Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 6, June 1996

A monthly digest of news and documents edited by Sean Howard. Credits

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Contents

• • Editor's introduction
  • • The CD Agenda: a summary
    • The Decalogue
    • The review so far
• The review of the CD Agenda - Opinion
• • International Disarmament: The Main Objectives
  • • By John Edmonds
    • Introduction
    • The CD as a negotiating forum
    • The most important issues
    • The significance of Britain and France
    • Conclusion: British policy and interests
  • Balancing Acts: Changing Needs and Concepts in Arms Control
  • • By Lawrence Freedman
    • Introduction: Statecraft and stability - the Cold War model of
    • The post-Cold War model: from maintaining to creating stability?
    • Conclusion
• Guest Comment - a Ukrainian Perspective
• • Ukraine and Disarmament Diplomacy
  • • By Mikhailo Bilousov
    • Introduction: the history and evolution of Ukraine's role
    • Ukraine's disarmament diplomacy credentials
    • Disarmament and domestic recovery
    • Ukraine's arms control agenda
• CTB Negotiations - Geneva Update No. 29
• • • By Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Intelligence Review
  • Latest developments
  • • Statements to Plenary
  • A summary of negotiations
  • • Scope
    • Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE)
    • Preamble
    • The CTBT Organisation (CTBTO)
    • Verification
    • On-Site Inspections (OSI)
    • Review of the Treaty
    • Entry into Force
    • Duration and Withdrawal
    • Amendments
  • Expansion
  • • Summary
    • 6 June plenary
    • 17 June plenary
    • 20 June plenary
    • Conclusion
• Documents and Sources
• • Statements at the CD
  • • China
    • Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)
    • India
    • Dissatisfaction with progress
    • Pakistan
    • Dissatisfaction with progress
  • US reaction to CTBT text
  • CFE Conference
  • • Final Document and Annexes
    • Final Document
    • Annexes
    • Annex A: Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on
    • Annex E: Statement of the Representative of the Russian Federation
    • US reaction
    • Statement by President Clinton
    • State Department reaction
    • National Security Council (NSC) reaction
  • US statement on ABM discussions
  • NATO meetings
  • • Foreign Ministers' NAC, Berlin, 3 June
    • Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation
    • Weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) arms control
    • Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
    • Defence Ministers' NAC, Brussels, 13 June
    • Arms control in the Balkans
    • Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation
    • Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and Nuclear Planning Group (NPG),
    • New Force Goals and Counter-Proliferation
    • NATO nuclear posture and doctrine
  • Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control in the Former Yugoslavia
  • IAEA press releases
  • • Plans for new inspection arrangements
    • Safeguards in 1995
    • Inspection of French test site
  • Ukrainian denuclearisation
  • • Statement by President Clinton
    • White House Fact Sheet
  • Andorran accession to NPT
• News Review
• • China tests again
  • • Reaction
    • Australia
    • Belgium
    • France
    • Germany
    • Italy (the current President of the European Union)
    • Japan
    • Kazakstan
    • Mongolia
    • New Zealand
    • Nordic States
    • Philippines
    • Russia
    • South Korea
    • Sweden
    • United States
  • Alleged ICBM transfer from Russia to China
  • Alleged China-Pakistan M-11 transfer
  • Missile defence developments
  • • Other developments
  • Ukraine completes transfer of nuclear weapons
  • • Related developments
  • Indian election results in uncertainty and tension on nuclear
  • US-North Korea Accord
  • • Missiles
  • Egypt and Libya discuss alleged chemical weapons plant
  • Iraq: some relief but renewed tensions
  • • Some relief
    • Renewed tensions
  • CFE Conference
  • • Reaction
  • Landmines developments
  • Arms and military spending surveys
  • • 15 leading arms exporters
    • 15 leading arms importers
  • UN small arms database

Editor's introduction

June's issue features two British perspectives on the future of arms control, plus a summation of Ukraine's disarmament experience and outlook.

Former senior British arms control official and negotiator John Edmonds emphasises the need for a sincere and consistent commitment to disarmament by all the nuclear-weapon States. With regard to the United Kingdom, he states that "the case for more positive policies deserves more attention", and challenges what he characterises as the "underlying assumption" in British policy that "maintenance of the nuclear deterrent and the encouragement of arms exports are major...interests which must not be endangered by international negotiations."

Professor Lawrence Freedman, Head of the Department of War Studies, contemplates the conceptual assumptions underlying the struggle to define the post-Cold War arms control regime. He concludes: "If traditional arms control could be based on verification, thus leading to theories of confidence-building, a new approach must be based on mechanisms for enforcement, and possibly an accompanying theory of Western responsibility."

Mikhailo Bilousov, former Soviet arms control negotiator and now Minister-Counsellor at the Embassy of Ukraine in London, elaborates the official Ukrainian perspective on disarmament issues. His contribution is timely, given Ukraine's completion in June of the transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia.

June was a dramatic and momentous month in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. In Geneva Update, Rebecca Johnson gives a wary but far from bleak assessment of prospects following the submission of a treaty text by the Chair of negotiations on 28 June.

Documents and Sources features material from and related to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty review conference and the completion of Ukrainian denuclearisation, as well as statements and documents from the CD, NATO and the IAEA.

News Review covers many of the above developments, as well as China's recent test and allegations of a Chinese transfer (to Pakistan) and receipt (from Russia) of nuclear-weapons related equipment. The customary watching brief on the missile defence debate, the implementation of the US-North Korea Accord, the Iraq- UNSCOM saga, and progress towards a landmine ban is maintained.

The CD Agenda: a summary

The agenda, in place since 1978, has ten items, known collectively as The Decalogue.

The Decalogue

Item 1. Nuclear Test Ban

Item 2. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

Item 3. Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Measures

Item 4. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

Item 5. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear- Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

Item 6. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological Weapons

Item 7. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

Item 8. Transparency in Armaments

Item 9. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

Item 10. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

The review so far

For the 1994 Session of the Conference, Sweden's Ambassador, Lars Norberg, was appointed Special Co-ordinator on Review of the Agenda. No Special Co-ordinator was appointed for the 1995 Session. Algeria's Ambassador, Hocine Meghlaoui, is Special Co- ordinator on the Agenda, though his deliberations are principally concerned with the 1996 Session.

The fullest account of the review so far came on 1 September 1994 with Ambassador Norberg's report to the Conference. His statement referred to "divergent views" on the issue of "the appropriate balance" between nuclear and non-nuclear issues:

"...consultations have revealed conflicting views among delegations as to the appropriate balance between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons on the agenda. Divergent views have also been expressed with regard to the question of a possible widening of the CD's scope of activities to include the negotiation of politically binding agreements covering, for example, global confidence building measures or regional questions."

The review of the CD Agenda - Opinion

International Disarmament: The Main Objectives

By John Edmonds

Introduction

Disarmament is a field where real progress is usually heavily dependent on a significant degree of consensus among the governments most concerned. The contributors to this series include many with relevant experience who are now retired from government service and thus less inhibited by national political considerations. The consensus among governments, and even within a single government, can easily amount to very modest proposals without the stimulus of more challenging ideas from such as the writers in this series; if, with their wide variety of nationalities, they come to similar conclusions - their own conclusions arrived at without pressure from others - then they may have some useful influence on present-day governments. Although some previous contributors are less optimistic about progress than others, there does seem to be a striking degree of agreement on what the main objectives should be.

The CD as a negotiating forum

Since 1945 there has been a steady development of the machinery for international negotiation of arms control and disarmament measures. Some important treaties have been agreed and brought into effect almost universally. With notorious exceptions such as Iraq, compliance with these treaties has generally been good, and improved measures of verification are gradually being introduced. But the negotiating process has often been very slow indeed - most obviously in the principal multilateral forum for the purpose, the CD.

Like most such organisations, the CD is only as effective as its member governments will allow it to be. This applies above all to the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (the P5). But it is worth recalling that for many years two of the P5, France and China, stood aside from many negotiations, and from the CD itself, without their absence preventing the negotiation and entry into force of major treaties such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.

Now that France and China have acceded to the NPT and are active members of the CD, a consensus among the P5 is usually desirable and may be decisive. But agreement among only some of the P5, especially if they include the US and Russia, may be enough if the others simply stand aside and do not attempt a veto.

In practice, therefore, negotiations in the CD depend for their success on the best obtainable consensus among the P5 which is itself acceptable to a large majority of other member States. This proposition is at present under severe test. The negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty are supposedly on the point of completion, but an acceptable degree of P5 consensus is still not certain. The CTB is also an outstanding illustration of dreadfully slow progress; it has been under negotiation at intervals for nearly 40 years. Failure to agree on this treaty now would be widely deplored and a serious setback to the prospects of further curbs on nuclear weapons and arms control more generally.

The most important issues

Provided that a CTB Treaty is completed soon, the CD can then turn, with its reputation usefully enhanced, to even more important issues. The vast majority of people would surely wish to see the total abolition of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and great reductions in conventional weapons, especially in the trade in them. These are two of the three issues which my old negotiating partner Roland Timerbaev believes should be given priority by the CD (see Issue No. 3). In principle, most governments would probably accept that these are the two most important objectives in the whole field of disarmament. In practice, however, many key countries' policies are affected by vested interests opposed to any serious progress in either case.

Nuclear disarmament depends above all on a positive approach on the part of the P5, because they are by coincidence the five declared nuclear-weapon States (NWS). A secondary requirement is that three States (India, Israel, Pakistan) who are not parties to the NPT and are believed to have some nuclear weapon potential, should be willing to renounce nuclear weapons. There are also a few 'rogue' States which are at times believed to intend acquiring their own nuclear weapons. But the international community expects the five NWS to take the lead, as was clearly reaffirmed in the 1995 programme of action agreed by the parties to the NPT.

This subject has been on the CD agenda for many years, second only to the CTB. At the start of this series, Frank Blackaby's essay ended with these words:

"However, the dominant question remains: will the CD be allowed to get to grips with the problem of banning the third, and most dangerous, weapon of mass destruction: the nuclear weapon? Sooner or later the nuclear weapon powers are going to have to give way on this, and they might as well do it now."

Robert McNamara's conclusion (Issue No. 4) makes the same point:

"...if the five declared nuclear powers dare break out of the mindset that has guided their strategy for over four decades, they can come to agreement on a series of steps that will lead to a return of a 'nuclear weapons free world'. The Conference on Disarmament is the forum in which such a process should begin."

Roland Timerbaev too concludes by discussing this fundamental question. He advocates more active involvement by the five NWS as a group which "might be institutionalised in some way as an informal negotiating component of the CD".

At first sight the CD, with its wide membership, is an even more appropriate forum for conventional arms control than for nuclear matters. Virtually all States are directly concerned - as possessors of arms and often as suppliers too. In practice, as Romulus Neagu has reminded us (Issue No. 3), the CD "continues to fail to address conventional weapons, despite many calls from the UN General Assembly."

It would be easy to overload the CD's agenda in this very complex field, and experience suggests that many practical measures of conventional arms limitation are best negotiated regionally. But the CD is the right place to negotiate 'qualitative' arms control where a universal ban on specific weapons is desirable. It should also be able to consider universal adoption of Codes of Conduct for arms transfers, being developed in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere.

The significance of Britain and France

In this context the British and French positions are nowadays closely comparable and distinctive, not easily subsumed into those of wider groupings such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), or more vaguely 'the West'. Although in many respects lesser powers than the US, Russia and China, they feature with them as the P5 on the UN Security Council and the five declared NWS; they also regularly appear among the top five arms exporters.

British and French policies on both nuclear disarmament and conventional arms control are therefore of considerable importance. It is only recently, however, that they have had much in common. From the 1950s Britain was associated with the US and USSR in major arms control measures including the NPT and test ban negotiations. France, like China, did not join the NPT until 1992, and was still conducting nuclear tests into early 1996. The French position moved substantially in the early 1990s, under the guidance of President Mitterrand; after the mercifully brief aberration of the 1995-96 nuclear testing programme, Chirac appears to be maintaining this relatively new proximity to the British position, at least in the nuclear field.

The British and French governments may be tempted to feel that they can 'rest on their laurels' for a time, consigning disarmament issues to the low priority that has always been preferred by some elements in their respective military-industrial complexes. Moreover, greater nuclear cooperation between the two governments has so far been presented as being far more concerned with such ideas as a 'European nuclear deterrent' than with nuclear non-proliferation, let alone nuclear disarmament.

In the immediate future some important political factors do justify a short period of relative inactivity. As this is written - 26 June - we await the result of Russia's Presidential Election, to be followed in November by that of the United States; the future leadership of China is unclear; Britain will have a General Election within less than a year. Since all the P5 have the most important influence on progress with arms control and disarmament, and all except France may have changes of government in the near future, this is an appropriate stage to review the positions of these key States. I will conclude with some thoughts on the case of Britain, but few of them are exclusive to this country.

Conclusion: British policy and interests

British policy towards the two main issues discussed above has often been cautiously conservative. The underlying assumption is that maintenance of the nuclear deterrent and the encouragement of arms exports are major British interests which must not be endangered by international negotiations. These assumptions are naturally fostered by vested interests, and none of the major political parties seriously challenges them because of the fear that to do so will lose votes. Given the British unfortunate habit of hysterical exaggeration about almost any aspect of foreign and defence affairs, this is understandable - though both media and politicians may underestimate the people's intelligence and common sense.

The case for more positive policies deserves more attention. The present assumptions are based on double standards of the most obvious kind. It should be recognised that the NPT does not 'legitimise' the possession of nuclear weapons in perpetuity by Britain and the other NWS. The assumption that Britain needs to maintain such weapons, for purposes increasingly hard to explain, greatly weakens the case for denying them to other States, some of them manifestly under far greater military threat. Britain's interests now surely require an active commitment to multilateral nuclear disarmament

Similarly, the promotion of widespread arms exports can hardly be presented as contributing to world peace and security. The overriding interest of Britain, her partners and allies, and the world as a whole, is for the progressive reduction of arms and the trade in them.

It will not be easy - as Paul Rogers says (Issue No. 2), "old attitudes die hard", in all the NWS and more widely. They can only be changed by strong political leadership. Let us hope that from 1997 we shall see far more positive policies on nuclear and conventional arms control - to the benefit of each of the countries most concerned and of the world as a whole.

John Edmonds is Chairman of the Council for Arms Control in London. He was Head of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1974-77, and British Ambassador to the 1977-80 UK-US-USSR test ban negotiations.

Balancing Acts: Changing Needs and Concepts in Arms Control

By Lawrence Freedman

Introduction: Statecraft and stability - the Cold War model of arms control

During the darker days of the Cold War there was an occasional debate over whether measures of disarmament or arms control might be the key to an improvement in political relations, or whether they must wait upon such an improvement taking place for other reasons. The experience of the past ten years has served to confirm that cooperative agreements on armed forces are shaped by, rather than shape, core political relations. Thus the conditions which obtained in the late 1980s made traditional arms control more possible to achieve but also rendered the agreements largely irrelevant, though the informal aspects of the negotiating process may at times have provided important opportunities for communication and reassurance.

The starting point for Cold War strategic concepts was the confrontation between the Western and Eastern blocs. This confrontation had a number of key features: the relationship was bipolar, with each side led by a nuclear Superpower, and contained elements of both antagonism and cooperation; the two groups of States were, in broad terms, equal in key military capabilities, especially in the nuclear area; as a result the relationship had acquired significant elements of balance in both political and military terms, and had come to be institutionalised.

The objective of both national programmes and arms control initiatives was defined in terms of stability - either politically, as measures which would deny either side a comparative advantage in the global struggle for influence by confirming an equality in military strength, or militarily by reducing any tendencies towards arms racing or the creation of a delicate strategic balance which might encourage reciprocated fears of pre-emptive strikes.

A status quo assumption was implicit in the design of the relevant policies in that the objective was not so much to create a new stability but consolidate one that already existed. The surrounding rhetoric always claimed that events were hurtling out of control in some 'mad momentum' or an aggressive Soviet armaments programme. Nonetheless, the old concepts were products of relatively stable conditions. This meant for example, that weapons systems could be postulated for a strategic environment ten years later which looked similar to that in existence at the time, while arms control negotiations could be conducted at leisure over long periods. It limited what was at stake because by themselves the negotiations could not transform the security situation: hence the frequency with which agreements were described as 'modest' in their efforts.

Because of this the informal aspects of arms control could be as important as the formal - the signals sent through the enthusiasm and seriousness with which the negotiations were conducted could communicate more general views about the state of the East-West relationship. This was all reflected in the lack of measures to enforce any agreement. There was no independent body which could assess compliance with treaty provisions and penalise transgressions. No third parties were involved at all. Because the agreements reflected a strategic balance, which they sought to reinforce, there were limits to the advantages which might be gained by cheating and also to the response of the aggrieved party if cheating was discovered. The invocation of ultimate penalties to enforce treaties was precluded by the very circumstances they sought to control.

Because a State could not be made to comply with a treaty, if it nonetheless did so this could be read as an important statement of goodwill and confirmation that it honoured its obligations. A whole theory was developed to prove that intrusive verification and surveillance of regular military activities could have a significant value of its own, beyond the substance of that being verified, in building confidence between potential belligerents and so softening antagonism. Inevitably this meant that a substantial amount of arms control activity took the form of an audit - counting items in known inventories and checking them against the amounts declared.

Arms control was thus a natural extension of Statecraft. It represented a medium by which great powers signalled their readiness to reach some sort of understanding with each other, demonstrating respect for vital interests and a capacity to make commitments and accept responsibilities.

Yet to give this exercise any credibility, given that the raw material was provided by existing armed forces, it had to be in some way linked to strategic analysis. Inevitably the analysis proved to be somewhat artificial, especially when it came to justifying a focus on a quantitative parity. It could only sound at all convincing by taking a simple bipolar, symmetrical model, and this led to an equally simple international relations theory. This was a hangover from the old disarmament campaigns, which had supposed that agreements on arms control reverse political antagonism, and thus implied that arms caused the antagonism in the first place.

In practice arms control seems to have reinforced the dominant political tendency of the time. When tensions were increasing it could aggravate the process (through for example rows over compliance or intransigence over apparently trivial points of negotiating detail). When tensions were easing it could accelerate an improvement in relations. A further problem was that it was often discussed in isolation from the variety of pressures impinging on the negotiating governments, from the need to reassure allies to keeping an eye on other potential adversaries, from worries about giving too much ammunition to domestic opponents to the need to demonstrate a sensitivity to the concerns of those who spoke for 'world opinion'.

The post-Cold War model: from maintaining to creating stability?

The above model is now irrelevant. It became irrelevant at the point of its greatest triumphs when decades of arduous negotiations suddenly concluded with intricate treaties on conventional and strategic arms. It would be wrong to dismiss the importance of the final years of negotiations. In both the nuclear and strategic case, the end game on ratification provided a helpful opportunity to dispense reassurance with regard to Western intentions, notably in connection with German unification, and a cover for difficult discussions among the States emerging out of the fragmenting Soviet Union and members of the former Warsaw Pact over the distribution of Eastern bloc military assets, including nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, all this represented a problem of transition - from the old order if not necessarily into a new order.

The problem, at least in Europe, has shifted away from one of reinforcing stability in the internal and external relationships of medium, small and in some cases quite tiny powers. For the West the major change since the Cold War has become one of compensating for the weaknesses rather than the strengths of non-Western States. This shift needs to be reflected in the approach to international agreements: those needed to introduce elements of stability into unstable situations are different in kind to those required to add stability to an already stable relationship.

The need for new thinking here is illustrated by the Dayton agreement on Bosnia, which included an arms control element which in June 1996 was turned into an agreement on force levels. Essentially the deal saw the Bosnian Serbs agreeing to cut down their arsenal (largely in the form of more elderly weapons) in return for a cap on the combined Moslem-Croat Federation forces, which they could see growing through the combined efforts of the United States and a number of Moslem States. The agreement reflects the expectation of 'balance', but of course the balance only exists to the extent that the Federation holds together (which may be too much to hope) and that it is not upset by external sources in the event that hostilities resume.

The advantage of the arms control regime may well be the opportunities it provides for the Implementation Force (IFOR) to monitor what the various parties are up to in the military sphere, but in substance it should not be assumed that it will contribute to stability. Stability here depends on a continuing and strong Western presence, including a substantial superiority of NATO capability in IFOR, or any successor agreed for 1997, and economic and political measures to break down the barriers and mistrust created over three years of war.

There were serious problems with the old idea of a balance as being inherently stable. To the extent that the East-West military stand-off did help to steady the Cold War this was largely because of the fear of a nuclear catastrophe and the lack of any reliable route to a decisive victory in such a war. Given Europe's past history a fear of another large-scale conventional war was a source of profound caution as well. However, significant variations in the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional relationship could be tolerated because of the overbearing influence of the nuclear dimension.

For many non-Communist States nuclear deterrence now plays little part as they are neither allied to nor threatened by nuclear States, and thus conventional force relationships have to be judged without reference to the prospect of escalation to a nuclear conflict. Even if NATO is enlarged to include some of the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) the extension of the US nuclear guarantee may well be fudged to ease Russian (and possibly US Congressional) fears. At any rate neither NATO nor a nuclear guarantee will extend into the most substantial, and insecure, parts of the non-Russian former Soviet Union (FSU) and non-Visegrad Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

However isolated from a nuclear balance, a conventional balance does not make much sense. In any conflict the immeasureables of training, morale, tactical grasp and strategic design as well as terrain and climate will have as much if not more impact than the measureables of manpower and equipment levels. The talks on convention forces in Europe (CFE) sought to get round the artificiality of parity for its own sake by focusing on types of equipment suitable for surprise attack and general offensive operations. Leaving aside the question of the validity of the offensive/defensive dichotomy it can be noted that this approach is only relevant to certain types of conflicts, in which the danger is of a classic act of aggression across recognised borders, and on terrain suitable for armoured warfare. Its relevance for conflicts erupting out of civil wars or confused border disputes, marked by skirmishing militias as much as regular battles, over mountains as much as open plains, directed as much against unwanted civilians as professional combatants, is less clear.

Furthermore, it must be doubted whether any approach based on comparative measures of force levels is going to be helpful. When forces are in a state of flux, with units at only part strength and in some cases of questionable loyalty, or when the reliability of much equipment is doubtful, any quantitative indicators are liable to be extremely misleading. In addition, it will be entirely fortuitous if two neighbours have symmetrical force structures. A focus on disparities in force structures will only encourage a sense of strategic disadvantage and could lead to inappropriate attempts to make up the 'difference'. As alliance formation is rudimentary within post-Communist Europe there would always be a risk that any putative balance could be overturned by two States suddenly forming an alliance or, as in the case of Bosnia, terminating one that has been focused upon them by the West. The political stability of the old Europe made it possible to conceive of a conventional force balance across the continent. The new political structure is far too complicated to make it clear who is balancing whom.

The CFE framework does, of course, allocate numbers to individual States and these are to be monitored. The numbers themselves reflect a complicated internal bargaining process and by and large represent high ceilings rather than realistic floors. They are being monitored, and this element of transparency has been hailed as an important source of confidence-building. The problem here will come with regimes which have tenuous control over military developments within their borders, especially when it comes to knowledge of the detailed state of individual units and also the overall approach being followed by senior officers. This could mean that infractions of specific provisions could be interpreted - perhaps mistakenly - as reflections of national policy. If the international audit is more competent than the national audit there could be a serious potential for a deterioration in confidence. Even when the best constructions are put on evidence of violations of agreements doubts could still be cast on the competence if not the hostile intentions of regimes. For regimes working at the limits of their capacity expensive inspection procedures could come to be resented if they are regular yet treated with suspicion if spasmodic.

In tense situations even an initial focus on the design of a local military balance can be not only irrelevant but also harmful. As was seen during the negotiations over the distribution of the assets of the former Soviet armed forces, this sort of exercise immediately fixes attention on the prospects for future warfare. Furthermore, exercises of this sort have awkward implications. Once a State is shown to have a certain entitlement of armed force - to either balance a potential enemy or simply as a reflection of its relative size and status - then it may seek to build up its numbers if they fall below its entitlement. In addition, as happened with the distribution of entitlements along the components of the former Warsaw Pact, this concept will legitimise access to heavy equipment to inherently unstable States. The equipment can then be employed to self-destruct.

The traditional approach based on audits and balances thus has little relevance for contemporary Europe. A relevant approach must address the new type of security problem in Europe: by preventing latent tensions from turning into open conflict, bringing conflicts which have erupted to a peaceful conclusion, and preventing conflicts which have defied control from spreading.

It is possible to identify some of the approaches that might be worth following in pursuit of prevention rather than cure. As the current instability in the region has economic as well as military dimensions, it is impossible to consider security measures in isolation from other measures designed to influence the non- military dimensions. Again as can be seen with Dayton, any security initiatives will therefore appear only as part of a wider package.

The purpose of arms control at this stage should be to marginalise the military instrument in both intra-State and inter-State politics. As has been recognised in the Partnership for Peace process, often of crucial importance here is the degree of civilian control over the military. Structures for a democratic defence policy can benefit from Western advice without the expenditure of vast resources.

Another issue to consider might be the location of garrisons, for example in ethnically sensitive areas or close to borders. The familiar range of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) might be helpful, except that none of these provide real guarantees against aggression and a number could even provide pretexts for offensive operations.

The sort of instruments employed by the international community in their - up to now vain - attempt to rein in the various conflicts which have erupted throughout the former Yugoslavia illustrate the sort of possibilities which might be considered in future conflicts: arms embargoes; air-exclusion zones; air and land humanitarian relief corridors; control of artillery pieces; cease- fire lines. The problem with all these measures is that they are partial. They are partial in controlling only limited types of military activity while other types are unconstrained, and also partial in tending to favour one side rather than another in the conflict. There is clearly much to be said for limiting the availability of weapons to the belligerents, but an embargo will tend to penalise the weaker, especially if geographically isolated (so that an embargo is more easily enforced) and without an indigenous arms industry.

None of these measures can be politically innocent. Even humanitarian intervention will either facilitate or frustrate one side's objectives - helping refugees escape supports 'ethnic cleansing' while supplying a besieged city thwarts attempts to starve it into submission. A cease-fire will consolidate the balance of advantage at a particular time, endowing it with what one side (and often both) may judge to be undeserved permanence.

This is not to argue against measures of this nature but rather to suggest that they must always be put into the wider context. If they are proposed it should be in the full knowledge of their strategic partiality, as part of an attempt to limit the position of the party most in breach of international norms. There are three linked problems here. First, the closer to the area of conflict the more the specific interests of non-combatant States are likely to diverge. Second, there are likely to be severe problems of command and control within the area of conflict and also adjacent to it. When warfare is undertaken by militias there can be a ready descent into brigandry. Evidence from Bosnia suggests that the flow of alcohol may be as pertinent to the incidence of violence as the flow of arms, and from Chechnya that racketeering and the black market are powerful influences on the scope and intensity of violence. In neighbouring States the belligerents may have sympathisers ready to organise help ranging from arms to volunteers to cash. Senior commanders and political leaders may find it difficult to honour solemn undertakings: fragile agreements will be vulnerable to private enterprise at a street level. Controlling the flow of arms is not rendered any easier by the mass of surplus equipment still being traded around and about the FSU.

This leads on to the third, and most crucial, problem which is that of enforcement. At times of high tension agreements will be seen in zero-sum terms and will often be signed only under duress. What seems to be advantageous at one moment could become an obstacle the next. Furthermore if the proposed measures are known to be partial in their effects then those proposing them cannot simply expect a signature on a piece of paper to suffice as a guarantee of compliance. Trusting European Union and UN negotiators troubleshooting in the former Yugoslavia came to despair of agreements lasting more than a few hours. They were told what they wanted to hear but none of it was really meant.

There are always plenty of sanctions available. The non-military list is familiar - diplomatic isolation, expulsion from international organisations, loss of sporting and cultural links, economic embargoes ranging from specific products such as oil to all trade. The trade record is unimpressive, in particular when time is of the essence. With traditional arms control time rarely was of the essence - controversies over compliance could linger for months, even years, and the sanctions under discussion might be such things as going slow on further negotiations or a delayed summit. In rapidly deteriorating situations, however, measures need to work quickly, lest they allow the target hope that if they can only be withstood for a few months, and a fait accompli created, then the pressure will gradually ease off.

Too often measures have been chosen not because of their likely impact on the calculations of the notional target, but to demonstrate activity for its own sake or as simply the maximum that the international community can agree upon and can afford to implement. The same can be true of military measures, such as air strikes or the enforcement of air exclusion zones which are often proposed because there is only slight danger to Western forces implementing them, but they carry the risks of tragic mistakes based on faulty intelligence and an inability to control retaliation on the ground against those supposedly being supported.

Even sending in ground troops, which is the most likely way actually to get a grip on the course of events, also can be counter-productive if half-hearted - by denying the troops the opportunity ever to seize the initiative. This danger may even be increased by tailoring any intervention precisely to a humanitarian purpose - to feed, heal and provide shelter - because the troops will still be seen as taking sides and the agents of hostile foreign powers. All this has been made clear through the Bosnian experience, which is why Dayton led to such a massive influx of international forces, under NATO command, and should have led to an equally substantial civilian capability to bring about political and economic reconstruction.

Conclusion

The history of arms control warns that it can never be free- standing, but is always a function of larger questions concerning the utility of force and security guarantees. It must also reflect the broad political currents of the time. If minority rights are to be satisfied without breaking up States and continually redrawing boundaries, then to the extent that the exercise of sovereignty lacks internal accountability there will be pressure for it to be rendered externally accountable. A developing concept of humanitarian intervention must address the implications of this for the regulation of armed force. Without the threat of large- scale involvement, Western governments will find their efforts at conflict prevention and resolution futile and frustrating.

If traditional arms control could be based on verification, thus leading to theories of confidence-building, a new approach must be based on mechanisms for enforcement, and possibly an accompanying theory of Western responsibility. In this way arms control might provide a framework for benign intervention - by defining its limits and purposes. The intellectual pedigree might start with established theories of peace-keeping, but because these must not be followed in abnormal conditions, in which peace remains an aspiration, they might be reinforced by ideas drawn from concepts of crisis management and its conventions.

However, any approach if it is to be successful will need to maintain a key sense of the dynamism of current conditions, which means that the governments with whom deals may be struck may change dramatically either in personnel or, because of new circumstances, in their orientation. The diffusion of power means that attention must also be paid to the micro-level of political action - the street - where agreements can be broken or made on the basis of the attitudes of local commanders.

Professor Lawrence Freedman is Head of the Department of War Studies at King's College, London.

Guest Comment - a Ukrainian Perspective

Ukraine and Disarmament Diplomacy

By Mikhailo Bilousov

Introduction: the history and evolution of Ukraine's role

Among the States which have recently joined the Conference on Disarmament is Ukraine - an important and potentially powerful country in Central and Eastern Europe, and destined to play a pivotal role in the stability of its region and of Europe as a whole.

Ukraine has partaken in disarmament diplomacy since it joined the United Nations as a founding member in 1945. Of course, Ukraine was not independent at that time, but due to an agreement reached at the Yalta Conference it joined the UN as a sovereign State, and as such it signed the UN Charter.

As part of the USSR, Ukraine followed the disarmament course of that country, and its representatives did their best, alongside other Soviet diplomats, to alleviate through disarmament measures the burdens of the arms race which fell on the shoulder of its citizens. The contribution of Ukraine was not easily accepted by the major Western powers, but nevertheless Ukraine strove, often in the face of difficulties, to become a party to important disarmament agreements. For example, Ukraine did not sign the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 which it supported in the UN. The reason, though not publicly stated, seems to have been the reluctance of the Soviet Union, a nuclear-weapon State enjoying certain privileges under the Treaty, to subject parts of its territory - in this case Ukraine - to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system which seeks to guarantee the prevention of diversion of nuclear materials to nuclear weapons. But despite such difficulties, Ukraine continued to play an active part in the search for greater disarmament.

Naturally, all formal objections ceased to exist after the demise of the Soviet Union. Soon Ukraine joined the NPT as a non-nuclear- weapon State, signed other disarmament agreements to which it had not been able to become party, and has now been admitted to the Conference on Disarmament.

Ukraine's disarmament diplomacy credentials

Upon achieving independence, Ukraine declared its utmost interest in continuing and deepening the process of disarmament. This interest was confirmed when it renounced nuclear weapons stationed on its territory which had become its property after the dissolution of the USSR. These weapons have now been dismantled and dispatched to Russia (1). Ukraine is fulfilling its obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Agreement. It ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) I Treaty. It is ready to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). And it possesses a body of highly qualified disarmament specialists. Since the 1960s, due to an agreement between the Foreign Ministries of the Soviet Union and Ukraine, Ukrainian diplomats were included in the Soviet delegations to the Disarmament Commission and later the Conference on Disarmament. Many of these diplomats now occupy senior positions in Ukraine's Foreign Service (e.g. Ambassador to Germany Kostenko, Ambassador to Greece Korneenko, Minister-Counsellor in Washington Kuchinsky, and the author).

Disarmament and domestic recovery

Ukraine's interest in disarmament is not only based on the traditions of its diplomacy but is rooted in its domestic requirements. As part of its reform programme, Ukraine has begun the conversion of its huge military industries. As is universally acknowledged in Ukraine, the development of the economy is hindered by its legacy of being a major producer of armaments for the Soviet Union. It produced tanks, transport aircraft, missiles, naval systems, and other major systems. This production is now being reviewed.

It is also felt in Ukraine that its contribution to nuclear disarmament has helped its reforms, as well as boosting the prospects of increased outside assistance. As the Strategic Survey 1994/95 stated: "though no formal linkage existed between disarmament and support for economic reform there is little doubt that a continued stalemate on nuclear weapons would have dampened US and Western enthusiasm for aid to Ukraine." (2) The deliverance of that assistance is eagerly awaited in Kyiv.

Ukraine's arms control agenda

Ukraine stands for giving priority to negotiations on further nuclear disarmament. Ukraine now feels much more affinity with the positions of non-aligned States on nuclear disarmament than before. Consequently, it attaches priority to completing a CTBT (Ukraine is, incidentally, prepared to provide a monitoring station for the verification regime), elaborating a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and tackling more systematically the problem of nuclear disarmament. Naturally, it also regarded as a priority the decision to expand the CD's membership.

Ukrainian attention to nuclear disarmament does not signify its disregard of the question of the elimination or reduction of so- called conventional weapons. As the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, H. Udovenko, said recently, "the current enormous conventional arsenals and the threat they pose for humankind place these weapons in the mass destruction category." (3)

Problems of disarmament lying beyond the CD's agenda occupy an important place in the foreign policy of Ukraine and in the activity of its diplomacy. At present a non-aligned country, Ukraine would prefer in the future to be part of a Euro-Atlantic structure of security and objects to being located in a 'grey' or 'buffer' zone between military-political organisations in Europe. In this connection, note should be taken of the recent proposal by President L. D. Kuchma to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Central and Eastern Europe.

Ukraine is also active in other fields relevant to disarmament efforts. It supported the decision to extend the prohibition on anti-personnel mines and is party to the Convention on 'inhumane' weapons. Ukrainian aircraft took part in the trial flights under the 'Open Skies' Treaty and received such flights by others. The Government has presented the Treaty for ratification by the Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, and will press for the speedy approval of the relevant legislation.

Even this short review must prove that Ukraine is committed to disarmament.

References

Mikhailo Bilousov is Minister-Counsellor at the Embassy of Ukraine in the United Kingdom. A Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor of the History of International Relations at Kyiv University, he participated in various disarmament conferences.

CTB Negotiations - Geneva Update No. 29

By Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Intelligence Review

Latest developments

Jaap Ramaker, chair of the Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) Committee, presented his revised text at 4.30 pm on Friday, 28 June, recommending that governments study the draft treaty during July, when the CD is in recess, with the intention of returning on 29 July to finalise their agreement. The Netherlands Ambassador therefore met the CD's self-imposed deadline for a clean text, although some delegations had clearly expected a decision on its acceptance, at least in principle. This was not attempted, as the final weeks of intensive negotiations had revealed wide chasms between the positions of some of the key States.

Though Ramaker spoke of conclusion of the negotiations, several States underlined that this may mark the end of a particular phase of negotiations, but it cannot be regarded as the end of negotiations altogether. Twenty-nine non-aligned delegations issued a statement regretting the lack of a consensus draft treaty and committing to continue negotiations when States come back in July. India reiterated its view that it could not sign the treaty in its present form, but said that it was willing to negotiate further to get a treaty that could command consensus. China noted the 'major progress' but said that the CD had been unable to 'adopt' the CTBT draft text today 'due to divergent positions and other factors including time constraints'. Ambassador Sha Zukang also said that after studying the text, in light of its security interests China would be putting forward amendments to the Chair's text. Pakistan, Russia and various others also spoke, essentially welcoming the chair's efforts, but not accepting that this is the end of the negotiations.

In a month which also saw expansion of CD membership from 38 to 61, negotiations on the CTBT became ever more fraught, with meetings stretching to midnight as the target date for a finalised text drew near. Ramaker's draft text of 28 May, WP.330, had focused attention on three problem areas: preamble, entry into force and on-site inspections (OSI). Though there was no attempt to take a formal decision supplanting the rolling text, the chair's first draft became the de facto basis for negotiations in June, just as it is expected that WP.330.Rev 1 will be substantially accepted in States' capitals. Nevertheless, there are some loose ends and rough edges, and further discussion, bargaining, and possibly arm-twisting may be necessary before the entry into force and OSI provisions can be finalised and agreed.

For most of June, negotiations were conducted in several different kinds of groupings. The declared nuclear-weapon States intensified their 'P-5' meetings in private, attempting to negotiate a mutually agreeable package on the issues they regarded as most important individually: OSI decisionmaking, including the role of information from national technical means (NTM); entry into force (EIF); China's demand for a provision on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs); concerns by Russia regarding equal transparency at the test sites; and whether and how noble gas sensors, satellites and/or electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) monitoring should be included in the verification regime.

While some discussions continued in the NTB Committee, Ramaker also convened around 15 key States to negotiate the most difficult issues under his auspices as Chair. This group included the P-5, the three undeclared nuclear-weapon States, India, Israel and Pakistan, and ambassadors from Japan, Mexico, Egypt, Germany, Canada, Indonesia and Australia which had acted as moderators or 'friends of the chair' on the major issues. In general, however, negotiations on all these levels in Geneva were thwarted by political developments or decisions in key States.

Elections in Russia, India and Israel caused policy hardening or confusion that not only affected the negotiating postures of their own delegations, but also prompted (or provided excuses for) an ossification of positions in others, including Britain and several Middle Eastern States. The United States expressed a willingness to be flexible on everything except OSI. In this, because of interagency conflict and ratification concerns, the US delegation apparently had so little room to manoeuvre that it was prepared to compromise its positions on other important issues in order to win concessions from China and Russia. At this late stage of negotiations, France has proved to be the most flexible of all, being the first to announce its willingness to adopt the chair's draft treaty, though stressing that the entry into force provision must be improved. Nevertheless, France has joined Britain in vigorously resisting the non-aligned States' pressure for stronger commitments to nuclear disarmament in the preamble, which in turn has provided India with both reason and excuse for turning away from the treaty.

Media speculation about India's intentions came to a head on 20 June, when many expected Ambassador Arundhati Ghose to announce India's withdrawal from the negotiations. Instead her statement was an ultimatum, Strongly criticising the direction of negotiations, she repeatedly said that India could not sign the treaty unless its concerns were met, referring specifically to a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to end the qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons and accept at least the concept of a time-table for nuclear disarmament. She indicated that India would not block CD consensus on the treaty (if it were achieved) but warned against attempts to bind India by making its accession a condition of the treaty's entry into force.

Despite its rhetoric, India appeared unwilling to work with its non-aligned colleagues to strengthen the treaty's preamble by confronting France, Britain and the United States with a co- ordinated proposal. This appeared to confirm the growing view that India is less interested in getting a good treaty than in pandering to a strident sector of domestic opinion that wants India to demonstrate its nuclear capability, thereby maintaining an illusion that India can keep its nuclear options open even if others sign a CTBT. Although 13 countries of the G-21 (Group of Non-Aligned States) managed to unite on a four paragraph proposal on preambular objectives and aspirations by the last week, they could accomplish little without either India's engagement or support from moderate western States, who preferred to stay on the side-lines.

The competing requirements of security and verifiability exemplified in the concept of on-site inspections have broken past treaty negotiations and their power to do the same to this CTBT should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, though the US, China and Russia had been facing off over inspections, the biggest threat to treaty conclusion has become the entry into force provisions. Attempts in the Chair's 28 May draft to bind India by virtue of a list based on IMS stations caused New Delhi to withdraw its seismic and radionuclide stations. As Russia and Britain fronted political manoeuvres by Pakistan, China and Egypt to make the CTBT's implementation absolutely dependent on accession by the eight nuclear test-capable States, India's refusal to sign under such conditions throws up the prospect of a CTBT in indefinite limbo.

Told by Britain's Ambassador Sir Michael Weston during a heated EIF debate that the treaty only concerns the eight, the other negotiators being there merely to share the financial burden of its verification, Japan has threatened that it would not pay to maintain the Preparatory Commission if implementation of the treaty were unreasonably delayed. Many others, from Mexico to Nigeria, have warned that entry into force conditions should not be used to delay or prevent early implementation of the CTBT, as that would risk the credibility of the treaty which could have dangerous consequences for future security, including further arms control and disarmament initiatives. Ramaker, Canada and others have attempted to resolve this issue with different combinations of list, number and waiver/pressure mechanisms, but there is still widespread unease, and it cannot be assumed that the formula in the Chair's 28 June draft is the final word.

Beginning the month with another nuclear test (which may have encompassed more than one detonation) Beijing announced that there would be one more, followed by a moratorium in September. With this, China began to negotiate in earnest, prioritising inspections, indicating flexibility on PNEs, and backing the hard line Russo-British position on entry into force. As China at last gave up on exempting PNEs from the general ban on all nuclear explosions in the treaty's scope, Japan and Canada headed many States' opposition to its attempts at obtaining an Article II commitment to review the issue. Pushed further and further back, it is now likely that the face-saving mention in Ramaker's revised draft will go through. As provided in the article on review of the treaty, PNEs would be banned unless this were reviewed and the treaty were amended by consensus.

It is not yet certain that the CD will send an effective treaty to the United Nations for signature in September. Attempts to coerce India backfired and hope is fading that the weak coalition government of H D Deve Gowda has either the will or the desire to rescue Nehru's baby from the flames of India's hyped-up media and domestic debate. If big power sticks were counterproductive, there may still be a chance to offer political and economic carrots to India, including meeting its primary concerns with preambular reference to the concept of a time-table or programme to achieve nuclear disarmament and a recognition of the treaty's long sought objective of preventing qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

However, none of the P-5 shows signs of engaging with India on these levels. As India withdraws to the side-lines of negotiations, the P-5 response has been to ignore its stated concerns and dismiss attempts by other non-aligned countries which also sought stronger commitments in these areas. If India walks, it is unlikely that Pakistan will sign, regardless of the EIF provisions. Strong criticisms of the emerging treaty voiced by India and Pakistan have been joined during the past month by Egypt, Iran and Nigeria. The P-5 are no doubt unworried by the prospect of others walking away from the present treaty, but there is a dangerous contradiction in their tactic of ignoring India while at the same time making its accession a binding pre- condition for the treaty's implementation.

On the positive side, there is now virtually complete acceptance of the scope language, informed by the zero yield decisions. The P- 5 have managed to resolve most of their differences regarding verification, and there are signs that all could accept the provisions on this in Ramaker's draft treaty - although there may be some attempt to wring additional concessions before August. China has accepted that PNEs must be banned unless the treaty is amended in the future, thereby removing a major hurdle to final agreement. Constructive positions adopted by Mexico and Indonesia towards the scope, preamble and entry into force provisions have attempted to bridge the gap between draft treaty provisions and non-aligned aspirations, while Cuba and France managed to agree on the merest mention of the environment in the preamble.

A declaration of support for the NTB Chair circulated by Canada was signed by over 20 delegations. However, signatories were mainly western countries which (with a few honourable exceptions) have to all intents and purposes joined the Eastern Europeans on the back benches during this final stage of negotiations, leaving the P-5 and G-21 to slug it out in an unequal contest for the spirit of the treaty. Rather than signing declarations, western countries could have shown more positive support for the Dutch delegation's attempts to conclude an effective treaty if they had backed the non-aligned States' more reasonable proposals (some of which were already the policy of certain western States) and been prepared to exert greater pressure to induce recalcitrant members of the Western group, such as the UK, to see reason on potential treaty breakers such as entry into force.

Nevertheless, considerable gains were made this month. A solid and significant treaty text has been tabled by its target date. To meet its obligation to have the treaty ready for signature by heads of State or foreign ministers attending the UN General Assembly mid-September the CD must now confront its real deadline. The task ahead is pre-eminently political. Decisions on this treaty text must be taken in capitals during the month of July so that the treaty can be finalised, agreed and sent from the CD no later than August 16, 1996.

Statements to Plenary

6 June Plenary

The 737th plenary of the CD, chaired by Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan, heard statements on the CTBT from Poland and China. Ambassador Olexander Slipchenko of the Ukraine announced that removal of strategic nuclear weapons from Ukraine was completed on 1 June, making Ukraine a non-nuclear State. Referring to the 'exhausting nuclear arms race' which had cost Ukrainians dear in terms of their well-being and economic development, Slipchenko emphasised the three non-nuclear principles adopted in July 1990: 'not to accept, produce or procure nuclear weapons.' The rest of the plenary was devoted to the expansion question, which is dealt with in a separate section.

For China, Ambassador Sha Zukang announced that China would be willing to accept 'a temporary ban on PNEs'. Providing that others would accept China's proposal that PNEs should be reconsidered by a future review conference, he indicated that Beijing would support the Australian scope in WP.222. On entry into force he reiterated China's requirement for all States 'technically capable of conducting nuclear explosions' and rejected any waiver option.

Referring to the importance of on-site inspections, Sha argued that IMS data should serve 'as the primary basis' for triggering an OSI, but conceded for the first time that NTM may have a 'supplementary role to play', providing 'necessary restrictions' were imposed. In this regard, 'they must be technical in nature, reliable, verifiable and obtained in keeping with universally accepted principles of international law.' He categorically rejected 'human intelligence' and also argued that NTM should go through 'a process of strict technical and political elaboration' although he did not expand on what this meant. Noting that in general the Executive Council would take substantive decisions by a two-thirds majority and procedural decisions by a simple majority, Sha argued that the launching of an OSI must be regarded as a substantive issue, and should only take place if approved by a two-thirds majority of the entire Council.

Sha supported aspirations by the G-21 to include language on nuclear disarmament in the preamble and 'in another gesture of flexibility' agreed to withdraw China's proposal for separate articles referring to security assurances and no first use, insisting that these be reflected instead in the preamble.

Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland, who had been chair of the NTB Committee in 1995, took the floor to support the current NTB chair for 'pursuing that process through intensive, open-ended consultations and in-depth examination of the issues'. He commended the timing and basis of the chair's draft in WP.330, while indicating that the preamble could be 'less timid' and that the executive council and EIF formulae could be made more effective.

13 June Plenary

The 738th plenary, chaired by Akram, was taken up with 14 statements from Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, Germany, Australia, Mexico, Japan, Chile, Republic of Korea, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Mongolia and the USA criticising China's test of 8 June. However, in light of Beijing's announcing that after one more test before September China would 'exercise a moratorium on nuclear testing' the criticisms were more muted than hitherto. Most welcomed China's announcement of a moratorium in September, but 'strongly urged' China to begin it now (and not conduct the further test). In reply, Sha read out the foreign ministry statement of 8 June. Saying that he understood the concerns of certain non-nuclear-weapon States, Sha complained that a 'certain nuclear super-power and its military allies under its nuclear protection, have made some irresponsible remarks on China's extremely limited number of nuclear tests irrespective of China's legitimate security concerns. This is totally unacceptable.'

Japan and Canada also made strong statements against inclusion of PNEs in the treaty text. Canada vigorously opposed the concept of PNEs, questioning both the validity and viability of its inclusion in the treaty. Downgrading its earlier expressed 'allergy', and referring by implication to rumours of the P-5 deal with China to include PNEs in the treaty text, Ambassador Mark Moher went on: 'Canada... has the strongest reservations about the incorporation of this concept in a CTBT.' To try to pre-empt this, he argued that 'Such incorporation would, at the least, give the concept renewed and updated formal recognition despite 30 years of experience and, at the most, might well encourage ongoing interest in, if not research and development of, this concept.' On the basis that only China wants PNEs in the CD, Moher argued that 'its actual inclusion in our collective CTBT should not be considered.' Instead, Canada suggested that China's perspective might be reflected in the CTBT's negotiating history 'by a formal Chinese statement or by a Chinese statement shared by any others interested in the concept or even by a presidential statement recognizing that view at the concluding stage of our negotiations.'

Japan's Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi made a short but strong statement pointing out that there were only two weeks before the deadline set by the CD and focusing on scope (including PNEs) and entry into force. Clearly stating that 'PNEs should not be allowed under the CTBT', she noted China's expression of flexibility and urged it to accept the scope in the Chair's draft text 'without any conditions'. Expressing 'serious concern' about entry into force, Kurokochi argued that 'if the CTBT had a formula that makes its entry into force unrealistic for a considerable length of time, the international community would question whether such a treaty will ever enter into force.' With regard to the 'three' de facto NWS, Japan argues that making them a prerequisite would 'take away the credibility that the CTBT will enter into force' and said that Japan supported the US-Swedish condition requiring ratification by 40 countries including the P-5.

Dr Ola Dahlman provided the CD with an update on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) and the technical test (GSETT-3) of an international seismic network and international data centre (IDC), currently underway. Characterising GSETT-3's progress as successful, he said that 130 stations from 45 countries were participating in the test, of which 67 were part of the envisaged IMS for the treaty.

17 June Plenary

The 739th plenary, chaired by Akram, was called especially to decide on enlarging the CD's membership from 38 to 61. See the section on expansion for details.

20 June Plenary

With 60 participating members (not counting Yugoslavia whose seat is disputed, with no agreed successor), the CD convened its 740th plenary, chaired by Akram, with rearranged seating and a smaller chamber. While most of the 27 statements were devoted to the expansion, and are dealt with in that separate section, an important statement on the CTBT was given by India. Several countries, particularly Iran and Mexico, also commented on the progress of the CTBT negotiations.

Mexico's Ambassador Antonio de Icaza referred to its many communications from non-governmental organisations supporting early implementation of the test ban treaty. He warned against providing a condition that allows 'excessive delay' and supported a list combined with a waiver mechanism as the best formula to maintain the treaty's credibility.

Ambassador Sirous Nasseri raised concerns about the treaty's nature and function: 'A treaty that does not prohibit nuclear testing, does not end qualitative development of nuclear weapons and allows the nuclear powers to pursue their programs to improve their nuclear weapons through simulations as well as sub-critical tests is not comprehensive; and when, furthermore, the treaty is not placed in its appropriate nuclear disarmament context it loses its meaning.' Therefore, at a minimum, Iran required specific commitments in the preamble to nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework and an ending of qualitative improvement, as well as establishment of a CD committee on nuclear disarmament 'to witness real good faith'.

Iran regarded permanent seats on the executive council for nuclear test-capable States as 'unacceptable', argued against NTM, except if brought under 'international scrutiny', and considered that the recent expansion of CD membership could 'pave the way for possible acceptable solutions.' In particular, Nasseri underlined that 'great advances in technical discussions...have not been matched with progress on the more fundamental issues which require decisions at political macro level' urging for negotiations to become more 'focused, extensive, continuous and transparent'.

Despite media reports from India predicting a walk-out from the negotiations, India's ambassador to the CD, Arundhati Ghose, indicated that India would not block the treaty, but could not sign it in its present form. Strongly critical of the direction of the test ban negotiations, she castigated the nuclear-weapon States for attempting to limit the treaty to being merely 'an instrument against horizontal proliferation' and said that India would not be able to accept a CTBT 'shaped more by the technological preferences of the nuclear-weapon States rather than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament.'

Making reference to new doctrines and targeting strategies, as well as advanced technology to 'preserve and refine capabilities into the distant future', Ghose raised regional concerns about 'clandestine transfers of nuclear weapon technology' and emphasised that India could not accept 'that it is legitimate for some countries to rely on nuclear weapons for their security while denying this right to others.' Since 'countries around us continue their weapon programmes, either openly or in a clandestine manner', Ghose said, 'India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons.' Rejecting attempts to bind India through the entry into force provisions of the treaty, Ghose underlined that India 'would not accept any language in the treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to decide, in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede to such a treaty.'

25 June Plenary

The 741st plenary, chaired by Ambassador Jose Urrutia of Peru, was addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Ali Alatas. Pakistan addressed the substance of the CTBT negotiations, while Cameroun and Syria took the floor as new members.

After scanning the international scene, Alatas noted that the CTBT constituted a 'litmus test for the willingness of States to halt the nuclear arms race and to pursue nuclear disarmament', underlining its importance as 'an essential step toward preventing the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new ones'.

Commending the NTB Chair for his 'timely and courageous initiative' in tabling a clean treaty draft, Alatas argued for the preamble to encompass two fundamental objectives: to curb nuclear proliferation and to 'serve as a basis for the pursuit of the objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons by all States.' Expressing dismay at the obduracy of the nuclear-weapon States, he said that efforts to obtain these objectives were 'not directed at undermining the security policies of a few nuclear or potentially nuclear States, but rather at achieving security for all.' He reiterated Indonesia's opposition to PNEs and gave qualified support to the Chair's proposal for allocating seats in a slightly larger Executive Council.

Alatas made two specific proposals, on OSI and entry into force. While saying that an OSI request should be 'based on data gathered solely' by the IMS, Alatas proposed that an OSI request based solely on IMS data could be approved by a simple majority, whereas a request based on NTM information not corroborated by the IMS would require a two-thirds majority. This is a variation of France's proposal from August 1995, which was taken further by South Africa in an attempt to narrow the gap between the US and non-aligned positions regarding permissibility of NTM. On entry into force Indonesia advocated a simple numerical approach, as found in the Chemical Weapons Convention, but suggested that it might be possible to devise a mechanism outside the treaty text, such as a declaration by the participating nuclear States 'not to engage in further qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons.' He concluded with an appeal not to allow divergences between positions to be 'used by any Party as an excuse to prevent or delay agreement on the treaty.'

Ambassador Akram made a statement highly critical of the CTBT progress, noting that having come close to concluding the treaty text, Pakistan was realising that 'it is not the CTBT we had sought for so long'. Echoing India's speech of the previous week, he said that the treaty text would ban only 'nuclear explosion tests and not all nuclear tests' and castigated the nuclear-weapon States for not being willing to agree that sub-critical and laboratory tests should not be used for improvements under the guise of safety and reliability. Pointing out the treaty's shortcomings in scope and verification, with bitter reference to the way in which 'most members of the Conference have become spectators to a drama played out among the five nuclear powers - in which the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee has had a minor role', he said that it would be easy to give up on the negotiations. Pakistan had not, Akram noted, because it felt that 'a ban on nuclear explosions is better than no ban at all' and accepted that it would 'severely constrain' the nuclear powers' development plans and would 'contribute significantly to nuclear non-proliferation.'

Akram warned that India's refusal to sign could 'spell the death knell' of the CTBT and reinforced once again the importance to Pakistan of an EIF provision that would bind all the eight nuclear and threshold States to the treaty before it could be implemented. At the same time he argued that 'constructive compromises' in the negotiations could help to reverse India's 'negative decision', identifying a stronger statement of purposes and objectives in the preamble, linked to periodic review of the treaty. Pakistan once again stressed that NTM would not be acceptable without 'severe constraints or conditions', excluding espionage and human intelligence, and could not be the sole basis for an OSI decision and made several other demands relating to inspections, any proposed role for the UN Security Council in enforcement, and the regional basis for allocating seats on the Executive Council. Pledging Pakistan's willingness to 'work around the clock in the next few days', he noted that more important than the 28 June deadline was the 'need to ensure that the Treaty which emerges is the outcome of genuine negotiations and thus acceptable to the general membership' of the CD.

27 June Plenary

The 742nd plenary, chaired by Urrutia, heard from France, Egypt, Cuba, Viet Nam, Nigeria and Mexico. Relieved of the Presidency, Pakistan added its voice to those who had rejected any direct link or possible precedent associated with the admission of 23 new members and their letter temporarily suspending their right of veto. This prompted a reply from the United States that in its view the G-23 letter was 'connected indivisibly' to CD consensus approval of the decision to admit the 23 new members. Viet Nam's short speech as a new member supported the statement made earlier in the week by Indonesia and backed G-21 demands for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.

Ambassador Joelle Bourgois gave a positive statement noting the equal importance that France attached to the dual objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the CTBT. She said that the cessation of nuclear testing would put an end to the nuclear arms race and make the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons 'impossible'. Stressing that NTM could fill in the gaps and underpin data from the IMS, she said that such means were necessary if they were to take the zero option seriously. Noting that entry into force was a major issue still to be resolved, she said that France wanted the treaty to be universal and to enter into force as soon as possible, but did not make any specific proposal for resolving the impasse. France then announced that it could adopt the revised chair's draft as the treaty, providing that this provision could be adjusted along the lines indicated by recent discussion. Imagining the 'worst scenario', no treaty, Bourgois encouraged her negotiating partners that though this may not be the treaty that each had for different reasons wanted to see, it was one that each could accept.

Nigerian Ambassador Ejoh Abuah noted that the draft treaty was limited since it did not cover a nuclear test ban and was weak on both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. Referring back to the UK Ambassador's remark during a debate on entry into force in the NTB Committee, Abuah replied that since States Parties to the CTBT would have to make financial commitments to verifying this treaty, they wanted this balanced by strong commitments in the preamble: 'Most of us will be paying for detecting the future tests of others without assurances that there will not be qualitative improvement in the weapon systems that exist today.'

Advocating a simple numerical formula for EIF, Abuah argued that 'failure to achieve early effectiveness of the treaty might damage the treaty, with negative consequences for any other nuclear related treaties that may be negotiated.' Nigeria did not like the regional breakdown on which the allocation of seats for the Executive Council was based and repeated its objection that Africa was under-represented. In conclusion he said 'this nuclear weapon explosion limitation treaty is important...[but] there is still much ground to cover.'

For Cuba, Ambassador Eumelio Caballero endorsed non-aligned concerns that the treaty would not deal with nuclear testing per se and recalled that from the beginning the measure was linked with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. Focusing his statement on the harm done to the environment by nuclear testing he made an eloquent plea for this relationship to be acknowledged by some reference to protection of the environment in the treaty preamble.

Ambassador Mounir Zahran reminded delegations of the full mandate of the NTB Committee and said that a treaty that did not address all nuclear tests fell short of Egypt's expectations. He criticised those States which did not wish to ban testing or end qualitative improvement or development of nuclear arsenals and argued that the draft treaty as contained in WP.330 and WP.335 did not contain a commitment to a process for achieving nuclear disarmament as agreed at the NPT Conference last year. He called for a more comprehensive scope, better representation for Africa on the Executive Council, EIF conditions based on a simple number plus the eight nuclear test capable States and argued that NTM should only be used if screened by the IMS.

Mexico gave a short speech encouraging everyone to make use of the time left to come to agreement or 'risk abusing the confidence that the international community has placed in this negotiating forum.' Ambassador Antonio de Icaza said that the talks were bogged down because they had not even managed to halt once and for all the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, nor endorse the commitments on a programme of action on nuclear disarmament adopted a year ago at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Most seriously, negotiations were bogged down 'by the insistence of some delegations...demanding terms for the entry into force of the treaty that are not realistic and will excessively delay it, if they do not actually make it impossible.' He closed by reminding his colleagues of the trust and expectations of the international community and called on them to conclude 'an effective verifiable treaty that has the possibility to enter into force in a reasonable time.'

A summary of negotiations

Negotiations on a CTBT opened in the CD in January 1994, chaired by Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico, who bequeathed an initial rolling text of 93 pages. Ludwik Dembinski of Poland took over the chair in January 1995, in a year which saw substantial progress on verification but little movement on the central political issues until August, when the US and France dramatically pledged themselves to zero yield. When Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands took over in January 1996, he inherited a revised rolling text, with more than 1200 brackets around disputed text or options.

In February, Iran and Australia submitted draft or 'model' treaty texts, which demonstrated areas of agreement and showed how the mass of brackets could be pared away. While differing in the detail of their solutions, the Iranian and Australian texts approached many of the outstanding problems in similar ways. They thus hacked a path to enable Ramaker to put down a Chair's text. Because of strong opposition to any 'premature' attempt to circumvent the rolling text, expressed by India, Pakistan and China (and milder but significant objections from Russia), Ramaker chose to pull the text together in two stages. At the end of March he therefore tabled an 'Outline of a draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty' (CD/NTB/WP.321) to 'assist States...in preparing for the final stage'. This outline consisted of a preamble and 17 articles, but included in brackets considerable sections of the rolling text, including China's proposals on PNEs, peaceful use of nuclear energy, security assurances and the relation to other international agreements.

On 28 May, Ramaker presented a complete 'Draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty', consisting of a preamble and 17 articles with no brackets (CD/NTB/WP.330). To this were attached various annexes and protocols covering the treaty's verification. On 24 June he provided a further working paper containing amendments to his 28 May text (CD/NTB/WP.335). On 28 June, the last day of the second part of the 1996 session, Ramaker tabled a revised draft treaty (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.1). In view of the lateness of the session, he did not seek endorsement of his chair's text nor even a decision to accept it in principle, but requested CD delegations to ensure that they and their governments study it during the intersessional period. In order to finalise the text in time to ready it for signature in September, as mandated by the UN General Assembly, it would need to be agreed by early August, leaving little time for further negotiations if any State wants any substantial changes. The chair's draft text from WP.330/Rev.1 is analysed below.

Scope

The basic obligations in Article I of the CTBT are taken from the most widely supported option in the rolling text, which had been originally proposed by Australia in March 1995:

"1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."

With the 'zero yield' understanding that this prohibits low yield explosive testing and hydronuclear experiments, this scope formulation has now received the backing of all the five declared nuclear-weapon States as well as the majority of non-nuclear weapon countries. As far as the nuclear-weapon States are concerned, it does not apply to sub-critical tests and laboratory experiments that do not involve a release of fission energy, but this is disputed by many non-aligned and non-nuclear weapon countries.

China's agreement came late in the day, as it finally recognised the futility of maintaining its lone insistence that PNEs be permitted. Egypt has continued to support the proposal put forward by Indonesia in June 1995, that the word 'explosion' should be deleted from the first part so that the treaty would ban all nuclear weapon tests and any nuclear explosion. For a while during the past month, Egypt was joined by Iran, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria in pushing for this tightening of the scope. Faced with complete rejection from the P-5 and resistance from other countries, including Indonesia, on grounds that such a scope could not command consensus and that persisting with it could jeopardise the treaty, these countries are expected to agree to Ramaker's scope text after making their point on nuclear testing per se.

India continues to want the treaty to ban all nuclear testing, clinging to its proposal to prohibit 'any release of nuclear energy caused by the rapid assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical explosive or other means.' However, India has no hope now of re-opening agreement on scope.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE)

China's demand for PNEs finally caved in, having failed to find a single backer (though Russia and Iran offered behind-the-scenes support). After indicating in May that it would be 'flexible', China proposed that Article II of the treaty should 'notwithstanding the provisions of Article I', offer the possibility of permitting PNEs, providing that a Review Conference of States Parties agreed to this by consensus. Such an article was unacceptable to the majority of delegations, who feared that this would raise ambiguities about the scope prohibition. Canada put forward an alternative paragraph, softening China's proposal and inserting it under Article VIII, the section on review of the treaty. This underwent a further transformation before being finalised as paragraph 1 of Article VIII in the chair's draft, which China is understood to be willing to accept:

'Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provision of Article VII.'

Reversing the prohibition clearly described in Article 1 on scope would thus require a request from a State Party to place the issue on the Review Conference agenda, then agreement at the review conference and further consensus at a subsequent amendment conference which would have to approve an amendment and proposals for the conduct of a nuclear explosion ensuring that no-one could gain any military benefit. While many States regard even this provision as otiose, it is likely to be accepted as a 'face-saver' since China has insisted that it must have some reference to PNEs in the treaty in return for giving them up. Since the legal position would be that PNEs are banned unless the treaty is amended, this review provision should not be regarded as a justification for any research programmes carried out by nuclear weapon laboratories with a view to circumventing the CTBT's intentions under the guise of PNEs.

Preamble

Ramaker's treaty preamble changed little from his first draft, although the G-21 had made a last ditch, unsuccessful attempt to strengthen the treaty's objectives in this section. The repository of a treaty's political aspirations, the preamble may become the display case for concepts that underpin the treaty, a storage site for ideas that were dropped from the body of the text or a bland assertion of general principles that offend no-one. With the three western nuclear powers rejecting anything stronger, Ramaker chose to make it the latter.

In view of its original purpose, the non-aligned countries wanted the CTBT preamble to commit the Parties to the concept of a time- table for nuclear disarmament and reflect the treaty's role in curbing vertical proliferation. In the penultimate week the G-21 began negotiating to find common language for the preamble that they could push for together. Coordinated by Mexico, amendment proposals were submitted by 13 countries. Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka and Venezuela submitted an amendment proposal on the preamble with paragraphs recognising 'that a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should end the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, thereby constituting an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects', and 'that an end to all nuclear weapon tests explosions and all other nuclear explosions is an indispensable step towards the larger goal of a nuclear weapon free world and should be complemented by negotiations, to be conducted on a high priority basis, on comprehensive phased programme with agreed time-frames for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at the earliest possible time'.

A further paragraph referred to the aspirations of the 1963 PTBT, including ending environmental contamination by radioactive substances. While not including Pakistan's separate section on purposes and objectives, the statement put the preamble into this context with a final paragraph committing to the 'achievement of the above mentioned purposes and objectives.' India, which had earlier submitted its own language on ending qualitative development and calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a 'time-bound framework', refused to negotiate with its non-aligned colleagues on a joint proposal. This weakened the bargaining power of the G-21 States and played into the hands of the western nuclear powers who made it clear that they would not negotiate on strengthening the preamble unless India gave a commitment to sign the treaty.

Rejecting any mention of curbing nuclear weapon development as an objective or aspiration of the treaty, France, Britain and the United States were prepared to allow the preamble to refer to 'constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons' as a consequence of the treaty. They would also accept a preambular paragraph recognising a CTBT as 'a meaningful step in the realisation of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.' With Cuba pushing hard to include mention of the environment and France continuing to oppose references linking nuclear testing to environmental harm (reportedly afraid that such linkage could make it possible for the nuclear-weapon States to be sued) the revised treaty text merely noted 'the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment.'

Elsewhere the preamble welcomes recent arms reduction measures and underlines the importance of their implementation and of further measures towards nuclear disarmament. Utilising language agreed in the decisions on Principles and Objectives at the NPT Conference in May 1995, the preamble stresses the need for 'continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control'. It reiterates the NTB Committee's mandate for a 'universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty' and affirms its 'purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security'.

The CTBT Organisation (CTBTO)

The revised treaty text made few changes to the sections relating to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which would be established in Vienna. This will comprise a Conference of States Parties, expected to meet annually, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General. The CTBTO will be an independent body, but can 'seek to utilise expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximise cost efficiencies, through co-operative arrangements with other international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency'.

Following pressure from African and European States, Ramaker decided to increase the membership of the Executive Council from the 45 originally proposed, keeping the six regions but adding one seat to each region's allocation, thus: 10 to Africa, 7 to Eastern Europe, 9 to Latin America, 7 to the Middle East and South Asia, 10 to North America and Western Europe, and 8 to South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. Although some African States continued to complain that they were under-represented, and Nigeria again argued for the allocation to be based on the UN 's five regions instead, it is likely that this will be the final say on the composition of the Council. The conditions for seat allocation remain much the same as in the previous draft, with one third to be filled taking into account particular criteria, one seat per region allocated by alphabetic rotation (to ensure that no-one is excluded), and the rest designated from among the States Parties in each region by rotation or election.

In the section to be filled according to certain criteria, Ramaker has bowed to Pakistan's objections and removed the reference to nuclear capabilities as determined by the IAEA. Instead, political and security interests are to be taken into account, alongside 'nuclear capabilities relevant to the treaty as determined by international data', IMS facilities, expertise and experience in monitoring and States Parties' budgetary contribution to the CTBTO. This formula was designed to provide equitable regional participation, ensure that no State is permanently excluded, and give States which regard themselves as major players the assurance of continuous seats on the Council, while avoiding the political overtones of providing 'permanent' seats to the nuclear-weapon States or others.

While the Conference of States Parties is the principal body, the Executive Council will have the greatest political role in decision making. With the exceptions of permitting or preventing an on-site inspection from being launched, the Executive Council would take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of its 51 members, and matters of procedure by a simple majority of the members. Its powers and functions are almost unchanged between Ramaker's first draft and this treaty text. However, reference in the earlier draft to considering 'apparently imminent non-compliance' with the treaty is now merely 'possible non-compliance'. When Germany dropped its requirement for including 'preparing' to test in the scope, it had pushed for consideration of imminent non-compliance elsewhere in the treaty, supported by Sweden and several non-aligned countries, including Indonesia. However, the nuclear-weapon States argued that this might be used to interfere with some of their non-prohibited activities at the test sites and could cause compliance ambiguities. Faced with their opposition, Ramaker has left direct reference to imminent non-compliance out of the treaty, although it may still be possible to raise questions under the provisions for consultation and clarification about activities which cause suspicion prior to a treaty violation being committed.

Verification

With the exception of the monitoring stations withdrawn by India, the verification regime has remained little changed from Ramaker's earlier draft. It would consist of an international monitoring system (IMS) of four basic technologies, non-mandatory consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. As far as the IMS is concerned, there is agreement on the number and location of stations providing global networks of seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic monitors. Despite India's withdrawal of a primary and auxiliary seismic station and a radionuclide monitoring station, Ramaker has kept the numbers the same, with India's replacement to be determined if New Delhi persists in its policy of non-cooperation.

The IMS would comprise 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations, a network of 11 hydroacoustic monitors, 60 infrasound stations and a network of 80 stations for measuring radionuclides in the atmosphere. Despite strong opposition from China, Ramaker has included noble gas monitoring. The draft requires 40 of the 80 stations for measuring radioactive particles in the atmosphere to monitor for the presence of relevant noble gases as well. Most countries with an opinion on the matter support this on grounds that noble gas monitoring would enhance the deterrence and detection capabilities of the system. The venting of gases such as xenon and argon are indicative of a nuclear explosion and cannot be completely or confidently contained even if a test is carefully concealed. Ramaker has omitted electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and satellites, which China wanted, but has included provisions for 'improvement of the verification regime', allowing EMP, satellites or other technology to be incorporated in the IMS subject to the consensus of the Executive Council. In this manner, technologies can be either added or deleted from the IMS without requiring the full process of an Amendment Conference. It would also be possible, under separately established 'cooperative arrangements' for any State Party to make available supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of the IMS, although it appears that this only applies to the IMS-type technologies.

The International Data Centre (IDC), attached to the Technical Secretariat, would be responsible for processing the mass of raw data from the IMS stations and sending it to States Parties in a variety of forms. The controversy over how much the IDC should analyse the data as part of its regular bulletin to States Parties was decided by Ramaker in favour of 'an enhanced option 2' of the Friend of the Chair's working paper (CD/NTB/WP.312). The revised draft text confirms the likely acceptance that the IDC would screen data in accordance with internationally standardised criteria established by the CTBTO, filter it according to nationally requested criteria, and provide some additional technical assistance to States Parties.

On IMS funding, Ramaker has decided that unless the responsible State meets the costs itself, the CTBTO would pay for establishing new facilities identified as necessary for the primary networks, upgrading existing primary or auxiliary facilities to the international standards, operating and maintaining primary IMS facilities, transmitting IMS data, both processed and raw, analysing samples and authenticating data from auxiliary stations. Providing a modified version of the US proposal for 'contribution credits', the Chair's text allows a State Party to offset its costs on establishing and operating its stations against its assessed financial contribution, up to half its annual financial liability. Overall, the costs of the CTBTO will be met by all States Parties in accordance with the UN scale of assessments adjusted to take account of the difference in membership of the two organisations.

Confidence-building measures relate to voluntary notification of chemical explosions and calibration of the IMS stations, but do not encompass any transparency or measures relating to the existing test sites, as some G-21 countries had hoped.

Consultation and clarification, identified by Ramaker as an essential component of the verification regime, has not been made mandatory, as wanted by Israel, India, China and others. States have the right (but not the obligation) to seek clarification and attempt to resolve, either among themselves or through the CTBTO 'any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with this treaty.' A State Party may request assistance from the CTBTO and be provided with information from the Technical Secretariat. The Party to whom the request is directed is obliged to provide clarification within 24 hours, and can be pursued for additional explanations if the initial information is deemed inadequate. Consultation and clarification should also be sought immediately if any request for an on-site inspection is received. Although time-lines are provided so that results of this exchange of information can inform the OSI decision process, conclusion of the clarification process is not obligatory.

On-Site Inspections (OSI)

During the past month on-site inspections have occupied considerable time in bilateral, P-5 and multilateral negotiations. Although some movement was reported, positions remained polarised between the United States, backed by the UK and France, which wants as unrestricted a regime as possible, including the right to use any kind of national as well as international sources of information, and China, backed by Pakistan and India, which wants greater controls and restrictions to prevent 'abuse' and espionage. The P-5 had been attempting to resolve several issues of contention among them as a 'package', including PNEs, satellites, EMP and noble gas monitoring, equal transparency at the test sites, and entry into force. More than any other issue, unreconcilable differences on inspection procedures and the use of national technical means (NTM) blocked agreement, even though the United States was prepared to sacrifice its better judgement on entry into force in return for stronger support from Britain and greater concessions from China and Russia on inspections.

For the U.S. the issue pertains not only to the effectiveness of the treaty's verification regime, but to Senate ratification of the treaty. In this, the Clinton administration is vulnerable to interagency struggles and those in the intelligence and military agencies who opposed a test ban treaty. However, for China, Russia, India, Israel and Pakistan, this is a fundamental question of national security, and they want to ensure that any inspection would be a very rare and circumscribed occurrence. For the US, the best way to ensure rare or zero inspections is to have an effective and deterrent verification regime so that no State attempts to do anything that might be construed as suspicious within the terms of the treaty. The others, however, want to ensure that all States would be monitored to the same degree, raising concerns that as the most technologically advanced the United States could have an advantage both for evading detection and for accusing others. As negotiations among the protagonists continued to go round in circles, Ramaker has chosen to make few alterations to the delicate balance of rights and responsibilities contained in his first draft.

The Chair's draft text allows any relevant kind of information, including national technical means, but 'consistent with generally recognised principles of international law', understood to exclude espionage. However, before the inspection can go ahead, the Executive Council must decide by a 'majority of all members' (the so-called green light). The United States continues to argue that this is too stringent. They had favoured a process whereby a requested inspection went ahead automatically unless countermanded by the Executive Council (red light). Though recognising now that this is not obtainable, the US is holding out for a simple majority decision by those members of the Executive Council who are present and voting. However, Pakistan and China have so far been unwilling to accept a simple majority, arguing that they have already dropped their requirement from three-fourths. Underscoring China's insistence on a two-thirds majority of the 51 members, Sha stated on 6 June that 'the launching of OSI can only be considered as a substantive issue in the EC'. Although the P-5, special consultations and the NTB Committee considered various alternatives such as two-thirds of EC members which are present and voting, no agreement was reached. Ramaker's confirmation in WP.330/Rev.1 of the simple majority voting formula suggests that this is the best compromise, providing a stricter filter than the US hoped for but less stringent than China wanted.

Some delegations had been concerned that requiring a positive decision of the Council to permit an inspection could be abused for purposes of delay so that time-critical evidence could be dispersed or erased. The Chair's text deals with this by providing a practical but strict time-line for the various stages between an OSI request and arrival at the site to be inspected, so that the time taken must not exceed one week. Although he has not recommended specific inspection phases, as proposed by the United States, Ramaker has introduced the provision that once an inspection is initiated, it can only be halted by a majority decision of the Council, or by recommendation of the inspection team (unless countermanded by the Council). However, if drilling is to be conducted, a further decision of the Council must be sought (green light).

Intrusion and effectiveness have been balanced with overflight provisions and managed access, although the precise conditions have been strongly contested by Russia and Israel, both of whom want to ensure that they could protect sensitive facilities from prying eyes. The envisaged time-frame for an inspection is 60 days, with the possibility of extending by up to 70 days, subject to majority decision of the Executive Council. Provisions covering the conduct of inspections aim to diminish the opportunity for abuse while ensuring that the inspection team is not prevented from carrying out its mandate by undue delays and impediments thrown up by an inspected State. States are allowed to protect sensitive facilities and information unrelated to compliance with the treaty. The inspection should move from less intrusive to more intrusive procedures. Inspectors and access points have to be identified to the CTBTO within 30 days of the treaty's entry into force for it (and updated as appropriate). Consideration has been given to inspections where the site under one State's jurisdiction or control is on the territory of another State (as with US bases in Europe or Japan). During an inspection, personnel are granted privileges and immunities consistent with diplomatic status, and up to three observers from the requesting part(ies) may accompany the team, subject to the inspected Party's agreement of the personnel.

The draft treaty also includes penalties if the Executive Council deems a request to have been 'frivolous or abusive'. This may be financial (requiring the requesting State Party to bear the costs incurred) or any of the measures in Article V, which covers the redressing of a situation, compliance and sanctions. Accordingly, failure to comply with treaty obligations or abuse of the treaty's provisions can result in penalties ranging from suspension of membership rights, collective measures in conformity with international law, and the taking of cases of 'particular gravity' to the United Nations. The earlier specific mention of the UN General Assembly and Security Council have been left out, as several States had raised concerns about the potential for bias and possible use of veto because of the permanent representation of the declared nuclear-weapon States in the UN Security Council.

Review of the Treaty

Article VIII on review of the treaty has caused considerable debate during the final stages of the negotiations. Acting as moderator on this issue, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt managed to win consensus for language enabling the ten year review to include 'the objectives and purposes in the preamble and the provisions of the treaty...' as desired by India, Pakistan and others. As discussed above, the review is also charged with taking into account any new and relevant scientific and technological developments. A State Party can request that PNEs be addressed, but this is not automatically on the agenda of a future review conference as China had originally wanted.

Entry into Force

Agreeing on the conditions to be met before the CTBT becomes fully legally binding has become the most difficult issue to resolve. Russia, supported by Britain, Pakistan and Egypt, is adamant in requiring that all States with the capability to conduct a nuclear test should have signed and ratified the treaty before it enters into force. Very early on in the negotiations Russia proposed that the condition for the treaty coming into effect should be ratification by all 68 countries on the IAEA list of those who have or have had nuclear power or research facilities. At that time, the UK and France favoured the 'expanded CD' of 61 States. Both lists were simply ways to include the P-5 and the undeclared nuclear weapon countries, India, Israel and Pakistan, without identifying them explicitly or giving them special status. When it appeared that the CD would not expand, the UK, France and China came to support the Russian position. The United States, which feared that such a list was too large and could delay entry into force, favoured ratification by 40 States including the P-5. While the US wanted all the nuclear weapon capable countries on board, it had decided against making accession by the threshold States a condition, partly to avoid conferring veto power and special status, but most importantly because it wanted the treaty to take effect as soon as practical and considered a smaller number more likely to accomplish this.

With negotiations on entry into force deadlocked during May, Ramaker inserted as a 'holding article' in his first draft text a proposal from the UK which had not been negotiated. According to this, the treaty could enter into force on ratification by 37 countries listed as providing primary seismic stations and/or radionuclide laboratories to the IMS. The absurdity of such a transparent ploy to bind the eight became clear when two more countries added stations to the lists and India, denouncing the pressure that was being exerted by the P-5 to make it accede to the CTBT, announced that it would withdraw its seismic stations - and promptly did so.

With India's early signature on the treaty looking less and less likely, Ramaker sought a formula that would appease the hard- liners such as Russia and Britain. On 20 June, just after India's declaration that it would 'not accept any language in the treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to decide, in the light of our supreme national interest whether we should or should not accede to such a treaty', Ramaker issued a working paper on entry into force with a very complicated procedure (CD/NTB/WP.334).

Essentially it provided two entry into force provisions. If the stringent list condition could not be met within five years, then States which had ratified would have a second chance to bring the treaty into effect by a combination of a simple number, waiver conference and 'deferment' option. The condition based on the States with seismic and radionuclide stations would stand for five years after the treaty was opened for signature. If the condition had not been met during that time, but at least 75 States had signed and ratified, then the treaty would enter into force automatically five years plus 180 days from the date of its opening for signature, unless one or more of the States which had ratified requests a special conference to be convened. If a conference is requested, then this would be open to all States which had fully ratified, who would have the power to agree to implement the treaty by a two-thirds majority. In recognition of the particular concerns put forward by Pakistan and Egypt, WP.334 proposes that any State which had ratified but did not support the decision to implement the treaty could, at the time of the conference, defer entry into force of the treaty for it until all the original conditions had been met or it revokes its decision to defer.

This complicated proposal was forced on the Chair because of the intransigence of Russia, UK, Pakistan and China on the one hand, and India's threatened refusal to sign on the other. The United States, though among those who disliked the condition imposed by Russia et al, was prepared to bargain the 'five plus three' condition in return for what it wanted on inspections, failed to rally opposition to the hostage-taking formula and even - briefly - gave it reluctant backing. Failing to agree the P-5 package, the US shifted again, publicly opposing the list of 37 as India withdrew its IMS stations. However Russia and the UK continued to dig their heels in, refusing to contemplate any kind of waiver provision and making a mockery of the late night sessions of the NTB Committee that attempted to resolve the differences. By this time France, the US and the majority of other States wanted a more flexible provision that would not allow India or any other listed country take the treaty hostage and delay implementation indefinitely, but even confronted with a proposal that would give them five years to make their proposal work, the UK and Russia refused to move.

While there is greater understanding of Pakistan's interest in this provision, it is Russian-UK intransigence which has caused the deepest political problems, giving rise to speculation that they were using India's sari to cover their own motives with regard either to the CTBT or to the Clinton Administration's pledge to conclude it successfully. Russia's anger about the zero yield decision taken by Clinton in August 1995 is recognised as a factor in several difficulties thrown up by Moscow since then, including its demand for closer monitoring of Nevada and Lop Nor and its elevation of the accession of all the nuclear test capable States into a treaty breaking issue. Similarly, the current British Foreign Secretary campaigned very hard (and unsuccessfully) in 1992 and 1993, when he was Defence Secretary, to overturn the US testing moratorium which had severely curtailed British testing plans, establishing in the course of his endeavours very close relations with anti-CTBT factions within the American defence and intelligence agencies.

For logistical reasons as well as India's withdrawal of its stations, the provision in Ramaker's first draft (WP.330) was dead. Many States were returning to the view that the newly expanded CD combined with a waiver provision could provide a condition that would facilitate early implementation, while exerting political pressure on the test-capable States. However, the US considered 60 too large and Russia and the UK continued to oppose any kind of waiver, so Ramaker resurrected an idea originally floated some months ago by Canada, for a 'political conference'. In summary, the revised chair's draft would make entry into force conditional on ratification by a particular list of 44 States. If this condition is not met within the first three years, then States which had already ratified can convene a conference to 'decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this treaty.'

The 44 countries comprise those which were participating members of the CD on 18 June 1996 and which were also listed by the IAEA's 1995 and 1996 schedules of nuclear power reactors in the world: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, DPRK, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, USA, Viet Nam, Zaire. This list was intentionally conceived to prevent ambiguity by clearly omitting Yugoslavia (still on the roll as a CD member but barred from participation) and Iraq. There is presently some question, however, as to whether it should have included Venezuela, bringing the number to 45 States.

Immediately after the revised treaty text had been tabled on 28 June it was clear that some States were confused about the powers of this conference and whether among the measures it could consider was the power to waive the condition listing the 44 countries. However, it appears that the drafters intended to rule out the waiver possibility, although States which had ratified could decide on provisional application of the treaty. While provisional application could provide an interim solution, enabling the CTBTO and IMS to be put in place and funded, serious problems could arise if a suspected explosion were detected, requiring a decision to launch an on-site inspection.

If this is to be the provision in the final treaty it will no doubt be cleaned of any confusion. Although most States will be wary of re-opening negotiations, there is a possibility that of all the articles in WP.330/Rev.1 this could be worked on again, for the sake of providing conditions that would not leave the CTBT so vulnerable to being stuck in indefinitely prolonged limbo.

Duration and Withdrawal

The CTBT is envisaged to be of unlimited duration, but provides the standard clause enabling a State Party, in 'exercising its national sovereignty' to withdraw if it decides that 'extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests.' France, Russia, the US and UK have all stated for the record that fears about the safety and reliability of their nuclear weapon stockpiles could provide such a justification for withdrawal. In general, the supreme national interest provision would only be used in extremis. While not accepting that the link made with the maintenance of nuclear arsenals is appropriate, delegations view the P-4 declarations as required for domestic consumption.

Amendments

Substantive amendments to the treaty would require consensus among all States Parties attending an Amendment Conference, but there is a simplified procedure for administrative or technical amendments and a fast-track means for adding or removing stations from the IMS or otherwise updating verification provisions.

1996 Session

The first part of the 1996 session ran from 22 January to 29 March. The second part will run from 13 May until 28 June, and the final part from 29 July to 13 September.

Expansion

Summary

On 17 June, the CD finally admitted 23 new members, swelling its number officially to 61, although with no agreed successor to take Yugoslavia's seat, the true membership is 60. This latest, and finally successful attempt to increase the CD's representation, was initiated by Argentina from within the CD, and pushed by Chile, South Africa and New Zealand on behalf of the 23 new members. It involved some careful negotiations with the United States, which in September 1993 had blocked the admission of the 23 States on a 'balanced list' drawn up by the Australian ambassador, Paul O'Sullivan. To bypass US objections to the inclusion of Iraq, while maintaining the integrity of the 'O'Sullivan list', all of the new members signed an undertaking that for the first two years they would not individually obstruct any action of the CD, which makes its decisions by consensus. While supporting the expansion and upholding the 'sovereign right' of States to make such decisions, a number of non-aligned countries were unhappy about the way in which it had been accomplished, and held up decision for several days in order to resolve their concerns.

Proposed by Argentina and adopted at the 739th plenary, the CD decided 'in implementation of its decision CD/1356 of 21 September 1995, to admit Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe as members of the Conference on Disarmament on 17 June 1996.' (CD/1406)

Since 1978, CD membership had been stuck at 38, despite repeated calls for it to be expanded to reflect present economic, political and regional concerns more effectively. In 1993, the CD appointed O'Sullivan as special coordinator on the issue. After consultations with many States, he recommended that 23 countries representing all the regions, and including several States of proliferation concern should be admitted together. To circumvent vetoes against individual States for regional or other political reasons, the list was presented as a package deal. Although the US delegation had accepted this, a few hours before the CD was due to adopt the decision in September 1993, the US withdrew its agreement on grounds that Iraq should not be granted membership as long as it was subject to sanctions under chapter VII of the UN Charter. This US decision blocked consensus, preventing all 23 from becoming members. Despite several attempts to resolve the problems, the US veto combined with the determination of the 23 to stick together resulted in impasse until September 1995.

On the penultimate day of the 1995 session, the President of the CD, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco managed to finesse agreement on a two stage expansion decision. In the first stage the Conference accepted O'Sullivan's 1993 recommendation of the 23 countries; however actual admission of these countries was to be delayed pending a further decision 'at the earliest possible date.' (CD/1356) Seizing on a slight revision of the US position on Iraq indicated by the US ambassador's statement that 'in the case where one of its members is subject to comprehensive enforcement measures taken by the Security Council under chapter VII of the [UN] Charter, that State would not have the right to deny consensus on any decision to be adopted by the conference pending a subsequent decision to the contrary,' South Africa persuaded the United States to withdraw its veto providing the country concerned gave an individual commitment not to exercise its veto. In part to persuade Iraq, and partly to maintain G-23 solidarity, all twenty-three States agreed to a declaration that they would not individually exercise their veto in the CD for a limited period: either until the chapter VII sanctions were lifted and the CD could decide that the situation had changed; or - for the 22 States not subject to enforcement measures - no longer than two years.

With members of the G-21 objecting to explicit mention of the chapter VII sanctions, stressing that there was no relationship between the CD and decisions of the UN Security Council, and the United States insisting that the undertaking with regard to Iraq be made explicit in the declaration, there were several weeks of hard bargaining. In particular, the G-21 were concerned about the status of the declaration and its relationship with the decision to enlarge the CD.

To resolve these difficulties, Argentina's Ambassador Juan Carlos Sanchez Arnau came up with an alternative approach which eventually won consensus. The CD was asked only to implement the decision of 21 September 1995, admitting the 23 countries. A letter (rather than declaration) signed by all members of the G-23 would be sent to the President on that occasion, setting out a 'legally binding' commitment not to exercise their right of veto for a specified time. The two events would be connected sufficiently to enable the US to lift its veto on expansion, but would not be linked in such a way as to set a precedent or affect the membership of any State other than those which had individually signed the letter.

6 June plenary

The protagonists originally hoped for a decision on 6 June, but the issue provoked a sharp and at times acrimonious debate in the 737th plenary. In particular, emphasising their support for expansion, Algeria and Morocco raised questions about the way in which this latest attempt was being done, complaining of a lack of transparency in the process. This led Ambassador Berguno of Chile, coordinator of the G-23 and Ambassador Selebi of South Africa, one of the prime movers, to spell out the distinction between the decision the CD was being asked to implement and the sovereign right of individual States, as exercised by the 23. Berguno stressed that 'only the unqualified, direct, unequivocal implementation of the decision CD/1356 is appropriate for consideration and approval by this Conference.' Selebi reiterated: 'Members are only being asked to implement decision CD/1356, admitting all of the Group of 23 countries to the Conference as full members with all - I repeat all - of the rights which this entails.' He went on to say that the letter 'will not form a part of the decision' which the CD was being asked to make, and would not be tabled together with it.

Rejecting accusations that the solution would create 'two classes of membership', Selebi stressed again that the 23 would have full rights of membership: 'the decision as to how we are going to use those rights is being made by ourselves and not by the CD.' Turning the argument around, he pointed out that 'any attempt by members to arrogate to themselves the right to decide how we as sovereign States should exercise our rights, by deciding whether or not we can take the steps which are intended, is in fact an attempt to limit our rights.' When Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco replied that 'since it is your sovereign right to censor yourselves...you don't even have to tell us...' knowing that the United States required that the letter be tabled as an official CD document, Selebi warned that 'delegations would do well to keep away from being little teachers.'

On 13 June, the anticipated expansion decision was thwarted by Egypt, which claimed it had no instructions from Cairo. Following a flurry of consultations between Argentina, Chile and South Africa, the President of the CD, Munir Akram of Pakistan, and representatives of the groups, the decision was set for a special plenary on 17 June, but delayed until the afternoon by continuing G-21 concerns over the procedure and 'choreography' of the decision. For them, it was crucial to maintain a separation between the decision to admit the new members and the letter from them giving a temporary promise not to prevent consensus. There was also disagreement over whether the letter should be tabled as an official CD document, which the G-21 resisted, but the US required. In the event, the letter, dated 12 June, became document CD/1407, 17 June, 1996. After listing the 23 States, the operative paragraphs read as follows:

"The above mentioned States therefore and hereby make the following solemn commitment legally binding upon each individually.

In an integral and indivisible connection with the anticipated decision of the Conference on Disarmament, and notwithstanding Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure, and without affecting the rights which they currently enjoy, each of the above mentioned States, in the exercise of its national sovereignty, will not individually obstruct any action of the Conference pursuant to rule 18.

This commitment shall cease to apply if there is a consensus decision in the Conference on Disarmament that the circumstances which had given rise to the situation requiring this solemn commitment no longer exists. In addition, for any State of the above-mentioned States not subject to comprehensive enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on a date two years from the date of the decision, this commitment shall cease to apply with respect to such States as of that date."

17 June plenary

After further delays, the gavel finally came down on Argentina's proposal to implement the September 1995 decision, thereby admitting the 23 countries. This was followed by prolonged applause. Akram told the conference that he had been informed that he would be receiving a letter from the 23 new members setting out the manner in which they would cooperate with and make their contribution to the CD. After a short recess, speeches welcoming the new members were made by Cuba on behalf of the G-21, Romania for the Eastern European group, China for itself, and Argentina for the Western Group. Despite an attempt by the main protagonists of the expansion decision to have all the speeches at a later date so as not to risk re-opening any of the quarrels which had bedevilled this issue, Egypt and Iran made reference to Israel's accession and regional security in the Middle East, to which Israel briefly replied, saying that it would respond later, when it deemed it necessary. Finland and the Republic of Korea also felt the need to celebrate their membership, making their first speeches in that capacity. Others held back to a later date.

20 June plenary

Twenty-seven of the statements to the 740th plenary concerned expansion. These fell into three categories: many G-21 countries and China emphasised that the decision did not set a precedent for other CD members nor establish a relationship between CD membership and rights and UN Security Council decisions; new members thanked the ambassadors and delegations which had accomplished the enlargement decision, and set out markers for their future CD involvement and work; and countries left out of the expansion pushed for early admission of all States which had applied.

Regarding the letter written by the 23 new States, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Cuba, Morocco, Algeria and China underlined their view that there was no legal relation between the CD and the United Nations, and that consequently the connection made between the sanctions on one member State, CD membership and decisionmaking was a one-off solution with political significance only for the 23 which had undertaken it, and not for the CD as a whole. While welcoming the new members, they were especially critical of the fact that the 23 had been forced to make this peculiar concession because of US intransigence over Iraq, and stressed that this should not be regarded as setting a precedent.

Several European Union countries, Morocco and some of the 13 who had applied (some more than a decade ago) but were not on the O'Sullivan list, such as Ireland, Malaysia, Denmark, Greece and Portugal, called for consideration and early accession of all who had applied or at the very least for appointment of a special coordinator to consider further expansion issues.

Several of the new members, including Slovakia, Spain, Austria, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, New Zealand, Bangladesh, Chile and Norway underlined the importance of their newly acquired CD membership and thanked the main actors, especially Argentina, Chile, South Africa and the CD President. Some also raised their positions on the CTBT, the CD agenda and related issues.

Conclusion

Thus the latest phase in the long saga of the CD's attempts to increase its membership from 38 to around 60 was accomplished at the Conference' 739th plenary. The negotiations were delicate and complicated, and at their height required personal intervention by President Mandela of South Africa to persuade first the United States and then some of the non-aligned States such as Iran and Egypt to allow this formula to be adopted.

To many, the US veto of the list over Iraq is still inexplicable, since the point of the O'Sullivan package was to ensure that States of international security concern as well as countries with regional importance would be brought closer to disarmament negotiations and accountability. Once the list had been blocked, however, it enabled other objections to surface again. Those such as Iran, which had wanted Israel to be excluded, gave rise to fears that if the O'Sullivan list were not accepted in its entirety, there would be piecemeal vetoes, personalising the membership choices in a way the majority regarded as undesirable.

There were further complications when the EU countries in the CD began insisting that all States which had applied should be admitted, a position adopted by the EU member States, several of whom were not on the O'Sullivan list. While not opposing expansion openly, several more delegations seemed unenthusiastic about the changes which enlargement would require. Some questioned whether the CD could continue as an effective negotiating forum with a decisionmaking procedure based on consensus. Others were afraid that their status within the groups would be diminished by the arrival of countries with competing regional power.

In reply, advocates of expansion argued that an overhaul of the CD procedures, groups and negotiating processes was long overdue, and that it could not negotiate credibly with fewer than one-fifth of the UN States. By expanding to 61, the ratio would be closer to one-third, comprising most of the significant regional and political players. Notable exceptions, countries which have a record of interest on nuclear arms control and disarmament issues but which remain observers, are Kazakstan, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines and Tanzania.

The CD's past history, taking decades to accomplish the Chemical Weapons Convention and agree a negotiating mandate for a CTBT, were less the fault of the CD than a reflection of cold war impotence. The 38-member CD may have done the best it could in the circumstances, but it was hampered by lack of resources and dysfunctional relations. It is clear that the CD cannot simply increase its membership and carry on business as usual. The challenge for the next months will be to ensure that the final stage of the CTBT negotiations conclude successfully and update the CD's agenda, consultations procedures and decision making to provide a representative and effective multilateral forum for negotiations on further conventional and nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Documents and Sources

Statements at the CD

See Geneva Update for context and reaction.

China

Statement by His Excellency Mr. Sha Zhukang, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China for Disarmament Affairs, Head of Chinese Delegation at the Conference on Disarmament, Plenary Meeting of the CD, 6 June 1996

Extracts

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

"As a technology with enormous potentials, peaceful nuclear explosions, if used properly, can play a dynamic role in promoting the economic development of some countries. This is of special significance for China, a populous country with a large territory but relatively scarce natural resources. We cannot agree to ban a promising technology just for the sake of banning nuclear weapon test explosions. The baby should not be thrown away together with the bath water, a simple wisdom.

China's original intention in raising the issue of PNE remains unchanged. The concerns that PNEs are not easily distinguishable from nuclear explosions for military purposes and that they may have an adverse effect on the environment are fully shared. However, we do not think these problems are insurmountable.

Although we still need to be convinced by the various counter- arguments, we also recognise the fact that the CTBT negotiations have reached its final stage and in order to facilitate the conclusion of the treaty within the time-frame as planned, the Chinese delegation is now ready to go along with a temporary ban on PNEs. Namely, China can agree to a treaty provision that the possibility of permitting the conduct of PNEs shall be considered by the review conference of States Parties. If States Parties agree to permit the conduct of PNEs by consensus, the Conference of States Parties shall immediately commence its work with a view to agreeing on arrangements for the possible approval and conduct of such nuclear explosions. ...

This is a major move by the Chinese Government for the sake of an early treaty. It is our hope that other countries will seriously consider this formulation and reciprocate with the same spirit of flexibility. If consensus can be reached on it, China will be in a position to favourably consider the scope language contained in CD/NTB/WP.222, which in essence bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

India

Statement by Ms. Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador of India, in the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 20 June 1996

Extracts

Dissatisfaction with progress

"Since January 1994...India has participated actively and constructively in the negotiations. We have put forward a number of proposals... These proposals are aimed at ensuring that the CTBT must be a truly comprehensive treaty, that is, a treaty which bans all nuclear testing without leaving any loopholes that would permit nuclear-weapon States to continue refining and developing their nuclear arsenals at their test sites and in their laboratories. Through these proposals we have underscored the importance of placing the CTBT in a disarmament framework, as part of a step-by-step process aimed at achieving complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

Despite all our efforts we have no choice today but to express our disappointment with the way the negotiations have developed. At this late stage we are obliged to conclude that the basic prohibitions, as drafted so far, which define the Scope remain very narrow and do not fulfil the mandated requirement of a comprehensive ban. ... This approach would give us only a 'nuclear weapon test explosion ban treaty' and not a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We are equally if not more concerned that any attempt to introduce substantive disarmament provisions in the treaty have been blocked by some delegations. Weak and woefully inadequate preambular references to nuclear disarmament such as those contained in Working Paper 330 cannot meet our concerns. We are only too aware that non-binding references in other treaties have been treated with complete disregard. How can we escape the conclusion that the nuclear-weapon States are determined to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security and visualise the CTBT not as a serious disarmament measure but merely as an instrument against horizontal proliferation? ...

The CTBT that we see emerging appears to be shaped more by the technological preferences of the nuclear-weapon States rather than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament. This was not the CTBT that India envisaged in 1954. This cannot be the CTBT that India can be expected to accept. ...

India remains convinced that complete elimination of nuclear weapons will enhance global security. ... Yet, there is opposition when it comes to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This...can only be explained by the desire to retain a monopoly, a desire which is sought to be furthered by the CTBT. We cannot accept that it is legitimate for some countries to rely on nuclear weapons for their security while denying this right to others.

Under such circumstances, it is natural that our national security considerations become a key factor in our decision making. Our capability is demonstrated but, as a matter of policy, we exercise restraint. Countries around us continue their weapon programmes, either openly or in a clandestine manner. In such an environment, India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons.

India has demonstrated its resolve in the past. We have refused to accede to the discriminatory order of today's international nuclear regime. ... The same conviction is reflected in our stand on the CTBT. Last year, we expressed our dismay at the indefinite extension of the NPT because, in our view, it sought to legitimise the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by five countries. Today, the right to continue development and refinement of their arsenals is being sought to be legitimised through another flawed and eternal treaty. Such a treaty is not conceived as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament and is not in India's national security interest. India, therefore, cannot subscribe to it in its present form.

Among the conditions put forward for CTBT to enter into force, there are suggestions that ratification by India will be a requirement. We would not accept any language in the Treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to decide, in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede to such a treaty. ..."

Pakistan

Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram in the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 25 June 1996

Extracts (emphases in the original)

Dissatisfaction with progress

"For over thirty-five years, Pakistan has supported the objective of concluding a CTBT. Two and a half years ago we warmly welcomed the commencement of these negotiations in the CD. Today, we are close to concluding the text of a Treaty.

Unfortunately, it is not the CTBT we had sought for so long.

What we have before us is a treaty which would ban nuclear explosion tests and not all nuclear tests. We understand that this limitation is because sub-critical and laboratory tests are not verifiable. But what we find unfortunate is that the nuclear- weapon States are not prepared to agree that such tests should not be used to enable them to continue to improve their nuclear weapons... In the circumstances, the Treaty we are negotiating is unlikely to fully achieve the objective of halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the frustration of the non-nuclear-weapon States is further heightened by the fact that the major nuclear powers are not prepared, under the Treaty, to provide any commitment to halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, promoting nuclear disarmament and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, with or without a 'time-bound framework'.

Thirdly, the international verification system to be established under the Treaty has been, deliberately, restricted in its capacity and operations. The compromises reached in the IMS [International Monitoring System] and IDC [International Data Centre] texts could unravel in the preparatory phase if the technically advanced countries seek to limit the products and services of the IDC.

Fourthly, while limiting the capabilities of the IMS, inordinate emphasis has been placed on the use of On-Site Inspections which should, in principle, be an extremely rare and exceptional circumstance. Our suspicions that OSIs could be used for harassment and interference are heightened by the demands, made for an easy 'trigger' for such OSIs.

Finally, the use of so-called National Technical Means in triggering such a OSI is bound to render the verification of this treaty even more unequal against the technologically less advanced countries...

Furthermore, my delegation is extremely unhappy at the manner in which our negotiations have preceded over the past critical month. While texts have descended one after another, 'from heaven and elsewhere', the full membership of the Conference...has not been able to participate in genuine negotiations. Indeed, most members of the Conference have become spectators to the drama played out among the five nuclear powers - in which the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee has had a minor role.

... It would be easy for us to say that we give up on these negotiations. It would be simple to say no to this Treaty.

Pakistan has not done so for at least two good reasons;

One, we feel that a ban on nuclear explosions is better than no ban at all. It will severely constrain the ability of the nuclear powers to further improve their nuclear weapons. ...

Two, a ban on nuclear explosions will contribute significantly to nuclear non-proliferation. While we decry the imbalance between the Treaty's effect on vertical and horizontal proliferation, for Pakistan, halting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities in South Asia is an important objective. A Test Ban Treaty accepted by both Pakistan and India will fulfill the objective of the bilateral test ban treaty which we had formally proposed to India in June 1987.

Therefore, Pakistan is extremely disturbed by the declaration made here on 20 June by our neighbour [above statement by India] announcing the decision not to sign the CTBT...unless all its conditions are met. If this decision is not reversed, it could spell the death-knell of the Treaty.

This is no exaggeration. ...this Treaty must foreclose the possibility of nuclear explosions being conducted by all the States which have the technical and the legal capability to conduct such tests. There are eight such States - the five nuclear powers and the three so-called 'threshold' States. To those who live in the 'real world', it is clear that if one of these States is out of the Treaty, all of them will be out. ...those who sincerely desire an early 'entry into force', with or without these eight States, ignore fundamental strategic and political realities.

The unilateral and, in our view, premature declaration by one of these eight States that it will not sign the CTBT in no way changes these fundamental realities. It is no reason to begin to look for waiver Conferences and special meetings to circumvent the requirement for ratification by all the nuclear capable States. ... To do so, is to contemplate the possibility of a Treaty coming into force whose parties do not include several or even any one of the eight nuclear capable States. Such a Treaty would be a farce. It would be 'dead on arrival'. ..."

US reaction to CTBT text

Statement by President Clinton, White House Press Release, 28 June 1996

Full text

"Today, the Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament's (CD) Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban tabled a compromise treaty text that reflects his best efforts to record agreement and resolve remaining issues. This action brings us one step closer to the day when no nuclear weapons are detonated anywhere on the face of the earth. I applaud this milestone in our efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and build a safer world.

American leaders since Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy have believed a comprehensive test ban would be a major stride in the international effort against nuclear proliferation and toward our ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Over the past four decades, many world leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Harold Macmillan of Great Britain, along with citizens from around the globe have worked hard to achieve a CTBT. Today, such a treaty is within our reach.

As President, my most basic duty is to protect the security of the American people. That's why I have made reducing the nuclear threat one of my highest priorities.

As a result, for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, there are no Russian missiles pointed at our people. We entered into force the START I Treaty that will, in combination with the START II Treaty pending ratification in the Russian Duma, reduce by 14,000 the number of warheads deployed by the United States and Russia just five years ago. We convinced Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to give up the nuclear weapons left on their land when the Soviet Union broke up. We persuaded North Korea to freeze its dangerous nuclear weapons program under international monitoring. We are working with countries around the world to safeguard and destroy nuclear weapons and materials - so that they don't fall into the hands of terrorists or criminals. We led global efforts to win the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty which bans the spread of nuclear weapons to states that do not have them.

It is now up to the 61 member states of the CD to study the Chairman's compromise treaty text and maintain the momentum toward a CTBT. I call on the members of the CD to return to Geneva in late July prepared to agree to forward a CTBT to the United Nations, so that a special session of the General Assembly can be held in August to approve the Treaty and open it for signature in the United States in September."

CFE Conference

Final Document and Annexes

Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, 31 May 1996

Final Document

Section II: Review of the operation of the Treaty and the Concluding Act

"5. The States Parties note with satisfaction that more than 58,000 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment have been reduced, and that the overall holdings of conventional armaments and equipment within the area of application [are] substantially lower than the limits set in the Treaty.

More than 2,500 inspections have taken place. A permanent system for regular and routine exchange of Treaty notifications and other information has been developed. The Joint Consultative Group has been firmly established and has demonstrated its utility and importance as the ongoing Treaty forum.

With regard to the Concluding Act, the States Parties note with satisfaction that the personnel strength of conventional armed forces in the area of application was reduced by 1.2 million persons. ...

7. The States Parties reaffirm the continued relevance of the basic structures of the Treaty including the principle of zonal limitations... In this respect, and in line with the decision of the Joint Consultative Group of 17 December 1995, the States Parties have agreed on a Document, which is contained in Annex A, reflecting a combination of measures agreed in cooperative fashion and acceptable to all Parties to the Treaty.

8. States Parties regret that not all reduction obligations pursuant to the Treaty have been met. They stress the necessity to complete as soon as possible reductions of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (TLE) in accordance with obligations under the Treaty. They note with satisfaction the reiterated commitment of those States Parties which still have to complete reductions to comply with the provisions of the Treaty and associated documents. ...

9. States Parties express their concern with serious difficulties of some States Parties to comply fully within their territory with the provisions of the Treaty and its related documents due to TLE unaccounted for and uncontrolled... This situation adversely affects the operation of the Treaty and complicates its implementation. ...

12. The States Parties reaffirm the arrangements on Article XII reached at the Extraordinary Conference in Oslo in 1992. They understand that for successor States that had become States Parties by 1992, paragraph 2 of the Article XII part of the Oslo arrangement should be read as:

'In particular, no State Party will increase within the area of application its holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions above that aggregate number held by such organizations at the time of the signature of the Treaty, as notified on their territory pursuant to the information exchange as of 19 November, 1990.'

They agree to work further on the issue of Article XII in the Joint Consultative Group, taking into account the proposals made at the Review Conference. ...

14. In the context of the process foreseen in Section III of this Final Document, States Parties will examine different interpretations of temporary deployments so as to ensure that these temporary deployments do not become indefinite.

15. The States Parties recall that according to Article II, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, the lists of existing types contained in Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment (POET) shall be updated periodically by the Joint Consultative Group... However, it has not been updated since the Treaty's conclusion.

The States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint Consultative Group to update the POET. They further agreed that:

* any inaccuracies should be corrected, including by removal of types, models and versions of conventional armaments and equipment that do not meet Treaty criteria;

* the Joint Consultative Group should consider if a yearly update of the lists would be appropriate..."

Section III: Future work on the Treaty

"19. ...the States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint Consultative Group to expand their work... Taking fresh impetus from this Review Conference, they will immediately start a thorough process aimed at improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment and, through that, the security of each State Party, irrespective of whether it belongs to a politico- military alliance. As part of this process, the States Parties will consider measures and adaptations with the aim of promoting the objectives of the Treaty and of enhancing its viability and effectiveness, including but not limited to the consideration of proposals already made to that effect. The character of this process should be such as to permit the Treaty to sustain its key role in the European security architecture. Its scope and parameters should be defined as a matter of priority.

20. Until the entry into force of such measures and adaptations, the States Parties will observe all provisions of the Treaty and its associated documents.

21. The States Parties will consider a progress report on the intermediate results of this process at the time of the OSCE Lisbon Summit [December 1996]. This report will inter alia include recommendations on the way ahead. ..."

Annexes

Annex A: Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

Section I

"1. Each State Party shall, taking into account the clarification set forth in this Document...and taking into account the understandings on flexibility set forth in the Document, comply fully with the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty...no later than 31 May 1999. ..."

Section II

"1. Within the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, the Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery so that no later than 31 May 1996 and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

(A) 1,800 battle tanks;

(B) 3,700 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more than 552 shall be located within the Astrakhan oblast [district]; no more than 552 shall be located within the Volgograd oblast; no more than 310 shall be located within the eastern part of the Rostov oblast...; and no more than 600 shall be located within the Pskov oblast; and

(C) 2,400 pieces of artillery.

2. Within the Odessa oblast, Ukraine shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery, so that, upon provisional application of this Document and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

(A) 400 battle tanks;

(B) 400 armoured combat vehicles; and

(C) 350 pieces of artillery.

3. Upon provisional application of this Document and until 31 May 1999, the Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery, within the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, so that the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

(A) 1,897 battle tanks;

(B) 4,397 armoured combat vehicles; and

(C) 2,422 pieces of artillery."

Section III

"1. For the purpose of this Document and the Treaty, the following territory, as constituted on 1 January 1996, of the Russian Federation shall be deemed to be located in the area described in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A) of the Treaty: the Pskov oblast; the Volgograd oblast; the Astrakhan oblast; that part of the Rostov oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar leading to Kushchevskaya.

2. For the purposes of this Document and Treaty, the territory of the Odessa oblast, as constituted on 1 January 1996, of Ukraine shall be deemed to be located in the area described in Article IV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A) of the Treaty."

Section IV

1. The States Parties shall, during the period before 31 May 1999, examine the Treaty provisions on designated permanent storage sites so as to allow all battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery in designated permanent storage sites, including those subject to regional numerical limitations, to be located with active units.

2. The Russian Federation shall have the right to utilize to the maximum extent possible the provisions of the Treaty on temporary deployment of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery within its territory and outside its territory. Such temporary deployments on the territory of other States Parties shall be achieved by means of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved.

3. The Russian Federation shall have the right to utilize to the maximum extent possible reallocation, in accordance with existing agreements on the current quotas for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery established by the Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done [sic] at Tashkent, on 15 May 1992. Such reallocations shall be achieved by means of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved. ..."

Section VI

"1. This Document shall enter into force upon receipt by the Depositary of notification of confirmation of approval by all States Parties. ... If this Document does not enter into force by 15 December 1996, then it shall be reviewed by the States Parties. ..."

Annex E: Statement of the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Review Conference of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe

"To promote the implementation of the Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Joint Consultative Group of 14 June 1991...I have been instructed by the Government of the Russian Federation to state the following.

1. It is understood that conventional armaments and equipment in the three Treaty limited categories referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative [battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery] will be deemed destroyed or rendered militarily unusable...upon the application of any of the following methods:

(A) Destruction or conversion of conventional armaments and equipment under procedures that provide sufficient visible evidence...;

(B) Provision of satisfactory documentary evidence as meeting requirements of sufficient visible evidence, only in case of such armaments and equipment destroyed prior to the promulgation of this Statement. The Russian Federation intends to provide such documentary evidence with regard to armaments and equipment destroyed in the area of application of the Treaty after 17 November 1995;

(C)...examination [by a group of experts] of a random sample representative of those conventional armaments and equipment, prior to their removal from a display site for final disposal...;

(D) Visit of group of experts...to count already derelict conventional armaments and equipment;

(E) Notification preceding or accompanying each transfer of conventional armaments and equipment to other States Parties...

2. ...the Russian Federation will apply methods referred to in paragraph 1 of this Statement to conventional armaments and equipment located on its territory. It will cooperate with the Republic of Kazakstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in applying those methods to conventional armaments and equipment located on their territories. The Russian Federation will negotiate the necessary arrangements with those States...by the year 2000.

3, If, despite good faith efforts, the quota of 6,000 battle tanks subject to elimination is not fully met, the shortfall of not more than 2,300 battle tanks will be covered by applying methods referred to in paragraph 1 of this Statement to an equal number of armoured combat vehicles in excess of the quota of 1,500 pieces; and thus the overall process...will be in general deemed completed. Notwithstanding that, a number of battle tanks equal to the above-mentioned shortfall will be subsequently eliminated. The envisaged date for the completion of the process of their elimination will depend on the duration of their operational and service life and on the availability of financial resources. ..."

US reaction

Statement by President Clinton

'Removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine and Agreement on CFE Flank Issue', Statement by President Clinton, 1 June 1996

Extracts

"... I...welcome the agreement that was reached today in Vienna by the 30 nations party to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. This agreement resolves a difficult problem that had arisen concerning the level of Russian and Ukrainian military equipment allowed on the northern and southern flank of the CFE region.

This agreement is the culmination of two years of negotiations led by the United States. I congratulate all parties, including our NATO allies, Russia, Ukraine and the states of the Caucasus and Central and Eastern Europe, for their hard work, cooperation and dedication to preserving the integrity and effectiveness of this crucial Treaty.

The CFE Treaty is a key element of a new, more stable Europe. The Treaty has resulted in the destruction of over 50,000 tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. It has also established a system of transparency measures, which will increase confidence through on- site inspections, notifications and information exchanges."

State Department reaction

Press Conference by US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Lynn Davis, Vienna, 1 June 1996

Extracts from statement

"I would like particularly to focus on how it is that we have been able to resolve the flank problem, and to do this through a cooperative solution, that is, through the 30 parties coming together to find a way in which that solution protected their legitimate concerns relating to sovereignty, to stability, and to security. This solution of the flank problem rejected unilateralism on the part of any country and found a way so that all 30 parties could be in agreement as we move forward.

This flank solution recognizes that there is a new security situation in the flank region. All 30 parties recognize that there have been changes, and, therefore, the new solution needs to recognize those changes. But it is a solution that will require reductions in Russian forces from their current levels. And the current levels of Russian forces cannot now be exceeded. We will freeze as of the 31 May Russian equipment in artillery, tanks, and armored combat vehicles (ACVs) in the areas covered by this flank solution.

This is also a solution that implements the overall framework that was agreed by the 30 parties last November, which had three basic elements, a realignment of the map for the flank region, constraints in equipment in the areas removed from the flanks through the map realignment, and finally additional transparency for the flank region and those areas removed from the flank. And it provides for clarity in the commitments by the parties to this flank solution so that we have confidence that the agreement will move to these reductions and that there are no ambiguities in how it will be implemented. ..."

Extracts from Questions-and-Answers

"Question: This has to do with...the limitation and restraints on equipment in the areas removed from the flank. Does that mean, in the areas which are left outside, that the Russians are going to cut down the number of tanks, artillery, and armored carriers?...'

Lynn Davis: 'The Treaty itself has a flank zone and written into that Treaty are limitations on three kinds of equipment: tanks, artillery, and ACVs. What we have done, through a realignment of the map, is to remove certain areas and military districts from that zone so that the limits that are applied to the flank are for a narrower geography. But for those areas that have been removed, we now have set overall limits in the same categories of equipment as for the current flank zone which by definition are somewhat higher than those in the Treaty but will keep overall limits in the three kinds of equipment that comprise the current flank zone. And what we have done is take the levels that currently exist for the current flank zone on the part of the Russians, we have frozen those in each of the categories. Then we set a period of the three years in which they have to reduce from the current level to specific levels, and we have then come to a common understanding among the 30 parties as to how one will count equipment so that the ways we go about counting the equipment in these areas is understood and there are no ambiguities, so that we have confidence that there is a current freeze and there will be specific levels at the end of the three-year period. For those areas that have been removed from the flanks as well - the military districts - two additional things are part of this resolution. One is additional transparency - that is, information will be shared and inspections will be undertaken. Secondly, there will be individual caps on equipment in those areas.

So - through this realignment which provides more flexibility for the Russians in these areas consistent with the new security situation - those countries most immediately affected can be assured of their own security by the transparency, the caps, and the fact that there will be now reductions from current levels. So it is a good deal.'

Question: 'Apparently levels are in excess of what the Treaty provides?'

Lynn Davis: 'That is correct: what the Treaty provides, because the problem developed because Russian equipment was higher in this flank region than called for in the treaty. It is also higher than what it is that will be required at the end of the reduction period so that this agreement will freeze Russian forces, as of yesterday, and will then bring them down over the next three years. And all of this can be found in the document that you will be able to pick up, but I hope that what I have done in terms of this overall view will help you understand the numbers as you find them in what is a legal document. So understand it as a legal document.'

Question: 'Down the road, are we looking at CFE 2...?'

Lynn Davis: 'The answer to that is that is very premature given where we are today. Essentially what we agreed to today is a process, one that gets underway immediately and one that will have this review at the Lisbon meeting in December. But precisely how that adaptation and modernization will occur is still to be worked through. In most governments, including my own, we are still thinking through precisely how it is that we would see this process - the modernization of the treaty - evolve. The answer to your question is still being considered. Individual governments will be looking at that. The NATO countries will be working through how the Alliance thinks about these issues, and then we will be working with all of our treaty partners to come to a view. ...'

Question: 'What is the American reaction to the Russian proposal to consult the group of states parties and establish new limits at a national level and, at the same time, keep a certain percentage on the 50 percent?...'

Lynn Davis: 'The Russian government has already put forward some ideas as to how it sees this modernization process evolving. But as I just said earlier on, each of our countries is working through precisely how it is that we would see the process evolving. At this point in time, the United States has no specific views on any of those issues. Not of course that we won't sometime.'"

National Security Council (NSC) reaction

Comments by Robert Bell, National Security Council Senior Director for Defense and Arms Control Policy, White House Daily Briefing, 3 June

Extracts from comments

"We agree with the statement that was released in Ankara by the Turkish foreign ministry over the weekend that said...'This understanding proves that issues concerning European security can be resolved by means of joint decisions to be reached by all the relevant countries rather than through unilateral moves.'

The flank agreement consists of four parts: first, a map realignment which reduces the area of the original CFE flank zone; second, new constraints that will limit the amount of equipment Russia and Ukraine can deploy in the areas of both countries being removed from the original flank zone; and third, increased inspection requirements in these areas; and last, increased notifications concerning the equipment in these areas.

The agreement does not change the treaty per se - it's not an amendment to the treaty - nor does it change the ceilings that were established for the flank in the original treaty as they will now apply to this new, somewhat smaller flank area.

In meeting these limits, Russia may obtain assistance from countries willing to grant them equipment entitlements that are currently assigned to them, but only if they willingly agree. There is nothing in this agreement that requires that any State transfer such increased flexibility to Russia.

If Russia, in the end, should not gain increased flexibility through decisions of these other States, it will have to reduce its equipment holdings in the new flank area by 215 tanks, 2,000 armored combat vehicles, and 255 artillery pieces. To the extent that these countries should choose to grant Russia some entitlements that they currently enjoy, these reductions would be proportionately smaller."

Extracts from Questions-and-Answers

"Question: '...how does the new agreement mesh with Russia's desire for flexibility in places like Chechnya, and do they have more or less flexibility?'

Robert Bell: 'Well, this agreement does not change the flank limits as they apply or relate to Chechnya. As I said, the numbers in the treaty are unchanged. Chechnya before was in the flank; as a result of this agreement, Chechnya remains in the flank.

This agreement was about something else, which was that since the end of the Cold War you have a treaty that when it was concluded reflected Soviet forces as far west as Eastern Germany. And since then, of course, we've seen the complete withdrawal of Soviet - now Russian - forces from not only Eastern Germany, but Eastern and Central Europe. And as this mass of equipment has come back to Russia, it has spilled over into the flank areas.

So the issue was were we going to keep the treaty as it was originally and force them to relocate all of that equipment into the center of Western Russia, or were we going to take account of this change in the strategic situation over the last five years and allow them modestly higher levels to the north and south. But that goes geographically well beyond the immediate question of the Chechnya region.'

Question: 'Does it give them, effectively, more latitude with regard to Chechnya, in terms of these entitlements that you describe? Suppose Moscow gets some of Belarus's entitlements, wouldn't that, in practical terms, allow them to move more military hardware into Chechnya?'

Robert Bell: 'Well, the amount of treaty-limited equipment that Russia has had in Chechnya - tanks, artillery pieces, and armored combat vehicles, which are the three categories that apply on the flank - that number has always been well below the numbers permitted in the treaty. In other words, even up to now, Russia has never chosen to concentrate its full flank entitlement in Chechnya. What this really does is allow them to have forces throughout the region of the North and South Caucasus and, to the north, the region around Leningrad, in higher numbers than was the case under the original 1991 treaty.'

Question: 'What happens if Yeltsin's opponent wins and has an expansionist policy?'

Robert Bell: 'Well, one reason that we're particularly pleased to get this agreement in Vienna over the weekend is that the agreement is now binding. In our case it will require congressional approval, and we'll be consulting with Congress on the road ahead, but the agreement was adopted by the 30 nations in Vienna on Saturday and will give us about nine months to secure legislative approval in all capitals where that's required. And then in December the States will confirm that that step has been taken, and the treaty then goes forward on a permanent fashion.'

...

Question: 'It looks like they're going to have a good six or eight months to reconsider whether they want to sign the treaty, so it's a little bit premature to say they'll held to the terms of it.'

Robert Bell: 'It's not a provision for reconsideration.'

Question: 'I mean, if they don't sign it - what if Russia's - Yeltsin's successor chooses not to sign it in the next nine months?'

Robert Bell: '... There are certain States that will have to get legislative action before they can confirm that we're depositing our notification of adherence to this agreement. It's a unique situation we faced in the United States because when the Senate gave its advise and consent to this treaty it noted at that time that if the map changed, Senate approval would be required. But there are not many countries, according to our count, that will require action by their legislation, including, it appears, not the Duma. So this is simply a provision to meet our own constitutional requirement here to obtain congressional approval to this map change before we can permanently bind ourself to the provision.'

Question: '[Does] the hill [have] to approve this?'

Robert Bell: 'I don't know that they've made a decision. As I said at the outset, this is not an amendment to the treaty. We negotiated this for two years intentionally to avoid it being an amendment to the treaty, which would have then forced it back into the parliaments of all 30 States. But it's up to the Russia government to decide what their requirements are vis-a-vis the Duma.'"

US statement on ABM discussions

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) statement on Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) negotiations, 25 June 1996

See next issue for further details and reaction.

Full text

"On June 24 in Geneva, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) completed a session that began May 20 - its second session of 1996 and the 52nd since its establishment.

During this session, Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States continued negotiations in four areas:

- Arrangements by which those States of the former Soviet Union that wish to succeed to the rights and obligations of the USSR under the ABM Treaty may do so,

- Regulations governing the multilateral operation of the SCC in light of changes brought about by dissolution of the Soviet Union,

- An initial demarcation agreement distinguishing between defenses against strategic ballistic missiles (ABM systems) limited by the treaty, and certain defenses against non-strategic ballistic missiles, i.e., so-called 'lower velocity' theater missile defenses (TMD). This agreement would make clear that all TMD systems with interceptor velocities up to and including 3 km/sec are permitted under the ABM Treaty, as long as they are not tested against target missiles with velocities above 5 km/sec or ranges greater than 3,500 km. The sides will continue discussions on demarcation of higher-velocity TMD systems. Pending an agreement on such systems, each side will continue to make its own decisions on compliance with the ABM Teaty. Finally,

- An agreement on TMD confidence-building measures, including notification and information exchanges.

As of the end of this session, there is preliminary agreement among all the SCC participants on the texts of two documents: a Memorandum of Understanding on succession and an Agreed Statement relating to demarcation. In addition, after the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan delegations had departed Geneva, the United States and Russia reached agreement on the other two documents. Consultations with those States will continue, and we are hopeful that they will soon be able to join the accord reached by the United States and Russia. Thereafter, the documents will be referred to governments for internal review and approval prior to beginning the formal process leading to entry into force."

NATO meetings

Foreign Ministers' NAC, Berlin, 3 June

Final Communique, Foreign Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Berlin, 3 June 1996

Extracts

Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation

"A key part of Alliance adaptation is action stemming from the decision taken at the 1994 Brussels Summit to intensify and expand the Alliance's political and defence efforts against the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) weapons continues to be a matter of serious concern to NATO as it can pose a direct threat to international security. We remain committed to our aim to prevent proliferation in the first place, or, if it occurs, to reverse it through diplomatic means. NATO as a defensive alliance must bear the responsibility to ensure means to protect its members against the risks resulting from proliferation.

The work of the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) - both established following the 1994 Brussels Summit - is an essential element of maintaining Alliance security and an integral aspect of NATO's adaptation to the new security environment facing Europe. We are satisfied with the progress of the work of the SGP and have endorsed the recommendations of the DGP for improvements to Alliance military capabilities to address the risks posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery means."

Weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) arms control

"We strongly support the work of the Conference on Disarmament in achieving a truly comprehensive and sufficiently verifiable global ban on all nuclear testing by September this year at the latest and in initiating negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty on the basis of the already-existing mandate. We emphasise the importance of the START Treaties for international stability and security, and commend the United States and Russia for implementation of their START I obligations. We welcome ratification of START II by the United States Senate last January and urge its early ratification by the Russian Federation.

We look forward to the early entry into force and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and strongly endorse efforts underway to negotiate a compliance regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention."

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

"We welcome the successful outcome of the CFE Treaty Review Conference in Vienna. The Final Document agreed by the 30 States Parties reaffirms their common commitment to preserve the integrity of the Treaty and achieve its full implementation. The success of the Conference confirms that the CFE Treaty is and will remain for the future a cornerstone of European security and stability. We call upon those States Parties which have not yet fully completed their reductions obligations to do so as soon as possible.

We note with satisfaction the achievement of a cooperative solution to the flank issue. This is an important step in ensuring the full implementation of the Treaty and the preservation of its integrity. In this context, we underscore the importance of full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved. It provides a reaffirmation of the continuing relevance of the basic structures of the Treaty, including the principle of zonal limitations. We look forward to its full and timely implementation.

The Allies welcome agreement by the States Parties to the Treaty to begin discussions aimed at defining the scope and parameters of a process aimed at improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment. They look forward to participating actively in this work together with the other States Parties, with a view to reporting initial progress at the time of the OSCE [Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe] Summit in Lisbon in December 1996 including recommendations on the way ahead."

Defence Ministers' NAC, Brussels, 13 June

Final Communique, Defence Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Berlin, 13 June 1996

As noted in the communique, this was the first NAC-level meeting of Defence Ministers for 30 years. The resumption of the meetings has been made possible by the decision last year of France to become more closely involved with Alliance deliberations and decision-making.

Extracts

Arms control in the Balkans

"We welcomed the contribution of arms control to promoting stability in the former Yugoslavia. The Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures is a promising starting point to foster cooperative and trustful relations amongst the Parties. We called on the Parties concerned to build on this and to ensure that arms are at the lowest level consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region. We regretted the fact that the Parties had not yet concluded an agreement on sub-regional arms control and urged them to overcome their differences quickly and conclude the negotiated agreement."

Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation

"Our defence efforts addressing proliferation risks are an integral part of the continued adaptation of the Alliance to the new security environment. These efforts will also play an important role in the enhancement of NATO's capabilities and will improve the Alliance's overall capacity to accomplish all of its required missions. In particular, we recognized the need for placing greater emphasis on the protection of deployed forces. While prevention remains our primary aim, we recognise that proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery means poses risks to NATO and can pose a direct military threat.

In this context we noted with satisfaction the culmination of the work program of the [DGP]...and endorsed [its] recommendations to improve Alliance military capabilities to address the risks posed by NBC proliferation. These capabilities will support NATO's central objectives for dealing with proliferation: prevent proliferation from occurring or reverse it through diplomatic means, deter use, and protect NATO territory, populations and forces from NBC attack. The substantial progress made by the DGP over the past two years provides a solid basis for continued cooperation among all Allies and, where appropriate, with Partners on relevant defense issues related to proliferation. An accelerated plan for action has been adopted, including arrangements for defining new force goals for the Allies concerned. We look forward to receiving follow-on reports from the DGP and other NATO bodies concerned on progress made in improving Allies' capabilities including prospects for common funding/procurement or multinational efforts and on further policy development."

Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), Brussels, 13 June

Final Communique, Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session, Brussels, 13 June 1996

The combined DPC and NPG meeting was attended at Defence Ministerial level.

Extracts

New Force Goals and Counter-Proliferation

"This year's Force Goals have put greater emphasis than in the past on capabilities needed for the full range of Alliance tasks, including new missions. Particular attention was given to enhancements to the Alliance's ability to move its forces within and between theatres and to sustain them once they are deployed. Such capabilities are essential both for the Alliance's collective defence and for new missions which require the capability for flexible deployments for defence, peacekeeping and crisis management and the capability to counter the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Based on the work of the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation, we have directed the preparation of new force goals, for our approval in December, to deal more effectively with those risks."

NATO nuclear posture and doctrine

"We reaffirm that the fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear forces is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion. In the light of the changing security environment in Europe, NATO's nuclear forces have been substantially reduced, they are no longer targeted against anyone and the readiness of NATO's dual-capable aircraft has been recently adapted. We reiterate our judgement that NATO's current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of the Alliance. In that regard, we reaffirm that nuclear forces continue to fulfill an indispensable and unique role in Alliance strategy and that the presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provides an essential and enduring political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance."

Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control in the Former Yugoslavia

Statement by State Department Spokesperson Nicholas Burns, 14 June 1996

Full text

"Under the leadership of the United States, representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska signed an Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control in the Former Yugoslavia 14 June, 1996, in Florence Italy. The Department of State welcomes the signing of this important agreement with set and verifiable limits which will reduce by a substantial margin the amount of armaments the parties can hold, through the destruction of large numbers of heavy weapons. This is the first ever such agreement in the region, and it covers the FRY [Former Republic of Yugoslavia] and Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is an important achievement in implementing the Dayton Agreement on Regional Stabilization (Annex 1-0, Article XV).

The agreement includes real reductions of some of the most deadly weapons in the war by setting agreed limitations for all parties in five categories of heavy armaments (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery over 75mm, combat aircraft and attack helicopters). In addition, the agreement commits the parties to extensive measures for regular exchanges of military information, and a credible verification regime that involves challenge inspections and declared site inspections. The international community will participate in inspections to ensure compliance. The agreement also establishes voluntary limits on military manpower. Reductions are to take place over a period of 16 months, starting 1 July, with 40 per cent reductions this year in the categories of artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, and 20 per cent reductions this year in the remaining two categories.

Negotiation of this agreement began 4 January under the auspices of the 52-nation Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The talks were chaired by Norwegian General Vigleik Eide, as the personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in- Office, Swiss Foreign Minister Cotti. These negotiations were mandated by Article IV of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement, which committed the parties to building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defense force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region, by agreeing to establish numerical limits on holdings of heavy weapons as defined in the Peace Agreement and voluntary limits on military manpower within 180 days of the signing of the Dayton Accords."

IAEA press releases

Plans for new inspection arrangements

'Strengthening of International Nuclear Inspection Regime - IAEA Board of Governors Moves to Finalize Detailed Provisions', IAEA Press Release, PR 96/10, 14 June 1996

Full text

"At its regular mid-year meeting in Vienna (10-14 June), the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gave a green light to moving ahead to finalization of increased rights and responsibilities for the Agency's safeguards inspectorate.

Having considered a Secretariat document, the Board agreed to establish a Committee presided over by the Chairman of the Board to draw up for its consideration a draft model protocol designed to supplement existing safeguards inspection agreements between the IAEA and non-nuclear-weapon Member States, defining inter alia the nature of additional access to information and to nuclear- related locations for the Agency's inspectors.

The Board acknowledged that additional information, including the taking of environmental samples and increased physical access would strengthen the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. It emphasized that the new measures should strike a balance between the Agency's need for information and access on the one hand and the State's need to protect its legitimate interests and to respect its constitutional obligations on the other. It further emphasized that implementation of these measures should be subject to strict rules of confidentiality to be observed by the Agency, with regard both to information received and to the entire process of verification.

The Board further considered that, in order to strengthen the Agency's capability to detect in the States concerned undeclared nuclear material and activities in an effective manner and increase the efficiency of the safeguards programme, cooperation is needed from all States. In this connection, it welcomed the willingness expressed by the Nuclear-Weapon States to consider how best to contribute to the implementation of the strengthened programme under consideration.

The Committee will begin its work in early July under current Board Chairman Ambassador Joost van Ebbenhorst Tengbergen of the Netherlands, report progress to the Board when it next meets in September, and report the outcome of its work to the Board at its December meeting this year.

Commenting on the Board's action, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix said: 'This latest and welcome step clearly provides the necessary momentum and reflects the desire of IAEA Member States, in the light of experience gained in Iraq and elsewhere in recent years, to reinforce the IAEA's ability not only to verify declared nuclear inventories and States' adherence to non-proliferation pledges, but also to detect indications of activity that could be indicative of a possible violation of such undertakings.'"

Safeguards in 1995

'Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in 1995', IAEA Press Release, PR 96/11, 21 June 1996

Full text

"The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), meeting in Vienna, June 10-14 1996, reviewed the implementation of IAEA safeguards last year.

The Agency did not find any indication in 1995 of the diversion of nuclear material, or of the misuse of any facility, equipment, or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards. It therefore concluded that such items remained in peaceful use or were otherwise accounted for. However, the Agency was still unable to verify the initial declaration made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK is not in full compliance with its safeguards agreement.

At the end of 1995, Agency safeguards agreements were in force with 125 States (and Taiwan, China), 66 of which (and Taiwan, China) had nuclear activities and were inspected. Safeguards were also implemented in 5 States with bilateral or multilateral agreements covering specified nuclear or non-nuclear material, facilities or equipment, as well as at designated installations in the five Nuclear Weapon States. During 1995, 554 nuclear facilities and other locations containing nuclear materials were inspected. A total of 2285 inspections were carried out requiring 10167 person-days of inspection effort.

The Agency employs approximately 200 field inspectors for this work, and the budget for this activity in 1995 was US $88,603,000, plus a further US $14 million of extra budgetary funds contributed by 8 Member States. Most of the Agency's inspection work is carried out under agreements pursuant to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was extended indefinitely in May of 1995.

In a separate action last week, the Agency's Board of Governors also agreed to establish a special Committee to negotiate a new legal document that would be attached to existing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. This document would give the Agency more information about the nuclear activities of a State and an increased access to relevant installations in the State. These broader rights would strengthen the present verification system and markedly enhance the Agency's ability to detect possible clandestine undertakings.

Other highlights from the Agency's activities in 1995:

* the Agency maintained in 1995 - and still maintains - a team of inspectors in Iraq and in the DPRK;

* in the United States of America, safeguards were applied on nuclear material released from the US military programme in 1995 and voluntarily placed under Agency safeguards, in addition to material already released in 1994;

* verification of the initial inventories of nuclear materials submitted by three Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union - Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine - was begun.

Although, in 1995, the Agency's safeguards activities were effective, several implementation difficulties have been encountered. These included technical difficulties with the Agency's surveillance equipment and also administrative restrictions imposed by several States on the designation of inspectors and on the availability of long-term multi-entry visas for inspectors. The Agency is taking steps to resolve these problems."

Inspection of French test site

'International Radiological Survey of Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls gets Underway', IAEA Press Release, PR 96/12, 25 June 1996

Full text

"International teams of scientists will be collecting terrestrial and marine samples at the Pacific atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa for about one month starting in early July in the context of the radiological study requested from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by the Government of France. Teams will visit the atolls in relays, to collect samples including plankton, fish, seawater, lagoon sediment, coral, soil, coconuts and vegetation.

The samples will be shared subsequently for analysis with a grid of laboratories worldwide, including the Pacific region. Results will be forwarded to the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) in Vienna, whose own laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria and in Monaco will also be participating both in the sample-taking and the analytical work. Data from French studies already undertaken will be available for comparative purposes in the scientific work to determine the radiological situation at the atolls. This part of the overall study is expected to take up to six months to complete.

Separately, geological specialists will be examining the situation regarding possible future scenarios, including the very long-term, using modelling techniques taking as their starting point inter alia the geological characteristics of the atolls, experience gained at other nuclear test sites, and information provided by the French authorities regarding their own series of tests. The results of this work will then be consolidated with the other part of the study and be made publicly available. The estimated date of publication of the complete, final report is early 1998.

The study is being conducted under the guidance and direction of an International Advisory Committee of distinguished scientists from ten countries, chaired by Dr. E. Gail de Planque of the United States, and including ex officio representatives of the South Pacific Forum, the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the World Health Organization and the European Commission. The Committee itself intends to visit French Polynesia at a later date, at which time a press conference is foreseen."

Ukrainian denuclearisation

Statement by President Clinton

'Removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine and Agreement on CFE Flank Issue', Statement by President Clinton, 1 June 1996

Extracts

"Ukrainian President Kuchma has announced that all nuclear warheads have been removed from the territory of Ukraine. This is a remarkable achievement. In 1991, there were more than 4000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in Ukraine. Today there are none. I applaud the Ukrainian government for its historic contribution in reducing the nuclear threat. When the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and I signed the January 1994 Trilateral Statement on this issue, we looked forward to a day that has now arrived.

The trust and cooperation the United States and Ukraine have established in resolving this issue are a cornerstone of a broad and productive relationship. Ukraine has embarked on a bold course of political and economic reform, laying the foundations for democracy and a market economy. We remain committed to supporting Ukraine through its ambitious and far-sighted reforms and to working with Ukraine and our European partners to promote Ukraine's integration into the European community.

I also want to note the fact that both the United States and Russia are ahead of the reduction schedule provided for in the START I Treaty. To date, the United States has eliminated 750 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and about 800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the former Soviet Union have been eliminated, including more than 700 in Russia. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program has played a major role in the elimination of these weapons in the former Soviet Union and in the denuclearization of Ukraine.

I have asked Secretary Perry to meet next week with his Ukrainian and Russian counterparts, Ministers Shmarov and Grachev, and mark the successful implementation of the Trilateral Statement by visiting a destroyed ICBM silo and a former nuclear weapons storage facility inUkraine. In doing so, they will celebrate another important step in making the world safer for us all."

White House Fact Sheet

'Removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine', White House Fact Sheet, 1 June 1996

Full text

"The US-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral Statement and Annex were signed on 14 January, 1994 in Moscow by Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk. The Statement and Annex:

* provided for the transfer of all nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement;

* specified prompt compensation by Russia to Ukraine for the highly-enriched uranium in the transferred weapons;

* provided for security assurances by the US, Russia and United Kingdom to Ukraine on Ukraine's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state; and

* reaffirmed the US commitment to assist the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear forces through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program.

The provisions of the Trilateral Statement and Annex are being implemented. When they were signed, there were some 1900 strategic nuclear warheads in Ukraine, most of which were on SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs targeted at the US. As of June 1, there are none. (In addition, in 1991-92, some 2500 tactical nuclear weapons were transferred from Ukraine to Russia.) There were far more nuclear warheads on the territory of Ukraine than in any country other than the United States or Russia.

Russia is dismantling the removed nuclear warheads and has provided Ukraine compensation for the strategic nuclear warheads in the form of fuel rods for civilian nuclear power plants in Ukraine. These fuel rods are being delivered according to a schedule agreed to by Russia and Ukraine.

On December 5, 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. On that same date, the US, Russia and United Kingdom provided security assurances to Ukraine, and the START I Treaty also entered into force.

The Trilateral Statement noted the US commitment of a minimum of $175 million in Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) aid to Ukraine to assist denuclearization. As of the end of April 1996, the US had notified CTR obligations for Ukraine totaling almost $400 million, primarily for the elimination of strategic nuclear arms and nuclear infrastructure."

Andorran accession to NPT

Announcement by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, 25 June 1996

Extracts

"The Principality of Andorra will formally accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] as a non-nuclear- weapon State in a ceremony here [Washington] Tuesday [25 June]...

US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum will preside over a ceremony in which Andorran Foreign Minister Manuel Mas will provide his government's instrument of accession... The United States warmly welcomes this action by Andorra and the contribution it makes to our shared goals on arms control and non- proliferation.

Andorra's accession to the NPT will underscore the continued vitality and importance of this Treaty and will highlight Andorra's commitment to the nearly universally accepted standard against proliferation embodied by the NPT. It will reinforce the important role the NPT plays in enhancing regional and international security and in helping the international community meet the non-proliferation challenges that have become a central element of the post-Cold War security environment.

With Andorra's accession, the total number of NPT Parties will have reached 182, bringing the NPT one important step closer to universality, a goal on which the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference places great emphasis. The United States believes that Andorra's responsible action in adhering to the NPT should stand as an example to those few remaining members of the international community who have yet to make a legally-binding commitment in support of nuclear non-proliferation.

The United States welcomes Andorra into the ever-growing community of NPT nations and looks forward to working with Andorra as preparations begin for the next NPT Review Conference scheduled for the year 2000."

News Review

Review compiled from reports appearing between 15 May and 15 June. The Review is an account of news reports and does not seek to put forward or reflect the views or claims of Dfax.

China tests again

At 0256 GMT (10.56am local time) on 8 June China conducted a nuclear test - its 44th, and the first this year following two in 1995 - at its Lop Nor underground site in the Northwest province of Xinjiang. The blast reportedly registered 5.7 on the Richter Scale. Its yield was provisionally estimated, according to Australia's Foreign Ministry on 8 June, as being between 20 and 80 kilotons. Subsequent reports speculated that more than one device may have been exploded. Following the test(s), China announced that it would conduct a further test before or during September and then observe a moratorium. It also expressed the hope that a CTBT would be concluded by the end of the year. See also Geneva Update.

The announcement that the blast was probably China's penultimate test came in a 8 June Foreign Ministry statement: "Before September this year, China will conduct another nuclear test to ensure the safety of its nuclear weapons. After that, China will exercise a moratorium on nuclear testing." The statement went on:

"China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and is in favour of reaching a comprehensive nuclear test ban in the process towards this objective. As early as in October 1993, the Chinese government announced that China stands for the conclusion of the CTBT not later than 1996. Since then, the Chinese delegation has taken an active part in the CTBT negotiations in Geneva. China will continue to work with other countries for the conclusion, within this year, of a fair, reasonable and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration.

The limited amount of nuclear weapons China possesses is solely for the purpose of self-defence and does not constitute a threat to any country. China has unilaterally and solemnly undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It has also committed itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. At the same time, China strongly calls on other nuclear-weapon States for a positive response to China's initiative by immediately concluding, through negotiations, a treaty on mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons, and reaching an agreement on the unconditional non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear- weapon-free zones.

In the world today, there still exist huge arsenals and the threat of a nuclear war caused by the first use of nuclear weapons. Against such a background, China cannot but conduct the necessary and the minimum number of nuclear tests. We have all along exercised utmost restraint in conducting nuclear tests, and the number of tests we have conducted is extremely limited.

Together with the governments and peoples of other countries in the world, the Chinese government and people will work unremittingly and do their utmost for the realization of the lofty goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world at an early date and for the maintenance of lasting peace and universal security."

On 13 June, the Chinese government's Liberation Army Daily published a front-page defence of the test:

"It is true that the four nuclear powers of the United States, Russia, Britain and France have announced a halt to nuclear tests. This is fact. But this should not be a reason for some people to attack and insult China. ...

Other countries do not have the right to criticise China, even if they have stopped nuclear testing. In particular, the United States has simply replaced live tests with computer simulation, and little has changed...

The halting of nuclear tests is just one method [of arms control] while the complete destruction of nuclear weapons is the final goal. To realise this goal, the Chinese government has made unstinting efforts...

For some time, several Western nations have distorted facts and publicised that China's nuclear tests pose a threat to regional and world security and have taken this as a major theory [sic] in trumpeting the so-called 'China threat'... The United States and other countries...plan by shifting China's nuclear tests into the international eye to cover up their plot to maintain a nuclear threat and to monopolise nuclear superiority..."

Reaction

Australia

Prime Minister John Howard, 8 June

"Australia condemns the latest test of a nuclear weapon by China. Given the strength of world reaction against the French testing programme, it displays a particular insensitivity for China to have gone ahead with the test. ... It is particularly regrettable that China continues to test when the negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are at a crucial juncture... I urge China to end immediately its nuclear weapons testing programme and affirm its unconditional support for a CTBT. These measures would be a significant boost to international efforts to curb the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction."

Opposition Labour Party spokesperson John Faulkner, 8 June

"The Labour Party condemns any nuclear test by any country in any environment."

Belgium

Foreign Minister Erik Derycke, 8 June

"[The test] is a setback in the bid to obtain a complete halt to nuclear testing... The development of new nuclear arms goes against the logic of disarmament..."

France

Statement by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jacques Rummelhardt, 8 June

"China has just carried out an underground nuclear test. It said it will subscribe to, from September, a moratorium on all tests... The whole of the international community, including China, has committed itself to signing this Autumn a total test ban treaty... France is calling again on all States to respect this commitment..."

Germany

Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, 8 June

"I was sorry to learn of China's latest nuclear weapons test... It discounts the flexible stance China has shown on the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. ... [Testing is] a relic of the Cold War era that has now lost any justification. ..."

Italy (the current President of the European Union)

Foreign Ministry statement, 8 June

"Italy has heard [the news] with regret... Any further nuclear tests are at this time difficult to reconcile with the primary objective of completing those talks which...would represent a concrete step forwards for the realisation of nuclear disarmament."

Japan

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, 8 June

"We are very disappointed as China had stepped toward an early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. I hope there will be no more tests."

Hashimoto on the inadvisability of yen-loan sanctions, 8 June

"We need to make efforts to make China come back to the international society on this matter, and to halt yen loans would go against that move."

Mayor of Hiroshima, Takashi Hiraoka, 8 June

"[The test was] an outrageous action that dampened international efforts for nuclear arms reduction."

Kazakstan

Foreign Ministry statement, reported 10 June

"We are deeply concerned... The People's Republic of China must make its contribution towards achieving the goals sought by all countries who want a safer world free of the nuclear threat..."

Mongolia

Foreign Ministry statement, reported 10 June

"Mongolia, as a neighbouring State, regrets and...condemns China's nuclear weapons test, which was carried out while the test ban treaty was in the final stage of negotiation... Mongolia appeals [to China] to improve the atmosphere for an international treaty to be signed as soon as possible and not to create obstacles."

New Zealand

Prime Minister Jim Bolger, 8 June

"[New Zealand] deplores the fact that China has decided to flout world opinion and continue testing at the very time the world is almost in reach of a comprehensive test ban treaty to ban all testing for all time..."

Foreign Minister Donald McKinnon, recounting to journalists his admonition of China's Ambassador Huang Guifang, 10 June

"I gave him very clearly New Zealand's position about all of this - that we do get very angry about the fact of the resumption of testing by the Chinese. We do not believe it's necessary. ... I pointed out to him that they would have been very much aware about just the way New Zealanders feel about this when they saw the activities of the French testing regime in the Pacific..."

Nordic States

Joint statement by the Nordic States (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden), issued by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 8 June

"It is deeply regrettable that China, alone among the nuclear powers, continues to carry out tests and fails to take into account the strong international protests that have been launched against such tests... It is of utmost importance to the Nordic countries that the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty...be completed in June, and that an agreement takes effect as soon as possible."

Philippines

President Fidel Ramos, 8 June

"China's latest test, viewed against the backdrop of its nuclear testing record, severely damages its credibility as a leading nuclear power claiming to be committed to the course of disarmament... [The test] greatly undermines the efforts to conclude the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by the deadline [of 28 June]."

Russia

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Grigory Karasin, 11 June

"[The test] was a negative development and created an encouraging environment for the open and secret opponents of a rapid and successful conclusion to the Geneva negotiations."

South Korea

Foreign Ministry statement, 8 June

"The government...deeply regrets that the People's Republic of China once again conducted a nuclear test at such a crucial time when international efforts to conclude the comprehensive test ban treaty have heightened. We strongly urge the Chinese government to halt immediately any planned nuclear testing and join the international efforts for the early attainment of a nuclear-test- free world."

Sweden

Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen, 8 June

"We dissociate [ourselves] from these tests and encourage the Chinese government to cancel them..."

United States

Statement by the White House Press Secretary, 8 June

"The United States deeply regrets this action. We urge China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join a global moratorium as we work to complete and sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by September."

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament, press conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 10 June

"...they are saying 'we're going to stop testing - after one more test.' They have never said that before. They even used the word 'moratorium' after the next step... [It's a] very positive step..."

Alleged ICBM transfer from Russia to China

On 21 May, a story in the Washington Post alleged that China was seeking to acquire nuclear-capable SS-18 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and/or SS-18 components from Russia and/or Ukraine.

On 21 May, US Defense Secretary William Perry conceded that "we do have information that China was seeking SS-18 technology from Russia." Perry made plain that the US had already acted to prevent any such move:

"We believe [it] would be a significant mistake to transfer...SS- 18 technology to China and have so represented our position to [the] Russian government and the Ukraine government. With the exception of making [the] booster available for space launching - and even then under tight control - other transfer of ICBM technology would in our view [constitute] a violation of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] agreement and of the missile technology control regime..."

The same day, State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns commented:

"We don't have evidence that any transfers have occurred, but we have seen reports...[and] there's other information available to us that would at least motivate us to ask questions. ... We'll continue to follow these reports and follow the evidence as it develops. We take this very seriously... We're watching."

On 23 May, a spokesperson for Russia's Foreign Ministry, Grigory Karasin, denied any impropriety: "Russia is rigorously adhering to all the non-proliferation accords on missile technology and will continue to do so."

Notwithstanding this assurance, Senator Jesse Helms (Republican - North Carolina), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reacted to the story with alarm and consternation on 7 June:

"No amount of policy reformulation can change the fact that the US is vulnerable to nuclear-tipped missiles fielded by China... The current course charted by the administration fails to recognize the inherent danger in China's pursuit of an advanced nuclear arsenal."

Referring to the possibility, raised by Perry, that the US would not object to the use of SS-18 booster rockets to launch non- military satellites, Helms averred: "I believe any such exception would be made at the peril of the national security of the American people."

Alleged China-Pakistan M-11 transfer

On 12 June, a Washington Post report alleged yet another missile- transfer impropriety involving China: this time, the transfer of M- 11 nuclear-capable missiles to Pakistan. The story also alleged subsequent Pakistan deployment of the missiles. The source of the article was reputedly a leaked US intelligence assessment - a leak State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns referred to on 12 June as "very disturbing". Of the allegations made, Burns said: "We have not made a determination that either China or Pakistan have engaged in activity that would be sanctionable..."

Also on 12 June, Representative Pelosi, claimed that, if substantiated, the report confirmed the abject failure of US attempts to reform Chinese missile export policy:

"If the events reported...have occurred, the world is a significantly more dangerous place... Every time they [China] made such a decision [to export missiles], we were told that the Chinese government had made new commitments to refrain from such activities... Today we see what a failure those promises have been."

In May, the US decided not to take any action over an alleged transfer of nuclear-weapons related technology from China to Pakistan (see last issue).

Missile defence developments

The Defend America bill, designed by the US Republican Congress as a decisive legislative and political breakthrough towards US deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, was thrown into doubt in mid-May with a report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) putting the total estimated cost of such a system at between $30-60 billion. The figure shocked and horrified proponents of the bill - prominent among whom are Robert Dole (Kansas), likely Republican Presidential nominee, and Newt Gingrich (Georgia), Speaker of the House of Representatives - who had been basing their plans on estimates as 'low' as $5 billion. The figure shocked and delighted opponents of the legislation - most notably the White House, which had been warning of overall costs in excess of $20 billion.

The CBO figures were made public in a 15 May letter from CBO Director June O'Neill to the Chair of the House National Security Committee, Floyd Spence. According to O'Neill: "Through 2010, total acquisition costs would range from $31 billion to $60 billion for a layered defense that would include both ground- and space-based weapons." The estimate for expenditure required between financial years 1997-2000 was given as $10 billion; "or," in the words of the letter, "about $7 billion more than currently programmed for national missile defense." The CBO figures assume an NMD system capable of, or aimed at being capable of, provided coverage against ballistic missile attack for all 50 continental US States. The Defend America bill calls for "a highly effective defense" of all 50 States. The CBO also gave an estimated total cost of between $6-13 billion for the Administration's theater ballistic missile (TMD) 'three-plus-three' programme, so-called because systems would be studied and developed for three years, with a three-year assessment on the merits of deployment to follow.

The news immediately caused the cancellation of a 23 May vote on the bill in the House of Representatives. Republicans rallied round the bill. According to the Chair of the National Security Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, William Young (Florida), on 22 May: "The Congressional Budget Office came up with some scoring we had not anticipated... We don't think the CBO number is accurate." Speaking on 6 June, O'Neill defended her Office's study:

"We gave [estimates] in components so it would be possible, if our interpretation was not somebody else's interpretation, they could pick something that was a smaller system... Since we weren't sure what 'layered' meant [in the Defend America legislation], we gave [figures] for the most sophisticated layered system as well as one that could meet [less ambitious specifications]..."

The Senate debated the bill in early June. On 4 June, a 'closure' motion, proposed by Robert Dole a week before his retirement from the Upper House, to move from a debate to a vote failed to obtain the necessary level of support: 60 out of 100 Senators. The closure-motion vote was 53-46, with every Republican voting in favour and all but one Democrat (Howell Heflin of Alaska) voting against. The outcome led to numerous protestations of Republican outrage and ire, typified by the "guarantee" offered by Arizona Senator Jon Kyl's (4 June) that "if we do not have [the] right [to vote], Republican candidate Bob Dole is going to be talking to the American people throughout the length and breadth of this country to remind them that today the United States has not the ability to defend against a ballistic missile attack by another country."

Apart from concern about the wider arms control implications of the Defend America approach (see below), many Democratic Senators naturally referred to the CBO estimates to justify their opposition. In the words of Byron Dorgan (North Dakota):

"Surely the American people who watch and listen must think we have the attention-span of house flies... If you're going to balance the budget...there is not room...for $60 billion for additional 'Star Wars' programmes."

On 4 June, John Holum, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), gave his opinion of the Defend America Act in no uncertain terms, telling journalists:

"[T]here's one item today in the United States Senate when the so- called Defend America Act is scheduled to be brought up for an attempt at a vote. This proposal...would mandate a nationwide anti- ballistic missile defense. The basic plan is, therefore, to throw out the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which, as a consequence, would mean also losing the START II Treaty and probably suspending implementation of START I, since both of those treaties depend heavily on the viability of the ABM Treaty for their effectiveness. In fact, the Russians have conditioned their ratification of START I, let alone START II, on the ABM Treaty's continued effectiveness.

So that means that for the United States, we would have to add to the cost of the system, according to the CBO numbers, $31 billion to $60 billion; also, the costs of maintaining our own forces at at least the START I levels. We'd have to forego the reductions that are now the basis of defense planning and spend roughly $5 billion more during the treaty implementation period on offensive weapons, as well as on the defensive systems. And that assumes no new construction, no new programs, but simply maintaining the forces now in being.

It also suggests that we should build defenses some years ahead of the relevant threat. ...the Department of Defense has proposed three years for examination or development of defenses and then, should the threat warrant, a three-year deployment period. So the administration is not opposed to responding to these dangers as they emerge. But that's still some years away. So what the Defend America Act suggests is that we should rush to deploy based on today's technology before the threat has fully emerged, which means essentially that we'd be building a typewriter defense for a computer age.

And it also proceeds...under the false claim that the United States is defenseless. One of the things that's troubled me most about this whole idea is the proposition that there's nothing you could do if we're threatened with nuclear attack from a rogue country or perhaps from China. Any country that contemplates launching a nuclear attack against the United States knows that it would be pulverised in response by our overwhelming nuclear capabilities. So the notion that we are defenseless is nonsense."

Holum's concerns were echoed by the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General John Shalikashvili, in a letter to senior Democrat Senator Sam Nunn (Georgia) on 1 May:

"Efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardise Russian ratification of START II and...could prompt Russia to withdraw from START I... I am concerned that [the] failure of either START initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face."

On 3 June, speaking during the Senate debate on the Act, Nunn outlined alternative legislation, which, while taking on board the arms control concerns of Holum and Shalikashvili, is far from uncritical of Administration assumptions and policy:

"My major concern with the administration's proposal is the absence of any real criteria for evaluating three years hence whether or not the time has come to end development and start deployment... The administration's programme also does not portray how much more effective or how much cheaper a NMD system might be if we were to defer deployment for an additional finite period..." Nunn added that he did "not believe we can assume that no ballistic missile threat for the United States will emerge over the next fifteen years", and conceded the Republican point that deploying NMD systems before a new threat or threats emerged could have "some pre-emptive and deterrent value."

Specifically, Nunn's legislation stipulates: provision by the administration of its criteria for assessing the merits of moving from development to deployment; development of a NMD site, compliant with the ABM Treaty, at Grand Forks, North Dakota, capable of becoming operational in 2003; greater sharing of information and data with Russia; and exploration with Russia of the possibility of going back to the original ABM Treaty plan to permit each Superpower two ballistic missile defense sites, rather than just one, with a combined maximum of 200 interceptors. This latter suggestion was advocated by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, in the course of testimony to the House National Security Committee (13 June) that urged the Administration to learn from Russia's determination to revise the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty:

"The Russians have pursued those [CFE] revisions diligently, to put it mildly... The key point I want to make is that the Russians persisted in getting a change...and that change was something that they felt was important to their national interests in the new environment that existed after the break-up of the Soviet Union. I'm not opposed to those changes... The point on the ABM Treaty is that we should have no hesitancy in doing the same thing. The world is a very different place than it was in 1972...

There are a number of reasons why revisions and modifications and interpretations of the ABM Treaty ought to be on the table... Before this Committee a few months ago, I suggested that a modification of the ABM Treaty moving toward two sites rather than one, which is essentially the original form of the treaty, with a change in location of the two sites, might be the sort of thing we should propose to permit a more effective national defense, but still within the framework of the essence of the original treaty. I understand Senator Nunn made a speech the other day in the Senate which began to explore that type of an idea."

Other developments

On 31 May, the head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation (BMDO), Army Lt. Gen. Malcolm O'Neill stood down, to be replaced temporarily by Rear Admiral Richard D. West. Shortly before leaving his post, Lt. Gen. O'Neill spoke about US BMD plans, making the rare claim that there was little difference between the Administrations' 'three-plus-three' schedule and the timelines of the Defend America Act:

"You could call the Defend America Act a six-year program, whereas the Administration program is a three-year plus three-year program. I think in second grade I learned that three plus three equals six."

O'Neill took issue with the conclusion of the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE - see last issue) that the United States would face no ballistic missile threat from 'rogue States' in the next fifteen years - a claim he is reported to have described as "unscientific" and "emotional". He also claimed that the 'three-plus-three' programme reveals a nearer-term concern, and took some credit for it: "If the threat is fifteen years away, why would the Administration have a three-plus-three option? Well, because I threw enough uncertainty into the game, I think."

On 13 June, the Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC) presented its report on the measures it would like to see included in the FY97 Intelligence Authorization Act. The SIC called for a commission to be established to carry out a more impressive and reliable threat- assessment - and assessment of US capabilities to counter new threats - than that on offer from the NIE. The SIC would want the commission - which it would call the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - to "report to Congress on specific administrative, legislative, and other changes it believes are required to improve US performance." The SIC contends:

"In the view of the Committee, the US government at present is not well organized to meet the threat to US national security posed by the worldwide proliferation of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or devices, and their delivery systems... No individual or organization is responsible for coordinating the political, military, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence resources that are required to prevent or roll back proliferation... Organizational inefficiencies and a lack of central focus and direction have made US efforts to combat proliferation ad hoc, reactive, and less effective than they could be..."

On 20 May, President Clinton spoke of the ballistic missile threat in the Asia-Pacific region. Addressing a meeting of the Pacific Basin Economic Council meeting in Washington, Clinton said: "We are meeting today's missile threat to the region by building advanced ballistic missiles defense systems to protect our troops and allies."

Also on 20 May, France confirmed that it was pulling out of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) project, which aims to battlefield protection against short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles (see last issue). The remaining parties to the program - the US, Germany and Italy - signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 28 May.

Ukraine completes transfer of nuclear weapons

On 1 June, Ukraine's President, Leonid Kuchma, announced that his country had completed the transfer of all nuclear warheads left on its territory at the end of the Soviet era. Kuchma coupled the announcement with a plea for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in much of Europe. Under the terms of a 14 January agreement between Ukraine, Russia and the US, Ukraine transferred around 1,300 strategic nuclear warheads to Russia, where they have or will be destroyed. See Documents and Sources for more details.

Kuchma's statement read:

"The process of transferring Ukraine's strategic nuclear warheads to Russia for their destruction was completed on 1 June... Ukraine has now proved to the entire world its commitment to the idea of global nuclear disarmament...

[T]his disarmament process cannot be unilateral. It must be sustained and completed in political and practical spheres by other countries, including the nuclear powers... [I call for] a denuclearised central and Eastern Europe...in order to reduce the threat of new separation lines appearing in Europe."

The statement added that destruction of missile silos was expected to be completed by the end of 1998.

The achievement was marked at a 4 June ceremony in Pervomaysk, a former nuclear missile base in Ukraine, attended by the Defence Ministers of Ukraine (Valerie Shmarov), Russia (Pavel Grachev) and the United States (William Perry).

On 2 June, President Yeltsin expressed his satisfaction:

"In spite of the fact that at a time when difficult political, economic and technical problems had to be tackled, common sense and the sides' adherence to international obligations have always taken the upper hand... I would like to express my sincere gratitude to diplomats, Russian servicemen, experts and employees of various ministries and departments taking part in carrying out this unprecedented operation..."

The news particularly pleased Senator Richard Lugar (Republican - Indiana), who, together with Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat - Georgia) has been prominent in urging the US to support and assist denuclearisation in the former Soviet Union. On 3 June, Senator Lugar issued the following press release:

"The elimination of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union that had been aimed at the United States substantially strengthens the security of all Americans... With elections quickly approaching in Russia, the need to gain control of the nuclear arsenals has become even more urgent. Political and economic uncertainty in that region requires increased efforts to reduce the nuclear threat. ...

For over five years, Senator Nunn and I have worked in a bipartisan way to dismantle and control weapons of mass destruction in that region... The removal of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine marks a signal success for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program [CTR]. ...

The best way to deal with nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism is to prevent it at the source... Terrorists using weapons of mass destruction are a real threat to our country. Unless we work to control materials and increase readiness here at home, we have good reason to expect an incident on American soil."

Related developments

On 18 May, it was reported in Kiev that Russia had agreed to pay Ukraine $450 million compensation for its 1991-2 transfer of tactical nuclear weapons. The arrangement - not officially confirmed - was apparently agreed during the 17 May Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

On 29 May, the US announced an additional $43.1 million of aid to Ukraine to help it discharge its remaining denuclearisation obligations, including, reportedly, support for personnel made redundant in the process. The sum brings the total assistance made available to Ukraine under the CTR to around $400 million.

In Kiev on 6 June, discussions between Ukraine and the G-7 (Group of Seven leading industrialised countries) ended without agreement on the amount of compensation to be awarded to Ukraine for its decision to close down the Chernobyl nuclear reactors. The head of the G-7 negotiating team, Claude Mandil of France, strove to calm fears of a protracted dispute: "This should not prompt doubt in Ukraine that the G-7 nations will not fulfill their political promises." However, senior Ukrainian official Yuri Kostenko told reporters: "If there is no decision acceptable for Ukraine's economy, the Ukrainian government will be forced to review the deadline for fulfilling the Chernobyl [closure] programme."

Developments in Belarus

On 5 June, Colonel General Viktor Yesin, Chief of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, expressed his chagrin at the delay in completing the transfer of nuclear weapons (18 SS-25s) from Belarus to Russia. Under a December 1995 agreement between the two States' Defence Ministries, the transfer should have been completed by the beginning of June. Yesin complained: "the fulfillment of the international commitments taken by Russia is under threat through Belarus's fault."

Neither the reason for the delay or its likely duration was clear from reports. The Belarussian leadership, including President Lukashenko, has recently warned (see issues 4 & 5) that proposed NATO expansion and possible nuclear deployment on the territory of new Member States, could jeopardise the process.

Indian election results in uncertainty and tension on nuclear issue

The April/May Indian General Election has finally yielded a 'centre-left' United Front coalition government, led by H. D. Deve Gowda. The United Front took power after the collapse of the fledgling Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party, BJP) at the end of May.

On 5 June, the United Front published a detailed policy-programme which included the commitment to "continue to work for universal disarmament" and well as an insistence on India's right to "retain the nuclear option until this goal is achieved." According to reports, there was no commitment to signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Nor was the Front's policy with regard to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles (see below) spelled out.

During their brief sojourn in power (16-31 May), the BJP made plain their determination not only to retain but develop the nuclear-weapons option. According to Defence Minister Pramod Mahajan on 20 May: "our party manifesto says that after studying the defence needs of the country, we will exercise the nuclear option." One aspect of this 'exercise', he also made clear, would be the deployment of ballistic missiles - the medium-range (2,500 kilometres/1,500 miles) Agni (Fire) and Prithvi (Earth) systems - currently under development:

"We would like to continue with this programme. And any missile produced is for deployment... The BJP has consistently opposed any attempt at shelving the Agni project..."

Such pronouncements can be assumed to have influenced the tone of a 23 May speech by Pakistan's Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, during which she claimed:

"India has one of the most active nuclear programmes on earth, producing fissile material each day... Some say they plan to hold a second nuclear test. The Indian nuclear missile programme in South Asia gives Pakistan only three-minutes response time to an attack. Having faced aggression four times at the hands of India, Pakistan cannot remain unconcerned at such developments..."

On 18 May, Pakistan's Defence Minister, Aftab Shabaan Mirani, had observed: "Pakistan is strong enough to defend its geographical missiles... We are not scared of Indian...missiles...and [we] possess an effective deterrent."

On 20 May, one of Pakistan's senior nuclear-weapons scientists, Dr. Qadeer Khan, told reporters that although "we are not manufacturing any" nuclear weapons, work on achieving manufacturing-potential had never, despite official protestations, been suspended:

"Let me make it clear that at no stage was the programme stopped... I don't think any Prime Minister, President or even the Army chief would even dare contemplate touching the programme which is so central to our security."

US-North Korea Accord

Steady progress appears to be being made towards beginning the replacement of North Korea's frozen nuclear facilities with non- proliferation-friendly light-water reactors (LWRs). Such replacement is the centrepiece of the October 1994 US-North Korea Framework Agreement - the implementation of which is being entrusted to the (New York based and US-Japan-South Korea dominated) Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organisation (KEDO).

On 16 May, the US Department of Energy (DOE) announced that it had authorised the participation of two US firms - ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Systems, known as C-E, and Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - in the replacement project. According to a DOE press release:

"The North Korean reactors will be based largely on C-E technology, which already incorporated in South Korea's Ulchin-3 and -4 nuclear plants now under construction. South Korea's Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO), owner of the Ulchin plants, is prime contractor for the North Korean reactors and is using the Ulchin plants as the model for the North Korean reactors."

In New York on 22 May, North Korea and KEDO signed a protocol guaranteeing diplomatic immunity and consular rights on KEDO engineers and other experts. According to reports, a further nine protocols are under negotiation.

On 9 June, the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun alleged that North Korea had admitted to the US that it possessed four nuclear- armed missiles. The following day, State Department spokesperson Nicholas treated the speculation with contempt: "It sounds preposterous... I know nothing about it... I've never heard about it. North Korea's nuclear programme is frozen by the actions of the United States government and remains frozen to this day."

Missiles

The US has also been discussing issues of missile development and proliferation with North Korea (see last issue). On 4 June, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord reportedly suggested that North Korea was seeking economic recompense in return for a commitment to freeze or curtail its missile development programme, and review its missile export policy. Lord conceded that economic benefits could flow from a serious change of stance:

"As we go ahead with missile talks, if they are productive, I would imagine that [the issue of] sanctions would come into play... We are obligated...as they meet our concerns on...issues like missiles, to free up our economic interactions with North Korea."

On 10 June the US and South Korea began discussing missile issues, with South Korea reportedly offering to join the 28-State Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Egypt and Libya discuss alleged chemical weapons plant

Egypt has been attempting to persuade the United States about the non-sinister nature of a factory under construction at Tarhunah in Libya which the US claims is designed to be a chemical weapons facility. In late May, an Egyptian team of experts visited the mountain site and, according to Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, quoted on 30 May, concluded that "there are tunnels but no installations, no equipment." Mubarak added: "I think the Americans know very well there is no activity now in those tunnels."

A report in the 28 May edition of the Washington Times quoted Mubarak as quoting Libya's President, Colonel Gaddafi, as saying with reference to Tarhunah: "alright, I'm not going to do it." Referring to this imputed remark, Defense Department spokesperson Kenneth Bacon said (28 May):

"Based on that report, obviously we're happy to read that Mr. Gaddafi says that he doesn't plan to go ahead with the chemical facility. We think that's the right decision, and we hope that his actions meet his words."

On 30 May, State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns said the US remained "sceptical that any inspection of the facility at Tarhunah, still under construction, could establish that it will not be used for chemical weapons purposes. Unfortunately, we believe that the Libyan government is intent upon building a chemical weapons capability." Burns explained that the US was not claiming the site was already operational: "we never said there were chemical weapons at Tarhunah... What we have said...is that there's very good reason to believe this facility is under construction for the purpose of harbouring a chemical weapons programme. And that is the purpose of the very mysterious construction underway..."

Burns was complimentary about Egypt's efforts, claiming that Egypt shares "the very strong concerns of the United States," and arguing:

"The Egyptians did a very good thing by shining a very large international spotlight on this programme. And perhaps...Colonel Gaddafi will think twice now about trying to make this particular site operational."

Colonel Gaddafi, speaking on 29 May, proposed an alternative interpretation:

"After the testimony of Mubarak, can the US still talk about Libya building a chemical weapons plant? Is not Egypt trusted? ... Egypt is a trusted partner in the peace process... Egypt is an ally, partner and friend [of the US]..."

Iraq: some relief but renewed tensions

On 20 May, Iraq and the UN agreed on details for a $2 billion sale of oil to raise funds for humanitarian supplies. The move, however, is not an indication that sanctions are about to be lifted. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) remains adamant that the profound disablement of, and ascertainment of all available facts concerning, Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes remains an ongoing process; and one, moreover, still being periodically hampered by Iraq. Events in early and mid-June - with UNSCOM inspectors denied access to sites and leaving Iraq with their missions uncompleted - doubtless served to spectacularly reinforce this impression.

Some relief

The oil-sale agreement was drawn up under the remit of Security Council Resolution 986. The following 20 May US State Department Fact Sheet sets out the context and details of the deal:

"The memorandum of understanding signed 20 May, 1996, between the UN and Iraq is an important step in implementing Resolution 986 by providing for the procurement and distribution of humanitarian supplies in Iraq. It ensures that Saddam Hussein will neither control nor have access to proceeds from the sale of the oil, and that only the people of Iraq will benefit from the oil-for-food resolution. Other steps will need to be taken before Resolution 986 is fully implemented, including acceptance by the Secretary- General of an Iraqi food distribution plan and creation of guidelines for that plan by the UN Sanctions Committee.

The details of Resolution 986 include:

* The Iraqis will be allowed to sell $2 billion worth of oil over the next 180 days.

* $600 million of that amount will be transferred to the UN Compensation Fund to compensate individual and other claims arising from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

* Between $260 and $300 million will be set aside during this 180- day period for the humanitarian program in three northern governates.

* Money will also be set aside to cover the costs of the independent inspection agents to be provided by the UN, the current operating costs of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), and other expenses related to the export of petroleum, as determined by the UN Sanctions Committee.

* The resolution authorized the allocation of up to $10 million every 90 days to compensate governments which have transferred frozen Iraqi assets held by them to help pay the costs of various UN activities regarding Iraq, as authorized by UNSC Resolution 778.

* Finally, Resolution 986 states that the larger share of the petroleum and petroleum products to be exported will be conveyed through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, and authorizes export to Iraq of parts and equipment to ensure the safe operation of the pipeline."

British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, issued the following statement (20 May) on the development:

"I congratulate the UN Secretary-General on the successful outcome of his talks with the Iraqis... I am delighted that the resolution...will at last be implemented; Saddam's refusal to implement it for over a year has caused much unnecessary suffering to the Iraqi people. Implementation will bring them some relief, but they will sadly not enjoy a normal life until Iraq fulfills its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions; sanctions will remain until Iraq does so. It is hard to imagine this happening while Saddam remains in power."

Renewed tensions

On 30 May, a senior Iraqi official, General Hussam Mohammed Amin, , accused UNSCOM of "raising minor and trivial questions" with an intent to "prolong" sanctions. The same day, Oil Minister Amer Rashid, insisted that Iraq "is making enormous efforts to cooperate with the UN Special Commission so that it has no more justification not to agree that Iraq has completely satisfied its commitments." Rashid added that "incidents occurred in 1995" which hampered the conclusion of the process, but was adamant that mistrust and ill-feeling left over from them "must no longer influence our work." In June, new incidents occurred to create fresh mistrust and ill-feeling.

On 11 and 12 June, a team of around 50 UNSCOM inspectors was denied access to sites at Abu Ghurib, close to Baghdad. The UNSCOM team, led by Nikita Smidovich, a ballistic missiles expert from Russia, had hoped to search the site - home to forces from the Republican Guard - for documents and possible equipment. According to Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, on 12 June, Iraq had given permission for the team to "inspect six installations in the Abu Ghurib region and we have prevented them from visiting two others belonging to the Republican Guards for security reasons." Aziz added:

"[UNSCOM has] been pretending to search for something hidden and each time their inspection has failed to achieve anything... But they keep coming back and for some time they have wanted to provoke us... We did not bar them access because we have something to hide, as their experts are saying, but because these sites are important to our security..."

On 12 June, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution - 1060 - expressing its equally exasperated disapproval. The resolution read:

"The Security Council...

Noting the progress made towards the elimination of Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction, and outstanding problems reported by the Chairman of the Special Commission,

Noting with concern the incidents of 11 June 1996...when access by a Special Commission inspection team to sites in Iraq designated for inspection by the Commission was excluded by the Iraqi authorities,

Emphasizing the importance the Council attaches to full compliance by Iraq with its obligations...to permit immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission to any site which the Commission wishes to inspect,

Emphasizing the unacceptability of any attempts by Iraq to deny access to any such site...

1. Deplores the refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access...

2. Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions; and that the Government of Iraq allow the Special Commission inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect..."

On 13 June, Iraq again denied the team access. The team decided to remain at the location, in an attempt to prevent, or at least observe, any removal or documents or equipment.

On 14 June, Aziz wrote to the Security Council, suggesting that the inspections would be allowed to proceed a) following an explanation of the purpose of the inspections, and b) in the presence of Iraqi officials. The same day, the Council rejected the imposition of demands and issued a statement reiterating its position and urging UNSCOM Chair Rolf Ekeus to visit Iraq in the near-future (17 June, it was later announced). The statement read:

"The Security Council condemns the failure of Iraq to comply with its resolution 1060 (1996) of 12 June 1996 by refusing access to sites designated by the Special Commission on 13 June 1996. Coming after the denial of access on 11 and 12 June, this new dimension of non-compliance marks a step backwards in Iraq's cooperation with the Special Commission. The Council considers that these events constitute a clear and flagrant violation of resolutions 697 (1991), 707 (1991) and 719 (1991).

... The Council rejects attempts by Iraq to impose conditions on the conduct of inspections by the Special Commission. ...

... The Security Council requests the Chairman of the Special Commission to visit Baghdad as soon as possible with a view to securing immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites which the Special Commission wishes to inspect, and to engage in a forward-looking dialogue on other issues under the Commission's mandate. ..."

On 16 June, still thwarted, the UNSCOM left Abu Ghurib. According to Nikita Smidovich:

"On the instruction of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission [Ekeus], the team left the sites that were kept secured for more than 50 hours... We have seen a lot of military personnel inside the fences of these sites... There is an obvious solution to the crisis - that is to provide access in accord with Iraqi obligations."

Earlier (9 June), an unnamed member of UNSCOM had reportedly revealed that the Commission was nearing the destruction of Iraq's alleged main huge biological warfare centre at al-Hakam. According to reports, the official claimed:

"Our experts are dismantling and destroying dual-use machines at al-Hakam. They started in the middle of May and we expect to finish our mission by the middle of June."

CFE Conference

On 31 May, the review conference of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty ended in agreement on a new, interim numerical and geopolitical re-organisation of the Treaty, particularly with regard to the obligations of Russia and Ukraine (see Documents and Sources for summary and details).

Reaction

On 4 June, a spokesperson for Russia's Foreign Ministry, Grigory Karasin, described the new arrangements as being "an outcome of special significance":

"The parties have reached an agreement to settle the problem of flank restrictions bearing in mind the interests of Russia' security. The agreement ensures an opportunity to maintain a necessary strength of military groups in Russia's flank regions in order to guarantee its security..."

Also on 4 June, during a meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) - a forum for discussions between Alliance members and other European States - the Foreign Ministers of Estonia (Siim Kallas) and Latvia (Valdis Birkas) reportedly expressed concern that the new arrangements would lead to a significant increase in the number of tanks - up to 600 from only 180 - that Russia would be permitted to deploy in its Pskov region, adjacent to the two Baltic States.

Landmines developments

On 23 May, the European Parliament in Strasbourg passed a resolution condemning "the weak provisions of the new second protocol on landmines" recently agreed at the review conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (see last issue for extensive coverage). The resolution criticised what it characterised as the new protocol's "vague definition of anti- personnel mines, the virtual absence of transfer barriers, the long and meaningless transitional periods and the non-existence of any effective system of verification."

Also on 23 May, Denmark imposed a ban on the use by its armed forces of anti-personnel mines. The declaration, according to a Defence Ministry statement, was designed to give "a clear and unequivocal political signal" of Denmark's advocacy of a total, global landmines ban. The statement added: "The irresponsible use of these weapons has turned into human disasters around the world."

On 11 June, it was announced that a UN Conference on demining would be held in Copenhagen from 2-4 July. According to a 11 June UN press release, the aim of the conference - to be attended by Denmark's Minister for Development Cooperation, Poul Nielson, and the UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Yasushi Akashi - is intended to concentrate governmental minds on the issue:

"The proliferation of more than 111 million landmines worldwide, many in countries that are striving for peace after years of war, poses an enormous humanitarian and economic problem. Most landmine victims are civilians, including children, and the presence of landmines often prevents refugees from returning home for many years after a conflict has ended. Despite this, research on improved mine clearance technology has not been a priority for governments."

Two regional meetings have called for more decisive moves towards a global ban, and more effective regional action in the meantime. Addressing a 29-30 May regional seminar in Jakarta on humanitarian international law, sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, said (29 May):

"In the protracted Cambodian conflict which lasted through the 1980s, we saw how the use of landmines has killed or maimed a large percentage of the non-combatant population... The killing and the maiming continue to this day as a large, unknown number of landmines are still in place in that country... We should therefore take concerted and concrete action to prevent this experience from recurring in our region." Alatas added, however, that achieving a total ban was not a straightforward affair, and that the security concerns of some States needed to be taken into sensitive consideration:

"There are arguments, for example, that say some need it [landmines] as a defensive weapon and under certain circumstances they hope it can continue under strict rules... We are still discussing the issue..."

The seminar was attended by 10 Southeast Asian States - Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam - plus Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States.

At its 26th General Assembly - Panama City, 3-7 June, the Organisation of American States (OAS) discussed the issue, and heard its Secretary-General, Cesar Gaviria of Colombia, urge (3 June) further progress. Gaviria stated:

"Central America is the region that has most suffered, in the Hemisphere, from the devastating consequences of one of the cruelest means used in...wars. Anti-personnel mines are a weapon that not only causes cruel and inhuman mutilations, physical trauma and psychological wounds to all combatants but also poses a dark and latent threat to the civilian population. Every year, these tools of death not only kill and incapacitate thousands of innocent victims, among them hundreds of children, but also disable vast agricultural and cattle-raising areas.

I am convinced that, within the OAS, it will be possible to reach a political consensus that will allow the hemisphere to free itself forever of these mines fields. We must take advantage of the current international climate against the production, commercialization and use of anti-personnel mines to push for the adoption of legal instruments for this purpose, within the context of the OAS.

Meanwhile, we must redouble our efforts to remove the constant threat these mine fields in Central America represent. Despite the successes achieved by the OAS, with the help of the Inter-American Defense Board and thanks to the generous assistance provided by member states and observers, we are still far from completing this objective..."

Nicaragua - infested with an estimated 90,000 landmines, has invited Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States to a 25 June meeting to discuss demining assistance. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Alvaro Sevilla, quoted on 11 June: "We are in the midst of a motivational campaign to get friendly countries to become donors."

Arms and military spending surveys

Two major surveys of arms and other military spending were released in June: by the International Monetary Fund (IMF - 3 June) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI - 13 June).

According to the IMF survey, the period from 1985-95 saw a fall in military spending equal to about 3% of global gross domestic product (GDP) - an estimated saving of $720 billion. The total percentage of global GDP devoted to military expenditure in 1995 was 2.4%, compared to 3.6% in 1990.

The sharpest fall came in former Soviet and Warsaw Pact States, where the collective percentage of GDP devoted to military spending dropped from 7.9% to 3% - an estimated saving of $125 billion. The drop in 'developing' countries taken collectively was from 4.9% in 1990 to 2.6% in 1995, and in 'developed' countries from 3.2% to 2.4%. In Asia, taken as a whole, the decline was far more modest, from 2.8% to 2.3% (though due to the large increase in Asian GDP in the period, the amounts spent increased). Overall, the decrease barring the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact amounts to only 0.5% of global GDP.

According to the SIPRI annual survey, there were $22.8 billion of arms sales in 1995, a drop of only 0.2% from the previous year. There was a stunning increase in the share of the arms trade now claimed by Russia, up to 17% from only 4% in 1994. The leading arms importers were China and South Korea, both registering huge increases in purchases. The survey's 'league tables' for the fifteen leading exporters and importers of arms in 1995 are summarised below.

15 leading arms exporters

15 leading arms importers

UN small arms database

On 15 May, Swadesh Rana, Senior Political Affairs Officer of the United Nations' Centre for Disarmament Affairs, spoke about a new UN database recently set up to monitor the use and transfer of small arms. Addressing a briefing organised by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Rana said:

"Small arms were the sole instruments of violence in nearly 95% of all global conflicts... The killings and chaos resulting from the use of such weapons was out of proportion either to their technological sophistication or their financial costs."

Editor's note: the next issue of Disarmament Diplomacy will be a July/August edition, appearing in the first week of September.

Disarmament Diplomacy is edited by Dr. Sean Howard with the assistance of Simon Robinson, Dr. Kevin Warnes and Richard Whittaker.

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