Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 8, September 1996

A monthly digest of news and documents edited by Sean Howard. Credits

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Contents

• • Editor's introduction
• CD Opinion Pieces
• • The CD: Crisis and Opportunity
  • • By Rebecca Johnson
    • Preface
    • Introduction
    • Background
    • The Fissban
    • Structure and procedures
    • Future work
    • Conclusion
  • CD negotiations on time-bound nuclear disarmament: The case against
  • • By Michael Krepon
    • Introduction
    • Dangers in seeking time-bound negotiations
    • Conclusion
  • Return nuclear arms reductions to the UN
  • • By Nikolai Sokov
    • Introduction
    • The present division of labour
    • Problems with the division of labour
    • The possible suitability of the CD
    • Conclusion
• Guest Comment
• • A strengthened BTWC regime: Facing the Facts
  • • By Graham Pearson
    • Introduction
    • The essential necessity for on-site measures
    • The requirement for a BTWC Organization
    • The relevance of the Chemical Weapons Convention
    • The Way Ahead
  • Bombs Away? The World Court Decision on Nuclear Weapons
  • • By Alyn Ware
    • Introduction
    • The legal significance of the ruling
    • The political significance of the ruling
    • The role of citizens' groups
    • Conclusion
• CTBT Special Report
• • By Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Intelligence Review
  • Summary
  • Overwhelming UNGA endorsement
  • CTBT Signed
  • Conclusion
• Geneva Update No. 31
• • By Rebecca Johnson
  • Summary
  • 29 August Plenary
  • 3 September Plenary
  • 12 September Plenary
• Documents and Sources
• • China, Russia, US: Statements to the UNGA
  • • China
    • Russia
    • The United States
  • US-Russia statement on ABM Treaty
  • IAEA General Conference
  • • Statement by the Director-General
    • IAEA verification of US and Russian weapons-origin fissile materials
    • Resolutions
    • Convention on Nuclear Safety
    • Strengthening Safeguards
    • Report: Inspection of the French nuclear test sites
  • US tritium supply PLANS
  • Report of the Canberra Commission: Annex on Verification
  • • Annex A: Verification
    • Verification Tasks
    • Components of a Verification Regime
    • Non-Proliferation Undertakings
    • Verifying a Production Cut-Off
    • Verifying Nuclear Warheads Dismantlement and Elimination
    • Disposition of Warhead Uranium and Plutonium
    • Civil Fissile Material
    • Tritium
    • Funding
    • Infrastructure Dismantlement
    • The Elimination Phase
    • Verification in a Nuclear-weapon-free world
• News Review
• • CTBT approved by UN General Assembly
  • • Introduction
    • Reaction and comment
    • Australia
    • Brazil
    • China
    • Cuba
    • Egypt
    • France
    • Germany
    • India
    • Indonesia
    • Iran
    • Ireland, on behalf of the European Union
    • Japan
    • Malaysia
    • Nepal
    • New Zealand
    • Norway
    • Pakistan
    • Russia
    • South Korea
    • United Kingdom
    • United States
    • Zimbabwe
    • Other comment
  • France continues to seek to restore tarnished image
  • Missile defence developments
  • • US-Russia ABM Treaty discussions
    • US missile defence plans
  • Czech government opens door to possible NATO nuclear deployment
  • Belarus repeats calls for NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe
  • Alleged Pakistan-China missile factory
  • US-North Korea Accord: precarious progress maintained
  • UNSCOM efforts in Iraq disrupted and caught in crossfire
  • CWC gloom as US Senate delays ratification decision
  • • Summary
    • Reaction
  • Russia emerges as world's top arms dealer

Editor's introduction

Much of the September issue is devoted to the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Rebecca Johnson reports from New York on the momentous, if nerve-wracking, culmination of three years of negotiations: "Applause at the end of the UN General Assembly session was as much from a sense of relief that the CTBT had finally gone through without the nightmare scenarios of amendments and procedural knock-backs as a celebration of the treaty itself."

All three CD Opinion Pieces ponder the future of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) after its failure to agree, but broad success in negotiating, the test ban. Michael Krepon, President of the Henry L. Stimson Center, argues that a task many States would like the CD to take on, "a negotiation on phased nuclear disarmament," is "likely to do more harm than good to the CD, and to near-term prospects for nuclear disarmament." In contrast, former Soviet arms control negotiator Nikolai Sokov asks "is it possible that negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arsenals could return to the UN fold?" and answers that "recent events, as well as problems which are likely to emerge in the near future, do, indeed, suggest that this is possible." Rebecca Johnson foresees an important role for the CD in shaping the post-CTBT nuclear arms control agenda, but does not foresee that future as usefully encompassing negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty.

Two Guest Comments are also featured. Graham Pearson, former Chief Executive of Britain's Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, urges strong action to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and argues that such action is entirely possible as long as "the States Parties...stop indulging in the temptation to suggest that biological and toxin agents are too difficult to control effectively." Commenting on the July ruling of the World Court on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, Alyn Ware, Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, maintains that it "constitutes a resounding challenge to...continuing policies of nuclear deterrence."

Documents and Sources features extensive extracts from the Canberra Commission's impressive consideration of the verification necessary to reach, verify and maintain a nuclear-weapons-free world.

The adoption of the CTBT features prominently in the News Review, together with the US Senate's failure to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), progress towards implementing the US- North Korea Framework Agreement, and the violent disruption of UNSCOM's work in Iraq.

CD Opinion Pieces

The CD: Crisis and Opportunity

By Rebecca Johnson

Preface

For the past three years I have observed the Conference on Disarmament and attempted to report on its deliberations as fairly and accurately as possible. The piece below is not a report, but a personal opinion, intended to provoke discussion and stimulate further thinking on the future role and work of the CD at this critical stage of its history.

Introduction

The Conference on Disarmament is facing a crisis which combines danger and opportunity. This is not brought about by its failure to adopt the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and send it by consensus to New York. Nor is it caused by Australia's initiative which bypassed the CD's deadlock and transmitted the draft treaty to the UN General Assembly by way of a nationally sponsored resolution. These actions may have highlighted some of the CD's structural and decision-making weaknesses, but the crisis was bound to come to a head with or without the extraordinary events of the past two months. The principal challenge is for the CD to determine a role and relevance for itself in a multipolar and post Cold War world. The crisis looms because the CD has concluded negotiations on the CTBT, a measure that was born out of a desire to halt the East-West nuclear arms race and which codifies the end of that era. The Conference has no clear idea what to do next.

Background

There has been recognition for some years in the CD that it needed to review and update its agenda and institutional arrangements. The original agenda, known as the 'decalogue' was established at the first UN special session on disarmament (UNSSODI) in 1978 as follows:

1. Nuclear test ban

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related measures

4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear- weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons

7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

8. Transparency in armaments

9. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures

10. Consideration and adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In 1994 four ad hoc committees were established: on the Nuclear Test Ban (NTB); Transparency in Armaments (TIA); Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS); and Negative Security Assurances (NSA). However, only the NTB Committee had a negotiating mandate and sense of direction. The other committees were little more than acrimonious talk shops, and in 1995 and 1996 the CD failed to agree to reconvene them. This was blamed on 'linkage' by which certain delegations or groups made their agreement to establish one committee contingent on agreement to establish another or others. In particular, the split was seen to be between those (primarily in the western group) which wanted more emphasis on conventional arms (the TIA Committee), who argued that PAROS was outdated and NSA was inappropriate in this forum, and those in the G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States which regarded nuclear disarmament as the main priority. They were therefore characterised as unenthusiastic about TIA, but insistent on the relevance of NSA and also PAROS, because of changes in US posture regarding ballistic missile defence.

The Fissban

After the 1993 UNGA resolution 48/75L, the CD undertook consideration of how to ban production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In March 1995, somewhat pressured by the up- coming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, a mandate was agreed, establishing an ad hoc 'Fissban' Committee. It has never been convened. Again, the demand for 'linkage' was blamed, at least by the Western group, as a number of G-21 States argued that the Fissban Committee should be complemented by an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.

The core problem, however, was whether stockpiles of military plutonium and highly enriched uranium should be included in the fissban negotiations, as demanded by Pakistan and many non-aligned countries, or whether only a 'cut-off' of future production was to be addressed, the view of the P-5 nuclear-weapon States, Israel and India. The mandate agreed in March 1995 fudged the issue, the result of clever drafting by Gerald Shannon, the Canadian Special Coordinator, at a time when certain States wished to report progress to the NPT Conference but no real compromise could be agreed.

In the aftermath of the indefinite extension of the NPT, and clearly illustrated by the dynamics of the CTBT endgame, such fudges won't work. In his report to the CD on 3 September (see my Geneva Update in this issue), Hocine Meghlaoui, Special Coordinator in 1996 for the review of the agenda, delicately noted that 'no delegation is opposed to negotiating [the fissban], but the difficulties encountered since the presentation of Ambassador Shannon's report remain.' He further remarked that while some regard immediate negotiations on this as a priority, 'other delegations expressed reservations and sought prior clarification of the question of nuclear disarmament as a whole.'

In addition to the fundamental question of stockpiles, India has followed up its CTBT strategy by requiring that the fissban should be more clearly related to nuclear disarmament. In the Programme of Action put forward in August on behalf of 28 of the non-aligned CD members, India has also insisted on reference to immediate and concurrent commencement of negotiations on several measures including a fissban, no use convention and a convention eliminating nuclear weapons. The central contradiction in this posture is that India is one of the States most adamant in rejecting the consideration, declaration or control of stockpiles as part of the fissban. Without consideration of stocks, the fissban is no more than a basic 'cut-off', a non-proliferation measure, freezing the status quo and codifying a halt to production that at least four of the P-5 have already practically undertaken. However, if would leave the nuclear ambiguity of India and Israel intact, of fundamental importance to those two countries.

If the CTBT negotiations turned out to be, in essence, about the eight declared and undeclared nuclear-weapon States, the proposed fissban mandate for the CD will become bogged down in similar problems more quickly and to a greater extent. Those in the P-5 who insist on a multilateral treaty for a minimal fissile cut-off are misusing the CD in order to tie in the 'Threshold-3' (T-3) States - India, Israel and Pakistan. It is noticeable that those who are most adamant on this are the smaller nuclear powers, who also want to ensure that international control of fissile material goes no further than a weapons-related production cut-off.

Until the 1993 resolution, the UNGA regularly passed by overwhelming majorities fissban resolutions that covered stocks as well as future production. For the wider purposes of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the declaration, control, reduction and ultimate elimination of fissile stocks becomes inevitable. However, given the objections of some of the P-5, India and Israel, there is validity to the view that if the major producers are now willing to take a first step to halt production, it would at least be worthwhile to begin to put their military production facilities under some safeguards. That argument made some sense when there was a prospect of negotiating a cut-off in the CD within reasonable time. But as the arguments over the mandate and subsequent deadlock over the ad hoc committee have shown, this would not be easy. Furthermore, the CTBT endgame indicates that multilateral negotiations on a fissban are likely to be long drawn out, acrimonious, and in the end may fail to bring the T-3 on board.

As with nuclear testing, the fissile materials production capability and record of the five declared nuclear-weapon States so outweighs the stocks and capacity of the threshold countries, that the security interest of all would be better served by an immediate, legally binding and verified halt by the P-5 than by years of wrangling and posturing among 60 States in an attempt to catch the T-3. Even more than the test ban, this would become hostage to South Asian - and possibly Middle Eastern - regional politics. India has already served notice that it wants the fissban linked to a timetable for nuclear disarmament, and Pakistan denies the validity of a fissban without stocks.

The CTBT at least required international involvement and participation for its verification regime. For a cut-off, verification could be established, as in the NPT, by means of bilateral agreements between signatories and the International Atomic Energy Agency for full scope safeguards and inspections at the relevant facilities. Nothing would preclude the P-5 consulting with the IAEA, India, Israel, Pakistan or others during negotiations, with a view to meeting as many T-3 concerns as possible. The finalised agreement could then be opened for signature by the international community, as was the tripartite Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. For non-nuclear NPT Parties this would not involve any additional measures or costs for implementation.

If handled right politically, such a process to achieve a verified fissile cut-off would stand as good - if not better - chance of bringing the T-3 on board, and could be accomplished more quickly, cleanly and cheaply than bogging the CD down in what would be a sham multilateral exercise in P-5/T-3 arm wrestling.

Despite agreeing the Shannon mandate, the CD should look long and hard at whether it is, after all, the appropriate place to negotiate the fissile materials ban indicated in UNGA 48/75L. There are fissile materials issues which should be discussed multilaterally, but the basic cut-off which the P-5 are prepared to consider at present would be neither an efficient use of CD time, nor could it deliver an effective international agreement any time soon or guarantee India's early signature.

For the CD to decide now to hand the issue back to the P-5 (which in any case determined many of the crucial CTBT decisions in sidebar discussions among themselves) would be a brave but wise decision. A multilateral forum with 60 participating States and the rule of consensus should not be used merely to place an international, legal stamp on unilateral decisions by the nuclear powers nor to provide chaperones for the dangerous flirtations of those with continuing nuclear ambitions, declared and undeclared. It would be a mistake to fill the gap left by the CTBT too quickly. The CD must consider its role, structures and capabilities very carefully.

Structure and procedures

In his 3 September statement, Meghlaoui noted a general agreement from his consultations that the CD should not duplicate the UNGA First Committee or UN Disarmament Commission. The CD is the sole multilateral negotiating forum, and that responsibility should lie at the heart of decisions on its future agenda. This requires a limited size and procedures which enable countries with specific security interests to hammer them out within a safe working framework. Engaging in negotiations as a CD member is a responsibility as well as a right. Sixty is already large for a negotiating body, and care should be taken before adding new members. However, some significant international players are still on the outside: countries like Malaysia, Kazakstan and Ireland. There are also persistently empty seats. Where members have failed to attend or contribute for more than a year, there should be an agreed procedure to replace them with those on the waiting list, who should demonstrate their readiness by contributing fully as observers.

If the CD wants to ensure that its role as a negotiating body is respected, its relationship with other international fora needs to be thought through more fully. UN General Assembly resolutions have long been used as indicators of priorities for the CD, with consensus resolutions on CTBT and fissile materials acting as 'instructions' for the CD to consider appropriate negotiating mandates. Yet many diplomats feared that taking a CD-negotiated treaty back to the UN without CD consensus would undermine the Conference, and it was necessary for Australia and others to underline their support for the CD during the General Assembly debate on 9 and 10 September to counteract this unintended effect.

Given that CD membership comprises only one-third of the United Nations, it is right and proper that the full international community should have some say both in the CD's agenda and priorities for work and in endorsing its final products. Indeed, Meghlaoui also suggested this, at least in relation to the CD's agenda, which he characterised as a 'legislative matter.'

I would take this a step further, in the interests of democracy and effective decision-making. In its substantive negotiating role the Conference needs to limit its size and work by consensus, but its overall responsibility is to the international community. Consensus does not have to be a rigid concept and does not (at least in the outside world) always confer an indefinite right of veto on each party. While all attempts should be made to reach consensus on CD decisions, the jurisdiction of the wider international community should be available as a recognised mechanism if a blockage is intransigent, unreasonable or reflects only the interests of one or two particular States. These States would of course retain their sovereign right not to accede to any agreement or treaty, but the international community has a legitimate interest in CD outcomes, and this too must be fully incorporated in CD procedures.

Future work

As noted by Meghlaoui, there is agreement that the CD's future agenda should include both nuclear and conventional disarmament, but disagreement about the priorities and balance. Since I have argued that the CD should not now take on negotiating the fissban, I ought now to say what I think it should, or could, do.

Conventional Disarmament

In the arena of conventional weapons, there are a lot of good reasons for the CD to take on landmines, and a few arguments against. The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) comes under humanitarian law and governs use. It has been woefully inadequate. As shown by the recent review conferences, there are limits to how effectively this can be tightened up. To seek to amend the Convention by means of the CD would run into problems of participation, which also beset the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which some would like the CD to take on. The CD's membership is not the same as that of the CCW or BWC and it is difficult to see how the CD with its present institutional arrangements could negotiate changes to existing treaties.

In the case of landmines, however, as more of the international community comes to the conclusion that a ban on exports and/or production and possession of anti-personnel mines is the only way to deal with this scourge, the issue becomes one of disarmament rather than use. The changed international situation - and particularly the growing worldwide condemnation of landmines - means that negotiating a new treaty may well be a quicker and more effective route than continuing to review and tighten the existing CCW. If that is decided, perhaps by overwhelming decision of the UN General Assembly, then the CD may well be the most appropriate forum to negotiate a landmines ban.

Nuclear Disarmament

Once dismissed by diplomats and military strategists as the pie-in- the-sky idealism of the anti-nuclear lobby, the abolition of nuclear weapons is looking more and more realistic as the best (and most rational) response to the threat of proliferation. The Chemical Weapons Convention showed that it could be done with a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. The disintegration of the East-West ideological confrontation makes it possible, while the increased risks of nuclear theft and terrorism make stringent controls on all nuclear materials and technologies a necessity. On a fragmented security map, nuclear weapons are recognised by most military specialists themselves as having little or no reliable function, while their very possession creates an ambition and incentive for others to acquire them. Majority public opinion is against nuclear weapons and governments are less and less willing to cover the environmental and economic costs of their production.

The NPT was extended indefinitely in May 1995, carrying with it a permanent, binding and verified commitment on non-nuclear weapon parties not to acquire nuclear devices and an obligation on the nuclear powers to seek nuclear disarmament. In July this year, the International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion, unanimously endorsed and strengthened this obligation, stating that: 'There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international controls.'

In the past year several important studies have been published which outline practical steps to be undertaken towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, most notably from the Canberra Commission and the Henry L Stimson Center. Following up the non- aligned States' demand for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, 28 countries proposed a three-phase programme of action with the goal of achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

None of these studies has come up with all the answers yet. The point is that there is a worldwide public clamour, growing intellectual credibility and a strong international momentum indicating that the time is ripe to consider how best to achieve total nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament has an important part to play in this process. Resolutions to the UN First Committee and Fifty-First General Assembly will call again for an ad hoc committee for nuclear disarmament, and some will demand that negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention should begin in 1997.

With only three of the nuclear powers still opposed, it is high time for the CD to convene a nuclear disarmament committee. However, I do not think that a hasty negotiating mandate for a Nuclear Weapon Convention would serve a useful purpose at this time. The G-21 Programme of Action has many useful ideas, but would also throw up barriers and problems which need to be re- considered very carefully before multilateral negotiations could go forward.

The nuclear disarmament committee, working under a mandate developed from the ICJ ruling and existing treaty obligations, should concentrate on developing an overall framework. Working in tandem with the enhanced review process of the NPT, the first PrepCom of which will meet in New York in April 1997, the CD (which includes not only the P-5 but also the T-3 threshold countries) needs to identify the steps to achieve nuclear disarmament and set realistic targets for the nuclear-weapon States to achieve by unilateral action and joint agreements. A Nuclear Weapon Convention should be the objective, but will take time, and is likely to be agreed only towards the end of the process, codifying and setting up the verification regime for complete abolition. Much more needs to be done by way of US/Russian and P-5 agreements, controls on fissile materials, verification development and confidence building before such a convention has a genuine prospect of being successfully negotiated.

It may be that the CD decides to negotiate an interim multilateral agreement, such as a warhead production ban (proposed last year by New Zealand) or a more comprehensive ban on production and stockpiling of fissile materials; or the Nuclear Weapon Convention could itself be a framework agreement, with protocols to deal with specific measures, such as a fissban, no first use and so on. No- one yet has the answers, and it would be a mistake to straitjacket the CD prematurely into one approach. However, I am not advocating turning the CD meanwhile into a talking shop on nuclear disarmament. There is more than enough of that in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC).

Whether or not the CD decides to negotiate a landmines convention, nuclear disarmament should remain a priority. I am merely arguing that much focused negotiation must take place before the CD is in a position to identify the right multilateral approach or agreement to undertake.

Conclusion

The intensive focus on the CTBT over the past three years has enabled the CD to avoid dealing with its underlying problems. In practical terms, few regretted the deadlock over other committees because it freed up time for the NTB Committee and its working groups. Conclusion of the test ban treaty now makes it imperative for the CD to resolve its conflicts over agenda and structure.

In my view, the linkage tactic is a symptom of the CD's problems, not the cause, but if it continues to paralyse the work of the Conference, it could destroy it. The western nuclear powers have never been very keen on the CD. They may play up its failures and try to tip all the disarmament eggs into the NPT review basket, thereby excluding the T-3 - and especially India - even further. While it is important that the NPT review process should be utilised as effectively as possible to further the implementation of Article VI on nuclear disarmament, it is not a negotiating forum. Attempts to replace the CD with the NPT review process would therefore be mistaken or hostile. It would be more appropriate to view the CD and NPT processes as working together in a pincer action to identify measures and apply pressure for further unilateral and bilateral actions and lay the groundwork for future multilateral agreements.

Rebecca Johnson is Director of Disarmament Intelligence Review in London.

CD negotiations on time-bound nuclear disarmament: The case against

By Michael Krepon

Introduction

The Conference on Disarmament has clearly been damaged by the government of India's decision to block transmittal by consensus of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) text to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Whether the CD returns to good health or is further damaged depends, in part, on its next negotiating agenda item. A negotiation on phased nuclear disarmament is likely to do more harm than good to the CD, and to near-term prospects for nuclear disarmament.

The test ban treaty that emerged from arduous negotiations in Geneva was generally welcome, if far from perfect. The text fairly reflected resolutions passed unanimously by the UNGA and the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference calling for a truly comprehensive, verifiable and universal test ban treaty. The CD's own negotiating mandate - again, approved by consensus in 1993 with India's complete support - demanded this outcome, as well. When, to the surprise of many, the CD actually managed to negotiate a truly comprehensive and verifiable treaty after four decades of sporadic effort, India flinched, troubled by the uncertainties of maintaining its nuclear option without testing. India's reversal places in limbo the universal treaty it has championed for four decades.

New Delhi's diplomatic offensive to block transmittal could not, of course, be framed in terms of the need to keep open the route to boosted fission or thermonuclear weapons. More inclusive themes were stressed, such as the need to strike a blow against nuclear apartheid and to force the nuclear weapons club to provide a timetable for disarmament. Widespread sympathy for these messages did not produce votes for the messenger.

New Delhi also defended its position by contending that the nuclear-weapon States could substitute simulations and laboratory experiments for new designs. This assertion is essential to prove that the CTBT is not truly comprehensive in scope, but it badly confuses theory with practice. Sophisticated new designs can be produced by computers - whether for nuclear, non-nuclear, or threshold States - but the designers cannot have confidence in them unless they are tested. Ironically, India's case against this 'loophole' in the treaty text reinforces the need for the CTBT's entry into force, now blocked by India's iconoclastic stand.

With the clock ticking in Geneva, and with continued P-5 support for the CTBT tenuous, at best, irregular procedures were required to circumvent India's veto by taking the treaty directly before the UNGA. There, the extent of New Delhi's isolation became painfully clear. Only Bhutan, whose national security calculations pass through New Delhi, and Libya voted with India to make the best the enemy of the good. Despite this lopsided vote, none should expect India's isolation to lead to a change of heart: New Delhi's diplomatic strategy may have appeared clumsy in Geneva and New York, but it received rave reviews at home. India is unlikely to sign this treaty, thereby blocking its formal entry into force, unless it first undertakes a series of nuclear tests.

Either way, India's sense of isolation from the international community will grow. Indeed, with Israel's signature on the CTBT, the number of countries that refuse to accept any formal treaty constraints on their nuclear options will dwindle to two: India and Pakistan, which follows New Delhi's lead on such matters. India's bete noire, the NPT, which it claims divides the world into nuclear 'haves' and 'have nots,' leverages against new nuclear powers. When the international community voted by acclamation in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely, India reacted with genuine disbelief, and great discomfort. Successful efforts at the Extension Conference by non-nuclear-weapon States to create yardsticks measuring progress in nuclear disarmament by the five 'haves,' as required by the NPT, were found completely wanting by New Delhi, which declined to accept observer status at the proceedings. The first concrete measure demanded by the non- nuclear States was, after all, the prompt completion of the test ban treaty.

Far removed from its vote bank at the NPT Conference, New Delhi could explain the treaty's indefinite renewal by poor leadership and divisions within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and by heavy arm-twisting by the nuclear-weapon States. The result would have been different, Indian analysts contended, had Delhi led the charge against indefinite extension. But the end result on the CTBT at the United Nations was a replay of the NPT's extension. India tried hard to summon support linking the CTBT to a timetable for complete nuclear disarmament, until preliminary vote counts necessitated a lonely, principled opposition instead of a full- court press. The insularity of India's stand must be doubly painful: twice within the past sixteen months, non-nuclear-weapon States have voted overwhelmingly in support of treaties that serve their national security interests while constraining India's freedom of choice.

New Delhi's game plan will now surely include a strong push for time-bound nuclear disarmament negotiations in Geneva. First, the guaranteed opposition to this proposal by some nuclear-weapon States provide justification for India's stand against the NPT and CTBT. Second, a strong push for time-bound nuclear disarmament in the CD will diminish India's isolation and reaffirm New Delhi's leadership position within the NAM.

Dangers in seeking time-bound negotiations

India will have plenty of company pushing for nuclear disarmament negotiations in the CD. The non-nuclear-weapon States assumed the role of wounded parties in the CTBT, even though the Treaty's obligations fell on the five nuclear powers. These 'have nots' can reasonably be expected to use leverage newly granted by the NPT's extension and the CTBT's Preamble to join in this effort. The five nuclear-weapon States are, after all, clearly unwilling to accept this end state, and sustained international pressure is needed to make this happen.

While the CD's procedures requiring consensus have recently been broken to secure the CTBT, unanimous resolutions supporting the test ban treaty's prompt conclusion provided sufficient justification for the end run. The pursuit of time-bound nuclear disarmament will be far more contentious, with little hope of reaching anything remotely resembling consensus. Under these circumstances, the purpose of debates over starting ad-hoc CD disarmament negotiations would be to make a political point, not to achieve the desired outcome.

Public pressures on nuclear-weapon States to fulfill their end of the bargain found in Article VI of the NPT are necessary. They are also warranted by the CTBT's Preamble and by the Statement of Principles and Objectives approved by acclamation at the time of the NPT's indefinite extension. If the nuclear-weapon States do not like a CD negotiation reducing the size of the arsenals, they have every right to demonstrate with concrete measures why such negotiations are not needed.

The central issue here is not whether the progressive reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals is required, but how best to accomplish the desired end state. Under current conditions, public appeals for a CD negotiation on nuclear disarmament could provide useful leverage; actual negotiations could be a cause of concern, rather than jubilation. An old proverb, claimed by several cultures, warns us to be careful of what we wish for, because it might actually become true. In this context, the acceptance by the nuclear-weapon States of nuclear disarmament negotiations in the CD could facilitate efforts by those States to retard, rather than facilitate, the process of reductions.

Negotiations over a CD mandate to carry out negotiations on elimination would, no doubt, be long and contentious. China, which is the only nuclear-weapon State currently supporting these negotiations, has indicated that it would use this forum to harden and formalize its position that the United States and Russia must reduce their nuclear arsenals to China's level before Beijing would consent to accept constraints on its nuclear forces. Beijing would therefore take a page from New Delhi's play book, avoiding treaty obligations until other States reduce to one's level of nuclear capabilities. Great Britain and France might well adopt a position quite similar to that presumed for China. Russia might well argue that its deep reductions would be contingent upon proportionate reductions by the three smaller nuclear-weapon States. The United States might show more flexibility than the other nuclear powers, or might not, depending on the administration in Washington.

The resulting deadlock in Geneva could reinforce hard-line positions in all P-5 capitals, which are likely to seek maximum freedom of manoeuvre. China's bomb lobby could argue that, in order to increase leverage, Beijing should be free to enhance its nuclear weapon capabilities while negotiations are underway - a practice well-known in bilateral US-Soviet strategic arms negotiations. Nuclear weapon establishments in Great Britain and France could argue that their nuclear forces must not contract further pending resolution of CD negotiations, regardless of economic imperatives. Deadlocked talks could also reinforce the stance of those in the United States and Russia who are opposed to unilateral initiatives to reduce arsenals.

Anyone who observed the negotiating tactics on display in the interminably long and inconclusive Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks should be wary of replicating this process with multilateral nuclear force structure negotiations. In the MBFR talks, the United States and the Soviet Union learned well how to foreclose progress and maintain the status quo along the division of Europe: whenever the United States Senate was poised to reduce force levels unilaterally, the Kremlin would propose a new negotiating initiative, against which the Congress was told not to interfere.

It has been difficult enough to coax, prod, and insist on bilateral US-Soviet nuclear arms reductions. Those who supported this process were beset by negative political developments abroad and by entrenched domestic opposition. Bilateral negotiations have not become easier with the end of the Cold War. Opposition to deep cuts continues in the US and Russian nuclear weapon establishments. The Kremlin remains a thicket of intrigue; the coherence of the old Soviet Union, which could override problems in past negotiations, no longer exists.

If bilateral arms reduction negotiations remain so difficult, and require much sustained, high-level effort, does it make sense to complicate these matters far more, whether by bringing in all five nuclear-weapon States, or by bringing in the five plus the fifty- six other members of the CD? One presumption behind such proposals is that bringing more parties to the negotiating table would override resistance to nuclear disarmament so amply demonstrated in US-Soviet/Russian negotiations. But how would such resistance be softened by adding three more nuclear-weapon States to the negotiating table - States that have also amply demonstrated their attachment to nuclear weapons?

A second presumption behind proposals for a CD negotiation over elimination is that the nuclear-weapon States have so far denied their obligation to eliminate, and that unless negotiations to secure this commitment are undertaken, a system of nuclear apartheid will continue indefinitely. Ironically, the country that has done most to propagate this view, India, now blocks the treaty most likely to facilitate the progressive reductions - the CTBT.

As has already been noted, the P-5 have undertaken binding and solemn treaty commitments to pursue disarmament in Article VI of the NPT. Moreover, the P-5 have clarified this obligation by agreeing to take concrete steps to pursue this end state in the NPT's Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament. The P-5 have reluctantly delivered on the first such step - the CTBT. That India would choose to downplay these commitments is understandable, given New Delhi's antipathy to the NPT. That the NAM would join India in downplaying the NPT's obligations is both strange and injurious to the very goals they seek.

Conclusion

Does it make sense to demand a negotiation on nuclear disarmament that would invite blocking manoeuvres and ill-will when a solemn treaty commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament already exists? Tactically, would we not be better off by asserting obligations and demanding their fulfillment in whatever ways work best? After all, the NPT's solemn commitments were accepted voluntarily by the nuclear-weapon States. Yardsticks for measuring progress were codified by acclamation at the NPT Review and Extension Conference after lengthy negotiations. Opportunities for measurement will present themselves at every subsequent NPT Preparatory Committee and Review Conference. Why demand reductions in a forum that has the least chance of success and the highest probability of generating resistance rather than acceptance?

Concrete measures must be undertaken to progressively reduce and eliminate nuclear dangers, but success can take many routes, including unilateral initiatives, bilateral, P-5, or even, at some point in the future, CD negotiations. Whatever has a high probability of success should be pursued; whatever has a high probability of failure should be avoided. Leverage for nuclear disarmament comes from the requirement for results, not from the particulars of procedure.

To be sure, what the Article VI obligation lacks, and what proponents of a CD negotiation seek, are specific deadlines for phased nuclear disarmament. Will the negotiation of deadlines for disarmament in the CD really help matters? This presumption, too, requires careful reconsideration. Deadlines are useful when they help parties to overcome the last hurdles in a negotiation. Deadlines that cannot be met generate cynicism, not progress.

Deadlines for staged nuclear disarmament also constitute a mechanical approach to a profoundly political process. What conditions would be necessary for nuclear-weapon and threshold States to entirely forego the nuclear option? What degree of transparency would be required? Surely, existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear material would have to be revealed, and States would require a high level of confidence in the accuracy of such declarations. Arrangements would be needed to address concerns over covert production of nuclear material or the existence of undeclared stocks. Bilateral disputes involving nuclear-weapon and threshold States would have to be resolved amicably, and arrangements established to deal with unexpected threats to global nuclear disarmament. Many other difficult issues would have to be resolved, as the Canberra Commission report and the Stimson Center's study group, chaired by General Andrew Goodpaster, have begun to address. Significantly, these reports do not advocate time-bound frameworks for phased disarmament.

How then to proceed toward elimination? The least complicated (but far from simple) way at present is to continue US-Russian reductions. This may be a tall order, given leadership questions in the Kremlin, and Moscow's aversion to the far greater levels of transparency needed for deep, deep cuts. These difficulties, however, will not be ameliorated by inviting other parties to this negotiation, especially States that are even more averse to transparency than Russia. The level of bilateral reductions required before engaging the P-5 need not - and should not - be specified, if it can be avoided. In this process, concrete steps matter more than procedure. Reductions can be informal, if necessary, but preferably by formally verified agreements.

Michael Krepon is President of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.

Return nuclear arms reductions to the UN

By Nikolai Sokov

Introduction

The process of nuclear disarmament seems to be developing in a circle. It began within the United Nations framework - the US Baruch Plan, then Khruschev's proposals about nuclear disarmament. But in the early 1960s, 'serious' arms control - reduction of nuclear arsenals - began to 'slip' from the area of responsibility of the UN and became the responsibility of the nuclear powers, under the assumption that only the States that have nuclear weapons can deal with them.

The first practical measure - the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 - was concluded between three nuclear powers (the Soviet Union, US, and UK), while the first arms limitation agreements - the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty - were concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, as were a host of other agreements, including the two START (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaties. START III talks, which are likely to begin in 1997 if Russia ratifies START II, will evidently be bilateral as well. In the meantime, the United Nations has been left to deal with very general, relatively uncontroversial measures, either legalising the decision to refrain from certain activities (like the ban on nuclear weapons in space) or affecting primarily the non-nuclear States (i.e. the NPT).

Recently, however, nuclear arms control has begun to return to the UN fold: the CTBT has been negotiated in the framework of the CD and will enter into force within the UN framework. Is it possible that negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arsenals could return to the UN fold? Recent events, as well as problems which are likely to emerge in the near future, do, indeed, suggest that this is possible.

The present division of labour

The 'division of labour' in nuclear arms control is implicitly codified in the NPT, built around the assumption that nuclear arms reduction is both a prerogative and a burden of the States which officially possess nuclear weapons. The famous Article VI of the Treaty explicitly recognised that it is the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons, while all other States were limited only to the power of 'oversight' - in other words, they could demand that the Five live up to their obligation, but could not prescribe in which ways or how soon the obligation should be discharged. The low effectiveness of the power of oversight was precisely the reason for the debate at the recent NPT Extension Conference about whether an indefinite extension might remove the political pressure upon the nuclear- weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The premises on which Article VI and its 'division of labour' rest are reasonably obvious.

First, it is the security of the nuclear-weapon States that is most directly affected by these weapons: they need to deter possible aggression by other nuclear States and thus need to keep all decision-making on the size and composition of their nuclear arsenals, as well as strategies of use (first strike, strike on warning, or second strike; first-use verses no-first-use, etc) in their own hands. Doing otherwise would be both an infringement upon the sovereignty of the nuclear-weapon States (because nuclear weapons are legally not fundamentally different from any other weapons) and upon their security, because non-nuclear States might inadvertently put forward conditions that would upset the strategic balance. Similar considerations guide nuclear arms reductions. Nuclear-weapon States reserve the right to determine for themselves the target levels and the target composition of their nuclear arsenals: although they are supposed to ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, they need to control the process in order to avoid dangerous destabilisation of the strategic balance during the process.

An example of this situation is the Soviet Union's long-standing tradition of putting the majority of its warheads on land-based missiles, ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles), which in the middle of the 1970s began to be equipped with more than one warhead (by fitting ICBMs with MIRVs - Multiple Independently- Targetable Re-entry Vehicles). The United States saw these weapons as destabilising and insisted that they be eliminated. Only in the early 1990s did Russia come to accept notions of strategic stability similar to those advanced by the United States. But, as the debate around START II ratification has demonstrated, that recognition was far from uniform. Certainly, an attempt by other nuclear or non-nuclear States to urge the Soviet Union to shift its emphasis from land-based to sea- or air-based delivery platforms would have been roundly rejected.

The same is true for war contingency plans. The United States and NATO have had a first-use policy to balance what they saw as a vast Warsaw Pact conventional superiority. NATO would not have accepted any guidance on the part of non-nuclear States to change that strategy. The first-use strategy has recently been accepted by Russia to deter the superior conventional capability of NATO. Again, it will not change it no matter what others say, as long as it is perceived as essential for security.

There is also the question of secrecy. The finer details of calculation of nuclear balance are usually a matter of the most closely guarded State secret: such things as accuracy, the time it takes to launch a missile, its ability to withstand the first strike of the other side (for example, to what extent it is protected from the blast-wave of a nuclear explosion), and a myriad of other variables that affect the second-strike capability of a nuclear arsenal. Even at confidential bilateral talks the sides, as a rule, do not disclose the motives behind particular proposals, and the other side is left to guess whether a proposal reflects a desire to gain a unilateral advantage or a genuine concern about certain characteristics of weapons. This severely limits the ability of outsiders to provide useful input: many contributions based on common sense and/or publicly available information could seem naive and dangerous to those who know the real situation.

The points above - and many others - were considered in the late 1980s in the Soviet Union, when some proposed to move the START I talks to the CD. In that dispute, I was on the side of those who wanted to keep the talks bilateral, and even today I think that that was a correct decision. But times change, and what was unthinkable then might become advisable in the future

Problems with the division of labour

While the 'division of labour' can be rationalised, it has caused mounting problems. The tension between the global impact of nuclear weapons (their presence affects the international system as a whole and their use is likely to affect the whole Earth) and the limited number of actors who have an impact upon the solution has been growing. The proposition put forward in this article is that it is time to start thinking about returning the discussion of nuclear arms reductions to the UN framework; specifically, of shifting that discussion to the CD. Several problems with things as they stand may warrant this step.

First, nuclear arms control and reduction processes will have, ultimately, to become a multilateral endeavour. At present, the difference between the levels provided for by the START I Treaty (6,000 accountable warheads, but many more in reality, because the Treaty undercounts air-based nuclear weapons) makes it possible to disregard the potential impact of Great Britain, France, and China. One might remember, though, that in the early 1980s the Soviet Union insisted on including Great Britain and France in a regional, European, nuclear balance, although it ultimately turned out not to be necessary for the conclusion of the Intermediate- range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Even the level of START II - 3,500 warheads - is sufficiently high to essentially view the global balance as a bilateral one. START III will also still be a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia. But START IV might well become a multilateral, five-party agreement, depending on the level reached under START III. The threshold is probably somewhere around 1,500-2,000 warheads, so the day when all five nuclear powers will have to sit around a negotiating table is not that far away.

A transition to the new format will hardly be smooth. None of the three players currently outside arms control negotiations is particularly anxious to take part; they will have to be persuaded or induced. Even if they agree to join, other problems will emerge. The United States and Russia have developed, over almost 30 years of negotiations, certain conventions and shared assumptions about the arms control process (a complicated classification of weapons into various categories, ways of reducing various types of weapons, verification procedures, etc). The new players will have to be integrated into the existing framework, and the framework itself will probably have to be changed to suit their particular preferences. An obvious problem is that no one knows how to calculate a five-sided nuclear balance: it is difficult enough with a two-sided one.

Another problem, whose solution cannot be postponed much longer, is that of the 'threshold nuclear States.' The distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States established by the NPT leaves India, Pakistan, Israel and perhaps some other similar States outside the nuclear disarmament framework. The principle of sovereignty, applied to them, effectively means that there does not exist a forum to discuss their weapons and that such a forum will not exist until they officially admit they have them.

The 'unofficial' nuclear-weapon States cannot legally join negotiations, even after all five 'official' nuclear States take part in them, because that would be a violation of the NPT. But their nuclear weapons and/or the capability to manufacture them exist and are present in the calculations of the military planners of the 'official' nuclear powers. In other words, they contribute - in their own way - to the problem, but do not bear the responsibility. This locks both the nuclear-weapon States and all the non-nuclear States Parties to the NPT into an awkward position: they cannot discuss nuclear weapons elimination with 'unofficial' nuclear States, they can only demand it, which might not be a practical approach to this difficult problem.

At the same time, as the nuclear non-proliferation crisis in the former Soviet Union has demonstrated, the stability of the non- proliferation regime is essential for a successful arms reduction process. The Russian military, after a careful analysis, concluded that five is about the maximum number of nuclear States that could be encompassed by an analysis of the nuclear balance; going beyond that figure would create insurmountable problems and would essentially make the nuclear balance unpredictable. Thus, even if nuclear arms reduction talks were to continue in the present bilateral, and later five-sided, format, at a certain stage they would stall because the impact of the 'unofficial' nuclear States would have to be taken into account. And, since the presence of eight or more players would increase the uncertainties of the situation beyond reasonable limits, the process of arms reduction would simply come to a standstill. From this it follows that the sooner the 'unofficial' nuclear States divulge of their arsenals, the better. Obviously, the institutional gap between arms reduction talks, which do not and cannot include the 'unofficial' nuclear States, on the one hand, and the UN framework, where these States are present, complicates the solution.

The possible suitability of the CD

The CD might provide a convenient forum to overcome these and other difficulties and give a strong boost to nuclear arms reduction talks. Of course, members of the CD will not acquire the power of prescription (as noted above, that would run counter to the principle of sovereignty), but they might acquire the power of advice - that is, they may help to develop guidelines, arbitrate in deadlocks, and exert political and moral pressure upon the participants in negotiations.

The five declared nuclear-weapon States could form a permanent Commission within the CD framework. This Commission would conduct the daily job of developing agreements on further reductions of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, would be the only forum where final decisions could be made. In addition, an advisory Commission selected out of the 'non-nuclear' CD members could be created to oversee the process, provide input, and arbitrate, if necessary; membership in the advisory Commission could be made permanent, or be rotating. The permanent Commission of the Five would report to the CD on a regular basis to update on the status of negotiations.

Of course, a way must be found to preserve confidentiality: if all negotiations are conducted with full public knowledge, concessions and package deals would become less likely. The advisory Commission would provide a balance between a multilateral, CD context and the requirement of confidentiality. In other words, one might foresee a hierarchical structure, which would provide a balance between the sovereign right of nuclear powers to dispose of their nuclear arsenals, a multilateral context that could facilitate the search for solutions, and the need to keep negotiations confidential.

The CD context might prove particularly convenient in finding solutions to several outstanding problems.

First, a consensus, albeit slowly, is emerging on the principles of strategic stability. Both the United States and Russia now implicitly recognise that the second-strike posture is stabilising, while the posture which facilitates strike-on-warning is not. From this it follows, for example, that MIRVed ICBMs (or, at least, excessive reliance on MIRVed ICBMs) contradict long-term goals of deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. On a more general plane, the counterforce (first-strike) potential of SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles) might be limited as well, while the second-strike role of these weapons could be further enhanced through such measures as limits on anti-submarine warfare. A broad discussion in the CD context could help to expedite further development and concretization of these principles and thus help to achieve a faster rate of progress at the talks between the nuclear powers.

Second, an intelligent and expert international discussion might help to deal with difficult and sensitive issues of modernisation. It is an open secret that, as the number of nuclear weapons is increased, the demands upon survivability and reliability become stricter, which means that existing weapons have to be replaced with new ones. On the other hand, there are examples of destabilising modernisation, such as a strategic ABM system. A serious international discussion might facilitate finding a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' modernisation, even while the ultimate right to make decisions would continue to rest solely with the State which plans it. The minimum benefit derived from a discussion within the CD context would be the absence of misperceptions, but more benefits might result.

Third, the political pressure of the members of the CD might help to bring the three nuclear-weapon States currently not participating in negotiations to the table. Of course, the current two participants would have to make the first step and transfer the talks to that forum and make it clear why they think they cannot proceed without the participation of the other three. While the three can easily resist pressure in favour of five-party negotiations if such pressure is applied in an 'unorganised fashion,' it might be more difficult to resist the sustained pressure of a legitimate international forum.

The context of the CD might also facilitate the adoption of basic principles of strategic stability by Great Britain, France and China. The existing, consensus-based principles may be seen as an imposition on the part of the United States and Russia if talks are conducted in a strictly five-party context, and much precious time would be lost in gaining acceptance by all the participants. The same principles may gain added legitimacy if an established multilateral forum, such as the CD, was supporting them.

Fourth, if nuclear arms reduction talks are conducted within the CD, India, Pakistan, Israel and others could, conceivably, be involved in a significant way without an explicit recognition on their or others' part that they have nuclear weapons. That is, if the elimination of nuclear weapons is tackled as a global problem which affects all States, the 'unofficial' nuclear States cannot escape responsibility and would have no pretext to shift the blame and the responsibility solely to the five 'official' nuclear- weapon States.

As noted above, nuclear disarmament is virtually impossible in the absence of a strong nuclear non-proliferation regime. As long as uncertainties regarding the possession of, or the ability to manufacture, nuclear weapons by States other than the five listed in the NPT persists, those five will not go below a certain point in the arms reduction process.

Before the five agree on implementing deep reductions in their nuclear arsenals, they will need to be sure that there are no more nuclear States around. In other words, reductions could proceed only if all the States that currently have undeclared nuclear weapons stockpiles and have the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons joined the NPT and submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regime. The CD context might be the most convenient and practical forum in which to arrive at such an outcome, because otherwise pressure will have to be applied by the five directly upon 'semi-nuclear' States, generating understandable resistance. Within a multilateral context, the same result might conceivably be achieved in a non-confrontational fashion.

Conclusion

To summarise, the process of nuclear disarmament is likely to complete the circle and return to the UN fold, where it began in the first place. This will not happen very soon: START III will, in all probability, be a bilateral treaty. But it is also very likely that START IV would involve a five-party negotiation, and the potential benefits of moving the process to the CD has to be explored. The points above do not exhaust the pros and contras of the proposed move, but even the short list presented here seems to constitute sufficient evidence that there is much to discuss.

Dr. Nikolai N. Sokov is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Affairs, US. Between 1987-92, he served in the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Soviet/Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was a delegate to numerous arms control meetings and negotiations, including those for START I.

Guest Comment

A strengthened BTWC regime: Facing the Facts

By Graham Pearson

Introduction

Marie Chevrier, in her Guest Analysis in the July/August issue of Disarmament Diplomacy, has outlined the current scene in relation to the ongoing negotiations to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally-binding instrument. A strengthened BTWC is essential, feasible and achievable(1); what is needed is for the States Parties to face up to the facts about the world in which we live today, realise the unacceptable dangers of failing to seize this opportunity to strengthen the BTWC, and stop indulging in the temptation to suggest that biological and toxin agents are too difficult to control effectively.

Deliberate disease - or biological warfare (BW) - is a real threat to international security and stability (2). As the Director- General of the World Health Organization (WHO) has stated in the 1996 World Health Report: "we also stand on the brink of a global crisis in infectious diseases. No country is safe from them. No country can any longer afford to ignore their threat."(3) Proliferation of BW continues to be of concern to John Deutch, Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who stated in testimony on 22 February 1996 that "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons systems pose the gravest threat to national security and world stability. At least 20 countries have or may be developing nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missile systems to deliver them. Biological weapons, often called the poor man's atomic bomb, are also on the rise. Small less developed countries are often eager to acquire such weapons to compensate on the cheap for shortcomings in conventional arms."(4) The danger of the possible use of chemical and biological materials for terrorist purposes was recognised by the G-7 meeting in Lyons, France, on 27 June 1996, with a communique on terrorism stating: "Special attention should be paid to threat of utilization of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist purposes."(5) As President Clinton said on 24 September 1996, "we must better protect our people from those who would use disease as a weapon of war, by giving the Biological Weapons Convention the means to strengthen compliance..."(6)

There has been clear international recognition of the dangers posed by biological warfare, and increasing signs of political will have been shown during the past decade. The agreement on four politically-binding Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) at the Third Review Conference in 1986, their extension and improvement at the Third Review Conference in 1991, the steadily increasing number of States Parties providing the required annual declarations, the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to examine possible verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, the ensuing Special Conference and the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to consider proposals to strengthen the Convention through a legally-binding instrument, all show progress in the right direction. Nevertheless, the negotiations at the AHG currently meeting in Geneva have progressed slowly, due in part to only eight weeks thus far having been made avilable for substantive discussion.

There is a clear need for the AHG to be given added impetus. At present, there appear to be some topics which some of the negotiators seem to want to believe will go away if they continue to move slowly. There are some key issues which the AHG needs to squarely address:

a. the essential necessity for on-site measures;

b. the requirement for a BTWC Organization; and

c. the relevance of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Each of these is addressed in turn below.

The essential necessity for on-site measures

At present, the only contribution to building confidence and transparency in the BTWC comes from the existing politically- binding CBMs which are essentially a set of declarations with considerably variable contents(7), with no other measures to complement them. No-one is suggesting that the present arrangements would suffice to strengthen the BTWC even if the CBMs were to be made legally-binding and thus mandatory. Experience at biological facilities from other bilateral and multilateral arrangements has shown that on-site measures are a vitally important tool in building confidence about the nature of the activities being carried out at a particular site. It is through on-site visits that a sound appreciation can be obtained of the type of activity being carried out, its purpose and its scale. A regime without on-site measures would not be credible in either building confidence or addressing compliance concerns.

Moreover, three quite different categories of on-site activity need to be included in a strengthened BTWC regime:

a. inspections to investigate compliance concerns;

b. visits to build confidence and develop the essential microbiological norm for the State concerned; and

c. investigations of an alleged use.

It is vital not to confuse these different types of inspection and visit - which it seems that some are content to do, so as to complicate the issues and thinking needed to develop the legally- binding instrument.

Compliance concern inspections

Such inspections will arise the generation when one State Party raises the concern that another State Party is carrying out an activity that may be non-compliant with the Convention. Any such compliance concerns must be thoroughly and promptly investigated by an impartial professional inspectorate whose report will be accepted as being factual and accurate. This will be vital for the Convention - and for international security and safety, which depends on a strong Convention. It needs to be recognised that there are three possible outcomes to a compliance concern inspection:

a. a determination that the site is in compliance with the Convention;

b. a determination that the site is non-compliant with the Convention; and

c. a determination that there are unanswered questions and thus that compliance cannot be shown.

Experience in the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections of Iraq have shown that outcome can frequently be in the third category.

Clearly the tools available to the inspectorate carrying out such a compliance concern visit need to be capable of providing information to aid the determination of the purpose of the site. Thus, sampling and identification techniques need to be able to determine what materials are being used - or have been used previously - at the site. And because this is a compliance concern inspection, there can be no suggestion of limiting the sampling and identification capabilities to a particular list of pathogens and toxins. It would be all too easy for a State seeking to cheat under the Convention to decide to use a pathogen or toxin that is not on the particular list as a way of evading detection of its illegal programme.

A compliance concern inspection would not be something carried out lightly. Precautions will need to be in place to prevent abuse, yet these precautions should not be such as to build-in a delay before an inspection could commence. Because of the nature of biological materials, any such inspection must be carried out as quickly as possible after the compliance concern has arisen. The assumption must therefore be that once a compliance concern inspection request has been made to the future BTWC Organization, then the visit would take place very quickly - within 24 or 48 hours - unless the procedure to prevent abuse is invoked and concludes that an inspection should not proceed. Any alternative arrangement would send a message to would-be proliferators that the States Parties of the BTWC could be misled into accepting politically motivated delays.

Visits to build confidence

Such visits are needed to build confidence in the veracity of the declarations being made by the State Party about activities of relevance to the BTWC being carried out within that State. Such visits would be cooperative in their nature and would be non- challenging. They would ensure that declarations are accurately compiled and thus enable States Parties to gain confidence under the strengthened BTWC that other States Parties take their obligations under the Convention and the future legally-binding instrument seriously. Such visits would also ensure that the BTWC continued to be an active obligation for all States Parties, and avoid the risk that, through inaction, less and less attention was paid in successive years by a State Party in meeting its obligations under the Convention and the legally-binding instrument(8). More importantly, over time, the combination of such visits with the declarations made by the State will enable the future BTWC Organization to build up an appreciation of the approaches to microbiology taken in that State, thus providing the understanding that would be vital should there ever be a compliance concern inspection of a site within that State. Without the experience gained from previous non-challenge visits, there would be a serious risk that the determinations made during a subsequent compliance concern inspection would be inaccurate and unreliable due to the lack of understanding of the norm for microbiological activities in the State concerned. Without such an understanding, false positive or negative conclusions could be drawn.

Such visits will gather freely available information. It is also probable that the site or facility would have been the subject of a declaration under the legally-binding instrument. A useful analogy is the visits that are made, and indeed welcomed, in most countries by politically elected representatives at both the national and local level to sites and facilities of all kinds. When politically elected representatives make such visits, the management of the site or facility generally goes out of its way to demonstrate its competence and effectiveness in carrying out its business - and thus to gain the confidence of the politically elected representatives that it is engaged in worthwhile and valuable activity. As non-challenge visits would be to sites and facilities engaged in activities permitted under the Convention, there should be no difficulty in the site or facility providing information to the future BTWC Organization about the nature and extent of the activities being carried out. It would be up to the management of the site to decide what information was provided to the future BTWC Organization inspectorate; it would, however, be very much in the interest of the management, and of the State, for it to be as forthcoming as possible in order for the BTWC Organization to gain the greatest possible degree of confidence, as well as the greatest degree of appreciation of the approaches to microbiology in that site and State. Consequently, there should be no question of the visiting team from the BTWC Organization arriving with requests to obtain samples or to seek access to information regarded by the management team as sensitive. It would be much more a question of the visiting team receiving whatever information is provided - which might include sampling, should the management decide that this would be helpful -and, through discussion of this information, seeking clarification, amplification and understanding of the activities carried out at the site or facility.

Investigation of alleged use

Such investigations are needed to investigate an alleged use, a release or an expose. These will generally be field investigations but may also include invesigation of adjacent facilities should there be evidence linking the facility with the alleged use, release or exposure. The AHG deliberations into such investigations have progressed to the extent that there now appears to be acceptance that the future legally-binding instrument will need, in accordance with the AHG mandate, to include measures to enable such investigations to take place urgently on-site.

The requirement for a BTWC Organization

The need for a permanent, professional and trained inspectorate appears to be questioned by some. The probable elements of a legally-binding instrument to strengthen the Convention are mandatory declarations, on-site measures (both visits to address compliance concerns and to build confidence), and measures to investigate allegations of use. It is also clear that most analysts recognise that the effectiveness of a strengthened BTWC will depend upon the existence of an Organization which would receive and analyse declarations made by States Parties, and would conduct on-site inspections and visits and investigate allegations of use. Although from time to time suggestions are made that other organizations such as the WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), etc, might carry out such activities, these fail to recognise that such organizations do not have trained teams of inspectors who are knowledgeable and respected experts with a sufficient understanding of biological warfare. These suggestions also fail to recognise the very different responsibilities of organizations such as the WHO whose role is to help Member States to combat disease and ill-health, and not to act as an investigator seeking evidence of non-compliance which may lead to concerted international reaction such as sanctions against the State concerned. Indeed, it is likely that the WHO, FAO, etc, would refuse to take on BTWC responsibilities because they could jeopardize their primary mission.

It is already clear from the meetings of the AHG so far that a major concern of many States can be identified in respect of the protection of commercial proprietary information, whether provided in declarations or during on-site activities. The advantages of a professional permanent Organization to receive and analyse such information should be apparent. The experience(9) of UNSCOM has shown how successful a small organization can be in receiving and analysing sensitive information; it has equally been apparent that the absence of a permanent inspectorate to carry out inspections was exploited by the Iraqis during the early years where the lack of a corporate memory meant that claims could be made that information had been given to the previous, or would be given to the subsequent, team of inspectors. UNSCOM has achieved a very great deal with the capabilities available to it: nevertheless, there has been much variation in the styles of the various inspection team in response to various situations, with consequential inefficiencies.

An independent, professional BTWC Organization with a trained inspectorate to carry out on-site inspections and visits and investigations of alleged use will be an essential instrument in a legally-binding instrument to strengthen the BTWC. An alternative based on ad hoc arrangements, or relying on teams of inspectors drawn from Member States or the WHO, etc, would be less effective and, it might be argued, less neutral. Furthermore, forming teams as required takes time and effort which could be better spent.

The relevance of the Chemical Weapons Convention

There appears to be a reluctance in the AHG to build upon the work that has been done to develop procedures and measures for the CWC(10). This is particularly surprising when it is recalled that there is essentially a spectrum of Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) agents ranging from the classical chemical weapon (CW) agents, such as phosgene and mustard, through bioregulators and toxins to the traditional BW agents. Whilst BW agents are living micro-organisms causing harm through infecting the target population and are thus quite different from the non-living chemical agents which cause harm through poisoning the target population, there is a lot of commonality between the various types of CBW agent in the spectrum. In particular, toxins, quite rightly, are covered by both the BTWC and the CWC. It would therefore be surprising if the regimes relating to toxins were to be very different under the two Conventions.

There is much of value in the CWC that could be adopted (11), with appropriate modification, in the legally-binding instrument for the BTWC. There is no suggestion that procedures and measures in the CWC should be slavishly copied and incorporated unmodified into the strengthened BTWC. Rather, the aim should be to seek out those elements and procedures that are relevant and to build upon the best of them. Thus the procedures developed in the CWC for the safeguarding of confidential information would appear to be just as relevant for the BTWC. Another example is the procedures in the CWC for the investigation of alleged use where a detailed study (12) has been made as to how these might be adapted for the purposes of the BTWC.

The Ad Hoc Group should recognise that by building upon what has been developed for the CWC - or has been learnt by UNSCOM - it will not only save time in the negotiation of the legally-binding instrument but also benefit from the greater confidence associated with the adaptation of proven procedures and measures. There is no merit in reinventing the wheel.

The Way Ahead

As Marie Chevrier has rightly said, the Ad Hoc process to strengthen the BTWC is too important to the security of too many nations to let it languish from insufficient attention. It is vitally important that the States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference to be held in Geneva from 25 November to 6 December 1996 endorse the work of the AHG thus far towards devising a legally-binding instrument including declarations, on-site measures and investigations of alleged use. It should also give the work of the AHG an impetus by setting a date, no later than the start of the autumn 1998 UN General Assembly, by which time the proposals of the AHG for a legally-binding instrument shall have been prepared and circulated to States Parties for consideration with the aim that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution for a Special Conference to be held in 1999 to discuss and agree the AHG's proposals.

Disease, whether of natural or deliberate origin, should be on the agenda of governments and industry worldwide. The health and well- being of the global community (humans, livestock and crops) directly benefits prosperity and trade. It is in the interests of all to ensure that disease is countered. The opportunity now to strengthen the BTWC effectively in the ways considered above needs to be pursued urgently.

Notes and References
1. Graham S. Pearson, A Strengthened BTWC is Essential, Feasible and Achievable, UNIDIR Newsletter No. 33, September 1996 (in press).
2. Graham S. Pearson, Deliberate Disease - Why Biological Warfare is a Real Concern, ISIS Briefing No. 54, June 1996; same author, Why Biological Warfare Matters, CBACI Arena Publication, No. 3, October 1995.
3. World Health Organization, The World Health Report 1996: Fighting Disease, Fostering Development, Geneva, 1996.
4. John Deutch, Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement for the Record, 22 February 1996.
5. G7 Lyons Summit, Declaration on Terrorism, 27 June 1996, Annex V of the United Nations General Assembly/Security Council A/50/208, S/1996/543 dated 12 July 1996.
6. William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President in Address to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 24 September 1996.
7. Iris Hunger, Article V - Confidence Building Measures, in Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: The Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, 1996.
8. Gordon K. Vachon, Verifying the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: The Role of Visits and Inspections, Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, Germany, 6-7 May 1996.
9. Kathleen C. Bailey, The UN Inspections in Iraq: Lessons for On- Site Verification, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1995.
10. United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, United Nations 93-05070, 1993.
11. John Gee, Future Verification Regime for the BWC: Lessons to be Learned from the Chemical Weapons Convention, presented at the VIII Amaldi Conference, Overcoming the Obstacles to Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Piacenza, Italy, 5-7 October 1995.
12. Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Biological Weapons Verification, Report of the Subgroup on Investigation of Alleged Use or Release of Biological or Toxin Weapons Agents, Washington, D.C., April 1996.

Dr. Graham S. Pearson, CB, is Honorary Senior Visiting Fellow in Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. He was previously Director-General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, Salisbury, Wiltshire, UK.

Bombs Away? The World Court Decision on Nuclear Weapons

By Alyn Ware

Introduction

The bursting of the atom bomb in 1945 prompted Winston Churchill to note that "the Stone Age may return upon the gleaming wings of science." The succeeding years of nuclear test explosions lighting up the skies, and nuclear bombs rolling out of the factories five a day, seemed likely to fulfil Churchill's stark prophecy.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and with it the Superpower stand-off, brought a sigh of global relief as people around the world entertained a notion that previously had been considered as idealistic and unrealistic - the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Despite this huge change, the nuclear States have been reluctant to give up their nuclear security blanket, holding on to their policies of nuclear deterrence and to over 30,000 nuclear weapons. And while they hold onto nuclear weapons, there is every likelihood that other States, or even terrorist organisations, will obtain the fissile material and nuclear technology to make and possibly use a bomb.

However, on 8 July this year, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) took a giant step toward kicking the nuclear habit. Sitting only blocks away from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and using some of the same principles of law that apply to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the ICJ held that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict." The Court further declared unanimously that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

The opinion had been requested by the World Health Organisation (WHO), out of its concern about the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons, and the United Nations General Assembly, out of its concern for global security. While both these bodies are on record as opposing nuclear weapons outright, taking the case to the Court was a risky venture given the uncertainty over the legal status of nuclear weapons and the fact that, while an overwhelming majority of countries reject nuclear weapons, the Court was composed of a majority of judges from nuclear States or their allies.

The legal significance of the ruling

The decision is much more than a slap on the wrist for the nuclear- weapon States, which, with the exception of China, tried to stop the WHO and the UN from taking the case to the Court, and then exerted pressure on the Court for it to decline to give an answer. It is indeed a resounding challenge to the continuing policies of nuclear deterrence, and to the resistance of the nuclear States to agree to negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Right Honorable Jim Bolger, Prime Minister of Aotearoa-New Zealand, commented immediately after the decision: "It adds absolute weight to countries like New Zealand who have argued for some time that there cannot be a position where five nations hold to themselves the rights of having nuclear weapons and say to the rest of the world 'trust us, we're OK, but the rest of you should have none.' Now that is not on." (1)

The first response of nuclear-weapon States was to jump on an area of uncertainty left by the Court when it said that it could not reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of "the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self defense in which its very survival would be at stake." The US and France commented that this therefore justified their policies of threatening to use nuclear weapons.

However, the President of the Court, Judge Bedjaoui, noted that the Court's indecision on the extreme circumstance cited in no way could be interpreted as amounting to a green light in such a circumstance, only a legal uncertainty. Even the extreme circumstance "cannot engender a situation in which a State would exonerate itself from compliance with the intransgressible norms of international humanitarian law."

Thus the main response from the nuclear States has been to attempt to downplay the decision. Jacques Rummelhardt, spokesperson for the French Foreign Ministry, stated on 8 July: "These opinions, which are not acts of jurisprudence, have no compulsory force." (2)

This, however, is both incorrect and misleading. An ICJ advisory opinion is an act of jurisprudence, as is any case in the Court. The term 'advisory' is so named to distinguish it from contentious cases, the other type of case the court can consider. Contentious cases concern disputes between two or more States. Advisory opinions concern questions of international law asked by a UN body. In both cases the Court declares the law applicable and declares where necessary the legal rights and obligations that flow from the law so laid down.

It is true that the ICJ has no power to compel States to adhere to its decisions. But this is not its purpose. Its purpose is to declare what the law is, and it is up to other bodies to see to it that the law is implemented. Internationally that could include the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. Nationally it could include actions in the supreme or high courts of individual countries.

As to whether the law applied by the Court in this case is binding or not, the answer would have to be that it is. The Court was applying principally the humanitarian laws of warfare which are binding on all States, and include the Geneva and Hague Conventions, which the nuclear-weapon States have all ratified.

The decision will thus be likely to generate much debate within the military establishments and foreign ministries of the nuclear- weapon States over their existing policies of threat and use of nuclear weapons. No longer will they be able to make nuclear threats such as those made against North Korea and Libya without there being a challenge that these are contrary to the decision of the Court. Similar challenges from within the nuclear militaries could arise regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons systems, which could be claimed to be in violation of the Court's ruling.

France's disclaimer on the effect of the Court's decision on its policies should be seen in the light of the 1974 Nuclear Tests Case, which challenged atmospheric testing in the South Pacific. Despite making a similar disclaimer in this case, France halted its atmospheric testing the following year.

Already legal ramifications are occurring. A High Court case was initiated, following the Court hearings, by an Australian citizen against his government regarding its participation in US nuclear war preparations through hosting such facilities as a nuclear command and communication base at Pine Gap. Also in the South Pacific, Papua New Guinea has raised the question of whether the transit of nuclear armed vessels through international waters can any longer be categorized as 'innocent passage.' If not, there could be grounds for excluding such passage from nuclear-weapon- free zones which cover half the world's oceans.

The political significance of the ruling

Irrespective of the legal implications of this case, the political implications will be profound. Non-nuclear States which for 50 years have been calling unsuccessfully for the nuclear-weapon States to disarm now have a much strengthened negotiating hand. The legal obligation, which the Court affirmed, on States to conclude negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons will be very difficult to avoid. If the nuclear States refuse to accept their legal obligations to begin such negotiations, they will find it that much harder trying to keep other States to their obligations under the NPT not to develop nuclear weapons; or, in the case of India, Pakistan and Israel, to make them accept obligations not to test nuclear weapons. One cannot flout the law and expect others to keep it.

Mexico, for example, stated in the hearings of the Court case, that if the nuclear States did not implement their obligations to negotiate for nuclear disarmament, they might feel compelled to reconsider their membership of the NPT, and their obligations thereby to not acquire nuclear weapons.

During the UN debate on the CTBT in early September, a number of countries, while not supporting India's desire to maintain a nuclear option, did join India in criticizing the nuclear States for not accepting their obligations to negotiate for nuclear disarmament.

The pressure on the nuclear States will increase during the current session of the UN General Assembly when a resolution will be introduced welcoming the decision of the ICJ and calling for the beginning of negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, providing for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international verification and control.

Pressure is likely to build at the NPT preparatory meeting in 1997 starting the count-down to the next Review Conference in 2000. In response to the ICJ's decision, Philippines has called for a Special Conference of States Parties to the NPT to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

The role of citizens' groups

Such moves as those listed above are supported by the International Abolition 2000 Network, comprising over 600 citizens' organizations worldwide, which was established at the ICJ hearings last November, with the aim of achieving a Nuclear Weapons Convention by 2000. While citizens' organizations cannot participate in such negotiations directly, the Network is likely to have a considerable effect in initiating and guiding such negotiations, much as the ICJ advisory opinion was initiated and guided by citizens' organizations under the umbrella of the World Court Project. The Project also assisted countries in their legal presentations to the Court, and gathered over 3 million declarations of public conscience which were presented to the Court in support of the case.

Conclusion

The movement for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been given a shot in the arm not only by the ICJ ruling but by the recent report from the prestigious Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, as covered in Disarmament Diplomacy. The Commission concluded that the elimination of nuclear weapons is not only vital in order to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by accident or design, but also that such a course of action is practical and verifiable.

The Commission, aided in particular by the experience of Rolf Ekeus, Chair of the UN Special Commission on the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, described the growing sophistication and effectiveness of monitoring technologies, which would make the verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons, if not perfect, at least capable of success to a degree that would prevent unacceptable risk. Other political or non-nuclear military measures would be able to be introduced to cope with the small risk of breakout from a non-nuclear regime.

While science has created the potential to send the Earth back into the Stone Age, it can also provide the possibility to effectively eliminate that threat, as long as there is the political will to do so. That is the real challenge that now faces us.

Notes and references
1. Press statement, Wellington, 9 July 1996.
2.France says World Court upholds its nuclear stance, Reuter News Reports, 8 July 1996.

Alyn Ware is the Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy and the Pacific Representative for the International Peace Bureau.

CTBT Special Report

By Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Intelligence Review

Summary

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature on 24 September at the United Nations in New York, after being endorsed two weeks earlier by 158 votes to 3 in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). On the first day, 71 nations signed, led by President Clinton of the United States and the foreign ministers of China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom. Israel was among the 9 who signed the next day, and many more are expected to follow. India, however, voted against the UN resolution and reiterated that it would not sign this treaty, while Pakistan indicated that its signature would await India's.

This dramatic finish to three years of negotiations and more than 40 years of public and political campaigning came after the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva became deadlocked on the adoption and transmission of the treaty text, as finalised in the Nuclear Test Ban Committee, chaired by Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands. Since the 60-nation Conference, which works by consensus, could not adopt the treaty or agree to send it to the United Nations for consideration, Australia decided that this should not prevent 185 UN members from deciding for themselves whether to endorse the treaty or not. On 22 August, Australia submitted to the UNGA a resolution attaching the finalised CTBT.

Overwhelming UNGA endorsement

By the time its resolution came up for consideration in New York, on 9 and 10 September, Australia had attracted 127 co-sponsors, more than two-thirds of the Assembly. Following the difficulties in Geneva, many CD members helped Australia to inform non-CD nations about the treaty and sign up co-sponsors, as it was considered necessary to have as many as possible backing the resolution and committing themselves to oppose any procedural initiatives or amendments likely to harm the treaty. Britain, France and the United States were among the co-sponsors, as were Israel, Kazakstan and South Africa.

Although the non-aligned countries were under-represented, notable co-sponsors included Brazil, Colombia (which leads the non-aligned movement), Peru, the Philippines and Venezuela. Japan and Australia had worked hard to sign up the Pacific countries and in a noted reversal from 1995, France lobbied the African francophone nations, persuading many to co-sponsor the resolution. (Last year France got those countries to vote against Australia's resolution condemning French and Chinese testing.) By contrast, few former British colonies in Africa were among the co-sponsors. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) States were almost fully represented. Russia and China withheld co- sponsorship on the grounds that they did not want to endorse the 'unprecedented process' of bypassing of the CD. Both spoke on the first day, underlining their willingness to sign the treaty in its present form and promising to vote for the resolution.

In the face of this overwhelming backing for the treaty, opposition collapsed. India spoke against the resolution, but made no attempt at blocking it procedurally or amending the treaty. Although Iran kept everyone guessing until the last possible moment whether it would try to tie things up procedurally, in the end it went along with the resolution, and was among the first countries to sign the treaty.

Introducing the resolution - A/50/L.78 - Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia argued that it had been necessary to take the CTBT to New York after CD consensus was vetoed, but emphasised that there was no intention to undermine the CD. Noting that 'we utterly respect and defend the right of any State to form its sovereign view and to act on it', Butler said that 'what we cannot accept is the extension of a national point of view to the point of seeking to prevent others from acting on theirs.' Australia emphasised that the treaty text (A/50/1027), circulated to the Assembly with the resolution, was identical with that negotiated by the CD, and that 'any suggestion that it is a merely national text would be wrong.' It met the criteria in the CD's negotiating mandate and it was only due to 'exceptional circumstances' that 'one member State has vetoed the transmission of the treaty' from the CD to the GA. Clearly intent on allaying concern that the CD was being sidelined, Butler reaffirmed the work and operating procedures of the CD and said that its bypass 'cannot and should not set a precedent.'

Following Butler's speech, China, the Marshall Islands, Ireland for the European Union and Associated States, Fiji, Brazil (on behalf of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile), Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, India, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Russia, Indonesia made statements. Of these, China, Russia, Malaysia, Mexico, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia were not co-sponsors of the Australian resolution, but all except India and Sri Lanka clearly stated that they would support the resolution and endorse the treaty, despite its flaws.

India made clear that it would not be supportive, using arguments now familiar from the past three months' debate in the CD (see recent Geneva Updates, especially in issues 6 & 7). UN Ambassador Prakash Shah said that India 'cannot permit our option to be constrained or eroded in any manner as long as the nuclear-weapon States remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.'

Sri Lanka, which subsequently voted for the resolution, expressed serious criticisms of the treaty and the process of taking it to the UNGA for adoption, stressing that the original intent was for the GA to endorse a treaty text adopted by the CD.

Pakistan said that while it would support the resolution it would not sign the treaty until its regional situation warranted, understood by many to include a requirement that India signs. Accusing India of hypocrisy, Ambassador Munir Akram noted that Pakistan had also supported timebound nuclear disarmament and had sponsored the programme of action with 27 others, but argued that India's insistence on this as a precondition of the CTBT was 'a transparent device to avoid a commitment to a nuclear test ban treaty, to veto a vital disarmament measure which has virtually universal support.'

On 10 September, the representatives of Egypt, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Iraq, Nepal, Western Samoa, Ukraine, Canada, Iran, Zambia, Thailand, Nigeria, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Bangladesh spoke. Over the two days, many issues were addressed, but four principal themes could be discerned:

* that bypassing the CD should not set a precedent and should not be perceived as undermining the CD in any way;

* concern about entry-into-force;

* the treaty's inadequacy regarding prohibition of non explosive testing and the prevention of qualitative improvement and development of more advanced nuclear weapons;

* and the need for more progress on nuclear disarmament.

Additionally, some Middle Eastern States reiterated their opposition to including Israel in that region for the purposes of allocating Executive Council seats, but in view of the large co- sponsorship did not attempt an amendment to alter the treaty.

The vote on the Australian resolution was taken at 4.00 pm (New York time) on 10 September, endorsing the CTBT by a resounding 158 votes to 3. India, Bhutan and Libya voted against. There were 5 abstentions: Tanzania, Cuba, Syria, Lebanon, and Mauritius. Additionally, 19 countries were diplomatically absent. Of these, several (including a number of co-sponsors and Iraq) were not permitted to vote because their payments to the UN were in serious arrears.

Seven countries made statements about their vote: Mauritius, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria and Tanzania cited problems with the treaty, the inclusion of Israel in the Middle East and their dissatisfaction with the negotiating process. India's Geneva Ambassador, Arundhati Ghose, declared that India would 'never sign this unequal treaty, not now, not later.' Referring to the treaty's provision that 44 named members of the CD with nuclear research or power reactors must sign and ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force, Ghose promised that 'as long as this text contains this article [XIV], this treaty will never enter into force.'

CTBT Signed

Following the overwhelming endorsement of the Geneva treaty by the UN General Assembly, the CTBT was opened for signature in a ceremony at the UN on 24 September. UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali called the treaty a 'turning point' and a 'major milestone' in efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation. Referring to the 'terrifying might' of more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions, Boutros-Ghali paid tribute to the officials and citizens 'who have struggled for so long to achieve this treaty.' He spoke of the 'constant and passionate flow of petitions, appeals and support from the peoples of the world' whom he thanked 'for making the world a safer place for our children and grandchildren.' He noted that adoption of the CTBT 'meets the demand of the great majority of the world's people for a clear signal that the nuclear arms race is coming towards its end.' Underlining the necessity to abide by the treaty and not to test during the time before the treaty enters into full legal effect, Boutros-Ghali called on all signatory States to ensure 'that their actions always conform to the purpose of the treaty.'

US President Bill Clinton was first to sign the CTBT, using the pen with which John F Kennedy had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. He was followed by the foreign ministers of China, France, Russia and Britain and then 11 more countries which had played a significant part in obtaining the treaty. During the first day, 71 nations signed the treaty, including Mexico, Colombia, Iran, Indonesia, Brazil and a number of States from the Pacific, which suffered most harm from the past 51 years of nuclear testing. By the end of the week over 90 countries had signed the treaty, including Israel and most European Union and OSCE States.

Later in the UN General Assembly, Clinton called the treaty a 'giant step forward' and said that the signatures of the world's declared nuclear powers and others 'will immediately create an international norm against nuclear testing - even before the treaty formally enters into force.' He underlined that a CTBT would 'help prevent the nuclear powers from developing more advanced and dangerous weapons. It will limit the ability of other States to acquire such devices themselves. It points us toward a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be even further reduced -- and eventually eliminated.'

Clinton paid tribute to all who had contributed to the treaty, with especial reference to Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, chair of the NTB Committee, and to Australia, for taking the lead at the UN. He sent a clear message also to India and other potential hold-outs, noting that 'some have complained that it does not mandate total nuclear disarmament by a date certain.' Clinton responded: 'I say to them: do not forsake the benefits of this achievement by ignoring the tremendous progress we have already made toward that goal.'

Russia's Foreign Secretary, Yevgeni Primakov called the CTBT a 'huge step' and underscored the 'principal importance that all countries capable of creating nuclear weapons accede to the Treaty.' Sounding a clear note of warning to India and Pakistan, Primakov said that 'testing of a nuclear explosive device by any country before the Treaty enters into force will cardinally change the international situation, greatly prejudice the Treaty itself and may compel many countries to revise their attitude to it.' Specifically for 'the attention of the opponents of the treaty', Primakov emphasised that the CTBT 'will not only contribute to the promotion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime but will also objectively stimulate a gradual transition to nuclear disarmament of the multilateral basis.' He reiterated Yeltsin's proposal for a 'Treaty on Nuclear Security and Stability' and for nuclear arsenals to be placed only on the territories of the nuclear powers concerned.

Malcolm Rifkind, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs told the General Assembly that the world 'is safer today' with the 'historic signature' of the CTBT. He said that the treaty 'can make an important contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting international security', showing 'that we can, by acting with determination and by making sacrifices, reap the benefits of the end of the cold war.' Defending Britain's stand on the treaty's entry-into-force provision, Rifkind reiterated that the treaty must 'command universal support' in order to be fully effective. While recognising 'the sovereign right of every State to decide whether or not to be bound by international agreements', he urged all States to give it their full support.

China's Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, speaking on 25 September, called the CTBT 'only a first step in the entire process of comprehensive nuclear disarmament' and said that there was still 'a long way to go...in order to achieve the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' He called on the major powers to renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence, renounce the first use, and use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and for further drastic cutbacks by those 'possessing huge nuclear arsenals.' China backed nuclear-free zones and considered that nuclear weapons should not be deployed overseas or in outer space, with reference also to 'missile defense systems that undermine strategic security and stability.' Finally, Qian called on all States to 'negotiate with a view to concluding an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.'

For France, the Foreign Minister, Herve de Charette referred to the 'honour' of signing the CTBT, which had been 'for many years...the wish of public opinion, a hope, a project that was desirable certainly but which was blocked by the reality of East- West confrontation.' Characterising the treaty as 'a major turning point in the world's strategic balances', de Charette said it 'puts an end to the possibility of the nuclear-weapon States developing new types of nuclear weapons and makes a decisive contribution to the fight against nuclear weapons proliferation.' He concluded that the CTBT opened the way 'to a more stable, safer world which will cease to be haunted by the twin dangers of the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of these weapons.'

Editor's note: see also Documents and Sources for coverage of the statements by China, Russia and the US.

Conclusion

Applause at the end of the UN General Assembly session was as much from a sense of relief that the CTBT had finally gone through without the nightmare scenarios of amendments and procedural knock- backs as a celebration of the treaty itself.

It's not the best possible treaty, but it must be hoped that it will prove adequate to its task. Its final weeks caused painful heartsearching among many long-time test ban advocates. Better provisions on entry into force and clearer objectives in the preamble would have greatly improved the treaty's implementation, but by the time it reached New York, amendments would only have wrecked it. Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States had all declared that their support was contingent on the treaty remaining in the form finalised by Ramaker. In the end, rather than lose the chance of a CTBT altogether, the vast majority of countries chose to give it the strongest endorsement they could, in hope of creating a powerful and enduring norm against nuclear testing, even if the treaty itself does not enter into force.

Despite its flaws, there were important victories in the negotiations. The zero yield scope bans all nuclear explosions. This will provide a stronger legal and technical constraint on the development of new types of nuclear weapons than if hydronuclear testing had been exempted, which at one point looked possible. So- called peaceful nuclear explosions are also banned, requiring consensus in both a review conference and an amendment conference in order to be considered again. France has already announced the closure of its Pacific test sites, and pressure will now mount for the other nuclear-weapon States to follow. With their signatures the P-5 nuclear powers have extended their moratoria and undertaken to act in conformity with the purposes of the treaty. A test from India could severely rock this commitment, but (notwithstanding Russia's explicit warning), retaliation in kind would not be the most effective way to respond. Should India take its desire to wreck the CTBT to these dangerous lengths, more effective international political and public pressure could be exerted which would not play into the hands of India's pro-nuclear hawks.

It is too soon to gauge the effect of the CTBT on progress for nuclear disarmament. The overwhelming vote in the UN will help counteract any damage from the lack of agreement in Geneva, but ratifications may come slowly if countries think that the treaty is not viable without India's signature. Arguments that the treaty does nothing to curb qualitative development are exaggerated, but confidence in the test ban will be undermined if the United States continues with sub-critical tests and the nuclear-weapon States pour more money into research, development and laboratory testing of nuclear weapons.

As was clear from many statements in New York, there is concern among diplomats that the CD has been seriously damaged by its failure to get agreement and the process by which it was eventually bypassed. Negotiations on defence or security issues are notoriously difficult, even among two or three protagonists. Put 60 countries into the chamber, and the competing agendas and interests will multiply the complexities, especially when only a few possess the weapons under discussion.

The P-5 nuclear-weapon States are reluctant to give up their power and privileges, but they also recognise that proliferation would devalue the security they attach to their own possession of nuclear weapons. They see multilateral negotiations as a way of bringing the three undeclared nuclear-weapon States into the established non-proliferation regime, while extending its scope to prevent new threshold states from emerging. However, each government also acts within domestic constraints that usually require them to minimise the national security consequences of any arms control measure they undertake.

Clearly the precarious condition of the CTBT was in some measure due to these structural and political constraints. This should prompt searching questions, not about the ability of multilateral negotiations to deliver effective agreements, but about which measures a multilateral forum such as the CD can negotiate effectively.

Notwithstanding the problems and lack of final consensus, the CD in fact did a creditable job of negotiating a multilateral CTBT in three years, once the US removed its 23 year bar. Given its domestic debate and perception of the treaty, India's veto was a legitimate, if regrettable, exercise of its procedural rights as a Conference Member. But since the CD's own procedures offer no way out of deadlock except the passage of time and changing circumstances (please see my CD Opinion Piece in this issue), it was also right and appropriate for Australia to enable all 185 UN members to give their judgement on a treaty negotiated by 60 and blocked by one. The real question is, what next?

Geneva Update No. 31

By Rebecca Johnson

Summary

After Australia's decision on 22 August to seek co-sponsors for its own UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, the action on the CTBT moved away from the CD. The Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) Committee concluded its work on negotiations with Austria over hosting the CTBT Organisation and then wound itself up. The main focus of discussion in the remaining three weeks was the future of the CD and the ongoing debate over its agenda, stimulated by a report from Ambassador Hocine Meghlaoui of Algeria, the Special Coordinator on the review of the future agenda and programme of work of the CD.

29 August Plenary

The 748th plenary of the CD, chaired by Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland, was addressed by India, Iraq, Belarus and by the Chair of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE), Dr Ola Dahlman. There was a brief exchange between Egypt and the Netherlands regarding a scheduled meeting to wind up the work of the NTB Committee.

In her statement, Ambassador Arundhati Ghose expressed India's objections to circulation of the draft CTBT text as a CD document (CD/1427), which had been requested at the previous plenary by Belgium. Ghose noted that the treaty text 'was the product of the work of several delegations', including India, and questioned how it could be circulated in the CD under Belgium's auspices when the NTB Committee had, she said, 'specifically agreed not to bring [it] to the CD.' She stressed that such a 'procedural manoeuvre' cannot confer any enhanced status on the text.

Speaking for the first time as a CD member, Iraq's Ambassador Barzan Al-Tikriti regretted that the CTBT text, which he called 'the minimal that could be achieved in multilateral negotiations' had not met with consensus and urged the CD to overcome its difficulties.

Saying that Belarus supported the draft CTB, Ambassador Stanislau Agurtsou focused his statement on his country's proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Belarus called on States of the region concerned to begin consultations with neighbouring and interested countries, NATO, the EU and OSCE countries to discuss the geography, parameters, principles and legal framework for establishing the proposed nuclear free zone.

Dahlman introduced the report of the GSE meeting attended by representatives of 32 States from 5-15 August (CD/1422). He observed that 43 primary and 90 auxiliary seismograph stations had participated in GSETT-3, of which 32 of the primary stations and 38 auxiliary stations were also envisaged as part of the CTBT's international monitoring system (IMS). Noting the useful contribution made by GSETT-3 in identifying problems and finding solutions, he recommended that the experiment should continue until the CTBT Organisation assumes responsibility for the IMS.

3 September Plenary

The 749th plenary of the CD, chaired by Dembinski, heard statements from Meghlaoui, Ambassador of Algeria in his capacity as Special Coordinator for review of the agenda and future work, with a brief response from the UK. Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium made his farewell speech, thanking his colleagues and saying that he had found the work fascinating and had enjoyed crossing swords with such 'formidable negotiators.'

Meghlaoui reported on his consultations with delegations regarding the future CD agenda, noting the added problems caused by the intensification of the CD's negotiations on the test ban treaty and the 'deterioration in the working atmosphere' which ensued. Since this made it impossible to reach compromise on the agenda and institutional arrangements, he said that it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions or make proposals at this stage. He observed that there was general acceptance of the need for a 'new, balanced agenda which can boldly reflect the changes that have taken place in the world over the last few years.' There was also general concurrence that the agenda should include specific items 'that can be addressed in negotiations aimed at the conclusion of universal agreements', in keeping with the nature of the CD as a negotiating body, and subject to consideration of financial and human resources available both to the United Nations and to delegations concerned.

Meghloui noted that the balance sought was one between 'nuclear disarmament' and 'conventional disarmament.' At least one group [the G-21, which now comprises 30 non-aligned States] has called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament as a high priority. He indicated that it might be useful to consider a broad item 'conventional disarmament' as well, replacing and updating the 'transparency in armaments' discussions currently conducted in accordance with UNGA resolution 46/36L.

Meghloui also addressed two specific issues which have occupied the thoughts of many delegations this year: the proposed ban on the production of fissile materials (Fissban) and landmines. With regard to the fissban, he noted that while 'no delegation is opposed to negotiating such a convention', there were still serious difficulties regarding the mandate. Furthermore, he suggested that the difficulties had worsened 'because of the turn taken by the CTBT negotiations' and warned that these would have to be resolved as a 'prerequisite' for possible compromise on the agenda.

By contrast, he suggested that opening negotiations on a landmines convention could 'enable our body to restore its image, which has been somewhat tarnished, leave enough time for further consultations on the agenda and reduce the temperature which has been too high for several months.' He noted that the question of the future agenda could be regarded as a 'legislative matter', which could be entrusted to the deliberations of the UN General Assembly, with the clear implication that this should be considered if the present dynamics in the CD make consensus impossible.

Meghlaoui ended his statement with a brief and philosophical farewell message. Considering the positive and negative elements of realism and idealism he argued that the two 'rub shoulders in the CD.' Recognising the 'difficult, practically impossible' task of the Conference, he warned against turning the CD into a 'forum for confrontation crudely reflecting relations based on force.' Rather, he said, it should 'offer a forum for negotiation among equal partners who, while representing different interests and sensibilities, are at the same time aware of the common future of the great human family.'

12 September Plenary

The 750th plenary of the CD, chaired by Dembinski, adopted its annual report contained in CD/WP.478/Rev.1 and heard statements from Kazakstan, the UK for the Western Group, and New Zealand.

In his concluding remarks as CD President, Dembinski called the session 'long and very arduous...in turn exciting and frustrating, encouraging and disappointing' and congratulated his colleagues on increasing CD membership to 61 [60 participating] States. He argued that the overwhelming vote for the draft CTBT at the UN General Assembly on 10 September justified taking it to the UN for 'it would have been unforgivable for the draft CTBT to be discarded and forgotten.' He said he was confident that the CD's standing was 'intact, if not enhanced', since the General Assembly, by its vote, had 'recognized the significance and value of the results of our negotiating effort.' Addressing the agenda debate, Dembinski called for 'a greater balance' and consideration of issues pertaining to conventional arms, including transparency in armaments and landmines.

On behalf of Kazakstan, Alexei Volkov regretted the lack of consensus on the draft CTBT, paid tribute to the UN General Assembly for adopting the treaty and commended the Australian initiative as 'the only remaining possibility to grasp the chance for the final realization' of this long sought measure. He reminded delegations that over 45 years, 459 nuclear explosions had been carried out at the Semipalatinsk site in Kazakstan, and that the former Soviet republic had had an option of 'going nuclear' after the disintegration of the USSR, but had instead decided to transform the START I Treaty into a five-party agreement, committing itself to removing all nuclear weapons from its territory under the Lisbon Protocol.

On behalf of the Western Group, UK Ambassador Sir Michael Weston thanked Meghlaoui for his report on the agenda and supported further consultations in the CD. In particular, the Western Group wanted a balance between nuclear and conventional items, with the focus continuing to be 'substantive negotiations and discussions.' Emphasising that negotiations already endorsed by the CD should be pursued, the Western Group wanted the ad hoc Committee to negotiate a ban on fissile materials to be 'established promptly.' New Zealand's Ambassador Wade Armstrong supported this statement but added that New Zealand, Australia and Canada were also interested 'in working for agreement in the Conference on an appropriate framework for the discussion of nuclear disarmament questions.'

Documents and Sources

China, Russia, US: Statements to the UNGA

See CTBT Special Report for speeches' coverage of the signing of the test ban. The following extracts deal with the general disarmament agenda.

China

Statement by His Excellency Qian Qichen, Vice Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 1996

Extracts

"We always stand for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In our view, [the] CTBT is only a first step in the entire process of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. There are still huge stockpiles of nuclear arms in the world. Some nuclear powers still refuse to undertake not to be the first to use such weapons. We still have a long way to go and must continue to work strenuously in order to achieve the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In order to expedite nuclear disarmament and free ourselves from the danger of a nuclear war forever, I wish to reiterate these calls on behalf of the Chinese government:

1. The major nuclear powers should renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence; those possessing huge nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically cut back their stockpiles.

2. All nuclear States should assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances; they should unconditionally renounce the use or threat of use of such weapons against non-nuclear States or nuclear-free zones; and they should conclude international instruments to this effect without delay.

3. Those States which have deployed nuclear weapons overseas should withdraw them completely; all nuclear States should pledge support to the moves to set up nuclear-free zones; they should respect the status of such zones and assume corresponding obligations.

4. All States should refrain from developing or deploying weapon systems in outer space and missile defense systems that undermine strategic security and stability.

5. All States should negotiate with a view to concluding an international Convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Since mankind has been able to produce nuclear weapons in the 20th Century, it is fully capable of abolishing them in the 21st Century. ..."

Russia

Statement by His Excellency Yevgeni M. Primakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, to the 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 24 September 1996

Extracts

"I would like to draw the attention of the opponents of the [CTB] Treaty to the fact that it will not only contribute to the promotion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime but will also objectively stimulate a gradual transition to nuclear disarmament on the multilateral basis. This is the purpose of the proposal of President Yeltsin...to conclude a Treaty on Nuclear Security and Stability with the participation of all nuclear powers. We invite interested States to start an exchange of views on this issue. Our proposal to have nuclear arsenals located only on the territories of the nuclear powers concerned has not yet lost its relevance.

The strengthening of the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is directly dependent upon the reliable prevention of the illicit traffic in fissile materials. The Moscow Summit of the Eight on nuclear security and safety convened on Russia's initiative contributed significantly to the solution of this problem. I call upon all the UN Member States to get involved in the implementation of the Moscow agreements. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty can give a significant impetus to this process. ..."

The United States

Remarks of the President, William Clinton, to the United Nations General Assembly, 24 September 1996

Extracts

"The United States has six priority goals to further lift the threat of weapons of mass destruction and limit their dangerous spread.

First, we must protect our people from chemical attack - and make it harder for rogue States and terrorists to brandish poison gas - by bringing the Chemical Weapons Convention into force as soon as possible. I thank the nations that have ratified the CWC. I deeply regret that the US Senate has not yet voted on the CWC, and I want the world to know that I will not let this treaty die.

Second, we must reduce the risk that an outlaw State or organization could build a nuclear force by negotiating a treaty to freeze the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should take up this challenge immediately. The United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom already have halted production of fissile materials for weapons. I urge other nations to end the unsafeguarded production of these materials pending completion of a treaty.

Third, we must continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals. When Russia ratifies START II, President Yeltsin and I are ready to discuss the possibility of further cuts - as well as limiting and monitoring nuclear warheads and materials. This will help make deep reductions irreversible.

Fourth, we must reinforce our efforts against the spread of nuclear weapons - by strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We should give the International Atomic Energy Agency a stronger role and sharper tools for conducting worldwide inspections. Our law enforcement and customs officials should cooperate more in the fight against nuclear smuggling. And I urge all nations that have not signed the NPT to do so without delay.

Fifth, we must better protect our people from those who would use disease as a weapon of war by giving the Biological Weapons Convention the means to strengthen compliance - including on-site inspections. We should aim to complete this task by 1998.

Finally, we must end the carnage caused by anti-personnel landmines - the hidden killers that murder and maim more than 250,000 people every year. In May, I announced a series of actions my country would take toward this goal. Today, I renew my appeal for the swift negotiation of a worldwide ban on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. Our children deserve to walk this Earth in safety."

US-Russia statement on ABM Treaty

'US-Russia Joint Statement on Missile Defense', 23 September 1996

The statement was released in New York, at a press conference given by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russia's Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. See next issue for coverage.

Full text

"In accordance with the understanding recorded in the Joint Statement of the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation of 10 May, 1995, which was further elaborated during the US-Russia Summit in April, 1996 in Moscow, the US and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, are conducting negotiations to work out agreements on demarcation of strategic and theater missile defenses.

Part one of these negotiations, relating to lower-velocity TMD systems, was successfully completed during the session of the standing Consultative Commission (SCC) [of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty] which was concluded in June, 1996. The sides prepared a basic document on demarcation of these systems - an Agreed Statement - and in the near future, an Agreement on Confidence Building Measures applicable to these systems will be completed which will expand on the basic document. Thus it can be noted that agreement has been reached on lower-velocity TMD systems.

At present preparations are being made for part two of the demarcation negotiations, regarding higher-velocity TMD systems. There is a good basis for a constructive outcome - the instructions of the Presidents of the US and Russia regarding the working out of an agreement on part two, the experience gained in working on part one, the list of questions prepared by the sides to be examined, and the political will to fully resolve the demarcation issue. The resolution of this issue will be an important contribution to the development of cooperation between the sides in the military area, to the creation of conditions for further reducing strategic offensive weapons, and to strengthening strategic stability and international security.

The US and Russia propose that the SCC reconvene on 1 October. At this SCC session, the components will conform and prepare for signature the part one documents and begin discussions of part two. By the end of October, our deputies will sign the part one documents and our SCC Commissioners will report to us on progress on part two."

Source: United States Information Agency, 23 September.

IAEA General Conference

The 40th Annual General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held at its Headquarters in Vienna, 16-20 September.

Statement by the Director-General

'Statement to the Fortieth Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency', Dr. Hans Blix, 16 September 1996

Extracts

"Development and Use of Nuclear Science and Technology

... The safe management, use or disposal of plutonium is a subject that is again calling for attention. The global inventory of civil plutonium will increase for several years to come and disarmament measures will contribute sizeable quantities. What should be done with this plutonium? The issue was raised at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit last spring and France will host a meeting in October on 'Safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes.' The Agency is invited to participate and is also itself arranging a major symposium next June entitled 'Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Reactor Strategy: Adjusting to New Realities.' ...

Nuclear Safety

... It has come to be recognized - most recently at the Moscow Nuclear Summit - that nuclear safety in any country is the legitimate concern of all other countries. While it has not been suggested that supervisory or regulatory functions should be conferred on the IAEA, it has been concluded that the IAEA is the appropriate institution to use for the establishment of an international infrastructure comprising three main elements - basic binding conventions, recommended standards and advisory services and assistance.

Within the IAEA Secretariat these activities are now the charge of a separate Department and during this year the various advisory groups, in which government experts consider draft international safety standards and guides, have been strengthened and reorganized. Through these changes strong input and guidance from Member States and products of high quality and consistency should be ensured.

The number of international conventions which provide legally binding norms as part of the regulatory framework is increasing. While the so-called Chernobyl Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Emergency Assistance were concluded in 1986, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which addresses the safety of nuclear power plants worldwide, will enter into force very shortly, on 24 October... I urge all governments that have not yet ratified the Convention to try to speed up the required procedures. A meeting of the States Parties will take place within six months of the entry into force to prepare for the full operation of the Convention.

Another important event will be the expected adoption, next year, of new rules in the field of nuclear liability. ...it now seems that sufficient agreement has been reached on the major issues to call a diplomatic conference to revise the Vienna Convention and to adopt a convention on supplementary funding. I hope the momentum which has built up through progress in the negotiations, through the signature by Russia of the Vienna Convention on 8 May and through the declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Summit, will lead us to agreement and also encourage more States to sign the Vienna Convention.

A third important development is the drafting of a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. ... I hope that Member Governments will move to settle the issues yet unresolved without much further delay so that a conference to conclude the Convention can be called next year. ...

Spent Fuel from Research and Test Reactors

... In July 1993 I wrote to the Secretary of Energy of the United States urging the renewal by the US Department of Energy (DOE) of its Off-Site Fuel Policy under which foreign research reactor spent fuel of US origin was returned to the US. On 2 February 1995, I also wrote a letter to the Minister for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation suggesting a similar take-back programme of foreign research reactor spent fuel enriched in the former USSR. I welcome the move by the US to resume for a number of years a programme for returning spent fuel of US origin and I hope that similarly positive steps could be taken by other suppliers of research reactor fuel. ...

Nuclear test sites

At the request of Member States concerned, the Agency has become engaged in the assessment of the radiological situation at three former nuclear weapons test sites.

An assessment of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site has provided assurance that radiation levels in villages around the site are very low. However, it has also been concluded that lengthy human occupation of the test site itself would lead to unacceptably high radiation doses and the authorities of Kazakstan have been advised to take steps to clean up the site or - more realistically - prevent access to it.

The habitability of the Bikini Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands was assessed, in particular to determine whether the islanders, who had been evacuated from the atoll before the start of nuclear testing, could safely resume living there. The assessment, which was made by an international, scientific advisory group convoked by the Agency, concluded that if some contaminated soil was removed and if the uptake of radioactive caesium by crops were controlled through the use of special fertilizers, the Bikini Atoll could be re-occupied without restriction.

The third study, now underway, is of the test site at Mururoa and Fangataufa in French Polynesia. It is directed by an international advisory committee chaired by Dr. Gail de Planque of the United States. Document GC(40)/INF/4 [see below] contains a full description of the status of this study. A final report can be expected by the end of 1997. ...

Safeguards

... Some 177 States have...committed themselves to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and 120 States have actually done so. Those States which have not yet fulfilled their obligation are from time to time reminded by the Secretariat of their duty to do so without further delay. At the present juncture we are particularly anxious that all the States parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty - notably some Caribbean States - should enter into safeguards agreements, as otherwise the full entry into force of that Treaty might be delayed. We have every reason to believe that Cuba, which has signed the Treaty, will proceed with ratification. There have already been contacts on the subject of the safeguards agreement. ...

...the IAEA is about to take a major step forward in further developing the safeguards system - a step essential to introduce new cost-effective methods and techniques and to provide vitally needed confidence that non-proliferation commitments are fully respected. This development will also help to make the safeguards system an adequate instrument that can be used to verify future nuclear arms control and disarmament measures - a need recently stressed in the report of the Canberra Commission.

... We believe that had Agency inspectors had access - which they did not - to some activities that took place in the declared nuclear centre at Tuwaitha in Iraq, they would have suspected that safeguards obligations were being violated. The case of Iraq also points to the conclusion that if more comprehensive information had been available about the Iraqi nuclear programme, inconsistencies would, in all likelihood, have been discovered and questions would have been prompted.

It is this experience combined with the vital interest of States in reliable safeguards that has led to the development of 'Programme 93+2' and a protocol additional to comprehensive safeguards agreements, designed to give the IAEA Secretariat much more information - notably, more data from the State and more data through observations by inspectors granted wider access. Only if the available information and inspection access is sufficiently broadly based will the absence of evidence of diversion give confidence that non-proliferation commitments have not been breached. The demand of Members that safeguards must give confidence, not only about non-diversion of declared material but also about the absence of non-declared nuclear material and installations, makes this access to more information and greater access for inspectors a high priority.

The requirements which are placed on States under the proposed additional protocol are not insignificant, but States which accepted them on a trial basis did not find them overly onerous. ...

It is clear that all parties to comprehensive safeguards must be treated equally. As a result, States with large nuclear programmes will have to supply more information and allow the visit of inspectors to more sites and locations than will States with small programmes. ...

It is further clear that States with non-comprehensive safeguards may be able to contribute information of value for the operation of the comprehensive safeguards, e.g. regarding exports and imports. They may also help make the Agency's safeguards operations more effective and less costly by accepting in the operation of the safeguards to which they are subjected some new techniques, like environmental sampling and remote data transmission. They may further help by joining others in dispensing with visa requirements or granting multiple entry visas and accepting streamlined inspector designation procedures. However, the central rationale for strengthening safeguards verification in States with comprehensive safeguards, namely to increase confidence about their compliance with their non- proliferation pledge, is not applicable to the States with non- comprehensive safeguards - as they have made no such pledge. This being the case, it would appear appropriate, in my view, to suggest that these States accept international verification of the steps they are taking, or hopefully will be taking, toward nuclear arms control and disarmament, for instance verification to create confidence that nuclear material released through dismantlement of weapons, is irreversibly transferred to the peaceful sector. This matter was explicitly raised in the Moscow Nuclear Summit and I have invited the United States and Russian Ministers present here to discuss with me the possibility of such verification by the IAEA. ...

Iraq

The Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) activities in Iraq have, since August 1994, involved more than 600 inspections, the majority of which were conducted without prior notice. No instance of proscribed activities, or of the presence of proscribed materials or equipment have been detected.

The Agency's activities in Iraq during the past year have also involved extensive efforts to analyse the vast amount of documentation which was handed over to the IAEA and the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) following the departure from Iraq, in August 1995, of the late Lt. General Kamel Hassan Al Majid. Much work has also been devoted to the follow up of procurement transactions and to assess draft versions of Iraq's re-issued 'Full, Final and Complete Declaration' of its former nuclear weapons programme. A few days ago, Iraq formally transmitted its finalized version of the Declaration to the Agency's Nuclear Monitoring Group in Baghdad. As soon as we receive it in Vienna we shall start the work of verifying its completeness and correctness.

Let me add that IAEA inspectors remain in Baghdad and continue their ongoing monitoring and verification activities. In the circumstances now prevailing there, activities take place only in areas with reliable radio communications with our Monitoring and Verification Centre in Baghdad. Those of our activities which should take place away from the Baghdad region will be resumed as soon as conditions permit. Transport to and from Baghdad has been severely affected by the recent events...

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 1995 states that the IAEA remained unable to verify the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that the DPRK was still not in full compliance with its safeguards agreement. This is still the case. ... Most recently, technical discussions between the IAEA and the DPRK took place in late June. These discussions resulted in some progress but the DPRK still did not accept various measures considered important by the Secretariat for verifying the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration - in particular measures for the preservation of data and the provision of information about certain facilities. On the positive side, the DPRK did agree to measures to improve Agency communications from the DPRK and to accept the designation of more inspectors. A next round of technical discussions is planned to take place very soon."

IAEA verification of US and Russian weapons-origin fissile materials

'Trilateral Statement to the Press', IAEA Press Release, PR 96/19, 17 September 1996

Full text

"Secretary of Energy of the United States, Hazel R. O'Leary, Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Viktor Mikhailov, and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Hans Blix, met in Vienna on 17 September 1996 to consider practical measures to fulfill statements by the President of the United States of September 1993 and the President of the Russian Federation of April 1996 concerning the application of IAEA verification of weapon origin fissile materials. The participants noted the importance of these commitments of the US and Russia as a significant contribution to the fulfilment of the Principles and Objectives agreed upon at the 1995 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference. Further, the Ministers noted that this endeavour is parallel to, and complementary to, the commitments made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in September 1994 and May 1995 regarding the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions. Specifically, in this meeting:

* The Ministers of the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to discuss technical methods designed to protect sensitive nuclear weapons information and to prevent its disclosure, and to hold appropriate consultations with the IAEA on this matter. It was agreed that it was essential to ensure that IAEA verification of relevant fissile materials would not undermine the obligations of the United States and the Russian Federation under Article I of the NPT.

* It was agreed that, to address the various technical, legal, and financial issues associated with implementing IAEA verification of relevant fissile materials, a joint group should be formed and shall report on progress in addressing these issues within nine months.

* All parties agreed that within six weeks of this meeting a trilateral visit to the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site and Hanford Site will occur to examine how the IAEA safeguards have been implemented at plutonium facilities under the existing US Voluntary Offer. The trip will also include a visit to Argonne National Laboratory for a demonstration of remote monitoring technology."

Editor's note: The US Department of Energy released a statement on the initiative (Press Release R-96-108) on 18 September. Extracts follow:

"[This is an] initiative to jointly verify that fissile materials produced for US and Russian nuclear warheads, and no longer needed for that purpose, are not reused to produce new nuclear weapons. This is a key nonproliferation objective of the Clinton administration. The initiative furthers pledges made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to improve the transparency of nuclear arms reductions and to safeguard weapons-usable materials. A trilateral working group was formed and will make recommendations within nine months on financial, technical and legal matters. The US Department of Energy is providing $1 billion to launch this initiative.

In another action supporting these goals, Secretary O'Leary announced in Vienna that the United States has developed a comprehensive plan for the international inspection of US fissile material that has been declared excess to national defense needs. Under the plan, the United States will make 26 metric tons of additional excess fissile material available for IAEA inspection during the next three years; 12 metric tons have already been placed under IAEA safeguards."

Resolutions

Editor's note: all resolutions adopted unanimously.

Convention on Nuclear Safety

'Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation and Waste Safety,' Agenda item 12 (GC(40)/22), GC(40)/27, 18 September 1996

Extracts

"The General Conference...

(b) Welcoming the fact that the requirements for the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety were met on 26 July 1996 by the deposit of the twenty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, it being also the seventeenth instrument from a State having at least one nuclear installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core, so that the Convention will enter into force on 24 October 1996...

1. Appeals to all Member States which have not yet done so to become Parties to the Convention so that it will obtain the widest possible adherence;

2. Expresses its satisfaction that the Director General, in his capacity as the Depositary of the Convention, will convene a preparatory meeting of Contracting Parties at the Agency's Headquarters at a date to be agreed upon but not later than April 1997..."

Strengthening Safeguards

'Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System', Agenda item 16 (GC(40)/22), GC(40)/31, 18 September 1996

Extracts

"The General Conference...

(d) Noting that decisions adopted by the Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and that the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased, and

(e) Stressing that the strengthening of the safeguards system should not entail any decrease in the resources available for technical assistance and co-operation and that it should be compatible with the Agency's function of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses and with adequate technology transfer,

1. Stresses the need for effective safeguards in order to prevent the use of nuclear energy for prohibited purposes in contravention of safeguards agreements entered into by States, and underlines the vital importance of effective safeguards for facilitating co- operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

2. Affirms that increasing the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in contravention of safeguards agreements will contribute to strengthening the effectiveness of safeguards; ...

4. Notes with approval the report of the Director General submitted in document GC(40)/17 pursuant to resolution GC(39)/RES/17 concerning Programme 93+2;

5. Calls on the Secretariat to continue the implementation of Part 1 measures as rapidly as time and resources allow and urges the States concerned to facilitate this exercise by providing timely responses to the Secretariat's requests for information;

6. Welcomes the establishment by the Board of Governors of a Committee which began its work in July 1996 and is tasked with the drafting of a model protocol in order to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the efficiency of the nuclear safeguards system and thereby reinforce and improve the Agency's capacity to detect any undeclared nuclear activities;

7. Urges the Committee to make every effort to advance its work with a view to reporting the outcome to the Board at its December 1996 session; and

8. Requests the Director General to report on the implementation of this resolution to the General Conference at its forty-first regular session."

Report: Inspection of the French nuclear test sites

'Study of the Radiological Situation at the Atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa', GC(40)/INF/4, 22 August 1996

Extracts

"Objectives

The objectives of the Study of the Radiological Situation at the Atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa are to 'assess the radiological situation (both present and future) at the atolls and involved areas from the point of view of radiological safety', 'ascertain whether there are any radiological hazards to people'...and make 'recommendations on the form, scale and duration of any monitoring, remedial action or other follow-up action that might be required'.

The Study covers both the current radiological situation and the potential long-term...radiological situation. ...

Progress

The first formal meeting of the International Advisory Committee was held at Agency Headquarters on 13-14 April 1996, with the participation of Task and Working Group Chairmen. The Committee established its terms of reference. Also, first proposals for the Task and Working Groups' terms of reference and action plans were reviewed. The membership of the Task and Working Groups was agreed...as was the format of the final report.

Task Group A has agreed upon its terms of reference and drawn up an action plan for terrestrial and aquatic sampling. The sampling campaign, aimed at evaluating the results of French environmental monitoring programmes and producing additional data useful for radiation dose assessment, has been taking place since mid-July. During this five-week sampling campaign, Task Group A's working groups have been receiving full co-operation and logistic support from the relevant French authorities. The sample analysis results are expected to be available by the end of the year.

Task Group B has reviewed the work programmes proposed by its three supporting Working Groups and has identified and resolved a number of interface problems. Also, it has agreed on schedules for future work and posed a number of questions to the French liaison team on matters requiring clarification.

Outlook

The International Advisory Committee will hold its next meeting, in the South Pacific region, probably in French Polynesia and in Fiji, late in 1996. It will review the progress made and discuss an outline of its report.

According to its terms of reference, the Study is to be completed within 18 months after the necessary information and data have been provided to the relevant Working Groups by the French Liaison Office.

The Study's findings, conclusions and recommendations will be contained in a report of the Committee to be published by the Agency. It is expected that the report will be published early in 1998. ..."

US tritium supply PLANS

'Energy Department Moves Forward Along Dual Path to Tritium Production', Department of Energy Press Release, R-96-133, 5 September 1996

Extracts

"As part of its dual-track strategy to provide a new tritium source for the country's nuclear deterrent, the US Department of Energy has selected a prime contractor to support the accelerator option for producing the radioactive gas.

Secretary of Energy Hazel R. O'Leary announced today that Burns and Roe Enterprises Inc. (BREI) of Oradell, N.J., has been selected to perform demonstration activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and design an Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT) for the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. If the accelerator option is selected in 1998 as the primary technology, the company would support construction of the plant, which would be fully operational by 2007. The nearly $3 billion contract has been awarded by the Department's Albuquerque Operations Office. ...

Tritium, which activates the fusion stage of a nuclear weapon, decays 5.5 per cent a year and must be replenished periodically. The United States has not produced this gas since 1988 but has relied on tritium from dismantled weapons to meet US national security requirements. Based on current arms control agreements and on nuclear weapons stockpile plans, a new tritium production source will be required in the 2005 to 2007 time frame.

Last December the Department decided to explore two promising methods of producing tritium: the use an existing commercial light water reactor and the construction of a linear accelerator. In 1998 the Department will select one method to be primary, and the other will serve as backup. Both options have attractive characteristics. The accelerator produces no high-level radioactive waste and advances the technology from a powerful tool for research to a powerful tool for production. The reactor option is likely to be the least expensive and fastest technical path to production. Both approaches have low environmental impacts. ..."

Report of the Canberra Commission: Annex on Verification

Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 14 August 1996

In the last issue, the Report's main conclusions and recommendations were featured. Below, we feature the Commission's detailed consideration of the practical difficulties involved in reaching and sustaining a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The Report was formally presented to the United Nations General Assembly by Australia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, on 30 September.

Annex A: Verification

Extracts

"The elimination of nuclear weapons will not be possible without the development of adequate verification. A political judgement will be needed on whether the levels of assurance possible from the verification regime are sufficient. All existing arms control and disarmament agreements have required political judgements of this nature because no verification system provides absolute certainty. This situation has not prevented the international community acting in the area of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction first with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, then the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Nor has it prevented negotiation and implementation of bilateral nuclear arms control agreements including the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons.

The nature of nuclear weapons, the secrecy that has surrounded their development and uncertainties about total amounts of nuclear material produced for weapons will make it very difficult, or in the view of some impossible, to be confident that States which have operated large scale military nuclear programs have made full declarations of their holdings of nuclear weapons and fissile material.

This potential uncertainty should not deter reductions to small residual arsenals. At that point the verification system can be re- evaluated and the benefits and risks of further reductions compared. Development and implementation of the verification arrangements needed for each step toward elimination will provide immediate benefit through reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation including nuclear terrorism. And a world of small residual arsenals would still be a safer place than the present world although the dangers of nuclear proliferation and a renewed arms race would remain.

Because no verification system can be perfect it is inevitable that some risk will have to be accepted if the wider benefits of a nuclear-weapon-free world are to be realised. The international community will need to determine the level of risk acceptable. This decision will be influenced by a range of factors, particularly the global circumstances applying when the elimination stage is reached. That the verification system for a nuclear-weapon-free world will involve a small probability that attempted breakout might go undetected does not alter the fact a nuclear-weapon-free world would be, fundamentally, a safer place... Furthermore, in an era in which the accuracy, penetrating power, and destructive force of conventional weapons are increasing rapidly, and economic interdependence is growing, the development of an illegal nuclear force would, in all probability, be self-defeating. It is nevertheless essential that there be a wide and politically acceptable level of confidence in the verification system. For this to be achieved the results of verification activities will need to be transparent to the international community both at the level of States and at the public level.

It should be recognised that a verification regime is composed of both its material and technical features, which should be of the highest order attainable, and the common political and legal commitments which support it. This creates the climate of confidence essential to any successful verification regime. Further, an inclusive approach to verification can increase levels of assurance. In the case of verification for a nuclear-weapon- free world, technical verification can be supplemented by measures such as transparency in nuclear activity, relevant national intelligence information passed to verification bodies, an enhanced role for individuals in verification and application of effective export controls.

A number of factors will assist development of adequate verification arrangements for a nuclear-weapon-free world. First, the nuclear weapon scientific/industrial complex is a tightly regulated governmental enterprise, so extensive records of nuclear weapons and weapons fissile material production should be available. Second, nearly 30 years of experience has been accumulated in verifying compliance with the NPT, and IAEA safeguards offer a proven and evolving system for delivering a high degree of assurance that safeguarded nuclear material remains in peaceful use. And, third, there is the experience of the SALT, START, INF, CFE and CWC agreements which individually and collectively demonstrate the powerful influence that political will can exert over what is desirable and possible in terms of verification.

The nuclear disarmament process will be progressive with new verification arrangements required at various stages. Because of the importance of adequate verification it is likely that progress with verification will dictate the timetable for the last stages of disarmament. Verification is likely to involve bilateral US/Russian measures, the nuclear-weapon States and the IAEA at various stages of the dismantlement and elimination of nuclear weapons. The undeclared nuclear-weapon States and threshold States will have to be involved in nuclear disarmament. Verification measures appropriate to these States' nuclear status at that time will have to be applied. Bilateral or regional involvement could be employed as a means of providing additional assurance and confidence-building above and beyond international inspections.

This annex concentrates on measures which may make up a verification regime to provide assurance that States are complying with nuclear disarmament obligations. In addition, it is of crucial importance that there be very high physical security against diversion or theft of nuclear weapons, fissile material (whether of military or civil origin) and nuclear weapon non- nuclear components and materials. A breakdown in physical security could result in nuclear weapons, nuclear material or components coming into the possession of would-be proliferator States or sub- State groups, including terrorists which would jeopardise the disarmament process. Nuclear disarmament will at various stages of the process involve monitored storage of weapons and weapons components including fissile material. It is imperative that the highest standards of physical security be applied to such items and material. Consideration of how this can best be achieved should form part of the nuclear disarmament process.

Developmental work on verification arrangements should begin soon to ensure that movement toward a nuclear-weapon-free world is not delayed by lack of adequate verification.

The political commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons must be matched by a willingness to make available the resources needed for nuclear disarmament, including for effective verification. The amounts involved are likely to be considerable, especially for the dismantlement of weapons and disposition of their fissile material content, but very much less than developing, maintaining and upgrading nuclear arsenals. ...

Verification Tasks

... Few facilities in the nuclear-weapon States are safeguarded at present and a number of other States operate unsafeguarded fissile material production facilities. The first stage of extending safeguards in these States is likely to be verification of facilities and material covered by a convention to end fissile material production for weapons. Systems will be needed to verify that nuclear warheads are dismantled and destroyed and that their fissile material content cannot be reintroduced to weapons use. To ensure that a nuclear force of strategic significance cannot be reconstituted quickly, a staged process for verified destruction of the nuclear weapons infrastructure is likely to be considered necessary. An intrusive inspection regime and new techniques will be needed to ensure a high probability that significant undeclared nuclear activity would be detected. Development of verification arrangements for each step toward a nuclear-weapon-free world will, in addition, be of immediate benefit to the existing non- proliferation regime.

Verifying the 'completeness' of declared stocks of warheads and fissile material will be a crucial and difficult operation. The IAEA has expertise in verifying declarations of previously unsafeguarded nuclear programs including its work in Iraq, the DPRK and South Africa... The extent to which this is transferable to the very large military programs of the nuclear-weapon States is to be established.

... Many weapons are small, readily transported and readily concealed. The fissile material cores are smaller and thus even more easily concealed. While radiation emitted from these cores can be detected at close range, it is not clear that they would always be detected if in properly shielded storage facilities, even through environmental sampling. However, nuclear weapons in storage deteriorate with time and the ongoing maintenance needed for a secret cache of weapons would carry a risk of exposure or detection.

If a nuclear-weapon-free world is to be credible and stable, it clearly will have to place prohibitions on much more than just weapons. Irreversibility of nuclear disarmament will also require verified elimination or conversion to exclusively civil use of the facilities used to develop and construct nuclear weapons and dedicated nuclear delivery vehicles. In the transitional period some of the facilities used to develop and construct weapons are likely to be needed to dismantle them, so the nuclear-weapon States will need to keep a part of their plant operational until the very last items in the residual stockpiles are disassembled.

Confidence to move to the final elimination phase would be enhanced if by that time all delivery vehicles built primarily for nuclear weapons are eliminated, leaving only the residual arsenals of bombs or warheads in monitored storage. It is therefore important that verified elimination of such delivery vehicles occurs in tandem with elimination of nuclear warheads. Means could be devised to make the removal of any weapons from monitored storage and their installation on improvised delivery vehicles as difficult and time-consuming as possible.

Other components which play an important role in nuclear weapons such as tritium should also be subject to a verification regime. Non-nuclear components of a weapon may also need to be taken into account. These are a collection of diverse materials: plastics, metals, chemical high-explosives and also extremely sophisticated electronics and various other items all organised inside the weapon to produce the optimum explosive output from the fissile material. These non-nuclear parts are in some cases made in or near the final assembly facility, but others come from far away, from specialised workshops or enterprises most of whose output may be civilian.

Measures must be taken to preclude leakage of sensitive information during the dismantlement process. Practical options for doing this include requiring States which own nuclear weapons to dismantle them within a containment boundary with monitored inputs and outputs. It may also be possible for international inspectors to estimate, with sufficient accuracy, the fissile material content of the stored fissile material 'pits' from dismantled nuclear warheads without revealing sensitive information. ...

In the transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world it will be important to find the right balance between bilateral (US/Russia), plurilateral (nuclear-weapon States) and appropriate international inspection of nuclear material made excess to military requirements. Bilateral and plurilateral inspections may be less transparent in the assurance they offer to the non-nuclear-weapon States than international inspections. But bilateral or plurilateral inspections may be considered preferable for the verification of material in sensitive forms. The transparency issue could be addressed by the nuclear-weapon States perhaps as part of increased accountability at NPT meetings. In areas of regional nuclear tension, bilateral or regional involvement in inspections on nuclear facilities and in monitoring the dismantlement of any nuclear weapons could be employed as a means of providing additional assurance and confidence-building above and beyond international inspections.

Components of a Verification Regime

... The verification regime for a nuclear-weapon-free world would need to bring under safeguards fissile material currently contained in weapons and military stockpiles, and to provide the most credible assurance that all such material has been accounted for; to provide a very high level of assurance that no weapons or stocks of fissile material have been concealed during the disarmament process; to ensure that all nuclear weapons facilities have been dismantled or converted to peaceful use; and to verify destruction of strategic delivery vehicles developed primarily for nuclear purposes.

Current, prospective and future treaties could provide the legal authority for application of the verification regime.

The IAEA has wide experience in application of safeguards to provide high assurance that nuclear material remains in peaceful non-explosive use. Subject to strengthening of its safeguards system the IAEA would seem the logical body to verify non- proliferation undertakings in a nuclear-weapon-free world. The development of concepts for CTBT verification is well advanced. Bilateral US/Russian agreements such as START and INF are a model for a verification regime for elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. The other main elements of the verification regime, especially verification of the elimination of nuclear warheads, are less well developed and should be afforded greater priority...

Non-Proliferation Undertakings

... Iraq demonstrated that a State with sufficient determination and resources may be able to establish a self-contained clandestine military nuclear program. This prompted a reappraisal of IAEA safeguards as it was clear there was a need to improve the safeguards system's capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activity. As a result the IAEA and its member States have worked to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. Since 1993 this effort has focused on a comprehensive program known as '93+2'. The 93+2 program is aimed at enhancing the legal and technical capability of the IAEA safeguards system with respect to its ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference also gave strong political support to strengthening IAEA safeguards including explicit support for the 93+2 objectives. And at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in April 1996 the participating countries (US, Russia, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Canada and Italy) agreed as well to work vigorously to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

The elements of the 93+2 program of most obvious application to verification of a nuclear-weapon-free world are increased IAEA access to information, expanded access for IAEA inspectors and use of environmental sampling. Regarding the first of the 93+2 elements, the need for maximum transparency about a State's nuclear program is fundamental. ... As nuclear disarmament proceeds, doubts are bound to arise about some States' commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world including whether full declarations of fissile material production have been made, whether nuclear weapons have been hidden or are being developed clandestinely and so on. Information provided by a State about its nuclear program, such as its plans for future nuclear fuel cycle activities or its fuel cycle research and development activities, together with other safeguards information such as fissile material production records, can contribute to determining whether such doubts have foundation. ...

To provide the levels of non-proliferation assurance needed in a nuclear-weapon-free world IAEA inspectors will need to have access to any location in a State, at very short notice or no notice and with no right of refusal. The expanded managed access arrangements being negotiated as part of the 93+2 program are a starting point in the development of access arrangements which will be needed in a nuclear-weapon-free world. The application of a program such as 93+2 would be central not only to effective non-proliferation arrangements but also to the ultimate development of effective verification arrangements for a nuclear-weapon-free world. ...

New technologies proposed as part of the 93+2 program have the potential to contribute significantly in this area. Of particular promise is use of environmental sampling which through air, water and soil sampling can detect characteristic radionuclide and chemical emissions from a broad array of nuclear and other industrial activities. Environmental sampling is thereby able to provide important information about the presence or absence of specific nuclear activities. Such information will be vital for verification of a nuclear-weapon-free world. To maximise the contribution of environmental sampling the IAEA must have the right of access to any location.

As the world moves toward a nuclear-weapon-free world the differences in application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States will have to diminish with the end point being universal application of the same safeguards in all countries. Verifying all nuclear-weapon State facilities, including former nuclear test sites, will cause the costs of the safeguards system to rise sharply because most of the nuclear- weapon States have extensive civil nuclear power programs of which only a few facilities are currently safeguarded. Improvements in safeguards procedures which have been demonstrated in the earlier phases of nuclear disarmament may allow development of alternative and more cost-effective safeguards approaches. Such approaches may moderate the increase in resources needed, for example improvements in the IAEA's capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activity may allow reduction or elimination of routine inspections at reactors.

Sharing of information between the IAEA, the chemical weapons verification regime, the prospective Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and the biological weapons verification regime (when developed) should be explored as a means of strengthening the weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regime. For similar reasons the weapons of mass destruction verification regimes need a flow of information on international trade in relevant sensitive items. States and individuals should also do all they can to maximise the information base of the international bodies about possible clandestine nuclear activity, including the provision of information obtained from national export licensing systems and other national technical means. Care would be needed in sharing proliferation relevant information not to breach the conditions of confidentiality under which States supply information on their own activities to verification agencies.

Verifying a Production Cut-Off

... Because it would effectively cap the amount of nuclear weapon raw material, a cut-off agreement is essential to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear reductions. ...

The extent of verification required by a cut-off convention will be determined largely by its scope, which is not yet resolved. The main options are a wide scope agreement which would apply to all nuclear facilities involved in fissile material production, processing or use as well as existing stocks of fissile material and future production, or an agreement concentrating on the sensitive fissile material production facilities, i.e. enrichment and reprocessing plants, and the product from these plants.

Cut-off verification will require at least application of IAEA safeguards at all enrichment plants capable of producing highly- enriched uranium, all plutonium separation (reprocessing) plants, all highly-enriched uranium and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants and research reactors and critical assemblies using large quantities of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium in the States joining the treaty. There might also be safeguarding of reactors and other nuclear facilities...

The unilateral nuclear-weapon States' action to end production of fissile material for weapons suggests that a cut-off agreement limited to production can be achieved within a reasonable timeframe. This approach would also moderate the increase in the IAEA's resources needed to enable it, as appropriate, to verify a cut-off convention as a verification regime concentrated on production facilities and their products would suffice. In contrast a wide scope agreement covering all facilities and all fissile material would require application of fullscope type safeguards similar to those currently applied in the non-nuclear- weapon States.

Acceptance of a commitment to cease production of fissile material should not imply that existing stockpiles are to exist in perpetuity. Arrangements should be found to have stocks verified and safeguarded as early as possible in the disarmament process.

This limited verification, confined to safeguarding of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium, is technically adequate, assuming that there are no clandestine, undeclared enrichment or reprocessing plants. Such an assumption will be supported by the increased capabilities of the IAEA safeguards regime for the detection of clandestine facilities.

Measures to build confidence that all activity has been declared should be developed concurrently with negotiation of a cut-off convention and might include declarations by all States of all their nuclear activities, military as well as civil, possibly with ongoing reporting on all activities, monitoring for environmental signatures indicating possible undeclared activities, application of remote surveillance techniques and access arrangements to enable the IAEA to investigate possible undeclared enrichment or reprocessing activity.

Safeguarding of enrichment and reprocessing facilities is complex, and considerable time will be needed to develop IAEA safeguards. ...

Verifying Nuclear Warheads Dismantlement and Elimination

Existing nuclear arms reduction treaties provide for destruction of missiles and other delivery systems but do not address elimination and destruction of nuclear warheads. This situation is reflected in the state of nuclear arms control verification. Methods for monitoring the destruction of strategic and shorter range missiles and strategic bombers are well established and have been used to verify destruction of heavy missile launchers (silos and submarine launch tubes) and heavy bombers under the SALT and START treaties, and intermediate-range missiles under the INF treaty. In the case of nuclear warheads, methods for verifying their dismantlement have been worked out on a general level but no comprehensive verification regime is in place.

The United States and Russia have taken some preliminary steps to ensure warheads are dismantled and the process made irreversible but these two States are yet to agree on specific technologies and procedures which could be employed. Higher priority should be given to bilateral and multilateral development of the techniques needed to verify nuclear warhead elimination. Bilateral procedures should in due course be shared with the other three nuclear-weapon States, perhaps with agreed modifications, as they prepare to join the disarmament process.

The first step toward a verification system for the elimination of nuclear weapons will be for the nuclear-weapon States to declare their holdings of nuclear warheads and weapons-grade material. In the first instance this could involve a US/Russian exchange as part of preparations for further bilateral reductions.

A possible model is the nuclear stockpile data exchange under discussion between the United States and Russia. A data exchange of this type could initially provide information on numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons added, retired, dismantled and remaining in service, broken down by categories. Information on total masses of military plutonium and highly-enriched uranium again broken down by categories should also be provided. Subsequent to a US/Russian exchange of stockpile data, whether public or not, the other nuclear-weapon States could make similar declarations as preparation for joining the nuclear disarmament process. As reductions proceed the initial data exchange should be expanded to provide a comprehensive picture of a State's military nuclear activity. The undeclared nuclear-weapon States and threshold States will also have to end their nuclear ambiguity and to provide data on their programs to establish a basis for their involvement in nuclear disarmament.

Confidence-building would be served by openness about weapons stockpiles. It is essential that States move promptly toward full disclosure of production and stocks of nuclear warheads and unsafeguarded fissile material.

One problem that must be addressed is the poor quality of accounting procedures applied during the early years of fissile material production. For example the United States recently admitted to a measurement error problem resulting in an inventory difference or material unaccounted for of 2.8 tonnes of weapons- grade plutonium. A difference of this magnitude in the civil plutonium cycle would be cause for great concern. In the military cycle measurement uncertainties could be used to disguise retention of stocks of nuclear weapons material.

The United States and Russia are already cooperating on measures to improve accountancy and control of weapons material. All States producing unsafeguarded fissile material must ensure they are in a position to establish the most credible baseline data possible for their fissile material production. Techniques such as study of enrichment plant records and tails assays should be employed to reduce to the minimum any uncertainties about past production of fissile material.

The more information that can be exchanged regarding the specific locations, amounts, and forms of materials, the greater the potential synergistic benefit in terms of developing a full picture of fissile material production. This process should be applied to each phase of the life cycle of military fissile materials: production and separation of the materials; fabrication of fissile material weapons components; assembly, deployment, retirement, and disassembly of nuclear weapons; and storage and eventual disposition of fissile materials. These measures would be mutually reinforcing, building confidence that the information exchanged was accurate and that the goals of the regime were being met.

A sufficiently inclusive approach would make it difficult to falsify the broad range of information exchanged in a consistent way. Nevertheless, because of the large amounts of fissile material involved, a small measurement uncertainty would represent sufficient material for many nuclear weapons. Resulting doubts that some nuclear material and/or nuclear bombs may have been hidden may delay final elimination of nuclear weapons but should not prevent movement toward this objective.

When information on warhead numbers and types has been established a next step would be to seal warhead containers and indelibly tag them using suitable verification techniques such as bar codes, tamper indicating seals, metal surface 'fingerprints', measurement of mass, dimensions and chemical composition of warheads and active and passive radiation detectors. With some of these techniques there is a danger that warhead design information could be revealed. Approaches in their application are available, however, which should preserve the security of design information, for example through lowering the resolution of radiation detectors.

Inventoried warheads awaiting dismantlement should be inspected periodically to ensure that warhead disposition corresponds with information in the stockpile data exchange and to identify weapons entering a dismantlement facility. Use of tagging techniques should ensure that fake warheads cannot be substituted for weapons awaiting dismantlement and the real warheads diverted.

It would be inadvisable to attempt to apply IAEA inspections at the dismantlement process unless verification techniques are available which protect sensitive information. Alternatives which would allow monitoring of dismantlement without revealing design information are available, such as application to the dismantlement facility of the containment principle whereby a boundary would be established around the dismantlement facility. Actual dismantlement would be carried out by citizens of the State owning the weapons. All portals with access through this boundary would be monitored visually and using techniques outlined above to ensure there was no passage of unauthorised items into or out of the facility. The main inputs would be the tagged warheads. The main outputs would be accurately measured quantities of highly- enriched uranium and plutonium in forms which do not reveal design information and which can be made subject to IAEA safeguards. Non- nuclear components would be destroyed within the containment boundary by the State owning the weapons. Another option for protecting sensitive information could be to ensure that inspectors monitoring the dismantlement process come from countries with a similar level of weapons program to the weapons being dismantled.

The two main fissile materials, highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, are at the heart of every weapon. In any phased elimination arrangement, both should be safeguarded downstream from the point where weapons are dismantled to their eventual disposal. In the interests of speed, monitoring of storage could initially be conducted by the nuclear-weapon States but the IAEA should be brought into the process rapidly. In the case of plutonium stored as 'pits' the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on management and disposition of excess weapons plutonium concluded that adequate safeguards could be provided without compromising sensitive weapons design information by declassifying the mass of plutonium in the pits, and allowing IAEA monitors to assay the sealed containers holding the pits without observing the components' dimensions. While this procedure needs to be scrutinised in the light of reasonable assumptions about what a State might do to attempt to defeat such verifications, as a concept it is worthy of further investigation.

Although intermediate storage is an inevitable step preceding all longer-term disposition options, such storage should be minimised. Maintaining vast stocks of excess material in a readily weapons usable form over the long term would send negative political signals for non-proliferation and for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It should also be noted that the security against the risks of diversion and theft is entirely dependent on the durability of the political arrangements under which storage is conducted. One of the key criteria by which disposition options should be judged is the speed with which they can be accomplished, and thus how rapidly they curtail these risks of storage.

Disposition of Warhead Uranium and Plutonium

Verification arrangements will be needed for monitoring the long term disposition of fissile material removed from warheads. The NAS report referred to above recommends that the United States and Russia pursue long term disposition options that:

* Minimise the time during which this material is stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons

* Preserve material safeguards and security during the disposition process, seeking to maintain the same high standards of security and accounting applied to stored nuclear weapons (which the NAS report termed the 'stored weapons standard')

* Result in a form from which the uranium would be as difficult to recover for weapons use as ordinary commercial low-enriched uranium, and the plutonium would be as difficult to recover for weapons use as the larger and growing quantity of plutonium in commercial spent fuel...

* Meet high standards of protection for public and worker health and the environment.

In the case of highly-enriched uranium, achieving these goals is technically straightforward. Highly-enriched uranium can be blended with other forms of uranium to produce proliferation resistant low-enriched uranium for commercial fuel. The United States has agreed to purchase 500 tonnes of excess Russian highly- enriched uranium, blended to low-enriched uranium, over 20 years. The United States is planning to undertake a similar blending process for most of its own stockpile of excess highly-enriched uranium.

Speeding up the rate of blending down of highly-enriched uranium would have the advantage of reducing the time during which this material remained in weapons usable form. Even if the commercial market cannot absorb the material more rapidly, or sufficient facilities for blending the material more rapidly to a commercial quality product cannot be made available, it would be highly desirable to blend the material rapidly to an intermediate level below 20 percent enrichment, or even below 10 percent so that it was no longer usable in weapons.

Plutonium raises more difficult issues. Because, at least in principle, all mixtures of plutonium isotopes could be used to make a nuclear explosive device, plutonium cannot be blended to a highly proliferation resistant form in the same way that highly- enriched uranium can. The NAS study identified two leading candidate approaches for reducing the accessibility of weapons plutonium to a level corresponding to the 'spent fuel standard'. They are:

* The current reactor/spent fuel option, which would use light- water reactors or Canadian deuterium-uranium reactors of currently operating types or evolutionary adaptations of them, employing mixed-oxide fuel in a once-through mode, to embed the weapons plutonium in spent fuel similar to the larger quantity of such fuel that will exist in any case from ordinary nuclear electricity generation

* The vitrification with wastes option, which would immobilise the weapons plutonium together with intensely radioactive fission products in heavy glass logs of the type planned for use in the immobilisation of military high level radioactive wastes.

All options should be evaluated carefully to determine which offers the best solution for long term disposition of former weapons plutonium, including any new possibilities that emerge as nuclear disarmament proceeds.

The security risks of plutonium in spent fuel are not zero, and this is so whether the plutonium is of military or civilian origin. So while it is very worthwhile to provide for weapons plutonium, as rapidly as possible, the same chemical and radiological barriers to diversion and theft for weapons use as exist for reactor grade plutonium in spent fuel, it is also important that safeguards and protections applied to all spent fuel are adequate in relation to the residual security risks posed by such material.

Work should be accelerated on development of techniques for IAEA safeguarding of former weapons use fissile material. The nuclear- weapon States should work closely with the IAEA to develop methods which provide the high level of assurance needed without compromising sensitive information.

Civil Fissile Material

In principle, plutonium of any isotopic composition (apart from plutonium containing 80 percent or more of the isotope Pu-238) can be used in nuclear explosive devices, and for IAEA safeguards purposes all plutonium (other than Pu-238) is regarded as a 'direct use material' that can be used in the manufacture of nuclear explosives. Because of the short time needed to convert direct use material into components for a nuclear explosive device it has been suggested that verification of a nuclear-weapon-free world would be simplified if plutonium recycle did not occur. Use of plutonium in civil power programs is not proscribed by the NPT, however, and a number of countries have formed the view that they have no alternative to plutonium use in their civil fuel cycle if they are to meet their electricity supply needs. Such States have invested large sums in civil plutonium use.

Plutonium is produced as a natural consequence of the irradiation of U-238. The production of plutonium in a conventional reactor is therefore unavoidable. In practice, plutonium for nuclear weapons purposes is produced in dedicated reactors where burn-up levels, hence Pu-240 and Pu-238 content, can be minimised and there is no doubt that plutonium at a suitably low burn-up level is extremely attractive for nuclear weapons purposes, and that 'reactor grade' plutonium is less so. History shows that reactor grade plutonium has not been a material of choice for weapons use.

Nevertheless, plutonium use in the civil fuel cycle raises a number of issues including the requirement that strict controls be applied through application of safeguards, physical protection and rigorous national accountancy and control. Because of the sensitivity of this material, any stockpiling of plutonium by a non-nuclear-weapon State beyond legitimate energy needs would be of security and proliferation concern and could result in doubts about the viability of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

It is essential that the control regime for civil plutonium use continue to deliver high levels of confidence that such material remains in exclusively peaceful use. States using civil plutonium also have a duty to ensure that by doing so they are not creating regional or wider tensions. This obligation is especially cogent regarding assurances that they are not stockpiling fissile material in excess of normal civil operational requirements for nuclear energy requirements. One means of doing this would be for such States to increase transparency regarding their management and use of fissile material by publishing details of their projected fissile material needs and fissile material holdings. Once a comprehensive, voluntary arrangement is operating steps could be taken to develop a treaty requiring all States to declare and account for their stocks of fissile material.

A correct balance must be struck by the international community between the interests of States using weapons-grade or direct use material for civil purposes and the wider general interest in ensuring that use of such material does not result in proliferation pressures or frustrate achievement of a nuclear- weapon-free world.

One possibility may be to draw a distinction between plutonium of different isotopic grades and to use this distinction both for safeguards purposes and for a proscription on the separation of plutonium of an isotopic composition which makes it attractive for weapons use. If combined with a prohibition on production of uranium at or near weapons-grade and the cut-off convention (which would apply only to fissile material produced for explosive use), this would stop production of all nuclear material at or near weapons-grade. This would constitute an important confidence- building measure in support of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Weapons-grade nuclear materials have very limited use in civil nuclear activities and therefore a prohibition on their production should not cause practical difficulties with any ongoing legitimate civil (or military) requirement for such materials being met from existing stocks.

Were a State to be producing significant quantities of separated plutonium at or near weapons-grade, the application of safeguards measures, though technically sound, would not provide the requisite degree of assurance about the future intent of the State concerned. The best way of building confidence is to avoid production of material of this kind. Where reprocessing of low burn-up material is proposed, arrangements could be put in place to ensure such material is reprocessed in stream with high burn-up material, such as normal spent fuel, so that the resultant product will have a sufficiently high proportion of the higher plutonium isotopes.

The clearest example of potential large scale incidence of low burn-up plutonium is the blanket material from fast breeder reactors. Plutonium in fast breeder blankets is the equivalent of very low burn-up, its isotopic composition being similar to weapons-grade (or even 'super grade', i.e. around 3 percent Pu- 240). Since production of blanket material is the major reason for operating fast breeders (i.e.. to obtain plutonium for recycle), obviously it is not practicable to proscribe the production of such plutonium in irradiated blanket material. It is possible however to avoid the production of low burn-up plutonium as a separated product, by ensuring that irradiated material containing any such plutonium will only be reprocessed in stream with high burn-up material (e.g. fast breeder core fuel, or light water reactor fuel).

It is an unfortunate consequence of the current practice of not differentiating between plutonium grades for safeguards purposes that special attention is not directed to plutonium having the isotopic characteristics of greatest proliferation concern. Where irradiated fuel containing low burn-up plutonium is stored in spent fuel ponds, there is a strong case for subjecting it to particular safeguards attention to provide extra assurance of non- diversion.

A possible risk of drawing a distinction between the various grades of plutonium is that it could result in pressure to consider whether controls on reactor grade plutonium should be reduced. A further consideration is that enhanced controls on low burn-up plutonium would probably increase the costs of safeguarding plutonium from weapons dismantlement. In circumstances where safeguards resources are under great pressure, it would be necessary to determine whether using such resources to increase controls on low burn-up plutonium would be the most cost- effective option in terms of benefit to the non-proliferation regime. Therefore there would be merit in investigating various categories of plutonium in terms of applicable safeguards measures and resulting verification costs.

As to a prohibition on production of uranium at or near weapons- grade, apart from minor quantities for laboratory use the only civil requirement for highly-enriched uranium (at or above 20 percent U-235) is in certain research reactors and critical assemblies. In recent years there has been a concerted program of converting research reactors from highly-enriched uranium to low- enriched uranium fuel, and very few still operate on highly- enriched uranium. Fewer still operate on highly-enriched uranium fuel of weapons-grade, the recent decision by Germany to proceed with a new reactor using such fuel being a controversial example. To the extent that use of highly-enriched uranium cannot be avoided in advanced scientific research, obtaining this material from the very extensive stocks held by the nuclear-weapon States will help run down those stocks and obviate any further production. Highly-enriched uranium is also used by some of the nuclear-weapon States in marine propulsion reactors for both surface ships and submarines. States using highly-enriched uranium for this purpose have adequate stocks and do not require further production.

A prohibition on production of all nuclear material at or near weapons-grade may prove a practical step of considerable value in support of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and could be included in the proposed cut-off convention or a complementary international agreement.

As nuclear disarmament gathers pace the amount of fissile material to be brought under IAEA safeguards will increase dramatically. This material will be made up of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium components from dismantled weapons and fissile material inventories not stored in weapon component form. As a guide, the United States currently has about 84 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium and about 500 tonnes of weapons use highly-enriched uranium. Russian stocks are at least equal and could be higher. It is essential that former weapons fissile material be afforded the highest standards of accounting and control and physical protection to ensure that it does not contribute to concerns about cheating or leakage to other actors.

As agreed at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, fissile material removed from weapons should be made subject to IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable. This will have to be done in a way that ensures that sensitive information relating to weapons design is protected. The options for doing this are either to convert the material to forms which do not reveal weapons information when accounted for by traditional IAEA safeguards measurement techniques, or to develop new techniques to account for the material in component form without revealing sensitive information. ...

Tritium

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is an essential ingredient of most modern nuclear weapons, both for initiation of the fission reaction and for enhancing or boosting that reaction. It is subject to rapid radioactive decay - its half-life is 12.3 years - so there is no doubt that an appropriate control regime could play a major part in the elimination of nuclear weapons. While pure fission nuclear weapons can be made without tritium, there would be profound design consequences, e.g. they would have to be physically larger for the same yield, hence less easily deliverable.

Tritium has a number of non-nuclear uses, and Canada, the major civil producer, has established a regime of peaceful use assurances and bilateral accounting for tritium supply. This might form the basis for an international tritium control regime although it is expected that verification arrangements would also be required.

The nuclear-weapon States are unlikely to accept inclusion of tritium in the proposed cut-off convention because of the changes to force structures this would require and consequent effect on deterrence. Nonetheless, such controls will be an important part of the disarmament process and associated verification arrangements and it would be surprising if the nuclear-weapon States did not come to recognise that it is in their own interests for an appropriate regime to be established in due course. ...

Funding

It is essential that the international community recognise that laying the foundation for a nuclear-weapon-free world will require additional resources. At the US/Russian bilateral level this will include funding verification measures for bilateral monitoring of the early stages of disarmament such as warhead dismantlement and initial monitoring of fissile material removed from warheads. This process would probably be extended to the other nuclear-weapon States when they join the disarmament process with accompanying resource requirements. Resources will also be needed for the multilateral safeguards system in particular to strengthen the IAEA's capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activity and to apply safeguards at nuclear-weapon State fissile material production facilities under a cut-off convention.

The IAEA's safeguards budget is approximately US $75 million per year and provides a considerable security benefit for a modest outlay. IAEA safeguards are under great pressure because of the need to apply safeguards at an increasing number of facilities. The demands nuclear disarmament will make of the Agency will add to this pressure. ...

The political commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons must be matched by a willingness to make available the resources needed for nuclear disarmament including for effective verification. The amounts involved are likely to be considerable, especially for dismantlement of weapons and disposition of their fissile material content, but very much less than developing, maintaining and upgrading nuclear arsenals. The costs of verification also need to be weighed against the substantial contribution to global, regional and national security effective verification of a nuclear- weapon-free world would make.

Infrastructure Dismantlement

Part of the penultimate stage before final elimination of nuclear weapons should be the sequential destruction of nuclear weapons facilities. The object of this infrastructure dismantlement would be to discourage any breakout by making it a drawn-out, highly visible, large-scale, costly process.

The infrastructure dismantlement phase would begin with disclosure by the nuclear-weapon States and any remaining undeclared weapon States and threshold States of their infrastructure for the production and assembly of the various elements of weapons. They would also need to agree to international monitoring to verify that weapons production has halted and that the capacity to resume production has been essentially eliminated. This would require agreements on infrastructure declarations, monitoring and dismantlement processes. Reductions in stockpiles of warheads would continue.

At this stage the nuclear-weapon States and any remaining States presumed to have a nuclear weapons capacity should compile annotated charts tracing each critical element of their weapons back out into the economy through the fabricator up to whatever level technical specialists may designate. At this stage of nuclear weapons elimination there can be no valid reason not to make full disclosure of this supply net and then to eliminate those critical elements whose retention could shorten the time and cost of resuming weapon production.

There may be a need to allow the retention of some facilities on a care and maintenance basis for a period of time to provide reassurance to the nuclear-weapon States until their confidence in the process has increased sufficiently to allow them to complete the task. Any cheating at this stage would require clandestine infrastructure which would need to be supplied with fissile material and the verification arrangements for a cut-off convention should be able to detect any clandestine activities at this stage in the process of disarmament.

More should not be expected of infrastructure dismantlement than it can deliver. In the period immediately following elimination any former nuclear-weapon State could rapidly reconstitute a few bombs using plutonium recovered from spent fuel, assuming it was prepared to abrogate the relevant treaties and the international community did not act to stop it.

By the time the elimination phase of nuclear disarmament is reached the nuclear-weapon States and the undeclared weapon States and threshold States will have halted production of weapon material, accepted safeguards on their facilities for enrichment and for plutonium separation and on material flows from those facilities and dismantled the infrastructure for the production of weapons. Ensuring the maximum degree of transparency during these processes is of central importance.

The Elimination Phase

As the nuclear powers go into their final countdown, there may be resistance to rapid elimination should the nuclear-weapon States want a pause of some years to assure themselves (and others) that this elimination of bomb-building capabilities was both genuine and stable. A penultimate step to elimination might be the reduction of nuclear forces to very small residual levels - possibly but not necessarily equal - that would be retained until it is clear that a viable support regime for a nuclear-weapon-free world is in place. The small residual weapon stocks would be reassuring to the nuclear-weapon States though not to many others, since it would mean that the world of mutual deterrence had not yet vanished. These residual forces would then be eliminated simultaneously.

Such a stalemate would be less likely if the strengthened safeguards system currently being developed by the IAEA is instituted quickly and further developed over the course of the nuclear disarmament process. In addition, successful operation of verification during the steps toward disarmament on such sensitive tasks as eliminating weapon assembly facilities and reducing weapon stockpiles would enhance confidence that the very last stage was indeed going to be executed in strict compliance with treaty commitments.

Verification in a Nuclear-weapon-free world

The most plausible breakout scenario would be for one of the nuclear-weapon States, or one of the States thought to have a nuclear capacity, to conceal a few weapons and/or fissile material from the disarmament process. Even with a highly intrusive verification regime, detection of a well shielded weapons/fissile material cache would be difficult with today's technology. But the elimination of nuclear weapons is likely to take some decades so prospects for technical detection of breakout should not be measured against today's technology. It is reasonable to expect substantial increases in the capacity of the technical verification system will flow from the experience gained in verifying the move to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Apart from international verification activities of the IAEA and related bodies, the cooperation of all States would be essential as an additional layer of deterrence to any government that might consider concealing fissile material. Any State which through national technical means becomes aware of potential violations of verification regimes should bring this to the attention the appropriate verification authority.

Societal verification, or citizen's reporting, may prove to be an additional means of supporting the verification system for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Considerable doubts have been raised about societal verification's potential to contribute to verification of a nuclear-weapon-free world. In today's world or one close to it this scepticism appears to have foundation. Where the sceptics may be wrong is in extrapolating today's world indefinitely into the future. Change is inevitably coming, including in international interdependence, in developments in global communications and within societies. The right of individuals to bring violations of international obligations to the public notice is becoming increasingly recognised. A number of these changes may make societal verification an increasingly meaningful adjunct to more traditional verification methods. ...

The possible role of societal verification would be enhanced if personal responsibility became an established norm in the area of weapons of mass destruction, i.e. if it were accepted that production and use of weapons of mass destruction constituted a personal crime under international law by the individuals involved as well as by the State. In these circumstances there would be a strong incentive for individuals not to participate in or support State weapons of mass destruction programs and an incentive for whistle blowing particularly by persons who might otherwise be seen as being implicated in an illegal activity.

A second source of breakout concern is that States may seek to establish a clandestine nuclear fuel cycle and weapons program. The 93+2 program for strengthening IAEA safeguards is a sound foundation for development of technical arrangements to provide a high degree of probability that undeclared nuclear activity would be detected. As with the concealment scenario, to increase the probability of detection, information from technical verification should be supplemented by a range of other sources including intelligence information, export control regimes and societal verification. ..."

News Review

Review compiled from reports appearing between 15 August and 15 September. The Review is an account of news reports and does not seek to put forward or reflect the views or claims of Dfax.

CTBT approved by UN General Assembly

Introduction

On 10 September, the 50th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approved the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiated between January 1994 and August 1996 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva - see CTBT Special Report. Resolution A/50/L.78 was adopted by 153 votes to 3 - Bhutan, India and Libya - with 5 abstentions - Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria and Tanzania - and 19 absentees. It read:

"The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 50/65 of 12 December 1995, in which the Assembly declared its readiness to resume consideration of the item 'Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty,' as necessary, before its 51st session in order to endorse the text of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,

1. Adopts the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, as contained in A/50/1027;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Treaty, to open it for signature, at United Nations headquarters, at the earliest possible date;

3. Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their respective constitutional processes, to become Parties to the Treaty at the earliest possible date;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Treaty, to report to the General Assembly at its 52nd session on the status of signature and ratifications of the Treaty."

It was later reported that the Treaty would open for signature on 24 September - see CTBT Update and next issue.

The Treaty cannot enter into force until it has been ratified by 44 States, including India, with nuclear reactors and/or research facilities. See last issue for a detailed summary of the Treaty's provisions, and analysis of developments leading to its failure to be adopted by the CD. The following thumbnail sketch was supplied by the White House on 10 September:

"Structure

The Treaty itself includes a Protocol in three parts: Part I detailing the International Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On- Site Inspections (OSI); and Part III on Confidence-Building Measures. There are also two Annexes to the Protocol: Annex 1 detailing the location of various Treaty monitoring assets associated with the IMS; and Annex 2 detailing the parameters for screening events.

Basic obligations

The CTBT will ban any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion...

Organization

The Treaty establishes an organization to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification measures. The organization includes a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat, which shall include the International Data Center.

Verification and inspections

The Treaty's verification regime includes an international monitoring system composed of seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures. The use of national technical means, vital for the Treaty's verification regime, is explicitly provided for. Requests for on-site inspections must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. The Executive Council must act within 96 hours of receiving a request for an inspection.

Treaty compliance and sanctions

The Treaty provides for measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement of disputes. If the Conference or Executive Council determines that a case is of particular gravity, it can bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations.

Amendments

Any State Party to the Treaty may propose an amendment to the Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Amendments shall be considered by an Amendment Conference and shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.

Entry into force

The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. Annex 2 includes 44 States members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with nuclear power and/or research reactors. If the Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, a conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification may convene annually to consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.

Review

Ten years after entry into force, a Conference of the States Parties will be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty.

Duration

The Treaty is of unlimited duration. Each State Party has the right to withdraw from the CTBT if it decides that extraordinary events related to its subject matter have jeopardized its supreme national interests.

Depositary

The Secretary General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession."

Reaction and comment

Australia

Prime Minister John Howard, Canberra, 11 September

"[The CTBT] is a milestone in international efforts to address the threat to global security posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. ... It is a vital step towards the goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons."

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Canberra, 11 September

"We regard the passing of this resolution overnight as an enormously important development in the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime... What we've been able to do is salvage this Treaty from certain death in the Conference on Disarmament, which depended on a consensus and a consensus couldn't be reached..."

Sir Richard Butler, Ambassador to the UN, 10 September

"What is at issue is the fulfillment of a promise, a promise made amongst ourselves and to the international community for over 30 years, a promise we are now able to keep... How easy would it be now for anyone to conduct a nuclear test?"

Butler, Press Conference, 10 September

"Now that the world community has spoken with such a clear voice, I am sure we will enter into a period of diplomatic and political conversation about ways in which [India] can be encouraged [to sign]..."

Brazil

Celso Amorim, Ambassador to the UN, also speaking on behalf of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, 10 September

"The complete cessation of nuclear tests forever is in itself a great achievement... It should lead to new and decisive measures of nuclear disarmament, paving the way to a world free of nuclear weapons. ... While the draft before the General Assembly may not address all concerns, it encompasses the unprecedented commitment to stop nuclear explosions forever... we should take advantage of the present window of opportunity and adopt the CTBT now..."

China

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang, Beijing, 11 September

"This undoubtedly conforms to the common interests of the entire international community... [The Treaty] can only help encourage the process of global nuclear disarmament, prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms, and strengthen global peace and stability. We hope this Treaty can be promulgated and signed as soon as possible, and that it is supported and respected by every country in the world. ... in the field of nuclear disarmament, the international community still has an arduous task and a long way to go..."

Cuba

Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, Ambassador to the UN, 10 September

"There is still a threat of annihilation of all mankind..."

Egypt

President Hosni Mubarak, Cairo, 12 September

"We will sign when Israel does..."

Foreign Minister Amr Mussa, Cairo, 11 September

"...the aim of this pact, to stop, nuclear tests, is good... [We want] this total ban [to] be implemented without exception on all the countries that have a nuclear potential."

Mounir Zahran, Ambassador to the UN, 10 September

"[This Treaty] should be followed by several serious steps on the road to the elimination of nuclear weapons within an agreed time- frame."

France

Government spokesperson Alain Lamassoure, recounting remarks by President Chirac to a Cabinet meeting, Paris, 11 September

"...this success will allow us to finally turn the page on the nuclear arms race. It gives future generations the hope of a world free from the threat of nuclear proliferation."

Foreign Ministry statement, 10 September

"The adoption and future opening for signature of the CTBT demonstrates the international community's desire to definitively end the nuclear arms race. It also contributes in a decisive manner to the battle against the proliferation of nuclear arms. The approval given to the Treaty in New York thus offers the prospect of a safer and more stable world."

Germany

Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, 11 September

"[This is an] historic breakthrough on the road to a complete test ban... [But] although an important obstacle has been removed on the path of the definitive abolition of nuclear tests, our goal has not been reached. ... We may not be able to put the genie of the atom back into the bottle, but we have at least tamed it."

India

External Affairs Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, addressing Parliament, New Delhi, 11 September

"I don't think the Treaty has any value as it stands. The CTBT is highly desirable but as it is set down it is a charade and a deliberate attempt to deceive the world. Our position for the last 40 years has been to abolish and destroy both nuclear tests and nuclear weapons. It is a misfortune for the entire world that India's genuine concerns are not being projected. People are being misled. ...

We shall not sign the Treaty... There has been no pressure on India to sign the Treaty but if there is any, this country has the national will to withstand pressure... We shall sustain the glorious path laid by Gandhi and Nehru..."

Gujral, remarks during a television interview, quoted by Press Trust of India, 7 September

"We will make the weapons as and when it suits us. We are not going to let others decide for us... I cannot bind my hands and also endanger the prosperity of the coming generation by not...responding to a matter of security as and when it arises..."

Gujral, New Delhi, 22 August

"The veto at Geneva by India does not mean that we are going in for new types of weapons... [We have exercised] unparalleled restraint in manufacturing nuclear weapons... But India cannot accept constraints on its nuclear option as long as nuclear-weapon States continue to rely on their nuclear arsenals for their security..."

Prakash Shah, Ambassador to the UN, 9 September

"This procedure erodes the standing of the Conference on Disarmament... Treaties are made through voluntary agreements, not by procedural manoeuvre and political persuasion...

The nuclear-weapon States have no intention of giving up their dependence on nuclear weapons, nor do they have any intention of letting the CTBT become an impediment in their pursuit of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons... Countries around us continue their weapons programme either openly or in a clandestine manner..."

Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador to the CD, speaking at the UN, 10 September

"I would like to declare on the floor of this august assembly that India will never sign this unequal Treaty - not now, not later... As long as this text contains this [entry into force] article, this Treaty will never come into force. ... [The Treaty] will encourage a nuclear weapons technology race [and] cannot be considered a first step in the disarmament process..."

Ghose, interviewed by Inter Press Service, New York, 10 September

"Nobody likes the resolution. They've all been sat upon..."

United Front government spokesperson S. Jaipal Reddy, New Delhi, 11 September

"China is the only nuclear power in Asia and holds the strings... It can step up pressure whenever it wants and can destabilise the region."

Jaswant Singh, Deputy Leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (Hindu People's Party - BJP), addressing Parliament, 11 September

"We cannot be at the mercy of the United States... It [opposing the Treaty] is all the more necessary looking at the way our neighbouring country, Pakistan, is arming itself and is engaged in developing its nuclear capability..."

Tapan Sikdar, BJP National Secretary, 11 September

"With Pakistan having been nuclear and China having been so for many years, India must go nuclear to defend its sovereignty."

Indian Express newspaper, 12 September

"Even India, bitter though it has reason to be for being put on the rack at Geneva, may find that this incomplete Treaty is better than no Treaty."

Times of India newspaper, 12 September

"It comes as no surprise at all that countries which voted to legitimise nuclear weapons should have replayed the sham through this Treaty and perpetuated the divide between the five nuclear hegemons and the rest of the international community... It [the adoption of the Treaty] was a sad day for the UN and the international community but a proud day for India."

The Pioneer newspaper, 12 September

"Non-nuclear countries with good standards of living and productivity are better models for India to emulate."

Editor's note: On 18 August, a poll published in the magazine India Today recorded only a substantial minority - 36% - of respondents as being supportive of the government's CTBT policy.

Indonesia

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Jakarta, 27 August

"... I hope the advanced countries don't delay their participation in the Treaty under the pretext that India has blocked it... We fully understand India's position...[but] we [also] see the importance of what has been agreed on by nuclear countries to stop nuclear testing after about 30 years of effort... The most important thing is to maintain what we have already achieved so far."

Iran

Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Javed Zarif, New York, 10 September

"The non-aligned States should be rejoicing today. But what we see here today, to our most profound regret, is an attitude that can best be described as sombre. ... There is a serious risk that the nuclear arms race [will] be re-ignited at a new and probably more dangerous level"

Deputy Foreign Minister Zarif, quoted by Iran's IRNA News Agency, 11 September

"We were left with no choice [but to support the resolution] - having to decide between a flawed Treaty and abandoning the Treaty altogether. Based on an overall assessment and a strong desire for nuclear disarmament, Iran will go along with the Treaty, while preserving its position on several points... This text is grossly tilted in favour of a few nuclear-weapons-possessing States. It provides them with the opportunity to develop nuclear arms... [Iran will] double efforts in cooperating with other non-aligned States to push for a programme of nuclear disarmament within an agreed time-frame... We hope that other independent countries will join us in convincing nuclear-weapons States that lame commitments to nuclear disarmament are not acceptable... [But even] with all its shortcomings [the CTBT] should accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament."

Ireland, on behalf of the European Union

Statement by Foreign Minister Dick Spring, Brussels, 11 September

"As [holders of the] Presidency of the European Union, Ireland [gives] expression to the firm support and commitment of the Union to this Treaty... This Treaty is not the end of the process. There is a need for further systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation."

Japan

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, Tokyo, 11 September

"It is a big step forward. From now on, the international community must make its utmost efforts to persuade India and other countries to accept the Treaty..."

Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda, Tokyo, 11 September

"[I hope opponents of the Treaty] will reconsider their positions from the broader perspective of promoting nuclear disarmament."

Government spokesperson Seiroku Kajiyama, Tokyo, 11 September

"We welcome the [move] as an historic step towards a nuclear-free world... We would like to be assured that the nuclear powers will never conduct nuclear testing..."

Malaysia

Razali Ismail, Ambassador to the UN, 10 September

"Flawed as the Treaty is, Malaysia would join others, albeit with a lot of reservations, in supporting the draft resolution..."

Nepal

Foreign Minister Prakash Chandra Lohani, Kathmandu, 9 September

"We believe that even in its present form, the proposed test ban treaty will help build a constructive environment conducive to nuclear disarmament. ... Nepal is of the long-term conviction that the world community should endeavour to attain nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework."

New Zealand

Disarmament Minister Doug Graham, 11 September

"...India...has said it will never sign the Treaty, so clearly entry into force will be a difficult process. However, we do have a commitment from the five nuclear-weapon States to cease testing, which in itself is a cause to celebrate."

Norway

Foreign Minister Bjoern Tore Godal, Oslo, 11 September

"The work for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been one of the main goals of Norwegian foreign policy for many years. It is of significant importance that the five nuclear powers have adopted the agreement... We are very pleased that the agreement was adopted by an overwhelming majority, and hope that this will also put pressure on those countries that decided not to join..."

Pakistan

President Farooq Leghari, Kampala, 13 September

"We agree with the Treaty in principle and we shall sign the agreements the moment India signs because we have great security concerns over nuclear activities in our region... We have a peaceful nuclear programme in our country even though we would like to build a military capacity to answer challenges posed by our neighbours..."

Munir Akram, Ambassador to the UN, 10 September

"I would like to state once again, for the record, that any step of nuclear escalation in our region will find a matching response by Pakistan to safeguard our security."

Ambassador Akram, 9 September

"...in view of the concerns arising from the position and policies of our neighbour, Pakistan will not sign the Treaty as long as these concerns continue to exist... The adoption of the CTBT should herald a new dawn in the history of the quest for global nuclear disarmament. Instead, a dark sun has appeared over the skies of South Asia."

Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Islamabad, 12 September

"Pakistan cannot be oblivious to threats to its security which are intensified by India's position on the nuclear test ban treaty... Pakistan, in view of its security concerns, cannot accept unilateral commitments...

Its [India's] opposition...is essentially due to its political ambitions and technological considerations rather than moralistic arguments over nuclear disarmament... It is evident that India's opposition...emanates from its nuclear ambitions and its reluctance to forego further development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programme, which poses a real threat to the security of its neighbours."

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, now Chair of the Senate Committee on Defense, 23 August

"The government should think that if India eventually signs, what option will be left for Pakistan?"

Mian Abdul Wahid, Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 23 August

"The stand that unless India signs Pakistan won't either sounds like a clever riposte. But there is a danger that we might be hoisted with our own petard."

Russia

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Gennady Tarassov, Moscow, 11 September

"We welcome this event with satisfaction... We are expressing hope that the accord will receive the support of all the UN member countries and that it will be a major contribution in the gradual process towards a nuclear-free peace."

South Korea

Foreign Ministry statement, 10 September

"[This] will serve as the occasion to promote nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament by checking the development and upgrading of nuclear weapons. ..."

United Kingdom

Foreign Office spokesperson, 11 September

"We welcome the UN General Assembly vote endorsing the Treaty by an overwhelming majority. Britain has played a very active part in the negotiations. The UK intends to sign the Treaty on 24 September and to ratify thereafter. ... In common with most of the rest of the international community, we were very disappointed by India's decision to block the Treaty in Geneva and not to sign the text endorsed yesterday."

Defence Secretary Michael Portillo, 9 September

"Discussing it in the United Nations may help in indicating world opinion, but it will not in itself clinch the Treaty..."

Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, Islamabad, 27 August

"We respect India's concerns, we respect the concerns of all countries. It was not easy for the United Kingdom to agree to a Treaty to ban all nuclear testing."

Rifkind, New Delhi, 29 August

"I'm here to try and understand better the Indian point of view. India has a long-standing commitment on disarmament issues. It has a genuine desire to see a safer world. ... We [in the UK] concluded that here was a historic opportunity for the world. If any country feels unable to sign, there is always a risk that others would come to the same conclusion and the whole thing starts unravelling. It's not a question of blame or responsibility."

United States

Statement by President Clinton, Kansas City, 10 September

"On behalf of the American people, I will have the honour to sign this historic Treaty.

Our signature, along with that of Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the vast majority of nations around the world will create an international barrier against nuclear testing as soon as we sign.

With this Treaty we're on the verge of realizing a decades-old dream, that no nuclear weapons will be detonated anywhere on the face of the Earth.

This has been a dream of American leaders going back to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. ... By banning all nuclear tests for all time, the Treaty will constrain any nation from improving its existing nuclear arsenal and end the development of advanced nuclear weapons and help to stop their spread. ...

For four decades visionary statesmen like Prime Minister Nehru of India worked tirelessly to make the Comprehensive Test Ban a reality. More recently, Britain's John Major, France's Jacques Chirac, Russia's Boris Yeltsin, China's Jiang Zemin - all have made courageous decisions to halt their country's nuclear testing programs. ..."

Asked about the opposition of India to the Treaty, President Clinton stated:

"The Indians have some concerns which they have made clear in public, but now that we have voted overwhelmingly to do it, and when we sign it, then we'll have to work out the entry into force provisions. I am convinced that we can do it, and I believe we can find a way for Indians to have their security concerns met. And so this is a big plus today. We're a lot closer today than we were yesterday toward realizing the dream of a comprehensive nuclear test ban Treaty."

Madeleine Albright, Ambassador to the UN, 10 September

"Today, nations of every size and outlook, from every continent, reflecting every culture and background, joined in support of a total ban on nuclear test explosions, and other nuclear explosions, of any size, in any place, at any time... This was a Treaty sought by ordinary people everywhere and today the power of that universal wish could not be denied. ... Overall, the CTBT reduces the danger of nuclear war and moves us towards the day when nuclear weapons will be nothing but a memory..."

Statement by John Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 10 September

"[Today has marked] an indispensable step to fulfilling our pledge to renounce the nuclear arms race and deny nuclear weapons to rogue States and terrorist groups. ... The nuclear danger has just been dramatically reduced... We have moved the world further from the days when schoolchildren drank milk laced with nuclear fallout and closer to a day when nuclear weapons themselves are a memory."

Statement by Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, 10 September

"I applaud the decision of the United Nations General Assembly... We all should salute President Clinton's courage in ending US nuclear weapons testing and providing an example for the world. ... The Treaty is a major advancement in the vital international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons... Its signing will be a giant step toward a more secure future and away from the nuclear weapons competition that defined the Cold War.

...technical talent from the Department [of Energy] allowed the United States to support a zero-yield CTBT and ensure its effective verification. This team now stands ready to face the challenges of Treaty verification and maintaining the safety and reliability of our remaining nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing."

Zimbabwe

M. T. Mapuranga, Ambassador to the UN, 10 September

"The Treaty would allow the most technologically advanced nuclear- weapon States to continue to improve their arsenals... It is understandable that some nuclear-weapon States find this unsatisfactory, for it blocks their advancement into the nuclear club. Yet it does not dissolve the club, but makes it even more exclusive... [But] for all its imperfections, the banning of test explosions would rid the world of the hazard of nuclear fall-out."

Other comment

UN Secretary-General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 10 September:

"The prohibition of nuclear weapons tests is an important first step toward nuclear disarmament and the future elimination of all nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth."

Dalai Lama, remarks quoted in Times of India, 17 August

"...I support India's stand on the CTBT that all nuclear powers should make a timetable for eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons... At present what's happening is that an attempt is being made to prevent non-nuclear powers from testing. That is inadequate..."

Reports: Dalai Lama backs Indian stance on test ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 17 August; 36 per cent of Indians support blocking of test ban treaty - survey, Agence France-Presse International News, 18 August; India vows not to go nuclear after vetoing test ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 22 August; Test ban waffle angers [Pakistan] opposition, Inter Press Service International News, 23 August; Indonesia urges CTBT adoption despite India's objection, Kyodo News Service, 27 August; Edited transcript of press conference by the Foreign Secretary, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 27 August; Indian nuclear block won't harm relations with Britain, says Rifkind, Agence France-Presse International News, 29 August; India to make nuclear weapons 'as and when it suits us', Agence France-Presse International News, 7 September; Text of Australia's anti-nuke resolution at UN, Reuter News Reports, 9 September; Britain casts doubt on CTBT, Australia confident, Reuter News Reports, 9 September; Nepal wants time frame for nuclear disarmament, Agence France-Presse International News, 9 September; UN General Assembly adopts global nuclear test-ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 10 September; France welcomes UN vote on nuclear test ban pact, Reuter News Reports, 10 September; France hails vote on CTBT, News From France, 10 September; UN vote means nuclear disarmament closer - Australia, Reuter News Reports, 10 September; Treaty banning atomic blasts to move through UN, Reuter News Reports, 10 September; Test ban treaty worthless paper - Indian officials, Reuter News Reports, 10 September; UN approves nuclear test ban treaty, AP Datastream International News Wire, 10 September; Strong majority backing nuclear Treaty in General Assembly, AP Datastream International News Wire, 10 September; White House Fact Sheet, 10 September; UN General Assembly overwhelmingly accepts CTBT text, United States Information Agency, 10 September; Clinton remarks on CTBT approval by United Nations, United States Information Agency, 10 September; Energy Secretary O'Leary's statement on CTBT, United States Information Agency, 10 September; India, Pakistan united against test ban treaty, Inter Press Service International News, 10 September; UN approves nuclear test ban, but doubts remain, Inter Press Service International News, 10 September; Statement by UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 September; UN approves comprehensive test ban treaty, Armed Forces Newswire Service, 11 September; CTBT 'a charade', says India Foreign Minister, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 September; Asia welcomes CTBT but wary of Indian sub-continent, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 September; Iran to reluctantly sign nuclear test ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 September; Indian test- ban snub puts South Asia in the nuclear spotlight, Agence France- Presse International News, 11 September; France to sign test ban treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 September; Russia hails adoption of nuclear test ban treaty, Agence France- Presse International News, 11 September; European powers praise nuclear accord, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 September; Norway says treaty an important move to end nuclear arms race, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 September; Nuke treaty signing begins soon - with eyes on India, Reuter News Reports, 11 September; Australia says UN vote boosts nuclear disarmament, Reuter News Reports, 11 September; UN approves anti- nuke treaty - signing begins soon, Reuter News Reports, 11 September; Japan welcomes UN adoption of nuclear ban pact, Reuter News Reports, 11 September; Asia welcomes anti-nuclear treaty, but mulls flaws, Reuter News Reports, 11 September; India, recalling Gandhi, resists nuclear test pact, Reuter News Reports, 11 September; Germany warns much work left on nuclear treaty, Reuter News Reports, 11 September; EU President Ireland welcomes treaty, urges more, Reuter News Reports, 11 September; Indian newspapers challenge anti-CTBT consensus, Agence France-Presse International News, 12 September; Israel must sign nuclear test ban treaty, says Egypt, Agence France-Presse International News, 12 September; Pakistan says will not sign CTBT without India, Reuter News Reports, 12 September; Pakistan to resist nuclear test ban unless India signs - Leghari, Agence France-Presse International News, 13 September.

France continues to seek to restore tarnished image

France's diplomatic and policy offensive to repair diplomatic fences damaged by its final series of nuclear tests has been boosted by its readmission as a Dialogue Partner of the 16-State South Pacific Forum (SPF). The decision was announced at a SPF Summit in the Marshall Islands on 5 September. A statement read:

"Leaders look forward to the resumption and further development of constructive relationship at a regional level with France. ... The suspension imposed...last year has been a significant and effective part of the region's campaign against nuclear testing..."

Despite the move, the SPF remains concerned at the condition of France's atoll test sites in the region. According to Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan (5 September): "We want them to be inside the ring so we can tell them exactly of the concerns of the countries close to the testing ground, or make them responsible for any damages...whether here, now, or into the future." Chan added that he was hoping for "conformity" with "some of the requests we hope to ask them."

On 6 September, France announced that its force of 18 S3D land- based nuclear missiles (with a range of 3,500 km/2,200 miles), based in silos at the Plateau d'Albion site in Provence, would be deactivated on 16 September. The decision to scrap the force, in service since 1971, was originally taken in February. The missiles will reportedly take 30 months to be dismantled, at a cost of around $75 million.

Reports: South Pacific ends nuclear rift with France, Reuter News Reports, 5 September; France shuts down nuclear missile base this month, Reuter News Reports, 6 September; France shuts down land- based nuclear missiles, Reuter News Reports, 15 September.

Missile defence developments

US-Russia ABM Treaty discussions

In late June, it was reported that the US and Russia had reached preliminary agreement on definitions of theatre missile defence (TMD) activity permissible under the 1972 US-Russia Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (see last issue). On 4 September, John Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), told reporters that full agreement was still proving elusive.

Editor's note: a partial agreement was signed in New York on 23 September - see Documents and Sources and next issue.

US missile defence plans

On 10 September, the US Senate approved - by 73 votes to 26 - the Financial Year (FY) 1997 Defense Authorization Act. The Act contains $350 million more funds for missile defence than requested (producing a total fund of around $3.7 billion) by the Administration. President Clinton announced on 7 September that he would not veto the Act, as he did last year in protest at missile defence stipulations aimed at establishing an ambitious national missile defence (NMD) system by 2003. To avoid a repeat veto, the Republican Congress is attempting to deal with long-term missile defence plans and objectives in separate legislation. In all, the Act contains over $10 billion of unrequested funding - which the Administration is not compelled to spend - out of total funds of $265.6 billion.

Doubt surrounds the fate of the intended legislation, and in particular the proposed Defend America Act. On 14 August, one of the would-be Act's strongest proponents, Senator Jon Kyl (Republican - Arizona) stated: "I don't think there's going to be a Defend America Act. The President will never sign it... We don't have time. And therefore I would say it's probably doomed for this year." Kyl added candidly that the Republicans had miscalculated the degree of public support for a massive NMD programme: "It's too complicated, the threat is not easy enough to perceive. It's simply not on people's minds."

In August, a report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) - Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options - claimed that the Administration could save $3.5 billion over the next years by abandoning "non-core" TMD programmes. The CBO classifies five programmes as falling into this category: the Wide-Area Upper Tier System (Navy), the Airborne Laser (Air Force), the Space and Missile Tracking Systems (STMS - also known as Brilliant Eyes), the US-Germany-Italy Medium Extended Range Air Defense System (MEADS), and the US-Israel Arrow missile Project. These would leave three "core" programmes: the Navy's Lower-Tier System, and the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3).

The Department of Defense's Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation (BMDO) reportedly currently plans to spend around $21 billion on all these systems by 2003.

Reports: CBO says missile defense shift could save $3.5 billion, Defense Daily, 20 August; GOP Senator doubts Congress will pass Defend America Act, Defense Daily, 21 August; Pentagon has wrong missile defense priorities, Kyl says, Defense Daily, 26 August; US- Russia talks on ABM demarcation stall, Armed Forces Newswire Service, 5 September; CBO - focus on core TMD systems to save funds, BMD Monitor, 6 September; US Congress approves compromise defense bill, Reuter News Reports, 10 September.

Czech government opens door to possible NATO nuclear deployment

On 21 August, the government of the Czech Republic approved draft legislation, rendering possible the deployment of nuclear weapons in the State. The legislation, designed to expedite the process of Czech admission to NATO, would, if passed by Parliament, prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons "unless an international treaty by which the Czech Republic is bound states otherwise," according to Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus at a press conference on 21 August. NATO has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any new Member States, but is insistent on retaining its right to do so.

According to government spokesperson Vadim Petrov (21 August), "the new draft will go to Parliament as soon as possible." An earlier draft, ruling out the presence of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, was rejected by Parliamentary Committees.

Reports: Czech government approves draft nuclear bill, Reuter News Reports, 21 August; Czechs to amend nuclear ban to ease NATO entry, AP Datastream International News Wire, 22 August.

Belarus repeats calls for NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe

Speaking at the CD on 29 August, Belarus's Ambassador, Stanislau Agurtsou, called for negotiations involving NATO, the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) covering the heart of the Continent. The creation of such a zone was called for by the Belarus Parliament on 16 July (see last issue). According to Agurtsou:

"In view of the imminent withdrawal from the territory of Belarus and at the same time from the whole central part of the continent - from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea - of the last nuclear missile, this region will be practically free of all nuclear weapons for the first time in four decades... Today history presents us with an opportunity to consolidate this situation by creating an international basis for the nuclear-free regime in Central and Eastern Europe..."

The 'imminent withdrawal'of nuclear missiles from Belarus, referred to by the Ambassador, was apparently confirmed on 14 September when Alexander Barkhatov, spokesperson for Russia's 'security chief' Alexander Lebed, said that the remaining 18 SS-20 missiles would be transferred to Russia before the end of the year. The announcement followed a 13 September meeting between Lebed and his Belarussian counterpart Viktor Cheyman. In July (see last issue), Belarus announced that the transfers had been suspended over the issue of financial compensation. Reports were unforthcoming on the details of any settlement.

Reports: Belarus proposes nuclear-free zone in Eastern Europe, Agence France-Presse International News, 29 August; Lebed visits Belarus for talks on air defence, nuclear warheads, Agence France- Presse International News, 13 September; Russian nuclear missiles renew journey home, Agence France-Presse International News, 14 September.

Alleged Pakistan-China missile factory

On 25 August, The Washington Post reported that China was helping Pakistan to construct a facility for producing medium-range missiles. The Post alleged that the factory was already under construction at Rawalpindi. The report is the latest in a string of allegations, often made initially by the newspaper, concerning Chinese involvement in an apparent Pakistan nuclear weapons programme. Indeed, the story further alleged that the medium-range missiles to be produced would be based on the Chinese M-11 design.

On 27 August, Pakistan Foreign Minister Assef Ahmad Ali said that the paper had exhibited an "unlimited imagination" on the issue. He added that the entire report was "false and malicious." The same day, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Shen Guofang, called the story "totally groundless." However, State Department spokesperson Glyn Davies was not convinced, stating (27 August):

"We make our decision based on our own information gathering... The fact that China and Pakistan have made public announcements won't alter the course of events from our standpoint. We're going to continue to look into this very, very actively..."

Davies added that the US was already in the process of "looking into the general matter of transfers from China to Pakistan of missile technologies.... We've not come to any conclusions at this stage that would warrant sanctions."

Reports: US rejects denials from China, Pakistan over missile factory, Agence France-Presse International News, 26 August; Pakistan aggrieved at latest US missile report, Reuter News Reports, 27 August; Pakistan denies building missile factory with Chinese help, Agence France-Presse International News, 27 August; China blasts US weapon sale to Taiwan, Kyodo News Service, 27 August.

US-North Korea Accord: precarious progress maintained

To the increasingly dark backdrop of political and military tension, and desperate economic hardship in North Korea, progress has been maintained towards implementation of the October 1994 US- North Korea Framework Agreement on replacing North Korea's nuclear reactors. The Agreement was confirmed and finalised in a December 1995 accord between North Korea and the entity created by the US, Japan and South Korea to implement the Framework Agreement - the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The plan's main feature is the construction of two light-water reactors (LWRs) at Sinpo, a coastal town in north-eastern North Korea. As of mid- September, KEDO had conducted five inspections of the Sinpo site.

In New York on 10 September, KEDO opened its first General Conference, at its Headquarters in New York City. The Conference was attended by KEDO's 9 Member States: the founding triumvirate of the US, Japan and South Korea, plus Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, Indonesia and New Zealand. The European Union is also hoping to join. The Conference was followed (11-12 September) by meetings of the Organization's Light-Water Reactor Advisory Committee and Spent Fuel Advisory Committee.

According to KEDO's Executive Director, Stephen Bosworth, speaking to reporters on 12 September, the Conference and associated meetings approved plans to "begin physical work at the site in the next several weeks, certainly before the onset of harsh winter weather in North Korea in November and December." Some protocols still had to be concluded, Bosworth said, predicting that this would occur "in the next several days" - at which point, "we will have completed all of the necessary legal and political requirements needed for us to begin actual work." One of the few outstanding issues is the amount and kinds of compensation North Korea should receive for suspending its nuclear power programme. Bosworth revealed that the compensation package "may include food." Overall, despite his general optimism, Bosworth admitted that the implementation target-date of 2003 constituted "a very difficult timetable."

Bosworth declared that the biggest problem in the way of untroubled implementation was internal - KEDO's finances. As of the end of July, he revealed, KEDO lacked $14 million of funds required for the supply of compensatory oil - some 500,000 metric tons in all - to North Korea:

"In all candour, we continue to have acute problems in financing, particularly the acquisition of the heavy fuel oil. ... This has been in some ways the largest single source of anxiety for us in KEDO over the past several months..."

The main source of the funding crisis is a dispute between the US Administration and Congress. The Administration is requesting $25 million over the next year, but Congress initially refused to countenance a figure higher than $13 million (see last issue). On 12 September, the Director of the State Department's Office of Korean Affairs, Mark Minton, addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued the case for the full request:

"Over the past 18 months, KEDO's fundraising efforts have produced $60 million in contributions from countries other than the founding three. ... Furthermore, we are optimistic about securing, later this year, a multi-year commitment from the EU for $20 million per year in funds. ... This impressive international effort continues to be premised on strong US leadership within KEDO. That is why it is so important that the Congress fully fund our request for $25 million for KEDO's budget in FY97. I would like to thank the Senate for restoring this full amount to our budget request. With such a show of American support for its own diplomacy, others will follow and do their share."

The likely policy of an incoming Republican Administration with regard to the Framework Agreement was made clear by Presidential Candidate Robert Dole during the Republican Party Convention in San Diego in August: "We will halt Bill Clinton's efforts to appease North Korea by rewarding treaty-breaking with American taxpayer-financed oil and nuclear reactors." North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) responded indirectly but angrily to Dole's remarks on 23 August:

"Amid Presidential Election campaigning in the United States, some forces are trying to improve their image by slandering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]... This is as good as telling the DPRK to suspend the nuclear freeze promised in the Framework Agreement and do anything at will... To tell the truth, we have these days pondered whether our continued implementation of the agreement with the United States will be beneficial to us."

On 9 September, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. Hans Blix, addressing an Agency Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, reported incomplete progress with regard to the IAEA's attempts to verify the full scope of North Korea's now-suspended nuclear programme. According to Dr. Blix: "While the discussions resulted in some progress in certain areas, [North Korea] still did not accept some important technical measures... [North Korea] is not in full compliance with the safeguards agreement." Nonetheless, according to spokesperson David Kyd (9 September): "As time goes by, the chances that [North Korea] can reconstitute [its] nuclear programme are diminishing."

Reports: North Korea warns US it may ditch nuclear pact, Reuter News Reports, 23 August; North Korea stops short of full cooperation with IAEA - Chief, Agence France-Presse International News, 9 September; KEDO to review progress on reactor deal, Agence France-Presse International News, 9 September; Korean nuclear group convenes in New York, Reuter News Reports, 9 September; Officials defend nuclear trade-off with North Korea, AP Datastream Washington News Wire, 12 September; Despite budget woes, KEDO poised to start reactor construction, Agence France-Presse International News, 12 September; KEDO expects to start reactor construction work 'in weeks', Agence France-Presse International News, 12 September; North Korea reactor work to start soon under pact, Reuter News Reports, 12 September; State Department testimony on US policy toward North Korea, United States Information Agency, 12 September.

UNSCOM efforts in Iraq disrupted and caught in crossfire

The US missile strikes against Iraq, launched in early September, and the subsequent extension of the no-fly zone have greatly complicated the attempts of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq's alleged weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) programmes. According to Commission Chair Rolf Ekeus on 3 September, the military escalation and extended zone (moved from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel on 4 September) have "seriously affected our operations, especially our flying operations." All flights by UNSCOM helicopters and transport aircraft had been suspended "for the time being," Ekeus added on 4 September, as "many sites are suddenly in the no-fly area, which complicates our life."

3 September also saw the umpteenth renewal (carried out every 60 days) by the UN Security Council of its sanctions against Iraq, on the grounds of the State's continued perceived unwillingness to cooperate fully with UNSCOM in the full and final accounting for, and disablement of, its WMD stocks and capability. Of particular concern, as Ekeus told reporters in New York, was Iraq's failure to "account for [its] missile capability fully." UNSCOM fears that Iraq is concealing between 6 and 16 missiles. Further, Ekeus said he was persuaded that Iraq had produced chemical warfare agents "to an extent which is not reflected in its declarations." UNSCOM is preparing to submit a major progress report on its investigations to the UN on 11 October.

The period before the US attacks had been dominated by a wrangle between Iraq and UNSCOM over the Commission's rights of access to, and inspection of, suspected sites (see last issue) - an issue which UNSCOM hoped had been satisfied by a 22 June agreement. On 28 August, Ekeus, speaking in the Philippines, said he had at last received "important assurances" from Iraq that inspections could proceed without let or hindrance. The apparent breakthrough, Ekeus said, came in the form of a "strong undertaking from the leader of the Iraqi delegation Tariq Aziz [the Deputy Prime Minister] that they intended to faithfully and truthfully comply with the statement reached on 22 June." According to Aziz (28 August):

"We stressed to [the] UNSCOM Chairman, and we repeat with all force again, that Iraq does not hide prohibited weapons or banned weapons components or related documents." Perhaps surprisingly, Ekeus concurred with the burden of Aziz's remarks, saying: "We don't believe that Iraq is hiding things." Ekeus also predicted - rather ironically, in light of immediately subsequent events - that:

"September will be crucial. Iraq, after more than five years of work...gave us these declarations... We will now send our inspectors to verify these declarations... The findings...will be very decisive..."

As reported in the last issue, agreement seemed to have been reached on 7 August on the details of an emergency sale of Iraqi oil in order to raise $2 billion of funds for humanitarian supplies. The sale was originally agreed by the UN Security Council - under the terms of resolution 986 - on 20 May, but had been delayed by US concerns over its implementation. On 10 September, the UN admitted that arrangements had still to be finalised. According to Chinmaya Gharekan, spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali: "We are going ahead with preparations... I hope it will not take too long." Mr. Gharekan said that the Secretary-General was "mainly concerned with safety" aspects of UN observation of the deal's implementation.

On 9 September, the Director of Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), Saddam Zaban Hassan, blamed the delay on the United States, and even refused to believe there was a delay:

"We are completely ignoring [the reports]... The American decision is unilateral. We have not received any notification from the United Nations. As far as we're concerned resolution 986 still applies. ... Once we reach agreement on a price structure, we can inform buyers and draw up contracts."

Report: UN chief arms inspector travels to Iraq for meetings, AP Datastream International News Wire, 26 August; UN-Iraq pursue arms talks, Iraqi media slams Ekeus, Reuter News Reports, 27 August; Iraq again pledges free access for UN arms teams, Reuter News Reports, 28 August; UN weapons experts to visit Iraq next month, Agence France-Presse International News, 28 August; UN to test Iraq's pledge before October report, Reuter News Report, 28 August; UN arms inspectors 'seriously affected' by Iraq events, Agence France-Presse International News, 3 September; UN says Iraq concealing clandestine weapons, Reuter News Reports, 3 September; UN suspends searches for concealed weaponry in Iraq, Agence France- Presse International News, 4 September; Iraq not informed of 'oil- for-food' agreement, Agence France-Presse International News, 9 September; No date set in oil-for-food deal, Agence France-Presse International News, 10 September.

CWC gloom as US Senate delays ratification decision

Summary

On 12 September, the US Senate postponed a decision, scheduled for 14 or 15 September, on ratifying the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The withdrawal decision was taken by Senate Majority (Republican) Leader Trent Lott and Minority (Democrat) Leader Thomas Daschle. A spokesperson for Daschle said on 12 September: "We are hopeful that further talk will lead to some resolution" of issues of dispute between advocates and opponents of the Treaty, and the subsequent re-submission of the ratification resolution. It is generally considered extremely unlikely that such a re-submission will take place this year.

The postponement had apparently been sought by the Clinton Administration, worried that ratification might be voted down. According to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on 12 September: "We decided it was better to step back and let things calm down and restore this to its proper setting, which is not part of a Presidential campaign..." An unnamed White Official was quoted the same day as saying: We want to reintroduce it when we are assured that we have support."

Holum was referring specifically to a 11 September letter from Republic Presidential Candidate Robert Dole - who has previously expressed his satisfaction with the Conventions' provisions - to Senator Lott, suggesting that the CWC was not "effectively verifiable and genuinely global." An amendment to the scheduled ratification, seeking to reflect Dole's concerns, was then tabled by Senator Jon Kyl (Arizona). The amendment would have postponed US ratification until Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria had all joined. Furthermore, the CIA would have to certify to Congress that CWC compliance could be "monitored with high confidence." For Kyl, the issue was simple:

"Do you want a treaty that doesn't cover the important countries and can't be verified?"

The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification. On 6 September, India became the 62nd State to complete its ratification. In a statement, the CWC's Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague enthused:

"India possesses a significant chemical industry and its ratification is of special significance in the context of the entry into force of the Convention... Just three more ratification are now required for ensuring the entry into force of the Convention in early 1997..."

Such enthusiasm was doubtless dispelled by the 12 September announcement from the Senate, which evidently harms the prospects of Russian ratification (reportedly scheduled for October) and thus opens the prospect of the Convention either remaining uninaugurated or entering into force with neither of two chemical weapons Superpowers - with an estimated 70,000 tons of chemical weapons agents between them - as States Parties.

Reaction

The postponement came as a major disappointment to the Administration. On 11 September, President Clinton had urgently enjoined the Senate "to go on and ratify this", arguing that: "It will enable us to reduce the availability of chemical weapons for terrorists, for countries that would promote chemical weapons and use them in an inhumane way." Upon hearing of the postponement, campaigning in Rancho Cucamonga, California, Clinton told supporters:

"Bitter partisan debate has broken out in the last few days and has threatened to derail this treaty. ... I want you to be protected against the dangers of poison gas insofar as we can humanly do it, and I ask you to join with me in asking the Senate to resolve the remaining questions, put partisanship aside and put America on the side of a safer world, without poison gas being exposed to our citizens, or our soldiers."

On 14 September, Clinton reflected: "The treaty seems to have gotten caught up in election-year politiking. I want the American people to know that I will work with the Senate to pass the Chemical Weapons Convention when a calmer political climate prevails. ... [The Senate has] missed an historic opportunity to make our soldiers and citizens safer..."

Senator Lott maintained that the Republicans had been raising grave and legitimate concerns, which he summarised as: "those who are the real threat don't participate, deny that they're involved, or we're not in a position to verify exactly what they're doing."

Another prominent foe of the Treaty, Senator Jesse Helms, had strongly argued in the build-up to the postponement that the Treaty regime would penalise the US chemical industry. This claim, however, is strongly refuted by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), whose spokesperson Mike Wells expressed an opposite concern on 12 September:

"We have continuously expressed our concerns over the potential trade effects if the US doesn't ratify the treaty. We are deeply disappointed by today's action..."

Former Republican Secretary of State James Baker, who was closely involved with the completion of negotiations during the Bush Administration, also expressed disappointment. Addressing the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 September, Baker stated: "we don't need chemical weapons, in my view. And I don't believe we need chemical weapons to restrain aberrant behaviour by rogue States in the area of chemical weaponry. ... [The Senate's failure to ratify will] make it a lot easier for those nations that don't want to ratify it and that do want to develop...chemical weapons capabilities."

Another prominent Republican, Senator Richard Lugar, spent the build-up to the expected vote seeking to persuade colleagues of the merits of verification. In a letter to seven Senators, Lugar argued that "the Chemical Weapons Convention offers us an important tool to help reduce the threat posed by chemical terrorism and warfare."

Editor's note: On 21 August, it was reported that a Committee of the Arab League, charged with considering non-proliferation developments in the Middle East, recommended that League Member States should hold back from signing the CWC until Israel accedes to the NPT. The Committee - formed in March 1996 and reportedly composed of experts from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the League's Military Department and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency (AAEA) - was said to have submitted its recommendation to a full meeting of the League scheduled for 14 September in Cairo.

Reports: Chemical weapons ban near as India ratifies pact, Reuter News Reports, 6 September; Clinton asks Senate to pass chemical weapons treaty, Reuter News Reports, 7 September; No chemical treaty till Israel joins NPT, APS Diplomat, 9 September; Lott expresses reservations about chemical weapons treaty, AP Datastream Washington News Wire, 10 September; Landmark chemical weapons pact heads for vote before US Senate, Agence France-Presse International News, 11 September; Senate delays treaty vote until '97 because of political storm, AP Datastream Washington News Wire, 12 September; US Senate postpones ratification of chemical weapons treaty, Agence France-Presse International News, 12 September; Chemical weapons pact postponed in US Senate, Reuter News Reports, 12 September; Clinton urges early passage of chemical weapons treaty, United States Information Agency, 1 September; Chemical weapons treaty vote put off, Inter Press Service International News, 13 September; No vote on chemical weapons treaty until after November elections, AP Datastream Washington News Wire, 13 September; Clinton vows to push chemical weapons treaty through Senate, Agence France-Presse International News, 14 September.

Russia emerges as world's top arms dealer

Russia was the world's top seller of arms in 1995, according to a report by the US Congressional Research Service released on 20 August. Russia's share of the market during the year was 31.6%, netting it $9.1 billion. The US ranked second, with its 28.6% market-share yielding $8.2 billion. Russia's advantage over the US was reportedly secured in part through a $1 billion sale of 24 Su- 27 fighter aircraft to China.

Trailing in a distant third was France, with $2.7 billion of sales, followed by Germany ($2 billion), and Italy and the United Kingdom ($1 billion). In total, $28.8 billion of arms sales were recorded for the year, down some $4 billion on the previous year.

Reports: Russia top weapons seller to developing nations in '95, Kyodo News Service, 21 August; Russia was top 1995 arms supplier, Arms Trade News, August/September.

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