have altered, although certainly not eliminated, the national security threats that we confront. These changes provide a greater opportunity to emphasize our commitment to open Government. Openness in the Department of Energy: A Unique Opportunity and Challenge ... A strong commitment to openness is particularly important at the Department of Energy. A tradition of secrecy affects progress on key missions, particularly cleanup of nuclear weapon facilities, disposition of nuclear weapon materials, and stemming nuclear proliferation. ... ... Executive Order 12958 sets a new direction towards a more open Government, but it only applies to one kind of classified information, called National Security Information. The Department of Energy, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is responsible for another kind of classified information called Restricted Data (and 'Formerly Restricted Data'...). These kinds of information do not fall under the scope of Executive Order 12958. They concern nuclear weapon-related technology and have long been recognized as being so sensitive as to warrant the special protection that are provided by classification as Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data. As a result, in order to fulfill President Clinton's commitment to Government openness, the Department of Energy must not only implement the President's Executive Order must also help redirect the policies and procedures governing the Government-wide classification and declassification programs for Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data. The Department of Energy is taking a wide variety of measures to deliver on the commitment to a more open Government. ..." Plutonium disclosures "'Plutonium: The First 50 Years' The Department is releasing a formerly classified report, 'Plutonium: The First 50 Years,' concerning the production, acquisition, use, disposition, and inventories of plutonium in the United States over the past 50 years. In unprecedented fashion, the report announces the following: * Plutonium produced in the United States. * Plutonium acquired from foreign countries. * Transfer of United States-origin plutonium to foreign countries. * Plutonium expended as a result of various processes. With respect to plutonium inventories, the Department is announcing the Government's total inventory of plutonium, 99.5 metric tons, which includes the holdings of both the Department of Energy and Department of Defense. This newly declassified data is incorporated into the report, 'Plutonium: The First 50 Years.' In 1993, the Department declassified and revealed that the United States plutonium inventory was 33.5 metric tons. However, this total excluded the quantities at the Pantex Plant in Texas and in the Department of Defense stockpile, which is revealed today for the first time. The information publicly released for the first time today is directly relevant to the current debate about the proper management and ultimate disposition of plutonium. ... In addition, the release of information by the United States should encourage other nuclear powers, such as Russia, to declassify and publicly release similar information. Declassification provides multi-level transparency which is necessary as the basis for developing the mutual trust needed to successfully conduct any meaningful, international negotiations. Declassification is important to conducting meaningful bilateral inspections at current or former nuclear facilities under arms control and reduction agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. It is also essential for the granting of access to inspectors as required under the provisions of international safeguards and non-proliferation agreements. That access builds trust and helps to develop mutual confidence between nations thereby reducing the risk of conflict. The quantities of plutonium and uranium listed in the Fact Sheets are based upon the best available records, some of which are very old. Re-evaluation of the original records may result in some revision of the quantities. Since the Department has received numerous inquiries from the public, a similar report will be written about the production, use, disposition, and inventories of highly enriched uranium covering the last 50 years and will be released in about 1 year." FiguresExports of plutonium Storage sites and waste deposits Remarks by US ACDA DirectorRemarks by John Holum, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Non-Proliferation Breakfast Meeting, Washington, 15 February 1996Prepared remarksNPT "...as the NPT has been made permanent, quietly but emphatically, the world is also moving to make it universal. Four more countries have joined...since May. Those are Chile, Comoros, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. And we hope that four more - Andorra, Angola, Djibouti and Oman - will join soon. And that would bring the total membership...to 185, and leave only five countries outside [Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan]. ... Obviously, the run-up to the NPT Review and Extension Conference brought in a number of additional countries, and that trend has continued since. It's a very important but little noticed trend..." South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) "We've explained to ASEAN States that the latest text of the Treaty and Protocol still does not meet all of our fundamental concerns. We hope those concerns will be adequately addressed because we want very much to take part in that Treaty as well. We want that because the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zones are mutually reinforcing. ..." Questions and answersTimetabled programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons "...my strong belief [is] that the notion of establishing an imposed timetable for complete elimination of nuclear weapons...is a way to stall, rather than advance, the cause of disarmament. This Administration...has made clear our support for the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. ... If we say we want it all at once, we want it established now that it will all be done by a certain period, you will gum up and freeze the decision making process. The process is working... And...what I find most puzzling is the argument that we should stop the step-by-step approach just when it in fact has become the stride-by-stride approach. We are making enormous progress in arms control and disarmament..." Russian ratification of START II "I think ultimately it will be ratified because it is manifestly in Russia's interests. It will provide for true equality rather than the equality that is basically by formula in START I, where the counting rules on bombers favour the United States. It will provide for equality at force levels that the Russians can meet without starting up new production lines, and without replacing on [a] one-to-one basis weapons as they become obsolete, and without spending the enormous amounts that they would have to spend in order to build up to START I levels in the absence of an agreement. So I think the Treaty is of great value to Russia as well as to the United States. And I think that reality will ultimately prevail no matter what happens in the [June Presidential] elections. I think, however, delay has been costly and it makes it more problematic than it would have been had we...acted in a timely fashion last year." The ABM Treaty and the ballistic missile threat "I think it would be a serious mistake at this stage to withdraw from the ABM Treaty or to implicitly jettison the Treaty by mandating deployment of a national missile defense. I, therefore, am pleased with the new defense authorization bill... And the reason I say that...is because the ABM Treaty has enormous influence in the context of...ratifying and implementing both START I and START II. And...those treaties in combination are in fact an enormously effective, 100 per cent effective, national missile defense against the most deadly missile that the Russians had ever deployed, the SS-18, because every one of those missiles...will be completely eliminated without firing a shot and with absolute certainty, based on twelve different kinds of inspections. So, to jettison the ABM Treaty and thus jeopardize the START treaties...seems to me a bad policy, particularly when experts tell us that there is not...a ballistic missile threat to the United States from the so-called third country threats that are being discussed any time in the near-term future. ... I can't rule out the possibility...that some day this country may need a national missile defense... But this is not a subject that is being neglected. ...this isn't something where you'd wait seven or eight years and then move from a standing start. There is a great deal of R&D [Research & Development] and other work underway. ..." Possible sanctions against China Editor's note: the possibility arises (see News Review) over alleged sales to Pakistan of nuclear-weapons related technology. "I believe that sanctions have a very valuable, constructive role... Now, in terms of how they can be applied in specific cases, I think it's important for the Executive to have some flexibility... I think that, in the case of the Nonproliferation Prevention Act, Section 825, that Congress has...been fairly flexible, because it also includes a fairly broad waiver provision..." South Asia "...the situation in South Asia...is a very dangerous one...in terms of the time urgency of coming to terms with missile and nuclear potential. ... You have in both countries the ability within a short period of time to assemble nuclear weapons. You have two countries that are in the advanced stages of developing missile capabilities. And...what particularly concerns me is the juxtaposition [of] countries that are adjacent to each other and very close [in] missile and nuclear capabilities. And I base that [assessment] in part on our own experience. During the height of the Cold War...we...had warning times of any nuclear exchange of - what? - twenty minutes, [a] half hour, [something] in that range... In this case, because of proximity, the warning times with missiles would be less than reaction times, and that creates a very dangerous circumstance..." Remarks by US Defense SecretaryRemarks of Defense Secretary William Perry at the Hoover Institute Board of Overseers Meeting, Madison Hotel, Washington DC, 31 January 1996Extracts from Secretary Perry's addressDismantlement of nuclear weapons under START "I...never imagined that the Russian defense minister would help me blow up an American nuclear missile silo in Missouri, which we did three months ago. I've spent most of my career as a Cold Warrior trying to find ways to prevent Russians from blowing up nuclear silos. And there the two of us were, each of us putting a thumb down on the detonating device and causing this silo to blow up, pursuant to the START Treaty. I never imagined that I would help him and the Ukrainian defense minister blow up a missile silo in Ukraine, which we did just two weeks ago. We stood in the snow and ice at Programaisk [sic], and each of us turned a launch control key. These are the keys that were originally used to launch the missiles, and they had them rigged up so that s the three of us turned the key, the silo detonated. A year ago...this silo was one of 80 at Programaisk which in aggregate contained 700 nuclear warheads, all of them aimed at targets in the United States. Five months from now, by this June, the last of these warheads will have been removed and the missile field will have been turned into a wheat field. Indeed, over the past year, the Defense Department has not only destroyed thousands of American nuclear weapons, but it has helped dismantle and destroy thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons as part of a cooperative self-reduction program. We spend $400 million a year out of the defense budget helping the Russians and Ukrainians and Kazakhstanis dismantle and destroy their nuclear weapons complex. When I'm challenged by Congress, which I am, to justify the expenditure of defense funds for what some of them consider non- defensive purposes, I tell them that these programs are an example of defense by other means. That is, we are strengthening our own security by helping the Russians reduce their nuclear weaponry. These are the benefits of engagement." Extracts from question-and-answer sessionBallistic missile proliferation and defence "Question: 'This morning's paper mentions that the Iranians are testing a Chinese cruise missile in the Gulf. While I know you're conducting efforts on the...supply side of these advanced missile technologies, like the Missile Technology Control Regime, do you think at some point it would be appropriate for the US to begin deployment of ballistic missile defense capabilities?' Secretary Perry: '... First, a key part of our policy to deal with proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is to try and make it as difficult as possible for countries like Iran to get them. We have been reasonably successful in that, but not totally successful. One of the leakage points is through technology coming into Iran from China. And one of the reasons for wanting to engage with China is that we can pursue a policy of trying to get them to stop that better by engaging with them than by being isolated from them. To this point...that policy has had moderate success, but it has not been completely successful, as evidenced by this cruise missile transfer to...Iran. So trying to restrict the sale of arms and the transfer of technology is something we will continue to pursue, but we cannot count on it being successful. And that gets to your second point, what do we do in terms of ballistic missile defense? We are pursuing, in my judgment robustly, vigorously, a so-called theater missile defense program in the United States which will give us the capability of defending US forces and US allies against medium-range ballistic missiles. We are moving towards...the production and deployment of this system on a high- priority schedule where the first of the new generation of such systems will begin their deployment in a few years. We're also working cooperatively with several of our allies - Japan, the United Kingdom, to name two of them - to formulate joint programs in ballistic missile defense in which we cooperate, we pool resources to arrive at a quicker and more economical ballistic missile defense for all countries involved. And finally, we are in the development phase of a national missile defense program, which has very limited objectives. It is to protect ourselves against the very small-scale attack that might come from a rogue nation getting a hold of some missiles and perhaps getting a hold of some nuclear warheads. We don't see that last threat as being a likely threat. Nevertheless, we are pursuing the development of a system. We will...be three years from now in a position to make a deployment decision. That is, if three years from now we decide to deploy a system, it will be far enough on its development that we can begin on production and deployment. It will take another three years to get that system deployed and in the field. So we are six years away from the deployment of a national missile defense system if we elect to make that deployment decision three years from now. ...the short-range, medium-range ballistic missile threat is upon us now, and therefore the very sharp emphasis in our missile defense program is on what we call theater missile defense...'" US statement on the Wassenaar ArrangementThe Wassenaar Arrangement, Address by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Lynn E. Davis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 23 January 1996In December 1995, 28 States reached agreement on an arrangement with regard to international arms sales intended to develop into a successor regime to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports Controls (COCOM). Whereas COCOM was designed to prevent arms transfers to the Soviet bloc, the new Arrangement is targeted principally at 'rogue' states in the developing world. On 23 January 1996, US Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis outlined in detail the reaction of the Clinton Administration to the new agreement, and its hopes for its consolidation and strengthening. Substantial extracts follow. "In December 1995, twenty-eight governments agreed to establish a new international regime to increase transparency and responsibility for the global market in conventional arms and dual- use goods and technologies. The official name of the regime is 'The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies' - Wassenaar being the town outside The Hague where five rounds of negotiations took place over the past two years. The Wassenaar Arrangement is just an initial international framework that will need to be elaborated and defined more fully. But it already represents some notable achievements for US foreign policy. For the first time there is a global mechanism for controlling transfers of conventional armaments, and a venue in which governments can consider collectively the implications of various transfers on their international and regional security interests. In view of the close association between advanced technologies, including production technologies, and modern battlefield weapons, sensitive dual-use commodities will receive the same measure of scrutiny as do arms. Moreover, the preliminary scope of international support for this enterprise is already quite broad. Our friends and allies in Europe and in the Pacific comprise the core membership, but Russia and the four Visegrad States of Central Europe [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland] have also joined as full members. ... Restraint in Trade to Pariahs Even before its establishment, the regime has served to attract countries worldwide wishing to join the first post-Cold War security framework. To meet the membership criteria, they have taken steps to adhere to the policies of other non-proliferation regimes and to establish effective export controls. Most importantly, all of the participating countries currently maintain national policies to prevent transfers of arms and sensitive technologies for military purposes to the four pariah countries - Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. This is a critical requirement that the United States insisted on - and will continue to insist on in examining the credentials of new members. The United States has sought and obtained commitments through sensitive, high-level negotiations that produced bilateral agreements with Russia and other prospective members to close down their arms sales to Iran and forego any new contracts involving arms and arms-related technologies. By requiring responsible arms transfer policies as a condition for membership, the new regime fosters our international security interests and the security of long-standing allies, such as Israel and South Korea who live in dangerous neighbourhoods. ... The transparency provisions in the new arrangement and our own national technical means will give us confidence that current policies of restraint toward the pariah countries are continuing and that future transfer policies remain consistent with this goal. Does this mean that we have bridged our differences with Europe over high technology sales to Iran? Unfortunately, we continue to have serious concerns with European policy in this area. What we have obtained to date is a growing recognition that certain levels of technology trade, even when intended for civilian use, should not be carried on in secrecy. When it comes to dangerous regimes like Iran, international transparency - and accountability - are necessary. The Wassenaar Arrangement will help advance that proposition through the initial information sharing measures. But, those measures need to go much further before we can say there are effective international guidelines in place that will prevent future tyrants from embarking on the kind of military build-up that Saddam Hussein undertook before invading Kuwait. Preventing Destabilizing Accumulations of Arms ... The case of Iraq showed us that often the only constraint on a State's ability to obtain dangerous arms is its ability to pay for them. Suppliers from both East and West, including our allies and American firms, contributed in different ways to Saddam Hussein's multi-billion dollar military build-up. How will this arrangement help us to prevent future Iraqs? During plenary discussions and working group meetings, governments will share intelligence on potential threats to international and regional peace and security. They will look particularly at clandestine projects and dubious acquisition trends. They will also exchange specific information on a regular basis about global transfers to non-participating countries of certain sensitive dual- use goods and technologies. More than one hundred of these have been selected for this information sharing, including machine tools, computers, and telecommunications. ... Governments have agreed to notify denials of items on this list to non-participating States promptly on an individual, case-by-case basis and of transfers on an aggregate and periodic basis. They will also require notification of any transfers of any sensitive item previously denied by another member State for an essentially identical transaction. This transparency in the transfer of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies will help the new regime identify acquisition patterns that suggest emerging threats to regional and international peace. Transparency also allows countries to alert one another to export requests that warranted denials. This will help foster common and consistent export policies, while eliminating inadvertent undercuts by participants. Although all export decisions will remain fundamentally at the discretion of each country, transparency will enhance responsibility in arms transfers because countries will only go forward with those transfers that they are prepared to defend to others in the arrangement. We will obtain similar benefits from the transparency regime on the arms side. We will provide information on arms transfers on a weapons list that initially will be composed of the categories of major weapon systems used for the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Treaty and the UN Arms Register. The information will come twice a year and include more details than previously available, such as descriptions of the model and type of all weapons, except for missiles. And we have agreed as a priority to expand and redefine that list to cover more comprehensively the weapons of modern warfare. In the cases of both armaments and dual-use items, governments will have the ability to request additional information on individual transfers through diplomatic channels. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement is expected to provide for more intensive consultations and more intrusive information sharing among six major weapons suppliers: the US, United Kingdom, Russia, France, Germany, and Italy. From the United States perspective, we hope that this group will provide the means of defining common approaches to trade with regions of potential instability, such as the Middle East and South Asia. It could also include steps to enhance stability by preventing the introduction of sophisticated weaponry in certain parts of the world, where it currently does not exist. We have made some specific proposals to the other five suppliers concerning timely notification of shipments of major weapons and the development of measures to address situations of particular concern. ... Next steps The first plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement is slated for early April in Vienna. Vienna will be the homebase for the regime and the site of a small Secretariat to conduct day-to-day work. Member governments will use the intervening months to make preparations at the national level necessary to carry out the understandings they have reached and to work out the modalities for sharing information on specific transfers. The Wassenaar Arrangement will be open, on a global, non- discriminatory basis, to all countries meeting the agreed membership criteria. There is a line forming of countries seeking membership, e.g., Argentina, South Korea, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine. We hope that some of these countries will have met the criteria by the time of our April plenary. Perspective on the Arrangement Although the COCOM parties were responsible for initiating development of The Wassenaar Arrangement, the successor regime differs significantly in its goals and procedures, given the changed strategic environment. COCOM was designed as an institution of the Cold War to respond to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. The West sought to maintain its qualitative edge on the battlefield by a virtual prohibition on sales of arms to 'communist countries' and by controlling the export of strategic products and technical data. As the original threats of the Cold War diminished, new threats to global security began to emerge, including the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. This led the US and other countries to develop worldwide non-proliferation regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group. The Wassenaar Arrangement extends and complements this development. And it begins, as did these other regimes, with the initial elements essential to getting underway the practical work - frameworks, basic guidelines, and lists. Although we are pleased that the regime will be up and running at the April plenary, I want to note quite frankly that the arrangement falls short of US goals in some important areas. We need to go further. Americans hold as a fundamental principle the importance of promoting international responsibility in arms transfers and in public accountability for these transfers. Not all participants in this agreement share this view and some have consistently resisted comprehensive information sharing - even in diplomatic channels. Specifically, the United States found itself alone in supporting prior notification of transfers. The United States also did not win support for focusing the information sharing on regions of instability and where the security risks are the greatest, because participants raised political objections to 'targeting' specific regions or countries. Instead, we will begin with a global exchange. As a result, we will share and obtain not only all of the information that we would have available through a regional focus, but additional information as well. That said, the Wassenaar Arrangement provides an initial international framework to respond to the critical security threats of the post-Cold War world and to promote the overall non- proliferation and conventional arms transfers policies of the Clinton Administration. The realization of a broadly based multilateral arrangement covering conventional arms and dual-use commodities has only been possible through strong American leadership, leadership which must continue to ensure the further development of more specific measures in the new regime to meet the risks to international peace and stability around the world." News ReviewReview compiled from reports appearing between 15 January and 15 February. The Review is an account of news reports and does not seek to put forward or reflect the views or claims of Dfax. France conducts sixth and final testAt 2130 GMT on 27 January, France conducted what it subsequently declared (29 January) to be its final nuclear test. On 13 June last year, President Chirac announced that France would be conducting a final series of eight tests. The series was subsequently scaled back to six. The purpose of the tests is generally regarded as having been twofold: to complete certification of a new strategic warhead (the TN75, to be loaded on the M-45 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) ); and to accumulate data relevant to the computer-simulated tests that France feels will be necessary following the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The last test was reportedly the most powerful of the six explosions. According to a 27 January Defence Ministry statement: "The energy released by the blast was less than 120 kilotons". The dates and estimated yields of the six tests were as follows: This review purports to give a thorough, but by no means exhaustive, summary of reaction to both the sixth test and the announcement that it was to be the last. Reaction to sixth testNuclear Weapon StatesFrance Defence Ministry statement, 27 January"[T]he aim of the test was to guarantee the safety and reliability of the weapons in the future." Socialist Party statement, 28 January"[The test was] a sixth mistake." Former Gaullist President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, 28 January"I wish [for] the fastest possible conclusion to French nuclear testing." US White House spokesperson Ginny Terzano, 28 January"The US policy on nuclear testing is unchanged. We support a global moratorium as we work to complete and sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year... [The US is] working closely with the French to get this." South PacificAustralia Prime Minister Paul Keating, 28 January"Such an irresponsible action sends the worst possible signal to nations that aspire to possess nuclear weapons, and damages efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation..." Opposition Conservative Party leader John Howard, 28 January"It shows a continuing pattern of French insensitivity... it will be resented by all Australians, irrespective of [how] they intend to vote at the next election [on 2 March]... I know I speak for all Australians when I say that what the French have done flies in the face of civilised world opinion." New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger, 28 January"The aim of the world must be to stop nuclear testing forever and as a step in that direction, France must close its testing sites in the Pacific for all time. ... There is no such thing as a safe nuclear test..." Other reactionJapan Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, 28 January"It is extremely regrettable..." Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama, speaking on 28 January, said that Japan "takes very seriously the fact" that France had "twice ignored" the call made in the 12 December UN General Assembly resolution for an immediate end to all tests. Norway Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Gidal, 28 January"We regret this sixth nuclear test. In light of previous statements from French authorities, we hope this will be the last French nuclear test... All efforts must now be made to conclude work on a comprehensive test ban treaty." Philippines President Fidel Ramos, 28 January"The Filipino people, and I personally, once again condemn in the strongest terms the latest test... This test comes also shortly after the heads of government of all 10 Southeast Asian countries signed a treaty on a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone as our region's contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The series of French tests defies the spirit in which this treaty was concluded... sadly, the encouraging progress that has been achieved in non-proliferation is undermined by the continued testing of nuclear weapons by France and China." Reaction to announcement of 'definitive end' to testingNuclear Weapon StatesFrance For the full text of President Chirac's 29 January announcement, see last issue. Defence Minister Charles Millon, address to Parliament, 30 January"The President had the intelligence to take the steps which now put France in a position to demand disarmament and cooperation." Charles Millon speaking on RTL Radio, 30 January"Now we will have to move to abolish nuclear tests completely and France favours the zero [yield] option... We said in advance that this would be our last series of tests and we would stop completely afterwards but others said: 'We are stopping tests but we may continue them a bit'*. Our answer is No, we must stop tests altogether so that the treaty is not a hypocritical one. If we ban tests, we must ban all tests..." Also speaking on RTL Radio, Millon claimed that the tests "had been a 100% success. They gave us scientific data as never before...which will allow laboratory simulation which will protect our nuclear deterrence". The French arsenal, he added, was now "credible, safe and able to protect the next generation". *Editor's note: coverage of these remarks suggest that this may refer to a now-shelved US proposal allowing for easy withdrawal from a CTBT to conduct further tests; alternatively, it could refer to extremely low-yield hydronuclear testing, also now abandoned by the US and others, or China's continuing commitment to Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs). Jacques Bouchard, Head of the Military Department, Commissariat for Atomic Energy (CEA), article in Le Figaro, 13 February"The six tests provided full experiments, each of them with various objectives... The objectives have been fulfilled. This is an indisputable technical success. ... Simulation aims at guaranteeing the duration of our deterrent by giving us the capacity to renew our current weapons in 15 to 20 years without any further test." Statement by French Green Party, 30 January"The abandoning of the seventh and eighth tests could be a cause for modest satisfaction... [However, simulations] will allow maintenance of nuclear weapons... For those who battle for abolition of the atomic bomb, the fight goes on." Russia Foreign Ministry spokesperson Grigory Karasin, 30 January"Moscow greets with satisfaction the decision by the French President Jacques Chirac to end nuclear testing... As is well known, Russia consistently sticks to a moratorium on experiments on nuclear weapons and sees it as a great contribution to ending all nuclear tests..." Referring to China (see below), Karasin added: "We hope that the step-by-step progress towards ending nuclear tests will be international". President Yeltsin, 31 January"[This is] an important and mature step in the field of nuclear non-proliferation." Editor's note: On 29 January, it was announced by President Chirac's office that Presidents Chirac and Yeltsin would jointly Chair the summit on nuclear safety issues scheduled for 19-20 April in Moscow. The conference was a Russian proposal made at the G-7 Summit in Canada last June. UK Foreign Office spokesperson, 29 January"France did say it would [not] go on after six tests if it got the results it wanted. This decision today is a matter for them." Opposition Labour Party Foreign Affairs spokesperson Robin Cook, 29 January"[The announcement comes] six tests too late. It would have been better if there had been no tests at all..." US Statement by White House Press Secretary, 29 January"Today, France announced it has conducted its final underground nuclear test in the South Pacific. Since 1993, the United States has consistently urged that all nations abide by a global moratorium on nuclear testing as we work to complete and sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The United States welcomes France's decision to end nuclear testing in the Pacific and France's strong support for the early conclusion of a zero yield CTBT. Today's announcement in Paris will provide new momentum to our efforts to conclude a CTBT that can be signed this Fall, as called for by President Clinton in his 23 January State of the Union Address. A CTBT will be a historic milestone in our efforts to advance the cause of nonproliferation and disarmament and will reduce the nuclear danger to every American and people all over the world." South PacificFrench Polynesia Gaston Flosse, President of the Territorial Assembly, 30 January"We salute the courage of Jacques Chirac... it is thanks to his tenacity that France now has a credible deterrent suitable for a great nation. ... as long as Jacques Chirac is there, there is no chance of France losing interest in Polynesia... [Chirac deserves praise for] daring to resume and to stand alone against everyone... The excesses of the New Zealanders and Australians, aided and abetted by Greenpeace, did not diminish his tenacity and his courage... [Chirac should be remembered as] the man who signed the Rarotonga Treaty and put a final end to testing." Marc Helias, spokesperson for the Territorial Administration, 30 January"The territorial government here is completely in agreement with Jacques Chirac and his government. Even if a part of the population was against the tests, we allowed some more tests to take place knowing that this was the end of the process. The tests are over and the most important thing in the eyes of the Polynesians is development in future years. Here in French Polynesia, people are speaking of a new era." Leader of the Polynesian independence movement, Oscar Temaru, 30 January"In his statement, the President [Chirac], true to his nature and to the arrogance he has always shown towards my country and the whole world, didn't even say a word about Polynesia and its people. What cynicism towards us! It is as if we didn't even exist for him. He is bequeathing us two nuclear waste-bins as a legacy that will remain forever frozen in the belly of our mother earth." Australia Prime Minister Keating, 30 January"The fact that he has announced their cessation is welcome, but they should never have been on in the first place... There was never a case for these tests. To find a major democracy like France [testing] at this point after the end of the Cold War was completely unacceptable..." Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, 30 January"This chapter is by no means closed and it won't be until we can be confident that there has been no environmental damage." New Zealand Prime Minister Bolger, 29 January"The end of testing is welcome, but France should never have resumed testing in our region in the first place. France's testing in the Pacific, in defiance of world opinion, has cast a shadow over its relations with the region. France will have to work hard to regain lost ground. We want to see France play a positive role in our region, as it does in international affairs generally. But the restoration of France's standing in the region will necessarily be a gradual process." Prime Minister Bolger, speaking in a radio interview, 30 January" Hopefully that's the end of it - full stop, finito, finished... The Pacific will look at the French with a careful eye for some years to see whether or not there is anything else they're going to go back on..." EuropeBelgium Foreign Minister Eric Derycke, 30 January"I hope this practice of nuclear test]s]...will be ended definitively and worldwide... [Any further testing] must be avoided at all cost[s]..." Denmark Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen, 30 January"I am extremely happy to learn of this decision. It is very good news, but it does not mean that I am not still very critical of the atomic tests which the French carried out. ... Let us hope that this step taken by France opens the way to a total end of nuclear tests in the world in 1996." Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 30 January"President Chirac has...kept his word by completing the series of tests at the earliest moment possible. ... I particularly welcome the fact that France is sticking to its commitment to sign as quickly as possible a verifiable and comprehensive treaty banning tests throughout the world. I am positive that President Chirac's decision will now contribute to rapidly winding up the negotiations on this treaty. Together with our partners we shall join forces to reach this goal as soon as possible." Other reactionChile Acting Information Minister Edgardo Riveros, 30 January"The Chilean government, while appreciating the French government's decision, insists that these tests should never have been carried out... As these tests affect the eco-system, endanger human beings and living species in the region, the Chilean government has always rejected these tests on an international level." Indonesia Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ghaffar Fadyl, 30 January"We welcome the statement made by the President and sincerely hope [it] will continue the process of disarmament which he has also affirmed in his statement." Japan Foreign Minister Yukihido Ikeda, 30 January"Now we want France to contribute in a more active manner to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty at the earliest possible time... We will strive vigorously to promote nuclear disarmament and bring about the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons..." Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama, 30 January"It is deeply regrettable that France defied protests from Japan and the international community and conducted nuclear tests six times..." Government spokesperson Seiroku Iwatare, in a statement delivered to France's charge d'affaires in Tokyo, 30 January"[Japan] strongly urges France not to again go against the will of the international community..." Mayor of Hiroshima Takashi Hiraoka, 30 January"I feel the road to nuclear disarmament is still a long one. Things have not taken a turn for the better." Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, 30 January"They [the French] hope of course [that] people will forget. I hope people will never forget that this country has decided to ignore the opinions of the rest of the world. They have already exploded six nuclear bombs and they have caused a lot of damage... And yet this same country I'm sure, as a member of the West, will be very critical if some minor violation of human rights is involved..." The Prime Minister pledged to raise the issue when leaders of South East Asian and European Union (EU) States meet in Bangkok, Thailand, 2-3 March. South Korea Foreign Ministry statement, 30 January"South Korea hopes that the declaration made by Paris on Monday would serve as an occasion for all nations possessing nuclear capability to join the global community's strong desire to end all testing." President Chirac's visit to the US, 1-3 FebruaryThe centerpiece of the President's visit was a 1 February address to a joint session of Congress, during which he referred prominently to his cessation decision: "Together we must promote disarmament and combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. France has finished once and for all its nuclear testing, after a final series designed to give us the assurance that our deterrent capability is reliable and safe. Let us join our efforts to make 1996 the year of the signing of the complete and definitive test ban treaty with the 'zero yield option' that France and the United States were the first to propose..." Speaking at a joint press conference with President Chirac on 1 February, President Clinton enthused about the new French position: "I welcome France's decision to end nuclear testing in the Pacific and its strong support for finding a zero-yield comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty this year. That is a project we can and will work on together and I believe we will succeed." Chirac's address was boycotted by a large number of Senators and Representatives in protest at France's final series of tests. According to reports, only around 25 Senators and 30 Representatives were in attendance. On his return from the US, at a meeting with the Mayor of Reims, Jean Falala, Mr Chirac apparently revealed that the US had been given access to the data derived from the tests. According to Mr Falala, the President said that "the Americans were very surprised by the quality of the work carried out by our scientists and our technicians" and considered the results of the tests "exceptional". Implications for the Raratonga Treaty ProtocolsFrench testing was the last obstacle in the way of France, the UK and US signing the Protocols to the 1985 Rarotonga Treaty establishing the South Pacific as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). Among other stipulations, the Protocols prohibit the testing and stationing of nuclear weapons in the region. The three nuclear-weapon States (China and Russia are already signatories) announced their intention to sign as soon as possible in a joint statement issued late last year (20 October). Shortly after its 29 January announcement, French sources made clear that it now intended to sign the Protocols in the very near future. Apparently, plans are well advanced for a signing ceremony in Fiji in the second half of March. According to France's Ambassador to Fiji, Jacques-Andres Costilhes, on 30 January: "we are trying to work out the dates with the British and the Americans... We want to sign as quickly as possible". The Protocols will be signed on behalf of France by Gaston Flosse, President of the Territorial Assembly in French Polynesia. According to Mr Flosse, speaking in Tahiti on 6 February: "It's an honour [for me], but also and especially it is an official example of one of the new prerogatives we have obtained with our new autonomous status." IAEA inspectionsOn 7 February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that it would begin its inspection of the test site atolls in March. The inspections were requested by France's Foreign Ministry last year. The announcement was made by Agency spokesperson David Kyd in Vienna: "It is the first independent, exhaustive examination of radioactive contamination and leakage from France's nuclear testing grounds. We will look at the current situation and the possible impacts ten, fifty and a hundred years out. We'll look to see if there are any cracks in the atoll, if radioactivity can leak out and what kind of radioactivity could seep into lagoons... The issue is whether the encapsulation [of radioactivity] remains permeable over time, letting nuclear material leak out..." Simon Carroll, of Greenpeace International, agreed (7 February) that this was the main issue: "the greatest cause of concern for us is when and how much of the radioactive material in the atolls will come to the surface". Mr Kyd added that $1.5 million and 18 months had been allocated for the inspections, but that "by the end of this year we will already have a pretty good idea of the radiological situation of the atolls". According to reports, the inspection team will consist of 25 experts, appointed by and responsible to the Agency's Director General, Dr Hans Blix. Some early tensions within the IAEA has been alleged, with reports that France may withhold some information - on the grounds of their militarily sensitive nature - likely to be deemed necessary by all or some of the inspectors. On 2 February, the leader of New Zealand's opposition Labour Party, Helen Clark, launched a stinging attack on the competence of the proposed inspections: "The French have covered up bad effects on health by atmospheric testing in the past so no one trusts their word on testing and its effects... When [the IAEA] investigated the 1986 Chernobyl accident, it claimed 30 people had died and the rest were suffering from 'radiophobia'..." The position of ChinaChina reacted swiftly and defensively to the news that it was now the only nuclear-weapon State with an ongoing testing programme. Speaking on 30 January, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Chen Jian insisted that France's decision would have no effect on China's stance: "The position of the Chinese government on nuclear testing is clear cut and remains unchanged... China has conducted a very limited number of tests and things will continue to be that way." Chen then suggested that China would regard itself as being bound by the terms of the CTBT not from the point of its signature, or even its ratification, but from the moment of the treaty's entry into force: "As far as international law is concerned, a legal obligation can only become a binding one after the international convention in question comes into force." A number of States used the occasion of the French cessation to urge China to follow suit. On 30 January, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama stated simply: "China is expected to conduct nuclear tests in the future. We would like to continue asking them to stop." Tomiichi Murayama, leader of Japan's Social Democratic Party (SDP), Prime Minister until recently, reportedly backed this call during a meeting (30 January) with China's Ambassador to Japan, Xu Dunxin. According to reports, the Ambassador assured him that "we understand the feelings of the Japanese people" on the issue. Also on 30 January, Australia's Foreign Minister Evans added his voice to those urging a cessation - "of course we will continue to pursue that with the Chinese government as I hope other countries around the world will" - but seemed to lay the stress of his remarks on the issue of China's commitment to a total global ban: "The Chinese have never committed themselves at any stage to stopping tests other than in the context of a fully signed-up Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but they do say they will support that and we'll certainly be holding them to that." France seeks to open NATO nuclear debateFrance has declared its willingness to discuss nuclear weapons doctrine and policy within NATO. The move is part of a general French willingness to include itself in detailed discussions about Alliance military planning. The move can also be seen in the context of French determination to open up a debate - in the EU as well as NATO - over the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. In the last three months of 1995, during its final series of tests, France made overtures - greeted icily by some and warily by most - implying the need for a European nuclear 'deterrent' (see Nuclear Proliferation News, issue Nos. 32-35). The move was signalled on 17 January, when the French Ambassador to NATO, Gerard Errera, told a NATO meeting in Brussels that France was prepared "to discuss nuclear questions". However, a Foreign Office spokesperson, Yves Doutriaux, was quoted on the same day as saying that this discussion would probably not take place until "later", adding that it would only take place "if the allies want it" and are prepared to "respect...the principles of our deterrent". France is thought to favour keeping open the doctrinal option of using nuclear weapons at an earlier point in a conflict than either of its NATO nuclear-weapon State allies. US Senate ratifies START II as Congress loiters on ABM brinkThe US Senate ratified the START II Treaty on 26 January. For the full text of President Clinton's statement heralding the move, see last issue. In a related move, President Clinton finally signed the Financial Year (FY) 1996 Defense Authorization Act on 10 February. The Act contains legislation setting out US policy on ballistic missile defences (BMD) likely to exert a significant influence on Russian legislators as they ponder START II ratification. If the Act is seen to enhance the chances of the US continuing to adhere strictly to the 1972 US-Russia Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the likelihood of ratification is certain to increase. START II ratificationThe Senate vote in favour of ratification was 87-4. The Treaty aims to reduce US strategic warheads from 8,500, after START I, to 3,500, and Russian strategic warheads from 6,500, after START I, to 3,000, with all cuts to be implemented by 2003. See Documents and Sources for a State Department Fact Sheet on the Treaty. Following the vote, Senator Richard Lugar (Republican - Indiana), one of the Treaty's strongest supporters, issued a celebratory statement: "START II removes thousands of missiles that are pointed at targets in the United States, threatening every American family... It eliminates the most destabilizing segment of nuclear inventories, specifically multiple-warhead weapons and heavy ICBMs." Speaking on national radio on 27 January, President Clinton echoed Senator Lugar's comments: "When Russia ratifies it, [it] will enable us to make continued dramatic reductions of our nuclear arsenal and remove further the nuclear cloud from our children's future". The FY96 Defense Authorization Act and US BMD policyThe US and Russia are currently locked in negotiations aimed at establishing development and deployment guidelines for systems designed to defend again theater ballistic missiles (TBM). These discussions, however, have become overshadowed by Republican demands for a far more sweeping BMD programme. On 28 December, President Clinton vetoed the Defense Authorization Act partly in objection to language on the BMD issue setting 2003 as the target date for the deployment of a 'multi-site' national missile defense system. On 22 January, the Congressional conference charged with redrafting the legislation agreed to withdraw all mention of a target date. However, funding levels for BMD were left unamended at a higher mark - around $1 billion - than had been requested by the Department of Defense. Of this sum, nearly half is dedicated to spending on national missile defense (NMD) projects. As the Chair of the House National Security Committee, Floyd Spence (Republican - South Carolina), said on 22 January: "The bill still retains the full $450 million increase in national missile defense funding. The battle will continue even more aggressively on the questions of ballistic missile defenses and the ABM Treaty as we move into the fiscal year 1997 budget cycle." Spence characterised the President as having an "unequivocal opposition to providing a defense of this country against ballistic missile attack". Sharing these views, 14 senior Republicans wrote to the President on 12 February, insisting that the pressure from Congress for US policy to swing comprehensively behind large-scale national missile defenses would be maintained and if need be intensified. The signatories, including House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader and Presidential candidate Robert Dole, argued: "We are writing to express our continued objections to your administration's efforts to expand the scope of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty... In the absence of any genuine efforts to address our concerns, we regret that we will have no choice but to pursue the legislative options at our disposal... With ballistic missile proliferation on the rise, this Cold War era treaty [the ABM Treaty] is increasingly an obstacle to effectively defending our forces, our allies and our citizens... The Congress is prepared to undertake a full review of: the growing ballistic missile threat to our nation; the validity of the ABM Treaty as a means of ensuring America is protected against this threat; and the ballistic missile defense requirements necessary to fully protect America." In a speech delivered on 1 February (see Documents and Sources), Defense Secretary William Perry defended Administration policy, saying that the US would be in a position in three years time to decide on the deployment on new BMD systems, with deployment feasible three years after that. The link between the START and ABM issues was again illustrated when one of the four Senators who voted against ratification, James Inhofe (Republican - Oklahoma), claimed (27 January) that the Administration was sacrificing American security, by elaborating inadequate missile defence plans, because of a too- great concern with Russian START II ratification: "If the President believes that the priority of protecting the American people with [anti-ballistic missile] defenses must be sacrificed to gain Russian approval of START II, then I say it is too high a price to pay..." Perhaps the most prominent advocate of extensive national missile defence - on a scale more than sufficient to destroy the ABM Treaty - is Senator Jesse Helms (Republican - North Carolina), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On 7 February, Helms introduced legislation mandating US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Strategic Anti-Missile Revitalization and Security Act - which revels in the acronym STARS - stipulates US notification, one month after the entry of the STARS Act into law, of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, with withdrawal to be followed by the construction of nation-wide anti-ballistic missile multi-site system not far short in the ambition of its scope from President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Indeed, Helms deliberately timed the introduction of his Act to coincide with President Reagan's 85th birthday. In his introduction of the legislation, Helms argued: "Today's greatest emerging threat to America's national security lies in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction... According to the CIA, at this moment more than 30 countries possess ballistic missiles, and more than 25 others either have or are in the process of acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. ... The ABM treaty is not only out-of-date and unnecessary - it has become a threat to America's national security... Like latter-day Luddites, the opponents of ballistic missile defense are now using the ABM Treaty as a tool to obstruct any and all progress toward the deployment of missile defense technology..." Reaction in RussiaThe Russian government's reaction to US ratification was to press its Parliament to follow suit as quickly as possible. On 27 January, President Yeltsin told reporters he was hoping for ratification in advance of the 19-20 April Moscow summit on nuclear safety issues. Yeltsin described the Treaty as "of vast importance not only in terms of strengthening world security, but also for Russia's economy". His call was promptly rejected by the Parliament on 31 January. If the April deadline is missed, chances must be high that ratification will be delayed until after the 16 June Presidential elections. Some Parliamentary advocates of the Treaty seem uneasy about forcing a vote. Vladimir Lukin, former Ambassador to the US and now Chair of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission, said on 1 February that he harboured doubts about the wisdom of trying to meet President Yeltsin's target: "If we are talking about April, this seems unacceptable. I would rather have this important treaty ratified after the elections than have it rejected before then... I am definitely opposed to setting dates because a policy matched to certain occasions is wrong". He added that ratification in advance of a clarification of US policy on the ABM Treaty would be ill-advised: "We cannot reduce our strategic armaments in the absence of an undeviating and strict observance of the ABM Treaty, observance in letter and spirit... failure to agree an agreement on the borderline [between defences against strategic and theatre ballistic missiles] would mean for us that we cannot discuss reduction under START II..." Mr Lukin repeated his concerns on 9 February, obviously directing his remarks at Senator Helms: "ratifying in Moscow will be absolutely unrealistic if the United States unilaterally pulls out of the ABM treaty". However, he added that "I don't think...rational Republicans will go for such suicidal measures". On 13 February, the Speaker of the Parliament, the Communist Party's Gennady Seleznev, managed to sound gloomily optimistic about the chances of ratification: "I do not think that ratification will be simple...but I do think that most deputies will decide to support ratification, because we simply do not have the economic means [to avoid deep reductions]". However, Seleznev had no doubt that "if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty, everything will be ruined. There might be retaliatory measures..." On 15 February, Victor Ilyukhin, Communist Chair of the Parliament's Defense Committee, was quoted as warning that "one should be prepared for the ratification process meeting with serious obstacles... many Russian military experts openly oppose the ratification or at least want the treaty to be drastically altered". The Treaty is also openly opposed by the Liberal-Democratic Party, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. According to a Party Deputy, Alexei Mutrofanov, also quoted on 15 February: "Our position on START II remains unchanged. Maybe the military and diplomats [might] convince us later, or the Americans could give some sound arguments, but till now our party believes START II should not get Duma's [the Parliament's Lower House] stamp of approval." Foreign Minister Primakov has been working strenuously to reassure Parliamentarians about the US ABM stance, praising President Clinton's veto of the first version of the Defense Authorization Act. However, Primakov, speaking on 1 February, did not conceal the detrimental impact of some of the anti-ABM opinion voiced in recent Congressional debate: "I won't hide the fact that to some degree [members of Parliament] were stirred up by statements in the US Congress about rejecting the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty..." A few days previously (29 January), Primakov spoke of his government's fears that US Republicans would insist on Authorization Act language seriously amending the ABM Treaty. "Fortunately," he exhaled, "it did not happen". Primakov and US Secretary of State Christopher, meeting in Helsinki on 12 February, pledged to take advantage of this reprieve by moving quickly to conclude the discussions on the 'borderline' between tactical and strategic defences. According to Primakov: "The US Secretary of State and I agreed to give the appropriate stimulus to the talks on demarcating these two types of ABM..." Although by far the most serious threat to ratification appears to be doubts over US ABM policy, the issue of NATO's plans to expand its membership, and possibly also to deploy nuclear weapons, eastwards is becoming drawn into the debate. Speaking in Kiev on 1 February, Primakov strongly urged that distance be maintained between the issues: "I think this link is unnatural... I believe the Treaty should be ratified and as soon as possible". Writing in the New York Times on 10 February, former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev did make the link between ratification and planned NATO expansion. Describing NATO's insistence on retaining its 'right' to deploy nuclear weapons on former Warsaw Pact territory - or even extend its nuclear 'umbrella' - as "a fundamental violation of Western guarantees after Russia dissolved the Warsaw Pact and agreed to German unification", Mr Gorbachev wrote: "Many in Moscow think the real objective [of START II] is to disarm Russia as soon as possible... The problem is the American double standard: a demand for disarmament while disrupting the balance of power by pushing NATO's ill-conceived plans to march towards Russia. ... Already the friction over NATO and START II is undermining what is left of Russia's confidence in the West and helping our ultra-nationalists in their bid for presidential power." On 29 January, France, in the form of Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jacques Rummelhardt, strongly urged Russia to follow the US lead: "France hails the US Senate vote authorising ratification of the START-2 Treaty [and] hopes for similar action soon by the Russian Parliament, enabling the treaty to take effect." India defends its nuclear and arms control policiesFollowing angrily denied rumours in December that India was preparing to conduct a second nuclear test (see last issue), tensions between India, its neighbours and the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the US, have remained high. On 17 January, State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns warned that a test by India would activate the 1994 Glenn Amendment under which the US would suspend all loans, export licenses and economic and military aid to any State, outside the five declared nuclear- weapon States, which explodes a nuclear device. The Amendment would also mandate the government to oppose any loans to the offending government being granted, or under consideration of being granted, from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and similar multilateral organisations. There was only one exemption: "only, and only possibly", humanitarian food aid would be permitted. Despite these charged pronouncements, John Holum, Director of US government Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), sought on 19 January to stress that, while reviewing the situation, the US did not expect the worst to happen: "I'm taking a very positive view on this, and assuming that there won't be a test". Another major area of concern is India's missile development programme - in particular the development of the Prithvi missile, most recently test-fired on 27 January, which is believed to have a range of between 150 and 250 kilometres and is thought to have been designed to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. On 4 February, India's Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, insisted that the Prithvi development programme would continue as planned: "There is no question of abandoning the Prithvi programme". Referring to the recent test-firing, which had been criticised by the US and others, Mukherjee stated: "We do not consider it a mistake... We have no intention of destabilising in any way the situation prevailing in the region". The destabilising force, he added, was Pakistan and its "spending spree" on military purchases. "In this context," he insisted, "and [bearing in mind] what has happened in the last four decades, India cannot compromise its security requirements". Earlier (31 January) Pakistan's President, Farooq Leghari, had reacted with impassioned consternation to the Prithvi test, which he described as "tantamount to deployment": "Pakistan will do whatever it can to respond for our own security because the introduction of the Prithvi missile will create a very serious and a new threat perception for Pakistan... We can also put in our effort to produce an indigenous missile, but we wish to avoid such a race... We don't want the introduction of new weapon systems of mass destruction. Prithvi is nuclear-capable and that is where its danger lies. The response time in Pakistan then becomes just two or three minutes. That is why we have been asking for a zero-missile regime in South Asia." Commenting on the alleged prospect of a nuclear test, Leghari inveigled: "Any such test would not only escalate tensions between India and Pakistan, there would be a tremendous backlash urging Pakistan to respond. It will also really hurt the whole process of nuclear disarmament... Pakistan will have to seriously think of the options available to it". On 7 February, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Aseff Ahmed Ali, flew to Washington to discuss security and disarmament issues in the region. According to the official Pakistan press agency - the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) - the visit was an important part of the government's ongoing efforts to "stop India from [a] massive arms build-up which in no way will be beneficial for the one-fifth of the world population living in the region... India's ambitious nuclear and missile programmes pose a grave threat to international efforts for non-proliferation." On the same day, Chaudri Nisar Ali, a senior figure in the main Pakistan opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), called for Pakistan to elaborate a "nuclear policy independent of the Indian position". Speaking at a press conference in Islamabad, he said that Nawaz had recently agreed to adopt a new nuclear weapons policy, breaking with the long-standing formula that Pakistan cannot take any major disarmament initiatives (such as joining the NPT or accepting IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities) until India agrees to do the same. Mr Ali reportedly explained that his party had become frustrated by the thus far fruitless search for a regional solution, and now intended to concentrate on a global approach - much the same philosophy as that espoused by successive Administrations in India. Speaking at a conference in Washington on 12-13 February, the former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the leader of Nawaz, and India's former Defence Minister K. C. Pant, gave their views on developments. Neither could offer their audience much in the way of reassurance. According to Sharif: "While the environment for durable peace has improved at the global level...the situation has in fact worsened in the Gulf and in South Asia... Prospects for effective disarmament in South Asia continue to decline." Mr Sharif argued that Pakistan's nuclear policy was a legitimate response to this worsening situation. The international community, he suggested, should thus have some sympathy for "Pakistan's need to have a sufficient nuclear deterrent against India". If India were to test again, he warned, it "would bring the whole region of South Asia to the brink of a disastrous nuclear war". And there were other potential triggers for disaster, such as the ongoing conflict in Kashmir: "There are issues, like the Kashmir dispute, that could lead to a nuclear conflict...[so] both India and Pakistan need to address the nuclear question with utmost caution". Mr Pant identified as "destabilising" the new US willingness to resume supplies of military equipment to Pakistan, and criticised China for its alleged nuclear-related sales there (see below). Mr Pant also defended India's current insistence that a CTBT be linked explicitly and specifically to timetabled progress towards a nuclear-weapon free world: "[India wants] disarmament, not arms control that reinforces the supremacy of a few States." On 14 February, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, said India had "not given a positive response" to repeated initiatives from her government on the nuclear issue. She called again for such a response: "We want India and Pakistan to come to an understanding over proliferation issues." US concern over alleged China nuclear-weapons related exports to PakistanOn 5 February, a report in The Washington Times alleged that China had been supplying Pakistan with equipment which could be used to produce weapon-grade fissile materials. The story broke days before a visit to the US by Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Aseff Ahmed Ali. Speaking in Washington on 9 February, the Foreign Ministry described the report as "entirely speculative", adding "there is no truth" in the speculation: "We have flatly denied it". Specifically, the allegations referred to Chinese provision of magnet rings which could be used for enriching uranium in gas centrifuges. According to the report, which claimed it had obtained a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis to this effect, it was planned to supply around 5,000 magnet rings to the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear research facility in Kahuta. On 8 February, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Syed Iftokhar Murshid issued an uncategorical assurance that no such equipment had been received: "As far as the question of magnet rings is concerned, there is no truth in the report whatsoever". Murshid added that his country had been the subject of similarly baseless assertions in the past, such as suggestions that China had provided M-11 missiles: "We had seen similar wrong reports previously... Those allegations subsequently proved to be false." Instead of focusing on Pakistan, the US should be concentrating on India's plans: "It is India that is preparing for a nuclear test and that has fired medium-range surface-to-surface...missiles". In recent months, US-Pakistan relations have been easing, with the lifting of a ban on military aid imposed by Congress in the wake of rising concern over Pakistan's nuclear programme. However, while there were reports that the US would reimpose such a ban if it became persuaded that the alleged supplies had taken place or been agreed, perhaps the most drastic implications were for Sino- US relations. Speaking on 8 February, White House spokesperson Michael McCurry stressed that the US was not yet persuaded that any reprehensible trade had occurred, but implied that if such trade were proven, sanctions (mandated by Congressional legislation in the form of the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act) may have to follow: "We haven't made any determination that China has taken actions that would trigger the imposition of sanctions...as a result, we've not made a decision to impose sanctions... We have very real concerns, and we're evaluating the information that is available." Reports persisted over the next few days that the US Administration was deeply uneasy about imposing sanctions, and might be considering waiving the requirements of the relevant legislation (as the law itself is thought to permit) for the sake of the broader Sino-US relationship. On 14 February, the President's most senior foreign policy advisors reportedly met to try to reach agreement on either the evidence of the sales or the nature of the US response to them. Agreement on either front apparently remained elsuive. According to one of those senior advisors - John Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) - on 15 February, if the evidence warrants it, a strong response could be expected. The allegations, Mr Holum insisted "are being taken very seriously": |